I typed that before listening to all of the second video, and even now I haven't heard all of it, but now I hear "nonconformity is such an important ingredient in a life well lived."
Now that CLEARLY to me as a non-Epicurean ring. I have not listened further to how he is going to define it, but it certainly has a Platonic/Aristotelian/Stoic ring that isn't obviously based on pleasure. But let me listen further....
I just saw the second video. For example in line with my prior thoughts, I see the slide: "it is the nonconformists who bring forth the new ideas, creations, and ways of living that produce a vibrant society."
That is EXACTLY the issue that is raised in the HG Wells "Things to Come" that we discussed several months ago on the facebook group. In that movie, Passworthy (and in more extreme form, Theophilus) represents the often large number of people who want the world to "stop" and always say the same - they want "rest" rather than what we think of us pleasure.
But if THEY think of "rest" as their highest pleasure, are we to say that they are wrong? They are wrong TO US, yes! but are they wrong for themselves? I "think" the answer Epicurus would give is that they need to be very careful about their choice (as do we!) but that if indeed those people do find more "pleasure" in "rest" then FOR THEM that may be the choice they should pursue.
Yes I was thinking based in part on our past discussions that you were probably considering whether this is an example of the development of attitudes over time that might factor into anticipations. And I think I agree with that.
I am sure you and I share the same view that freedom is pleasurable and restrictions are painful, and so we would act from that basis to try to live in a society that honored those same views. Like you say a mix of private property where we can be "king of our own domain" plus the ability to easily mix with others (preferably those who are our friends who see things the much the same as we do).
But what I think Epicurus may also be saying is that not EVERYONE sees things that way, and some indeed find pleasure in conformity and even restrictions. If such people do exist (and I think they do - e.g. in Islam?) then what does that mean to us? I think it means as in PD39 that we have to accept that some people not only aren't going to be compatible with us, but are actually going to be our enemies, from whom we have to protect ourselves.
So while of course we would prefer if everyone had our same thermometer of pleasure and pain, I think Epicurus would tell us that various people are "wired" very differently (just like cats and dogs are wired differently, and various breeds of cats are wired differently from others, just like breeds of dogs, etc)
And if this line of thinking is correct, this is pretty challenging in a modern world where the prime directive seems to be that everyone must get along no matter what degree of difference of opinion they have. Maybe the best example is the hardest: In the end can dedicated Islamists get along with dedicated secularists or people of other religions? I suspect the answer is no, and the best option is as in PD39 - "....and where he finds even this impossible, he avoids all dealings, and, so far as is advantageous, excludes them from his life."
Martin and Alexander have posted on the Facebook page that they would prefer a 5pm Eastern Start time. Is that OK with you, Brett, and/or anyone else?
Alex I picked out a couple of themes. Was one or more of these what you refer to as compatible with Epicurean theory?
All of the ones I listed seem apparently true and therefore would be consistent with Epicurean theory, which does nothing if not observe what occurs and acknowledge it.
One thought going through my mind in all of these is that while there are some who reject control "instinctively" (and I bet most all of us "Epicureans" fit that mold) there is also a much larger group which accepts controls, grows accustomed to it, and I would dare say even finds it pleasurable. So as the video goes through listing different types of societies, it seems to me that all of those types can be described as pleasurable to at least some significant part of the population, while other parts find the same society oppressive.
That's why it has always seemed to me that the Epicurean principles of "justice" emphasize that arrangements are based on agreement rather than on absolute justice. If a majority (which has sufficient force) finds an arrangement pleasurable to them, they will naturally seek one form, while the minority finds the same arrangement painful. Since there's no god and no vindicating central force, the people involved then have to personally measure their best judgment as to what is worth fighting for and what is not. No one can count on gods or ideas to vindicate them.
But that's probably not touching on your question. What part were you thinking about?
Here is something else that I think is an aspect of this that we have seen on the Facebook group: When the stress is on "I've made the mistake of chasing commercialism / the rat-race and now I see that simple is beautiful" we come at the entire philosophy from the point of someone who has made incorrect decisions and to a greater or lesser extent warped their personality and/or emotions into focusing on the pain of their mistakes. Such people are naturally looking for help - for medicine - and their focus is on reducing pain as their primary goal. And such people are naturally going to think that the full message of Epicurus is "live simply so as to avoid pain."
