Posts by Cassius

Elayne, I completely agree with your view stated this and similar ways: "For me it is more like I have pleasures _in spite of_ unavoidable pains of the past or present, not _because of_ these pains. "

The part where I am not sure is that saying that we only have pleasure because of the existence of pain (and therefore we need pain) might not be the only way to read what Wright is saying. (Although I agree that it seems she is saying that)

Where I am thinking there may be validity is to ask a similar question:

Does matter exist because there is void? Does void exist because there is matter? It may be that Wright senses that Epicurus was saying that reality is the way it is because of Nature and that we should be grateful to Nature that reality is the way it is (various sayings I think would support that including the one to the effect of being grateful that what is good is easy to get and what is bad is not ....... -- I need the exact translation here.

So it might be possible that Wright is extrapolating from that.

Here it is:

From Elli:

When the parents feel the great pain of the loss of their child the psychologists suggest "the displacement" i.e. the transference of their feelings of love that had for their lost child to the rest of the children in their family. This procedure produces a healthy family environment and IMO is the real doctor that is able to cure their wound.

For the parents to lose their child is a great pain indeed, because it rejects the parents' hope to feel and share their child's pleasures in the future...But in parallel, the same parents reject the pleasures that they've shared with that lost child in the past.

This loss of their child rejects the feeling of the continuity of their genes in the present and in future...But in parallel, they reject that they may have in their family and other children that continue their genes in the present and in future. When the parents lose their child they also feel as being empty-handed and all the efforts they did were in vain... But in parallel, they reject their offering that was this great gift that is called LIFE to a child as long as was alive. Since they do not see that for a being for not living at all, it is like the darkness of the abyss.

Those parents also feel guilty and remorse that they did not offer more things and feelings to that lost child when was alive... But in parallel, they are focusing on the suffering and not on the pleasurable moments they offered and shared with the child when was alive. And if the parents have other children, with their continuous mourn, they make the other of their children to feel guilty and remorse too when those children want to feel pleasure in their life... So in parallel, those parents reject the fact to feel and share the pleasures with the other of their children and the real fact of the continuity of parents' genes that is still remaining in the present and in the future. For this reason, we see also many cases when the parents have lost a child, they're going to the procedure to have a new one.

I had the experience to lose my brother in a car crash, and through the empathy Ι felt my mother's pain that was indescribable, but during the time of the years that have passed, her great pain was decreased through the sharing of the pleasurable feelings of love with me, my sister and our children, i.e. her grandchildren as a real fact in the continuity of her family in the present and in future.

So, in that painful situation when the parents lost a child and have no other children or can't have a new one, it might be helpful and pleasurable to those parents for being more closely to their relatives' children for sharing the happiness and love they've lost. For this reason, the other relatives might be beneficial and good for them to speak to their children to be more closed to those relatives that had lost their only child.

For this Epicurus remarks in the starting point of his letter to Meneoceus: "we must then meditate on the things that make our happiness, seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is absent we do all to win it".

Yes, positively, the transference of parents' feelings of love that had for their lost child, and as they are offering this love to the rest of the children in their family is going along with all the efforts to win their happiness again. And that is because Epicurus is sure that happiness is connected with pleasure, and it is so recognizable as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure, we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good. So, pleasure is born within us, it remains inside us as long as we live, and its power shows up, as it is enriched and developed when is shared with the next others.

More from Elayne:

Thinking about my own life, I do not sense that the ability to experience pleasure requires pain first. Pleasure is a positive, active sensation, not only a relief from prior pain. There have been at least some times in my life when I have had no pain of body or mind, only pleasure, but when this was a less intense pleasure-- like the satisfaction at the end of a good day-- I was still able to feel bursts of more intense pleasure, such as when seeing beautiful colors of a sunset. When I am satisfied, I feel no urge to go looking for more pleasure-- which is, we think, dopamine related, the wanting. But already being completely happy does not prevent me from feeling "liking" pleasure (serotonin, oxytocin, endocannabinoids, endorphins?) if it happens to show up.

I think of pain as a danger signal of injury or impending injury-- which would have evolved because heeding it helped humans avoid damage. We pull away from a hot fire instead of being burned.

It just doesn't feel intuitively correct to me to think I would need to be burned before I could enjoy a pleasurable skin sensation-- or that I would need to lose a loved one to feel the pleasure of love.

What the knowledge of possible loss does is add some sense of urgency-- pleasure now or maybe never-- but I generally enjoy pleasure more when I am _not_ thinking about losing it. Urgency has a slightly anxious quality that's not pleasant. So I don't like to use that anticipation of grief on myself-- the Stoic practice.

