Posts by Cassius

As I am working through transcribing the 1743 edition of Lucretius, I am also working on a table of topics under which to organize the references. I think most all of Lucretius can be summarized under one of the headings below, but there are innumerable ways to summarize. Here is my current highest-level list - I will constantly fine-tune so I would be interested in any comments:

Physics: The universe is Natural. As a whole it has existed eternally in time, it is infinite in extent, it operates by natural and not supernatural forces, it is neither centrally ordered or chaotic, and nothing exists which is not part of the natural universe.

Canonics: All that is relevant to us is perceived and judged through the evidence of our five senses, our feelings (pleasure and pain), and our anticipations. "Reason" has no relevance to us unless it is grounded in such evidence.

Ethics: Morality/ethics has meaning only to a living mind/spirit, and our mind/spirit ceases to exist at death. Pleasure is the guide of the living, and there are no absolute ethical standards set by supernatural gods or by ideal forms of virtue.

Just to continue the thought while I am able, here is part of where I am going: Unless I am the only one doing this (and I don't think I am) we today tend to see the word pleasure and equate it with things like "lounging in the hammock" (nearby photo) or the usual physical pleasures either simple or sex/drugs/rock'n'roll. I think we do that because we are attuned to the stoic/christian/majority framework that pleasures in general are disreputable and physical pleasures are especially ignoble. We think that's the only issue, so we think "a life of simple pleasures" is the ultimate issue, and that is the main thing Epicurus was trying to tell us.

But when Epicurus was telling us that true gods don't show favor or anger, is that all he was saying?

When Epicurus was saying that death is the end of consciousness, is that all he was saying?

I don't think so.

I think he's pointing the way to an entirely new way of thinking with those as the STARTING points, not the end points at all.

And in regard to "pleasure" was he talking about bread and water or wine and cheese or even luxury items?

I don't think so either. I think that the STARTING point of the analysis is simply that the "faculty of pleasure" is the superior parallel to the framework of gods and ideal virtue. We aren't supposed to focus on particular pleasures any more than we should spend our time whether Allah might not be god, but Yahweh might be, or absent those Zeus or Diana might be gods. Or whether the ideal of justice might not be true, but the ideal of equality or democracy or "everyone is precious in the sight of god" or "we're all brothers" might be true.

We're supposed to break entirely out of the framework of giving ANY credibility to gods, or ANY credibility to ideal forms, and realize that it is the natural faculty of pleasure that takes the place of all of those, and which serves as the true "guide" without at any point having any interim or final destination in mind. The faculty of pleasure can serve as the guide in 2000 BC Africa just as well as it can serve as the guide in a 2100 Mars Colony or a 2500 colony in another galaxy.

By focusing exclusively on particular pleasures we limit our scope and horizon to the lowest possible common denominator. We see the trees and the leaves and the bushes, but we never grasp the full forest. What we really should be doing is examining the full implications of the fact that Nature has not given a god to rule over us or ideal forms to which to conform. What nature has given instead is a faculty to look to as we rule ourselves, and by which we can decide how high or how low we ourselves choose to go. Pleasure isn't a set of concretes, it is better thought of, as Lucretius suggested in book one, in allegory as reality's own "divine goddess" that supercedes all lower and false concepts of gods and abstract ideal forms.

Here are two other comments relevant to this topic:

"Do you all agree with Epicurean philosophy has life should be filled with as much pleasurable and the least amount of suffering (including causing any harm to anyone else).? Do any of you have objections to that?" It's not clear to me whether there is one part or another in there on which you are focusing, but as you get to the end I think you are perhaps implying an overbroad conclusion. Staying with the question of what did Epicurus teach, as opposed to what we think is correct ourselves, Epicurus clearly taught that sometimes we will embrace pain when that leads to greater pleasure or lesser total pain, so it's necessary to point out that there's no single "best" way in real life to handle the competing motivations (pleasure and pain). I would say sure, as Blanton said, that causing pain to others is generally painful for ourselves, but that doesn't mean we are not going to do it when the occasion requires, just as we choose pain ourselves when the occasion requires.

Having stated that pleasure should be maximized and pain minimized in the way you have stated it, have you really answered anything in terms of a preferred set of practical choices?

I am not sure that you have, nor do I think that Epicurus saw his philosophy that way either.