But what if we approached the philosophy as they must have for generations in the ancient world? What if we approached it as emotionally healthy people - as many if not most young people are because they have not yet been "damaged" by incorrect thinking? What if we approached this from the point of view: "I am young and healthy and happy and I am not afraid of anything - I just want to know how to live my life so I can take charge of it and pursue life with all the gusto I can give it!"
The non-warped, non-damaged person doesn't start from the presumption that life is all about avoiding pain. Such a person wants to know a framework of analysis from which he or she can decide for themselves what to pursue, and how to pursue it. Such people want to know whether the best life is dictated by a god, or by society, or by "virtue" or by some other set of absolute abstractions that they have to follow in order not to waste their lives.
And the answers that such people are looking for in Epicurus include (1) this is your ONLY chance at life (2) there's no god telling you what to do (3) there are no universal abstractions telling you what to do, (4) NATURE tells you what to do through pleasure and pain, and (5) if you grasp the true implications of all this, you are going to pursue pleasure as aggressively (while yes, also intelligently) as you can. And they will realize that the ONLY reason we "live simply" is so that we can maximize pleasure, because otherwise if our goal were solely to avoid pain, we would commit suicide and be done with life.
So not only will the points of interest be different depending on how badly warped the audience is, but the conclusions to be drawn about how to pursue pleasure, and why, are likely to be drastically different depending on that same factor.
I don't believe that Epicurean philosophy would ever have been popular in the ancient world, and certainly not in the Roman world, if the positive/activist interpretation I am describing were not understood to be the real message of Epicurus.
At least for myself, I want to devote at least as much attention to putting forward the positive full framework that explains WHY the ethical conclusions are correct as I do to helping people who just want a short-cut out of their latest wrong turn.
I think so too, Jason, in practical conclusion, but not in terms of thinking that the conclusions are correct simply because thy amount to "goodness" vs "doing wrong. In that sense Cicero's final conclusion seems to me to be nothing at all but circular. This is a topic for a lot of discussion because these points are pretty much disputed by large numbers of people, especially in the financial world. A large part of the big picture revolves around how we should apply the advice about people who we can't make friends and what that means for how we should treat them, which is a huge issues in MANY ways, not the least of which in terms of Islamic migration to the West.
I am not sure that I have written anything that develops this that would be useful. There is a lot of raw material in the Thomas Jefferson collection I put together, especially in the "earth belongs to the living" argument in the letter to James Madison - I thought I had on my page but don't! Especially the part about "I set out on this ground which I suppose to be self evident, "that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living;" that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by an individual ceases to be his when himself ceases to be, and reverts to the society. If the society has formed no rules for the appropriation of its lands in severalty, it will be taken by the first occupants. "
This is a huge topic for which there is a lot of material. Almost every time I type something I think "this is why I wanted to set things up as a forum like this so we can start talking and lay the groundwork where we can return and find it and build on it. "
I agree definitely that the audience and the situation determines the context. Talks which assume that pleasure and happy living are the goal are very useful. However the pattern that I see, and that I think far outweighs in number anything else, is that if we only stay on this level most people see this as just another "self-help" class to be filed away on their bookshelf with 100 others. Of course "most people" are not necessarily sitting in the audience - people who have the initiative to come to a philosophical presentation may already be in the camp of presuming that pleasure is good. On the other hand, it might be the opposite- that people who come to a PHILOSOPHICAL presentation presume the standard view - that "virtue" is the good, and that "happiness" is not defined in terms of pleasure, but in the standard non-Epicurean ways.
In short I think we definitely need both types of presentations.
Great comments, Hiram! I especially think that this observation "We are endowed with nature with certain instincts and faculties and tendencies, and (a very strong case can be made) with a sense of morality and justice, but not with rights, inalienable or not" is of huge significance, and once we understand that our entire perspective on justice changes.
