Posts by Cassius

Yes that is exactly what would need to be analyzed in order to determine how much of the final result came about through Epicurean thinking, and how much was diluted/mutated by Christian or other ideas.

I am not aware that copies of the initial draft survive, but as we proceed with this thread if anyone has more detail on who added what, and when, that would be great to link here.

"some commentators of Philodemus have argued that this natural measure is based on what is natural and necessary."

Part of my thinking in asking these questions is to lay the foundation at the most basic level possible. WHY should using a "natural and necessary" standard be the right answer?

You ended with "..... if one wants self-sufficiency."

WHY should one want self-sufficiency? Shouldn't we depend on God? Shouldn't we depend on our government, or our society, or our friends?

In a short presentation it's not possible to go into all these issues in detail, but I think it IS possible to point to where the answers are found, in Epicurean physics (infinite, eternal, no supernatural gods), and in Epicurean canonics (reliance upon senses/anticipations/pleasure-pain as the only contact with reality, rather than abstract speculation).

In other words, even in a short presentation it should be possible to point out that Epicurean ethics are not arbitrary, but derive straight from the more fundamental presumptions about the nature of the universe and the nature of man.

Facebook invitation posted here: https://www.facebook.com/events/1703931639652972/

Let's go ahead and pull the trigger and set this for 6 pm EST on Saturday. I'll sign on and be there no matter what. If we have enough people to proceed we'll do so, and if not we'll just chat about plans for moving forward. I am thinking 6 pm EST is consistent with Brett's 3-5 pm (given time zone issues) but if that doesn't work let's adjust the time to fit the most people. We probably won't have a large number this time, so we can work to accommodate those who can attend.

Here are some initial thoughts on questions that might go through minds in the audience listening to this presentation. Are there ways to head off these questions or point the way to the answer in a short talk such as this?

1. All this sounds fine, but why should I accept Epicurus' opinion that a simple life is all I should want out of life? Aren't there more important things than pleasure and pain? Shouldn't I live so that I will go to heaven, and not go to hell? Those things are more important than pleasure and pain aren't they?"
2. Haven't we always been taught that nothing good comes easily? Why should the best part of life be easy to obtain? I see people around me suffering and dying in misery and pain all the time. They didn't find a happy life easy to obtain. Doesn't that show that Epicurus was wrong?
3. I seem to hear you saying that avoidance of pain is the highest goal. Are you really saying that? If so, why shouldn't I avoid all pain by killing myself?
4. Ok, we won't go to extremes like killing ourselves, After all, moderation in all things, right? But I hear you saying that the simplest life is the best. If I really want the best life, shouldn't I go ONLY for bread, water, and a cave to get out of the weather? That would be the purest application of Epicurus, wouldn't it?
5. Did I hear you say that we should never want power? I live in a pretty bad neighborhood, and the people in the country next door are talking about invading our country. Right about now I would really like the power to put the criminals in jail and the power to stop the invaders before they burn my house. How can that be wrong - but you said I should NEVER seek power?
6. OK now I hear you saying that "static" pleasure is the best kind of pleasure, and that comes from absence of pain and not from the senses. But then you've also said that static pleasure "feels good." Are you trying to have it both ways? If the best kind of pleasure feels good, then I understand what you mean? But what kind of pleasure is worth having that I can't feel?
7. You say that your version of the pleasurable life can be satisfied, but that people who chase sensual pleasure can never satisfy their quest. Well tell me, then, how much time do I need to satisfy your definition of a pleasurable life? Can I take enough pain pills til I feel no pain, lie down in my bed, and stay there til I stop breathing from an overdose? If I've reached that state of total painlessness, there really isn't anything more for me in Epicurean theory is there? Why should I be concerned if I die tonight from an overdose? I won't feel any pain at all, and I'll feel "high" on the way there, so isn't that what you are telling me is the best way of life?
8. I have heard that Epicurus also said "There is also a limit in simple living, and he who fails to understand this falls into an error as great as that of the man who gives way to extravagance. (VS 63)" How do you reconcile that statement with the view that the simplest life is the best life?