Talking about pain as if it is necessary for contrast, to make pleasure possible, instead of necessary as a warning signal IF damage happens or is imminent -- that is what leads people to think they need a "balance" of pain and pleasure. I had not gotten that impression from Epicurus.

I definitely don't expect life to be free of pain-- that's not realistic. But I do a lot better when I don't imagine happiness requires pain. From trial and error.

For me it is more like I have pleasures _in spite of_ unavoidable pains of the past or present, not _because of_ these pains. There's a big difference.

Quote from Godfrey

Can our Greek friends provide any insight on this point?

Another specific point on which our Greek friends might help would be: "Is there precedent in Greek religion for a god dying (or choosing to die)?

I don't think that would be determinative of what Epicurus thought, because he clearly rejected many/most of the common attributes of gods, but if there are examples of such things (in Homer especially?) then that might be evidence to add to the discussion.

We presume that gods must be omnipotent and omniscient due to the influence of the major world religions. Is it possible that "immortal" and/or "eternal" is another attribute that we should not presume Epicurus accepted?

I have an open mind on this issue. I also have an open mind on whether a Epicurean gods are "eternal" (no beginning or end) or simply "immortal" (no end, but having a beginning). And that would have to be answered both for an individual god as well as for "the gods as a group"

Aside: DeWitt's own full translation of the letter to Menoeceus is in the appendix of his "St Paul and Epicurus" book.

In agreeing with these last two posts, one point that strikes home to me is that there clearly are certain types of depression which are clinical/biological/genetic or whatever other "medical problem" term would be appropriate. And in those situations while a philosophy might be of some minor help, the ultimate problem is medical and has to be addressed medically.

Oscar I hesitate to ask this because you seem very well read, but just to be sure, have you read the full poem of Lucretius? There is certainly a lot of material on death to be discussed from there too.

One aside: If Epicurus thought that the gods do at least occasionally experience pain, that would have obvious implications for his "gods among men" statement, or even Lucretius saying that Epicurus was essentially a god -- it would make both comparisons much more plausible.

Dewitt mentions a number of times that he thought the texts indicated that the intermundia was a place where the forces of preservation prevailed over the forces of destruction. That is not at all the same as saying that the forces of preservation *eliminate* the forces of destruction. I am not sure what the texts really say on this.

If there are gradations in gods, would at least some of them not be capable of experiencing pain? Would it offend Greek sensibilities to think that Zeus felt pain?

The "gods" - like us - are ANIMALS:

It may be relevant to this that DeWitt pointed out that Epicurus himself did not call the gods "deathless" (at least as far as we know). This may be another area where DeWitt has an instinct to look for views of the gods that we would not expect at all. Is it possible that Epicureans gods are not only not 'deathless' by nature, but are also not 'painless' by nature? This is from page 249 of the book:

Elayne has asked a great question which derives from Chapter 10 of A Few Days In Athens - specifically a paragraph in the section about consolation for death. Here is the part under discussion:

"What were the glories of the sun, if we knew not the gloom of darkness? What the refreshing breezes of morning and evening, if we felt not the fervors of noon? Should we value the lovely-flower, if it bloomed eternally; or the luscious fruit, if it hung always on the bough? Are not the smiles of the heavens more beautiful in contrast with their frowns, and the delights of the seasons more grateful from their vicissitudes? Let us then be slow to blame nature, for perhaps in her apparent errors there is hidden a wisdom. Let us not quarrel with fate, for perhaps in our evils lie the seeds of our good. Were our body never subject to sickness, we might be insensible to the joy of health. Were our life eternal, our tranquillity might sink into inaction. Were our friendship not threatened with interruption, it might want much of its tenderness. This, then, my sons, is our duty, for this is our interest and our happiness; to seek our pleasures from the hands of the virtues, and for the pain which may befall us, to submit to it with patience, or bear up against it with fortitude. To walk, in short, through life innocently and tranquilly; and to look on death as its gentle termination, which it becomes us to meet with ready minds, neither regretting the past, nor anxious for the future."

Elayne asks:

This is so moving and beautiful. Cassius, the last paragraph is the only part that trips me up. She seems to be giving a more important role to pain than I would assign, as if pleasure can't be fully felt without pain for contrast-- and then people may go looking for pain or thinking about it a lot, similar to the Stoics meditating on anticipatory griefs as a way of appreciating what they have. Do you think of the last paragraph as something Epicurus would say? It would not align with his concept of the gods as completely blissful beings, without pain and with the expectation of continuing in complete pleasure.