Yes that is exactly what would need to be analyzed in order to determine how much of the final result came about through Epicurean thinking, and how much was diluted/mutated by Christian or other ideas.
I am not aware that copies of the initial draft survive, but as we proceed with this thread if anyone has more detail on who added what, and when, that would be great to link here.
"some commentators of Philodemus have argued that this natural measure is based on what is natural and necessary."
Part of my thinking in asking these questions is to lay the foundation at the most basic level possible. WHY should using a "natural and necessary" standard be the right answer?
You ended with "..... if one wants self-sufficiency."
WHY should one want self-sufficiency? Shouldn't we depend on God? Shouldn't we depend on our government, or our society, or our friends?
In a short presentation it's not possible to go into all these issues in detail, but I think it IS possible to point to where the answers are found, in Epicurean physics (infinite, eternal, no supernatural gods), and in Epicurean canonics (reliance upon senses/anticipations/pleasure-pain as the only contact with reality, rather than abstract speculation).
In other words, even in a short presentation it should be possible to point out that Epicurean ethics are not arbitrary, but derive straight from the more fundamental presumptions about the nature of the universe and the nature of man.
Let's go ahead and pull the trigger and set this for 6 pm EST on Saturday. I'll sign on and be there no matter what. If we have enough people to proceed we'll do so, and if not we'll just chat about plans for moving forward. I am thinking 6 pm EST is consistent with Brett's 3-5 pm (given time zone issues) but if that doesn't work let's adjust the time to fit the most people. We probably won't have a large number this time, so we can work to accommodate those who can attend.
Here are some initial thoughts on questions that might go through minds in the audience listening to this presentation. Are there ways to head off these questions or point the way to the answer in a short talk such as this?
[Reminder - no criticism of the original presentation is expressed or implied! This is purely an exercise to consider how we might ourselves present Epicurean ideas to our friends or to small audiences - and at the same time the exercise will help us consider our own understanding of the philosophy!!]
Here is a summary of the presentation, prepared by me for discussion purposes.
Summary of A Presentation By Elena Nicoli
I urge everyone in this group to watch Elena Nicoli's excellent presentation on Epicurean pleasure, which the Dutch Research School of Philosophy has humorously mis-titled as "Atoms in the Rennaisance." As quickly as I can I am going to prepare an outline of the major points of her talk and attach that to this thread for discussion and reference in the future. I think you will find that this talk is easy to follow, very clearly presented, and does a very good job of presenting the "standard" interpretation of Epicurean ethical theory on pleasure. In my view Ms. Nicoli avoids the worst of the conclusions of the standard theory. Even though she presumes the validity of the kinetic / katastematic distinction that is disputed by Nikolsky, Wenham, and Gosling & Taylor (as detailed in our files section), she emphasizes the critical point: that Epicurus embraced "BOTH" of the two categories in dispute. As a result, she gives no hint of believing that life would best be spent living in a cave living a life of subsistence with only bread and water.
Just as with the presentation Ms. Nicoli recently posted to her Academia page ("Reassessing Nussbaum's Interpretation of Epicurean Therapy" ) it's clear that she is willing to challenge the orthodox criticism's of Epicurean philosophy. That presentation defends Epicurus against Nussbaum's charges that Epicurean philosophy is "not real philosophy" and that Epicurus "numbs the intellect and critical thinking." Those points alone would merit a major award from Lucian for "striking a blow for Epicurus!"
I urge everyone in the group to view this video as an example of how to present Epicurean philosophy to those who know very little about it, and then take a look at her Academia page and review her excellent writing on Epicurus.
Thanks again to Ms. Nicoli for posting this to the Epicurean Facebook group!
This question is prompted by this passage from Cicero's "On Duties." Would Epicurus agree with Cato?
One day Cato was asked, what is the most profitable aspect of property ownership?
Cato answered, "Raising livestock with great success."
He was then asked about the second most profitable aspect of ownership.
"Raising livestock with some success," he answered.
And what about the third most profitable aspect?
"Raising livestock with little success."
And the fourth? "Raising crops."