I think your question is excellent for illustrating something we all need to deal with - having observed that pleasure is desirable and pain is undesirable, can we stop at that point and think that we have a solution to anything?

I think not.

When Epicurus observed that (1) true gods would show no favor or anger, and (2) that death is the end of our consciousness, did he STOP and say - that's all you need to know?

I started to post this privately but decided it might be of general interest - it is a suggestion to Eoghan for his new Epicurean blog: Eoghan since you are attacking some of the most fundamental issues from a fresh perspective, here is one that I would appreciate your keeping in mind - from On Ends:

"(3) Yet we maintain that this does not preclude mental pleasures and pains from being much more intense than those of the body; since the body can feel only what is present to it at the moment, whereas the mind is also cognizant of the past and of the future. For granting that pain of body is equally painful, yet our sensation of pain can be enormously increased by the belief that some evil of unlimited magnitude and duration threatens to befall us hereafter. And the same consideration may be transferred to pleasure: a pleasure is greater if not accompanied by any apprehension of evil. This therefore clearly appears, that intense mental pleasure or distress contributes more to our happiness or misery than a bodily pleasure or pain of equal duration."

Here's why: Aside from the terrible tendency to dismiss the physics and the canonics, which we've also been discussing lately, I think there is far too little attention given to the meaning of "pleasure." I would wager that 80% of the people even in this group, and 99% of people out of it, think of purely physical sensations when they think of pleasure. For example, they think about such things as Lucretius' Example of lounging in the grass with friends at the side of a river. But if the record from Torquatus is correct, as I think it is, then Epicurus himself stressed mental pleasure in his own life, such as when he valued the company of his fellow schoolmembers more than the pain of his physical problems on the last day of his life. And if mental pleasures are even more varied that physical pleasures (which I also think is clear) then far from focusing on "grazing in the grass" on the side of a river, our example is more like that of Epicurus himself, in which it is least as pleasurable, if not more pleasurable, to help lead or participate in a worldwide philosophical revolution.

Which is not to say that we need to do the impossible of converting everyone into being a friend, but that as Epicurus said we live the life closest to being "gods among men" when we focus our attention on those things that are eternally true, and how we fit as individuals fit into them.

Yes that is the stereotype - the hotblooded red-headed irishman! In the past I didn't appreciate the merits of that, but now how the world has changed!!!

Eoghan my personal knowledge of Ireland is embarrassingly thin. Is it correct of me to think that whatever is in the water in England that inclines so many to stoicism is NOT in the water in Ireland?

In Seneca's "On Leisure" it is recorded "Epicurus says, the wise man will not take part in politics, except upon some special occasion."

Without more context, or even knowing who originated this phrasing, we probably have an example of how exceptions can swallow the alleged rule. I for one believe that PDs 30-40 make observation and appropriate participation in certain events absolutely appropriate and necessary for happy living.

My personal opinion (worth exactly what you pay for it) is that such an occasion is presented by the imprisonment of Tommy Robinson in England. His "crime"? That of live-streaming outside a courthouse to report on an islamic grooming trial.

I call Britain "the island of the Stoics" because stoicism seems to be so deeply rooted there. In fact if we did not historically know that stoicism originated in Greece, it would be hard to believe that the personality of the Greeks ever succumbed to the idea that "feeling" - emotion - is something to be repressed. The "stiff upper lip" mentality of Britain however, seems to provide a primordial soup where stoicism thrives. That's a topic worthy of a lifetime of study in itself.

The case of Tommy Robinson is all over the news and needs no explanation here. Free speech is under attack all across the Western world, and this particular threat is being carried out in the name of a religion that is one of free speech's single greatest opponents. Today Tommy Robinson's views on religion are suppressed - tomorrow the right even to discuss philosophy will be ended. That means it is time for defenders of philosophy to speak out and act, and in England, that means it is a time for choosing for the stoics.

Yes, yes - I know that according to David Sedley, stoicism has no tradition of resistance to repressive regimes, and that given the option the stoic will choose a melodramatic exit through suicide over action to fix a real-world problem:

I think it no coincidence that repression of free speech is correlated with the absence of appreciation for Epicurean philosophy. Be that as it may, modern stoics represent that they see great merit in some aspects of Epicurean philosophy.

In my view this would be a time when English stoics could profitably learn from the example of both Marcus Brutus (who was NOT a stoic) and Cassius Longinus (the Epicurean) and take a stand for free speech before it is too late.