I responded:

That is an excellent point Elayne! I am not able to think of a passage in the texts I have read that would provide an example for that, and I think you are right that it would not be consistent with the ability of "the gods" to continue to experience unending happiness. And can it be made consistent with the "continuous pleasure" argument? I think you are exactly right to raise this issue

I had previously noted that Wright seemed to be freelancing somewhat on her statements on free will / necessity, but this one I had not noted.

I wonder if this was inspired by extrapolating out from the dual existence of matter vs void, life vs. death, and pleasure vs pain. Does Lucretius say the universe would not exist if all space was void, or all space was matter? If so, would that imply that one of these combinations of two could not exist without the other?

There are many issues involved in pursuing that. Would Epicurus say that that kind of "what if" isn't appropriate since reality is the way it is?

There are lots of good questions here: "It would not align with his concept of the gods as completely blissful beings, without pain and with the expectation of continuing in complete pleasure." Does Epicurus say specifically that gods are TOTALLY without pain? Or is it possible that gods too exist in a "net pleasure" environment in which their pleasures dominate over pain, but in which pain is still present to some degree. When Epicurus calls us to continuous pleasure, he does not imply that we are going to be continuously painless, does he?

OK so that sets up the questions: Is Frances Wright wrong to make this argument? Can it be reconciled with Epicurus? Did Epicurus in fact say that the "gods" are totally without pain? When Epicurus made the remark about calling us to continuous pleasure, did he mean to continuous painlessness?

These are great questions for us to discuss to advance our thoughts, not necessarily on the gods specifically, but on the argument that Wright seems to be making: Is the experience of pain necessary for the experience of pleasure?

Elayne has asked a very good question about the quote from Frances Wright. Rather than hijack this thread too much, let's keep it focused on what Oscar asked, and I will start another.

Video!

Newly found statue of the man best known for being husband of Pompeia Plotina, Empress of Rome and Friend of The Epicureans -- otherwise known as Trajan. >>

https://twitter.com/OptimoPrincipi…Qw_ZtP6RbZYy0TY

One of the most interesting things we could be doing as we study Epicurus is to produce our own articles, books, graphics, music -- even if it's just a simple graphic meme for sharing on the internet.

I know through contacts that several people who post here or on Facebook are working on projects, and if you are working on something don't hesitate to start a thread to let us know about it and ask for help.

Whether it's help in setting up a meetup group, writing your own blog, or just learning to use a graphics program and designing a meme, let us know and we have numbers of people who would be glad to help.

I don't want to be too over the top in praising it, but that is excellent writing, and I have to think that Epicurus himself would have been proud of it.

Much of Chapter Ten of A Few Days In Athens is relevant to giving consolation at death, but the part quoted here always struck me as one of the best sections of Wright's book. I included some intro, but the part starting "But there is yet a pain" that stands out for use in a funeral context

The last two paragraphs here are - to me - gripping.

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Philosophy cannot change the laws of nature; but she may teach us to accommodate ourselves to them. She cannot annul pain; but she can arm us to bear it. And though the evils of fate be many, are not the evils of man’s coining more! Nature afflicts us with disease; but for once that it is the infliction of nature, ninety-nine times it is the consequence of our own folly. Nature levels us with death; but how mild is the death of nature, with Philosophy to spread the pillow, and friendship to take the last sigh, to the protracted agonies of debauchery, subduing the body by inches, while Philosophy is not there to give strength, nor friendship consolation, but while the flames of fever are heated by impatience, and the stings of pain envenomed by remorse! And tell me, my sons, when the body of the sage is stretched on the couch of pain, hath he not his mind to minister delight to him? Hath he not conscience whispering that his present evil is not chargeable to his own past folly, but to the laws of nature, which no effort or foresight of his could have prevented? Hath he not memory to bring to him past pleasures, the pleasures of a well-spent life, on which he may feed even while pain racks his members, and fever consumes his vitals? Or, what if agony overpower his frame, and cripple his faculties, is there not death at hand to reach him deliverance? Here, then is death, that giant of terror, acting as a friend. But does he interrupt our enjoyments as well as our sufferings? And is it for this we fear him? Ought we not rather to rejoice, seeing that the day of life has its bright and its clouded hours, that we are laid to sleep while the sun of joy yet shines, before the storm of fate has broken our tranquillity or the evening of age bedimmed our prospect?