[Reminder - no criticism of the original presentation is expressed or implied! This is purely an exercise to consider how we might ourselves present Epicurean ideas to our friends or to small audiences - and at the same time the exercise will help us consider our own understanding of the philosophy!!]

Here is a summary of the presentation, prepared by me for discussion purposes.

Summary of A Presentation By Elena Nicoli

1. In recent times her motivation and enthusiasm were drained because her objectives seemed difficult or impossible to achieve.
2. People were making all sorts of suggestions as to what she should pursue, but she wasn't sure about any of them.
3. She asked herself: Must everything that is worth pursuing be so difficult?
4. The answer she found was in the research in front of her - in her study of Lucretius and Epicurean philosophy.
5. Epicurus was an ancient Greek philosophy who taught a form of what is called "hedonism"
6. Epicurus taught that the one thing toward which our actions should be directed is "pleasure."
7. But if she accepts this, should she not be at a party or drinking instead of giving this lecture?
8. The answer is "no," because Epicurus' definition of pleasure is not what we generally understand it to be.
9. Epicurus did not suggest that we live a life of partying. In fact, he suggested living a modest life in the countryside, and living it simply, with bread and cheese, and not a dissolute lifestyle.
10. Epicurus said we should consider our actions from three perspectives:
    1. Are they natural and necessary? These are things we must have such as food and shelter.
    2. Are they natural but not necessary? These are things like sexual intercourse and fine foods. We should indulge these only occasionally.
    3. Are they neither natural nor necessary?
       1. These are things like wealth, power, and fame.
       2. We should never pursue these because the pleasure we derive from them is not genuine pleasure.
       3. These feel pleasurable but they do so because society tells us that they are pleasurable.
       4. Also, we can never get enough of these pleasures, and if we pursue them we will never feel satisfied and this will bring anxiety. No matter what we achieve we will always need more - but it never works like that - we get accustomed to new levels and we always want more.
    4. What we really need to be happy is simple - food drink, shelter, small amount of money to live decently, and good friends.
    5. We can reassure ourselves that these we can easily get at any time, and these are all we really need to be happy.
11. What did Epicurus really teach?
    
    1. According to Epicurus highest form of pleasure is static pleasure - to be free from mental and physical pain. Epicurus was criticized for this because seems to some like being being asleep.
    2. But this criticism is not fair because Epicurus did not intend that we seek ONLY the removal of pain, this is a state in which not only is pain absent, but it is a state of relaxed freshness that feels good.
    3. In addition, Epicurus also held there are kinetic pleasures -pleasures in motion - such as friends, massages, walking on sunny day, and these are included in our goals.
    4. So Epicurus taught the pursuit of pleasure, not overindulgence.
12. To apply these ideas to everyday life:
    
    1. This is a model for inspiration for every day, not an end goal to reach before we can consider ourselves as satisfied.
    2. What does it mean to live according to Epicurus?
       
       1. It means to realize that even the absence of pain is a pleasure. This is difficult to accept because we think of pleasure as pleasing to the senses, but looking at it that way is unsatisfiable and increasingly difficult to get.
       2. So what we should try to do is to identify happiness in our minds as a state of no physical pain and no mental concerns.
       3. But we can also embellish this state with pleasures in motion - friends, good food, and walking on sunny day - because pain is not present in these.
    3. As another practical example: Before saying yes to any job or task, ask yourself: "Is this what I myself want, or am I doing this to please society? Will this choice really make my life more pleasurable, or will it bring more pain than pleasure?
13. In sum:
    
    1. The things that really matter don't have to be so hard. PD21: "He who understands the limits of life knows that it is easy to obtain that which removes the pain of want and makes the whole of life complete and perfect. Thus he has no longer any need of things which involve struggle."
    2. Therefore embracing hedonism and Epicurus could be the best thing we can do for ourselves.