Tommy Robinson should be freed, and steps should be taken to ensure that something like this never happens again.

I have not studied the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam so my comments can only be brief and tentative. I suspect Hiram has so maybe he will have more comment.

But if his primary parallel to Epicurus is "his attack on the theistic or conventional judgments and his praise of simple pleasures" then we would want to explore his views on physics and epistemology as those are critical to any conclusions about ethics.

I think you are correctly putting your finger on the area of disagreement: Your view is that "Ordinary common sense would classify some of the things on that list (knowledge, safety) as things that are good in themselves, "

Epicurus disagreed with that, as you recognize: "But of course, unlike common sense, Epicureanism sees pleasure as the sole good, the one principle by which the goodness of things is to be judged"

As you also write, this is one key: "Therefore, as a matter of psychology, a consistent Epicurean could not find pleasure in work." And of course this is the disagreement: " Ironically, he is cut off from the most common, the most easily accessible fountain of pleasure in human life."

I think one reason I am so personally convinced of the correctness of Epicurus' position is that I believe it to be above all realistic about what is possible. Life is desirable even though it requires effort- it means taking in the big picture and realizing that work is the price we pay for pleasure, and that even though pain and pleasure are separate feelings, we do chew gum and walk at the same time - we experience many pleasures at the same time we are exerting ourselves, just like Epicurus experienced many pleasures on his last day, even while in great pain. If we could be gods and experience nothing but pleasures continuously while also experiencing no pain, we would choose to do so, but we are not, so we choose the best available to us, and we savor the pleasure in that.

So when you say: "Therefore, as a matter of psychology, a consistent Epicurean could not find pleasure in work, in any kind of sacrifice of the present for the future. " Are you not simply observing that pain is undesirable?

The remainder of this thread will be used to coordinate the transcription of the 1743 edition so that it is more accessible to new readers.

The transcription will be posted here: http://epicureanfriends.com/wiki/doku.php?id=browne_1 At present all of the Munro and Bailey versions are complete (though they need proofreading) and Book 1 of the Browne translation is complete.

The next step to be undertaken is to complete the remaining books of the Browne translation, and then cross-reference all books against the Latin text line numbers (taken from the Browne side-by-side Latin/English edition.

Anyone who is so inclined to contribute, please let me know and paste your suggested text here in the thread.

The transcription should be kept as close to the original as possible, but with certain necessary changes, especially in Browne, to modify archaic spellings, the font style in which "f" is used for "s", and mid-sentence capitalization.

Once we have all three editions cross-referenced by passage, it will then be possible to prepare a "plain English" version against which the three original translations can serve as a check.

Quicquam!!! - Anything whatsoever!

Don't try to tell me you are "because you think you are." All proof of existence rests on feeling/sensation!

Yes that's the source - thanks!

I thought I would put this together for purposes of highlighting what I think is an important distinction: In Epicurean philosophy some things are facts which are not open to dispute, while many others (especially in Ethics) are matters of personal preference. Comments? Suggestions? This is really just a quick draft to illustrate the question:

Theo: This is in my opinion the biggest hole in Epicurus for modern times. Back then E. was telling people that death was nothing because he wanted to erase the fear of an afterlife of eternal damnation. fast forward today in a world much more secular than the ancient, fear of death for many people has nothing to do with fear of a nightmarish afterlife but simply the end of enjoying things they like to do. Let me give an example. let's say that I'm getting the highest of pleasure from space exploration. I have no concerns about afterlife and I don't care about money, fame and the likes; I just want to travel space star trek style. But to enjoy that I know I must wait couple of centuries of technological advancement which under current situation is impossible. my certain death will deprive me from the thing I get the most of pleasure. the point is that in E. times space exploration was not a prospect for humans (as many other things); today it is and death is an unwanted barrier.

Cassius:

Theo I think at least one response to your point is that people have always wanted more than they have the ability to obtain, and death has as always been a barrier to that. "Death is nothing to us" has little relevance to that problem. As I understand the Epicurean doctrines that ARE relevant to that problem (such as PD 18-21), we should use "true reasoning" to understand that the body has no need of more pleasure than it can experience when it is functioning well and without pain. That condition of the body is relatively easy for most people to obtain, and new pleasure for the body in the future is simply variation of the same pleasures in the past. Those new pleasures (eating lunch tomorrow) are desirable, but not possible to extend to forever due to our limited lifespan. But the body doesn't know or care about the future.