Then his questioner asked, "What about money-lending?"
Cato replied, "What about murder?"
Here is a passage from Cicero's "On Duties" that I have always found fascinating, and I think it is interesting to consider whether Epicurus would agree with this analysis, which concludes: "To conclude, then, it is never expedient to do wrong, because wrong is always immoral; and it is always expedient to be good, because goodness is always moral." I suspect the analysis is open to many concerns from an Epicurean perspective, but I wonder if the same result in the specific examples given might be reached even under Epicurean analysis:
Cicero's On Duties -
"Let it be set down as an established principle, then, that what is morally wrong can never be expedient — not even when one secures by means of it that which one thinks expedient; for the mere act of thinking a course expedient, when it is morally {50} wrong, is demoralizing. But, as I said above, cases often arise in which expediency may seem to clash with moral rectitude; and so we should examine carefully and see whether their conflict is inevitable or whether they may be reconciled. The following are problems of this sort: suppose, for example, a time of dearth and famine at Rhodes, with provisions at fabulous prices; and suppose that an honest man has imported a large cargo of grain from Alexandria and that to his certain knowledge also several other importers have set sail from Alexandria, and that on the voyage he has sighted their vessels laden with grain and bound for Rhodes; is he to report the fact to the Rhodians or is he to keep his own counsel and sell his own stock at the highest market price? I am assuming the case of a virtuous, upright man, and I am raising the question how a man would think and reason who would not conceal the facts from the Rhodians if he thought that it was immoral to do so, but who might be in doubt whether such silence would really be immoral.
{51} In deciding cases of this kind Diogenes of Babylonia, a great and highly esteemed Stoic, consistently holds one view; his pupil Antipater, a most profound scholar, holds another. According to Antipater all the facts should be disclosed, that the buyer may not be uninformed of any detail that the seller knows; according to Diogenes the seller should declare any defects in his wares, in so far as such a course is prescribed by the common law of the land; but for the rest, since he has goods to sell, he may try to sell them to the best possible advantage, provided he is guilty of no misrepresentation.
"I have imported my stock," Diogenes's merchant will say; "I have offered it for sale; I sell at a price no higher than my competitors — perhaps even lower, when the market is overstocked. Who is wronged?"
??{52}"What say you?" comes Antipater's argument on the other side; "it is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve society; you were brought into the world under these conditions and have these inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow, that your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well; will you, in view of all these facts, conceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies is close at hand for them?"
"It is one thing to conceal," Diogenes will perhaps reply; not to reveal is quite a different thing. At this present moment I am not concealing from you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of gods or the highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more advantage to you than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your interest to be told."
{53} "Yea," Antipater will say, "but you are, as you must admit, if you will only bethink you of the bonds of fellowship forged by Nature and existing between man and man."
"I do not forget them," the other will reply: but do you mean to say that those bonds of fellowship are such that there is no such thing as private property? If that is the case, we should not sell anything at all, but freely give everything away."
XIII.
In this whole discussion, you see, no one says, "However wrong morally this or that may be, still, since it is expedient, I will do it"; but the one side asserts that a given act is expedient, without being morally wrong, while the other insists that the act should not be done, because it is morally wrong. {54} Suppose again that an honest man is offering a house for sale on account of certain undesirable features of which he himself is aware but which nobody else knows; suppose it is unsanitary, but has the reputation of being healthful; suppose it is not generally known that vermin are to be found in all the bedrooms; suppose, finally, that it is built of unsound timber and likely to collapse, but that no one knows about it except the owner; if the vendor does not tell the purchaser these facts but sells him the house for far more than he could reasonably have expected to get for it, I ask whether his transaction is unjust or dishonourable.
{55} "Yes," says Antipater, "it is; for to allow a purchaser to be hasty in closing a deal and through mistak ?? worse than refusing to set a man on his way: It is deliberately leading a man astray."