I urge everyone in this group to watch Elena Nicoli's excellent presentation on Epicurean pleasure, which the Dutch Research School of Philosophy has humorously mis-titled as "Atoms in the Rennaisance." As quickly as I can I am going to prepare an outline of the major points of her talk and attach that to this thread for discussion and reference in the future. I think you will find that this talk is easy to follow, very clearly presented, and does a very good job of presenting the "standard" interpretation of Epicurean ethical theory on pleasure. In my view Ms. Nicoli avoids the worst of the conclusions of the standard theory. Even though she presumes the validity of the kinetic / katastematic distinction that is disputed by Nikolsky, Wenham, and Gosling & Taylor (as detailed in our files section), she emphasizes the critical point: that Epicurus embraced "BOTH" of the two categories in dispute. As a result, she gives no hint of believing that life would best be spent living in a cave living a life of subsistence with only bread and water.

Just as with the presentation Ms. Nicoli recently posted to her Academia page ("Reassessing Nussbaum's Interpretation of Epicurean Therapy" ) it's clear that she is willing to challenge the orthodox criticism's of Epicurean philosophy. That presentation defends Epicurus against Nussbaum's charges that Epicurean philosophy is "not real philosophy" and that Epicurus "numbs the intellect and critical thinking." Those points alone would merit a major award from Lucian for "striking a blow for Epicurus!"

I urge everyone in the group to view this video as an example of how to present Epicurean philosophy to those who know very little about it, and then take a look at her Academia page and review her excellent writing on Epicurus.

Thanks again to Ms. Nicoli for posting this to the Epicurean Facebook group!

This question is prompted by this passage from Cicero's "On Duties." Would Epicurus agree with Cato?

One day Cato was asked, what is the most profitable aspect of property ownership?

Cato answered, "Raising livestock with great success."

He was then asked about the second most profitable aspect of ownership.

"Raising livestock with some success," he answered.

And what about the third most profitable aspect?

"Raising livestock with little success."

And the fourth? "Raising crops."

Then his questioner asked, "What about money-lending?"

Cato replied, "What about murder?"

Here is a passage from Cicero's "On Duties" that I have always found fascinating, and I think it is interesting to consider whether Epicurus would agree with this analysis, which concludes: "To conclude, then, it is never expedient to do wrong, because wrong is always immoral; and it is always expedient to be good, because goodness is always moral." I suspect the analysis is open to many concerns from an Epicurean perspective, but I wonder if the same result in the specific examples given might be reached even under Epicurean analysis:

Cicero's On Duties -

"Let it be set down as an established principle, then, that what is morally wrong can never be expedient — not even when one secures by means of it that which one thinks expedient; for the mere act of thinking a course expedient, when it is morally {50} wrong, is demoralizing. But, as I said above, cases often arise in which expediency may seem to clash with moral rectitude; and so we should examine carefully and see whether their conflict is inevitable or whether they may be reconciled. The following are problems of this sort: suppose, for example, a time of dearth and famine at Rhodes, with provisions at fabulous prices; and suppose that an honest man has imported a large cargo of grain from Alexandria and that to his certain knowledge also several other importers have set sail from Alexandria, and that on the voyage he has sighted their vessels laden with grain and bound for Rhodes; is he to report the fact to the Rhodians or is he to keep his own counsel and sell his own stock at the highest market price? I am assuming the case of a virtuous, upright man, and I am raising the question how a man would think and reason who would not conceal the facts from the Rhodians if he thought that it was immoral to do so, but who might be in doubt whether such silence would really be immoral.

{51} In deciding cases of this kind Diogenes of Babylonia, a great and highly esteemed Stoic, consistently holds one view; his pupil Antipater, a most profound scholar, holds another. According to Antipater all the facts should be disclosed, that the buyer may not be uninformed of any detail that the seller knows; according to Diogenes the seller should declare any defects in his wares, in so far as such a course is prescribed by the common law of the land; but for the rest, since he has goods to sell, he may try to sell them to the best possible advantage, provided he is guilty of no misrepresentation.