The mind, however, can construct limitless desires such as your desire for space exploration. The answer to that problem comes only with the study of nature and the realization that the body and mind are mortal, with limited lifespan, and neither will survive death. Since the guide of life is pleasure (and not the quest for unlimited knowledge) we can consider the problem and realize that filling our experience with pleasures is not generally so hard either (such as Lucretius' observation of lounging with friends by the river). Repeating pleasurable experiences day after day is variation of the same pleasures, which is in fact desirable, so we want to stay alive as long as we can continue that.

But we know that we will one day die and our time will be up. That isn't a "hole" in Epicurean theory, that is a recognition of fact of limited lifespan that no theory can override. Applying Epicurean observations and philosophy shows us the path to the living the best life possible to us, and if we steer for that then we should have no anxiety that we could be doing anything better or higher. Those frustrations are frequently planted by false religions and false standards of absolutes/rationalism/idealism, or simply by naive absence of thought about the nature of human life.

So from this perspective I don't think your space illustration indicates that anything has changed. You are simply looking at a desire which has no limitation (you can always go further and further into space, tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow) and you are seeing that that is impossible due to limited lifespan. You can label that "unnatural and unnecessary" if you think that helps, but the bottom line is that Epicurean philosophy doesn't promise the impossible. No philosophy or religion can deliver the impossible. All Epicurean philosophy can do is point out to you that yearning for the impossible just increases your anxieties needlessly, because "worrying" about it isn't going to change anything.

I can't end this post, however, without pointing out that this isn't a justification for sitting in your cave eating bread and water. Sitting in your cave doesn't guarantee a thing except that you will reduce the total experience of pleasure that might otherwise have been possible to you had you engaged reality more aggressively. And if pleasurable living over the lifetime that nature makes available to you is your goal, as it should be, then you are ignoring and perverting that goal by choosing to sit in a cave when happier alternatives are available. And for those who want to focus on the fact that sometimes happier alternatives are not always available, I ask that you please cite your authority, in Epicurus or otherwise, that "life is fair."

And is here is one of what I would contend is one of the most important sections of Lucretius - from Book 4 - "So the Reason of Things must of necessity be wrong and false, which is founded upon false Representation of the Senses." Maybe not quite clear as a bell, but superior to many versions of this I have seen.

Even THIS one seems more clear to me - the Trojan War - or any action, does not have an independent existence like a body does - an event, no matter how stupendous, is just something that occurs to the bodies in the space where the event is carried on. The continuing mystery to me is "Who says that events DO have a separate existence?" Did the Platonists or Pythagoreans give some mystical significance to certain events? Were they asserting something like the later Christians assert about the crucifixion, that it was some supernatural mystical event for the ages? Or were they somehow just saying that events have a "third nature" that is neither body nor space?

And how about THIS as to "time" -- Right or wrong, he's clear as a bell - time has no meaning apart from things at rest or in motion:

Poster: Lucretius uses “Venus” usually to refer to sexual desire, by which “nothing can rise to light” etc. The more literal occurrence when Venus kisses Mars may be an illusion to a statue, well known at the time but lost now. I’d say the same play is occurring with caelum, “heavens” as in the sky... ...unless the godly imagery is just too tempting. We are talking about a poet, after all! He let himself play here more than usual.

Cassius: Nocks, as you glance through this edition you know I am interested in any comment you have, as I know Lucretius is one of your favorite topics. The Latin text should not be anything new, but the choice of a translator is always interesting (at least to me) because I think the degree someone has immersed himself in Latin will tell the tale on how well the translation follows the meaning. This author is fast becoming one of my favorites, as I see from later in book one that he pushes away from using "accidents" to describe the non-essential attributes of bodies, and instead calls them "events" -- a choice dear to my heart

(As you know I've always considered "accidents" to be misleading, as implying "randomness," which I don't think is acceptable at all - "event" in my view is much better, implying only that it is a happening that occurs due to the particular context, but not at "random.")

Opening of Lucretius Book 1, from 1743 Edition of unknown author. Everyone has their own taste in writing style, but I've always found this opening one of the most difficult-to-read passages. If the rest of the book lives up to the standard set here, this might be one of the most understandable English versions available. Two takeaways: (1) If this translator is correct, "Venus" is pretty clearly not identical with "Nature." Whatever we conclude Lucretius considered Venus to be, whether it is "pleasure" or some other "force," it probably isn't a simple personification of Nature. (2) There's still significant interpretation going on, for example in the last sentence quoted here, does "Caelo" mean "sky," or "heavens," or can it mean "Gods"?