"Can you say," answers Diogenes, "that he compelled you to purchase, when he did not even advise it? He advertised for sale what he did not like; you bought what you did like. If people are not considered guilty of swindling when they place upon their placards FOR SALE: A FINE VILLA, WELL BUILT, even when it is neither good nor properly built, still less guilty are they who say nothing in praise of their house. For there the purchaser may exercise his own judgment, what fraud can there be on the part of the vendor? But if, again, not all that is expressly stated has to be made good, do you think a man is bound to make good what has not been said? What, pray, would be more stupid than for a vendor to recount all the faults in the article he is offering for sale? And what would be so absurd as for an auctioneer to cry, at the owner's bidding, 'Here is an unsanitary house for sale'?"
{56} In this way, then, in certain doubtful cases moral rectitude is defended on the one side, while on the other side the case of expediency is so presented as to make it appear not only morally right to do what seems expedient, but even morally wrong not to do it. This is the contradiction that seems often to arise between the expedient and the morally right. But I must give my decision in these two cases; for I did not propound them merely to raise the questions, {57}but to offer a solution. I think, then, that it was the duty of that grain-dealer not to keep back the facts from the Rhodians, and of this vendor of the house to deal in the same way with his purchaser. The fact is that merely holding one's peace about a thing does not constitute concealment, but concealment consists in trying for your own profit to keep others from finding out something that you know, when it is for their interest to know it. And who fails to discern what manner of concealment that is and what sort of person would be guilty of it? At all events he would be no candid or sincere or straightforward or upright or honest man, but rather one who is shifty, sly, artful, shrewd, underhand, cunning, one grown old in fraud and subtlety. Is it not inexpedient to subject oneself to all these terms of reproach and many more besides?
{58} XIV.
If, then, they are to be blamed who suppress the truth, what are we to think of those who actually state what is false? Gaius Canius, a Roman knight, a man of considerable wit and literary culture, once went to Syracuse for a vacation, as he himself used to say, and not for business. He gave out that he had a mind to purchase a little country seat, where he could invite his friends and enjoy himself, uninterrupted by troublesome visitors. When this fact was spread abroad, one Pythius, a banker of Syracuse, informed him that he had such an estate; that it was not for sale, however, but Canius might make himself at home there, if he pleased; and at the same time he invited him to the estate to dinner next day. Canius accepted. Then Pythius, who, as might be expected of a moneylender, could command favours of all classes, called the fishermen together and asked them to do their fishing the next day out in front of his villa, and told them what he wished them to do. Canius came to dinner at fleet of boats before their eyes; each fisherman brought in in turn the catch that he had made; and the fishes were deposited at the feet of Pythius.
{59} "Pray, Pythius," said Canius thereupon, "what does this mean? — all these fish? — all these boats?"
"No wonder," answered Pythius; "this is where all the fish in Syracuse are; here is where the fresh water comes from; the fishermen cannot get along without this estate."
Inflamed with desire for it, Canius insisted upon Pythius's selling it to him. At first he demurred. To make a long story short, Canius gained his point. The man was rich, and, in his desire to own the country seat, he paid for it all that Pythius asked; and he bought the entire equipment, too. Pythius entered the amount upon his ledger and completed the transfer. The next day Canius invited his friends; he came early himself. Not so much as a thole — pin was in sight. He asked his next-door neighbour whether it was a fishermen's holiday, for not a sign of them did he see.
"Not so far as I know," said he; "but none are in the habit of fishing here. And so I could not make out what was the matter yesterday."
{60} Canius was furious; but what could he do? For not yet had my colleague and friend, Gaius Aquilius, introduced the establshed form to apply to criminal fraud. When asked what he meant by "criminal fraud," as specified in these forms, he could reply: "Pretending one thing and practising another" — a very felicitous definition, as one might expect from an expert in making them. Pythius, therefore, and all others who do one thing while they pretend another are faithless, dishonest, and unprincipled scoundrels. No act of theirs can be expedient, when what they do is tainted with so many vices.
{61} XV.