"I have imported my stock," Diogenes's merchant will say; "I have offered it for sale; I sell at a price no higher than my competitors — perhaps even lower, when the market is overstocked. Who is wronged?"

??{52}"What say you?" comes Antipater's argument on the other side; "it is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve society; you were brought into the world under these conditions and have these inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow, that your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well; will you, in view of all these facts, conceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies is close at hand for them?"

"It is one thing to conceal," Diogenes will perhaps reply; not to reveal is quite a different thing. At this present moment I am not concealing from you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of gods or the highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more advantage to you than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your interest to be told."

{53} "Yea," Antipater will say, "but you are, as you must admit, if you will only bethink you of the bonds of fellowship forged by Nature and existing between man and man."

"I do not forget them," the other will reply: but do you mean to say that those bonds of fellowship are such that there is no such thing as private property? If that is the case, we should not sell anything at all, but freely give everything away."

XIII.

In this whole discussion, you see, no one says, "However wrong morally this or that may be, still, since it is expedient, I will do it"; but the one side asserts that a given act is expedient, without being morally wrong, while the other insists that the act should not be done, because it is morally wrong. {54} Suppose again that an honest man is offering a house for sale on account of certain undesirable features of which he himself is aware but which nobody else knows; suppose it is unsanitary, but has the reputation of being healthful; suppose it is not generally known that vermin are to be found in all the bedrooms; suppose, finally, that it is built of unsound timber and likely to collapse, but that no one knows about it except the owner; if the vendor does not tell the purchaser these facts but sells him the house for far more than he could reasonably have expected to get for it, I ask whether his transaction is unjust or dishonourable.

{55} "Yes," says Antipater, "it is; for to allow a purchaser to be hasty in closing a deal and through mistak ?? worse than refusing to set a man on his way: It is deliberately leading a man astray."

"Can you say," answers Diogenes, "that he compelled you to purchase, when he did not even advise it? He advertised for sale what he did not like; you bought what you did like. If people are not considered guilty of swindling when they place upon their placards FOR SALE: A FINE VILLA, WELL BUILT, even when it is neither good nor properly built, still less guilty are they who say nothing in praise of their house. For there the purchaser may exercise his own judgment, what fraud can there be on the part of the vendor? But if, again, not all that is expressly stated has to be made good, do you think a man is bound to make good what has not been said? What, pray, would be more stupid than for a vendor to recount all the faults in the article he is offering for sale? And what would be so absurd as for an auctioneer to cry, at the owner's bidding, 'Here is an unsanitary house for sale'?"

{56} In this way, then, in certain doubtful cases moral rectitude is defended on the one side, while on the other side the case of expediency is so presented as to make it appear not only morally right to do what seems expedient, but even morally wrong not to do it. This is the contradiction that seems often to arise between the expedient and the morally right. But I must give my decision in these two cases; for I did not propound them merely to raise the questions, {57}but to offer a solution. I think, then, that it was the duty of that grain-dealer not to keep back the facts from the Rhodians, and of this vendor of the house to deal in the same way with his purchaser. The fact is that merely holding one's peace about a thing does not constitute concealment, but concealment consists in trying for your own profit to keep others from finding out something that you know, when it is for their interest to know it. And who fails to discern what manner of concealment that is and what sort of person would be guilty of it? At all events he would be no candid or sincere or straightforward or upright or honest man, but rather one who is shifty, sly, artful, shrewd, underhand, cunning, one grown old in fraud and subtlety. Is it not inexpedient to subject oneself to all these terms of reproach and many more besides?

{58} XIV.

