Posts by Cassius

I think years ago I also read the "Painted Word" which goes along with FBTOH but I can hardly remember. I see my thoughts have changed a lot over the years and art theory is something that I don't have well developed thoughts on today.

Great and I hope you will. The surgery went well I hope? And you had an accident, or what caused you to need it? I think you said it was to your ankle, right?

Godfrey I definitely think there's a lot to that, and that reminds me of a book that I have - From Bauhaus to Our House by Tom Wolfe - https://misspreservation.com/2018/05/16/fro…olfe-1930-2018/

I don't have much of a theory developed yet but I definitely don't think it's "random" what we find pleasurable and what painful. It's pretty easy to conclude that certain physical contacts (like food) could have a very mechanical cause and effect relationship. but given that art is so sophisticated it's hard to imagine how the mechanism of finding something pleasing / painful functions. I gather the Epicureans thought in terms of smooth and rough motions, and maybe there's something to that.

But the issue of how pleasure works, and how it developed "in the first place" deserves a lot of study. And I put "in the first place" in quotes because I am not sure that is a proper question. I tend to think personally that it would not be Epicurean theory to think that there is a "first place" in the "development" of life. If life exists throughout the universe then there is some kind of "eternal" mechanism at work, and presumably that means there may be some kind of "eternal" mechanism of pleasure / pain as well.

That's far beyond the scope of your comment but the bottom line is that there is a lot to the issue of the nature of the pleasure/pain faculty that needs to be explored.

It seems to me that age/culture barriers largely explain different reactions to art. And that's a subset of the larger and wider fact that while we are all humans and there are definite limits to variation, we do have wide differences between individuals and groups in what we find pleasurable and painful. Even the same song or art can evoke different reactions in the same person depending on whether the things we associate it with change over time.

This is something that probably has to sink in over time, but that we probably ought to highlight. I am convinced that the core of Epicurean philosophy applies to everyone, everywhere, because the basic analysis of nature is correct. But within the scope of humanity there's a huge set of divisions culturally, and if we try to assert that our own variation of pleasure is going to fit everyone we're going to be very disappointed.

Something like this has come up before in discussion of "Eastern" vs "Western" approaches not only in music but in meditation and all sorts of "artistic" preferences. That's why when we started to update the "Epicurean music" playlist we worked on some time ago, it made sense to divide the playlist into styles so that each person can find his or her own preference.

I'm beginning to think that right up there with the jolts that people receive when they hear that Epicureans don't think there's life after death, or supernatural gods, or absolute virtues, we ought to include an item to the effect that "And everybody by Nature isn't going to want to live the same way, or follow the same politics, or economics, or music, or art...." With the emphasis on the point that none of these choices are "better" than any other, but that we all by nature have our own faculties of pleasure and pain, and Nature set us up to pursue them as WE see fit, and not as absolutists think we SHOULD see them.

Also - I don't want this to sound like I am taking a "libertarian" approach that every preference is totally the same. I think the reverse - I, like everyone who is honest, has strong preferences based on my sense of pain and pleasure. All I am saying is that when we rank our preferences we should be honest that our choices aren't sanctioned by gods or absolute ideals. We should all support what we find pleasurable, and avoid what we find painful, all the while being realistic about the reasons for our choices.

Great list, and if you get time to post the references like you did for Lactantius, please do!

Thank you!

And did you have your surgery? Are you now having down time during recovery? I hope you'll post away to
your heart's content even if no one responds immediately because setting up the conversations is of tremendous help!

Classic text!

Yes that is the name I remember. I thought his work was very consistent in what I've read - must better than the standard modern Stoic material.

Yes I have seen their material, but I can't recall any names or pages, and they see the same issues that we see.

As you know LD I totally agree, and if I don't watch myself I will say something I shouldn't OK let me go so far as to say that MOSTO seems to be in many respects a British phenomena, and It irritates me greatly think that the peoples I am most closely related to (and perhaps you? ) can't do better than to see how ludicrous their position makes them.

Having recently been pointed to the Ninon De'Ecoles material, and the correspondence she had with St. Evremond (I will come back and correct spellings) I am now forced to confess that I see a pattern. For centuries now the French have totally outclassed the English in their study and understanding of Epicurus. Somehow "stiff upper lip" and being French seem totally impossible to join together in one picture, and in that respect they run rings around are English ancestors.

Ok so my addition to this thread is not very scholarly and probably not helpful, but after ten years of studying Epicurus I am still looking for the day when I meet the first Brit who I think has really internalized what it means to follow Epicurean philosophy. The Brits and most of their MoSto people seem to be naturally-born Stoics in the worst sense of that word. They have taken the worst of Stoicism (the ascetic attitude) and ripped from it the intellectual foundation (the theistic/deterministic worldview) and come up with a result to which I bet my life the ancient Stoics would be mortified to have their name attached.