But if Aquilius's definition is correct, pretence and concealment should be done away with in all departments of our daily life. Then an honest man will not be guilty of either pretence or concealment in order to buy or to sell to better advantage. Besides, your "criminal fraud" had previously been prohibited by the statutes: the penalty in the matter of trusteeships, for example, is fixed by the Twelve Tables; for the defrauding of minors, by the Praetorian law. The same prohibition is effective, without statutory enactment, in equity cases, in which it is added that the decision shall be "as good_faith requires."/a In all other cases in equity, moreover, the following phrases are most noteworthy: in a case calling for arbitration in the matter of a wife's dowry: what is "the fairer is the better"; in a suit for the restoration of a trust: "honest dealing, as between honest parties." Pray, then, can there be any element of fraud in what is adjusted for the "better and fairer"? Or can anything fraudulent or unprincipled be done, when "honest dealing between honest parties" is stipulated? ??{62} But "criminal fraud," as Aquilius says, consists in false pretence. We must, therefore, keep misrepresentation entirely out of business transactions: the seller will not engage a bogus bidder to run prices up nor the buyer one to bid low against himself to keep them down; and each, if they come to naming a price, will state once for all what he will give or take. Why, when Quintus Scaevola, the son of Publius Scaevola, asked that the price of a farm that he desired to purchase be definitely named and the vendor named it, he replied that he considered it worth more, and paid him 100,000 sesterces over and above what he asked. No one could say that this was not the act of an honest man; but people do say that it was not the act of a worldly-wise man, any more than if he had sold for a smaller amount than he could have commanded. Here, then, is that mischievous idea — the world accounting some men upright, others wise; and it is this fact that gives Ennius occasion to say:
In vain is the wise man wise, who cannot benefit himself.
And Ennius is quite right, if only he and I were agreed upon the meaning of "benefit."
{63} Now I observe that Hecaton of Rhodes, a pupil of Panaetius, says in his books on "Moral Duty" dedicated to Quintus Tubero that "it is a wise man's duty to take care of his private interests, at the same time doing nothing contrary to the civil customs, laws, and institutions. But that depends on our purpose in seeking prosperity; for we do not aim to be rich for ourselves alone but for our children, relatives, friends, and, above all, for our country. For the private fortunes of individuals are the wealth of the state." Hecaton could not for a moment approve of Scaevola's act, which I cited a moment ago; for he openly avows that he will abstain from doing for his own profit only what the law expressly forbids. Such a man de ??{64}??{65} not enter, or, if he only is a good man who helps all he can, and harms no one, it will certainly be no easy matter for us to find the good man as thus defined. To conclude, then, it is never expedient to do wrong, because wrong is always immoral; and it is always expedient to be good, because goodness is always moral."
Not knowing when I will be able to get back to this topic, I will state this further. Most of the criticisms I see to "Death is nothing to us" center on the supposed view of Epicurus that it does not matter how long we live. I consider that contention absurd, and do not believe that Epicurus or Lucretius made it. The essential point of this doctrine in Epicurean philosophy is that there is no afterlife in which to suffer punishment. Period - full stop. To contend that it is of no difference to the living whether die in lingering pain, or quickly, or whether we live for another hour or another hundred years is absurd on its face. There is nothing in the texts that compels the conclusion that Epicurus advised his students to accept such an opinion and such conclusions arise only from cramped and hostile interpretations of Epicurean philosophy..
Such an argument is the best I can deduce from the opening abstract quoted below. Maybe indeed there are "modern Epicureans" who contend such a thing, but I certainly would not. Again, if anyone wants to wade through the jargon and post further on this article, please do.
"Perhaps death’s badness is an illusion. Epicureans think so and argue that agents cannot be harmed by death when they're alive (because death hasn’t happened yet) nor when they're dead (because they do not exist by the time death comes). I argue that each version of Epicureanism faces a fatal dilemma: it is either committed to a demonstrably false view about the relationship between self-regarding reasons and well- being or it is involved in a merely verbal dispute with deprivationism. I first provide principled reason to think that any viable view about the badness of death must allow that agents have self-regarding reason to avoid (or seek) death if doing so would increase their total well-being. I then show that Epicurean views which do not preserve this link are subject to reductio arguments and so should be rejected. After that, I show that the Epicurean views which accommodate this desideratum are involved in a merely verbal dispute with deprivationism."