If, then, they are to be blamed who suppress the truth, what are we to think of those who actually state what is false? Gaius Canius, a Roman knight, a man of considerable wit and literary culture, once went to Syracuse for a vacation, as he himself used to say, and not for business. He gave out that he had a mind to purchase a little country seat, where he could invite his friends and enjoy himself, uninterrupted by troublesome visitors. When this fact was spread abroad, one Pythius, a banker of Syracuse, informed him that he had such an estate; that it was not for sale, however, but Canius might make himself at home there, if he pleased; and at the same time he invited him to the estate to dinner next day. Canius accepted. Then Pythius, who, as might be expected of a moneylender, could command favours of all classes, called the fishermen together and asked them to do their fishing the next day out in front of his villa, and told them what he wished them to do. Canius came to dinner at fleet of boats before their eyes; each fisherman brought in in turn the catch that he had made; and the fishes were deposited at the feet of Pythius.

{59} "Pray, Pythius," said Canius thereupon, "what does this mean? — all these fish? — all these boats?"

"No wonder," answered Pythius; "this is where all the fish in Syracuse are; here is where the fresh water comes from; the fishermen cannot get along without this estate."

Inflamed with desire for it, Canius insisted upon Pythius's selling it to him. At first he demurred. To make a long story short, Canius gained his point. The man was rich, and, in his desire to own the country seat, he paid for it all that Pythius asked; and he bought the entire equipment, too. Pythius entered the amount upon his ledger and completed the transfer. The next day Canius invited his friends; he came early himself. Not so much as a thole — pin was in sight. He asked his next-door neighbour whether it was a fishermen's holiday, for not a sign of them did he see.

"Not so far as I know," said he; "but none are in the habit of fishing here. And so I could not make out what was the matter yesterday."

{60} Canius was furious; but what could he do? For not yet had my colleague and friend, Gaius Aquilius, introduced the establshed form to apply to criminal fraud. When asked what he meant by "criminal fraud," as specified in these forms, he could reply: "Pretending one thing and practising another" — a very felicitous definition, as one might expect from an expert in making them. Pythius, therefore, and all others who do one thing while they pretend another are faithless, dishonest, and unprincipled scoundrels. No act of theirs can be expedient, when what they do is tainted with so many vices.

{61} XV.

But if Aquilius's definition is correct, pretence and concealment should be done away with in all departments of our daily life. Then an honest man will not be guilty of either pretence or concealment in order to buy or to sell to better advantage. Besides, your "criminal fraud" had previously been prohibited by the statutes: the penalty in the matter of trusteeships, for example, is fixed by the Twelve Tables; for the defrauding of minors, by the Praetorian law. The same prohibition is effective, without statutory enactment, in equity cases, in which it is added that the decision shall be "as good_faith requires."/a In all other cases in equity, moreover, the following phrases are most noteworthy: in a case calling for arbitration in the matter of a wife's dowry: what is "the fairer is the better"; in a suit for the restoration of a trust: "honest dealing, as between honest parties." Pray, then, can there be any element of fraud in what is adjusted for the "better and fairer"? Or can anything fraudulent or unprincipled be done, when "honest dealing between honest parties" is stipulated? ??{62} But "criminal fraud," as Aquilius says, consists in false pretence. We must, therefore, keep misrepresentation entirely out of business transactions: the seller will not engage a bogus bidder to run prices up nor the buyer one to bid low against himself to keep them down; and each, if they come to naming a price, will state once for all what he will give or take. Why, when Quintus Scaevola, the son of Publius Scaevola, asked that the price of a farm that he desired to purchase be definitely named and the vendor named it, he replied that he considered it worth more, and paid him 100,000 sesterces over and above what he asked. No one could say that this was not the act of an honest man; but people do say that it was not the act of a worldly-wise man, any more than if he had sold for a smaller amount than he could have commanded. Here, then, is that mischievous idea — the world accounting some men upright, others wise; and it is this fact that gives Ennius occasion to say:

In vain is the wise man wise, who cannot benefit himself.

And Ennius is quite right, if only he and I were agreed upon the meaning of "benefit."