Death, then, is never our foe. When not a friend, he cannot be worse than indifferent. For while we are, death is not; and when death is, we are not. To be wise, then, death is nothing. Examine the ills of life; are they not of our own creation, or take they not their darkest hues from our passions or our ignorance? What is poverty, if “we have temperance, and can be satisfied with a crust, and a draught from the spring? — if we have modesty, and can wear a woolen garment as gladly as a tyrian robe? What is slander, if we have no vanity that it can wound, and no anger that it can kindle? What is neglect, if we have no ambition that it can disappoint, and no pride that it can mortify? What is persecution, if we have our own bosoms in which to retire, and a spot of earth to sit down and rest upon? What is death, when without superstition to clothe him with terrors, we can cover our heads, and go to sleep in his arms? What a list of human calamities are here expunged — poverty, slander, neglect, disappointment, persecution, death. What yet remains? Disease? That, too, we have shown temperance can often shun, and Philosophy can always alleviate.

But there is yet a pain, which the wisest and the best of men cannot escape; that all of us, my sons, have felt, or have to feel. Do not your hearts whisper it? Do you not tell me, that in death there is yet a sting? That ere he aim at us, he may level the beloved of our soul? The father, whose tender care hath reared our infant minds — the brother, whom the same breast hath nourished, and the same roof sheltered, with whom, side by side, we have grown like two plants by a river, sucking life from the same fountain and strength from the same sun — the child whose gay prattle delights our ears, or whose opening understanding fixes our hopes — the friend of our choice, with whom we have exchanged hearts, and shared all our pains and pleasures, whose eye hath reflected the tear of sympathy, whose hand hath smoothed the couch of sickness. Ah! my sons, here indeed is a pain — a pain that cuts into the soul. There are masters that will tell you otherwise; who will tell you that it is unworthy of a man to mourn even here. But such, my sons, speak not the truth of experience or philosophy, but the subtleties of sophistry and pride. He who feels not the loss, hath never felt the possession. He who knows not the grief, hath never known the joy. See the price of a friend in the duties we render him, and the sacrifices we make to him, and which, in making, we count not sacrifices, but pleasures. We sorrow for his sorrow; we supply his wants, or, if we cannot, we share them. We follow him to exile. We close ourselves in his prison; we soothe him in sickness; we strengthen him in death: nay, if it be possible, we throw down our life for his. Oh! What a treasure is that for which we do so much! And is it forbidden to us to mourn its loss? If it be, the power is not with us to obey.

Should we, then, to avoid the evil, forego the good? Shall we shut love from our hearts, that we may not feel the pain of his departure? No; happiness forbids it. Experience forbids it. Let him who hath laid on the pyre the dearest of his soul, who hath washed the urn with the bitterest tears of grief — let him say if his heart hath ever formed the wish that it had never shrined within it him whom he now deplores. Let him say if the pleasures of the sweet communion of his former days doth not still live in his remembrance. If he love not to recall the image of the departed, the tones of his voice, the words of his discourse, the deeds of his kindness, the amiable virtues of his life. If, while he weeps the loss of his friend, he smiles not to think that he once possessed him. He who knows not friendship, knows not the purest pleasure of earth. Yet if fate deprive us of it, though we grieve, we do not sink; Philosophy is still at hand, and she upholds us with fortitude. And think, my sons, perhaps in the very evil we dread, there is a good; perhaps the very uncertainty of the tenure gives it value in our eyes; perhaps all our pleasures take their zest from the known possibility of their interruption. What were the glories of the sun, if we knew not the gloom of darkness? What the refreshing breezes of morning and evening, if we felt not the fervors of noon? Should we value the lovely-flower, if it bloomed eternally; or the luscious fruit, if it hung always on the bough? Are not the smiles of the heavens more beautiful in contrast with their frowns, and the delights of the seasons more grateful from their vicissitudes? Let us then be slow to blame nature, for perhaps in her apparent errors there is hidden a wisdom. Let us not quarrel with fate, for perhaps in our evils lie the seeds of our good. Were our body never subject to sickness, we might be insensible to the joy of health. Were our life eternal, our tranquillity might sink into inaction. Were our friendship not threatened with interruption, it might want much of its tenderness. This, then, my sons, is our duty, for this is our interest and our happiness; to seek our pleasures from the hands of the virtues, and for the pain which may befall us, to submit to it with patience, or bear up against it with fortitude. To walk, in short, through life innocently and tranquilly; and to look on death as its gentle termination, which it becomes us to meet with ready minds, neither regretting the past, nor anxious for the future.”