MOTHER of Rome, Delight of Men and Gods, Sweet Venus; who with vital Power dost fill the Sea bearing the Ships, the fruitful Earth, all Things beneath the rolling Signs of Heaven; for ‘tis by Thee Creatures of every kind conceive, rise into Life, and view the Sun’s bright Beams. Thee Goddess, Thee the Winds avoid; the Clouds fly Thee, and thy Approach; with various Art the Earth for Thee affords her sweetest Flowers; for Thee the Sea’s rough Waves put on their Smiles, and the smooth Sky shines with diffused Light. For when the buxom Spring leads on the Year, and genial Gales of Western Winds blow fresh, unlock’d from Winter’s Cold, the airy Birds first feel Thee Goddess, and express thy Power; thy active Flame strikes though their very Souls. And then the savage Beasts, with wanton Play, frisk o’er the cheerful Fields, and swim the rapid Streams. So pleased with thy Sweetness, so transported by thy soft Charms, all living Nature strives, with sharp Desire, to follow thee her Guide, where Thou art pleas’d to lead. In short, thy Power inspiring every Breast with tender Love, drives every Creature on with eager Heat, in Seas, in Mountains, and in swiftest Floods, in leafy Forests, and in verdant Plains, to propagate their Kind from Age to Age.

Since Thou alone dost govern Nature’s Laws, and nothing without Thee can rise to Light, without Thee nothing can look gay or lovely; I beg Thee a Companion to my Lays, which, now I sing of Nature, I devote to my dear Memmius, whom Thou art ever pleased, sweet Goddess, to adorn with every Grace; for him, kind Deity, inspire my song, and give immortal Beauty to my Verse. Mean time, the bloody Tumults of the War by Sea and Land compose, and lay asleep. For Thou alone Mankind with quiet Peace canst bless; because ‘tis Mars Armipotent that rules the bloody Tumults of the War, and He by everlasting Pains of Love bound fast, tastes in thy Lap most sweet Repose, turns back his smooth long Neck, and views thy Charms, and greedily sucks Love at both his Eyes. Supinely as he rests his very Soul hangs on thy Lips; this God dissolv’d in Ease, in the soft Moments when thy heavenly Limbs cling round him, melting with Eloquence caress, great Goddess, and implore a Peace for Rome.

For neither can I write with chearful Strains, in Times so sad, nor can the noble House of Memmius desert the common Good in such Distress of Things. The Hours you spare apply with close Attention to my Verse, and free from Care receive true Reason’s Rules; nor these my Gifts, prepared with faithful Pains, reject with Scorn before they are understood. For I begin to write of lofty Themes, of Gods, and of the Motions of the Sky, the Rise of Things, how all Things Nature forms, and how they grow, and to Perfection rise, and into what, by the same Nature’s Laws, those Things resolve and die; which as I write I call by various Names; sometimes ‘tis Matter, or the first Principles or Seeds of Things, or first of Bodies, whence all else proceed.

For the whole Nature of the Gods must spend an Immortality in softest Peace, removed from our Affairs, and separated by Distance infinite; from Sorrow free; secure from Danger; in its own Happiness sufficient, and nought of ours can want, is neither pleased with Good, nor vexed with Ill.

Indeed Mankind, in wretched Bondage held, lay groveling on the ground, galled with the Yoke of what is called Religion; from the Sky this Tyrant shewed her Head, and with grim Looks hung over us poor Mortals here below; until a Man of Greece with steady Eyes dared look her in the Face, and first opposed her Power. Him not the Fame of Gods nor Thunder’s Roar kept back, nor threatening Tumults of the Sky; but still the more they roused the active Virtue of his aspiring Soul, as he pressed forward first to break thro’ Natures scanty Bounds. His Mind’s quick Force prevailed; and so he passed by far the flaming Limits of this World, and wander’d with his comprehensive Soul o’er all the mighty Space; from thence returned triumphant; told us what Things may have a Being, and what cannot; and how a finite Power is fixed to each; a Bound it cannot break; and so Religion, which we feared before, by him subdued, we tread upon in turn; his Conquest makes us equal to the Gods.