{63} Now I observe that Hecaton of Rhodes, a pupil of Panaetius, says in his books on "Moral Duty" dedicated to Quintus Tubero that "it is a wise man's duty to take care of his private interests, at the same time doing nothing contrary to the civil customs, laws, and institutions. But that depends on our purpose in seeking prosperity; for we do not aim to be rich for ourselves alone but for our children, relatives, friends, and, above all, for our country. For the private fortunes of individuals are the wealth of the state." Hecaton could not for a moment approve of Scaevola's act, which I cited a moment ago; for he openly avows that he will abstain from doing for his own profit only what the law expressly forbids. Such a man de ??{64}??{65} not enter, or, if he only is a good man who helps all he can, and harms no one, it will certainly be no easy matter for us to find the good man as thus defined. To conclude, then, it is never expedient to do wrong, because wrong is always immoral; and it is always expedient to be good, because goodness is always moral."

Not knowing when I will be able to get back to this topic, I will state this further. Most of the criticisms I see to "Death is nothing to us" center on the supposed view of Epicurus that it does not matter how long we live. I consider that contention absurd, and do not believe that Epicurus or Lucretius made it. The essential point of this doctrine in Epicurean philosophy is that there is no afterlife in which to suffer punishment. Period - full stop. To contend that it is of no difference to the living whether die in lingering pain, or quickly, or whether we live for another hour or another hundred years is absurd on its face. There is nothing in the texts that compels the conclusion that Epicurus advised his students to accept such an opinion and such conclusions arise only from cramped and hostile interpretations of Epicurean philosophy..

Such an argument is the best I can deduce from the opening abstract quoted below. Maybe indeed there are "modern Epicureans" who contend such a thing, but I certainly would not. Again, if anyone wants to wade through the jargon and post further on this article, please do.

"Perhaps death’s badness is an illusion. Epicureans think so and argue that agents cannot be harmed by death when they're alive (because death hasn’t happened yet) nor when they're dead (because they do not exist by the time death comes). I argue that each version of Epicureanism faces a fatal dilemma: it is either committed to a demonstrably false view about the relationship between self-regarding reasons and well- being or it is involved in a merely verbal dispute with deprivationism. I first provide principled reason to think that any viable view about the badness of death must allow that agents have self-regarding reason to avoid (or seek) death if doing so would increase their total well-being. I then show that Epicurean views which do not preserve this link are subject to reductio arguments and so should be rejected. After that, I show that the Epicurean views which accommodate this desideratum are involved in a merely verbal dispute with deprivationism."

The article at this link was posted to the facebook group, it is entitled "A Delimma For Epicureanism" by Travis Timmerman.

Here is the response I wrote to the initial post. As per my comment on Facebook, if someone can get something worthwhile to discuss out of this, please post further in clear terms so we won't all waste our times. At this point I consider the article a waste, but I will be happy to be educated otherwise. Here is my response to the post:

I trust Hiram that you do not think this is an *effective* refutation? I am going to edit this response as I read through the article.

(1) My first comment after reading the first few pages is that this kind of dialectical hairsplitting and is why philosophy has a bad name, and why Epicurus said that it is of no use if it does not help us toward living more happily.

(2) This is all I need to read: " I do not discuss ancient Epicureans, such as Lucretius or Epicurus, since historical interpretations of their work are contentious and because I do not need to take a stand on the correct interpretation of their positions for the purposes of my argument."

I am not going to waste my time reading through dialectical word games splitting hairs with "modern Epicureans." If someone reads through this gibberish and can articulate that there are worthwhile points to be addressed, please do so without resort to "ED" "PL" "DD" and similar verbal gamesmanship, and we will all profit from the exercise. As written, I believe this article to be a waste of time for the members of our group.

However, I can see this article has one redeeming benefit: it shows how worthless much of modern scholarship on something as important as the Epicurean view of death has become. If you are a new student of Epicurus go straight to DeWitt and get a grounding in what Epicurus is all about before you waste your time with something like this.

Remember this from an Epicurean rant from Seneca:

"And on this point, my excellent Lucilius, I should like to have those subtle dialecticians of yours advise me how I ought to help a friend, or how a fellowman, rather than tell me in how many ways the word “friend” is used, and how many meanings the word “man” possesses. Lo, Wisdom and Folly are taking opposite sides. Which shall I join? Which party would you have me follow? On that side, “man” is the equivalent of “friend”; on the other side, “friend” is not the equivalent of “man.” The one wants a friend for his own advantage; the other wants to make himself an advantage to his friend. What you have to offer me is nothing but distortion of words and splitting of syllables. It is clear that unless I can devise some very tricky premises and by false deductions tack on to them a fallacy which springs from the truth, I shall not be able to distinguish between what is desirable and what is to be avoided! I am ashamed! Old men as we are, dealing with a problem so serious, we make play of it! ‘Mouse’ is a syllable. Now a mouse eats its cheese; therefore, a syllable eats cheese.”

Suppose now that I cannot solve this problem; see what peril hangs over my head as a result of such ignorance! What a scrape I shall be in! Without doubt I must beware, or some day I shall be catching syllables in a mousetrap, or, if I grow careless, a book may devour my cheese! Unless, perhaps, the following syllogism is shrewder still: “‘Mouse’ is a syllable. Now a syllable does not eat cheese. Therefore a mouse does not eat cheese.” What childish nonsense! Do we knit our brows over this sort of problem? Do we let our beards grow long for this reason? Is this the matter which we teach with sour and pale faces?

Would you really know what philosophy offers to humanity? Philosophy offers counsel. Death calls away one man, and poverty chafes another; a third is worried either by his neighbor’s wealth or by his own. So-and-so is afraid of bad luck; another desires to get away from his own good fortune. Some are ill-treated by men, others by the gods. Why, then, do you frame for me such games as these? It is no occasion for jest; you are retained as counsel for unhappy men, sick and the needy, and those whose heads are under the poised axe. Whither are you straying? What are you doing? This friend, in whose company you are jesting, is in fear. Help him, and take the noose from about his neck. Men are stretching out imploring hands to you on all sides; lives ruined and in danger of ruin are begging for some assistance; men’s hopes, men’s resources, depend upon you. They ask that you deliver them from all their restlessness, that you reveal to them, scattered and wandering as they are, the clear light of truth. Tell them what nature has made necessary, and what superfluous; tell them how simple are the laws that she has laid down, how pleasant and unimpeded life is for those who follow these laws, but how bitter and perplexed it is for those who have put their trust in opinion rather than in nature."

Given what appears to be the declining importance of Facebook, I have put back up the Google Adwords advertisement that I experimented with earlier. I think even a brief introductory podcast made from one of our sessions would be helpful for getting the word out on a place for positive discussions of Epicurus. (I say "positive discussions" because I can frankly do without those who want to asset that"absence of pain" divorced from pleasure is the full meaning of life). More material in which we highlight the other aspects of Epicurean philosophy (aspects which combine to make that interpretation absurd) are probably the best way forward.

I especially think that single page graphical memes which can be circulated on Twitter and similar places are probably a good place to start.

Isn't it probably safe to say that the main goal of this forum is to bring us into contact with more people who have the same general approach to life that we have? If so, lots of discussion should always center around how we go about expressing the core principles in easy-to-grasp form.

Yes. Elli is out for now, and I feel like Ilkka is really stressed to make it, and Martin is traveling, so we should probably now focus on a time that works for the Western Hemisphere. Of course that would then primarily mean you, me, Eric, Julie, and Jason (if he is available). However it might not be a bad thing for us to work together more closely, and perhaps record one of these sessions to make into a podcast.

This is to pose a series of questions about one of the most famous passages of the American "Declaration of Independence." As discussion develops on one or more of these in particular we can split the discussion into separate threads, but to start here is a list of questions:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. "

1. What do we know about whether this paragraph was written entirely by Thomas Jefferson, or contains modifications from others?
2. Would an Epicurean agree that what follows in the paragraph after the first phrase are "self-evident?" What does "self-evident" mean?
3. Would an Epicurean agree that "all men are created equal." It is absolutely clear that all men are NOT created equal in every respect (health, sex, race, capabilities, preferences, etc.) It is also clear to an Epicurean that men are not "created" if that term implies a supernatural god. In what respect, if any, would an Epicurean say that "all men are created equal."
4. What does it mean to say "endowed by their Creator?" Would an Epicurean use this phrasing? If so, what would an Epicurean mean by "their Creator?"
5. What are "inalienable rights"? What is a "right"? How is a right "inalienable"?" It seems clear that this cannot be read superficially, as much of what we think of as "rights" are certainly taken from people all the time and thus are not "inalienable." In what way, if any, can this phrase be reconciled with Epicurean philosophy?
6. What does the phrase "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" mean in Epicurean terms?
7. "That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." This passage is perhaps easiest to reconcile given the Principle Doctrines on "justice." How could we elaborate on this in Epicurean terms as to the meaning of "just powers" and "consent of the governed?"
8. "That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. " Again, this passage seems directly supported by the Principle Doctrines on justice. How would an Epicurean elaborate on the meaning of this passage?

I'm revising a thread originally started in 2018 to serve as a focal point for finding Jefferson's Epicurean-related writing. At the moment, the best collection of Epicurean-related fragments that I've put together in the past is located here:

Jefferson – NewEpicurean

Unfortunately that's not particularly well formatted, so I will work on improving that and adding it here at the forum.

Also, I'd like us to use this as a thread to assist in research and discussion of what we can reconstruct about Thomas Jefferson's interest in and development of Epicurean ideas. What can we reconstruct as a timetable as to when Jefferson first began to become familiar with Epicurean ideas, leading up to his 1819 letter to William Short where he wrote "I too am an Epicurean?" Jefferson died in 1826, so the 1819 letter was near the end of his life.

Looks like at this point we better plan for April 21st. I'll put up a notice at the top of the EF page, and also post to Facebook in a couple of days. The "announcement" at the top of the page has now been added, and I will add a Facebook notice next week. In the meantime let me say this: We can make a pragmatic judgment call on how many people we need to indicate that they will attend before we schedule, and if we need to do so we'll postpone til we have more. But if we do, it will be just that - a postponement - because while we may be delayed, we will persevere until we have the numbers to go forward!

More on Elena Nicoli, someone definitely worth following! https://radboud.academia.edu/ElenaNicoli

Based on her public posts on her facebook page, she is VERY active in Epicurean scholarship - https://www.facebook.com/elena.nicoli2

CV listing her articles: https://portal.ru.nl/people/cv/665145.pdf

This is a thread to discuss the presentation material posted by Jason Baker entitled "The Pleasure of Knowledge: Reassessing Nussbaum’s Interpretation of Epicurean Therapy" by Dr. Elena Nicoli, Radboud University, subtitled "A Contested Influence. Hellenistic Philosophy and Modern Thought from Nietzsche to Nussbaum." This is not the full lecture, but summarizes the main points with some excellent citations to Epicurean literature.

The original post is here:

File

The Pleasure of Knowledge. Reassessing Nussbaum's Interpretation of Epicurean Therapy - Elena Nicoli

A Contested Influence. Hellenistic Philosophy and Modern Thought from Nietzsche to Nussbaum

jbaker

April 11, 2018 at 8:30 PM

All of us get discouraged at times, but we shouldn't be tempted to think that we need a fraudulent Jewish ghost or a mindless Christian ethical system. We are fighting for the people and the things that we love in life, and that is more than enough reason to fight. All the evidence our heart needs come from the pleasure we feel in that which we love, and the pain that we feel in losing it. And all the evidence our mind needs starts with the fundamental Epicurean observation we make with our own eyes: that nothing comes from nothing, and nothing goes to nothing.

Welcome Matthaios! When you get a chance please introduce yourself and let is know about your background in Epicurus.