Ok we are making good progress -

1) When you write: "However, my point is this: if happiness is the sole consideration for one's decisions, he is not likely to embark on ambitions which require great long-term sacrifice. "Whatever is natural is easily procured and only the vain and worthless hard to win." <<< You are pointing out a perceived contradiction between the natural and necessary discussion and any pleasure which requires lots of exertion to obtain. I agree that someone who interprets the "natural and necessary" passages too rigorously is going to make that error, but I don't think it is necessary to lay that error at the feet of Epicurus. This point fits very closely with my argument about the part of the letter to Menoeceus that says "By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul." Yes I know the translations say that, and maybe they are even accurate to what Epicurus did write, but I think both of these issues (natural/necessary and pleasure=absence of pain) have to be taken in the overall context of the philosophy that would have been firmly established in the mind of any Epicurean student before he read that letter.

Even within the letter to Menoeceus itself there are other passages that also taken separately would totally contradict the ascetic interpretation of those passages, and so what we're getting at here is that it is essential to take the philosophy as a whole and to interpret any apparent ambiguities or apparent contradictions in a way that is consistent with the message of the whole. So I agree that a standard academic interpretation of Epicurus is going to be vulnerable to the charge you are making. I simply think that the standard academic interpretation of Epicurus is largely worthless and not worth defending, so I take the DeWitt approach as amplified by Gosling & Taylor, Nikolsky, and Wentham on the nature of Epicurean pleasure.

2) I would argue that death alone is probably a "misfortune" so I would have no issue with argument based on that. It's definitely not something to be desired expect at those times when future pain will outweigh future pleasure. This is another issue where I would deviate from what I gather to be the academic consensus. They take the position you suggest, but I think that Epicurus would definitely say that the longer life can contain greater pleasure so would generally be preferred than the shorter life. That's another extremely interesting issue to discuss and develop over time. But the heart of the issue is this:

"Using your example, the murderer who tortures babies: surely this is unjust. If the definition of injustice does not include horrible acts such as this, we should think the definition is improper." << in a universe where "fate" and absolute principles do not exist, i do not believe you are safe in saying "surely." The "surely" implies facts not in evidence. Would it be possible to say that torture is *always* improper? There are lots of people who would argue that torture of one terrorist to save an innocent city from an atomic bomb would be totally proper. Can we "surely" say that torture of the terrorist's baby, or five or ten or any number of terrorist babies, to save that innocent city from atomic bombing would be improper? I doubt we can - at least I would be willing to entertain it myself, and I won't admit that that makes me a monster.

Now you are returning to " intuition based in reason" for your sanction. As you know I think that there are very interesting questions revolving around the nature of anticipations in Epicurean thought, and to what extent they are related to intuitions. I know DeWitt rather strongly saw them as analogous. And there are related issues in regard to the faculty of pleasure -- from where does the programming that decides what we find pleasurable and painful come? So I think there is potential for common ground on "intuition" playing a role here, so long as the suggestion is not that intuition is programmed by supernatural gods, or by ideal forms existing in another dimension. But as to "reason" I would strongly insist with Epicurus that "with the assistance of reason" is the best that can be said for reason. Computers have no feelings of pleasure or any other "goal" other than what is given to them by their programmers. I see reason as a "tool" not unlike hammers and screwdrivers and compasses and plumb lines and the rest -- all very valuable to assisting us in projecting out consequences of future actions, but never providing in themselves any motivation to pursue any of those future actions.

Yes I think you are correct as to issue two, in that Epicurus would say that the only standard for what is "horrible" is ultimately pain and pleasure, and thus the appeal to any other standard makes no sense (as they do not exist). I think we are pretty clear on that one.

I am not clear, however, on your issue one, and the assertion that Epicureans cannot have deep friendships and strong ambitions. I think Epicurus would define deep friendships and strong ambitions by the intensity of the feelings involved, rather than by any other standard of what a friend "should do" under any particular situation. Same would go for ambitions. For a cite in support of depth of emotion I would include this from Diogenes Laertius: "He [the wise man] will be more susceptible of emotion than other men: that will be no hindrance to his wisdom."

So I presume that you are stating as the basis for your first assertion your definitions that you believe altruistic sacrifices are necessary for strong friendship and strong ambitions. I am familiar with the first part as to friendship, but I don't think I have ever seen anyone assert that altruistic sacrifices are necessary for strong ambitions.

Can you state with any greater clarity the basis for those assertions?

As for issue two, where you conclude that "certain horrible acts are not unjust" that is definitely the Epicurean viewpoint, and you could probably expand it from "certain" to "many." But just so I understand your point, to what authority or source are you appealing to argue that they should be considered "unjust?" Stating that source will bring us even more clearly to the point in dispute.

I hope we can try to reduce the argument down to those specific points which are the keys. This is an important one, but I don't quite think that this is it "There must be intuitive truths about how humans ought to conduct behavior toward one another that goes outside the limit of the hedonistic calculus."

I think Pivot that you are making a point more closely related to the "role of reason" but I am no quite sure that is it either. Not trying to short-circuit the discussion, but do you have a suggestion Pivot on how to most concisely state the ultimate point at issue?

Pivot i am going to be delayed in responding to your most recent post but I wanted to think you for taking the time to write it. As far as i am concerned you are right over the target in seeing these as the issues which must be decided.

But for now when you say: "There must be intuitive truths about how humans ought to conduct behavior toward one another that goes outside the limit of the hedonistic calculus." I would ask why is that the case. If you are suggestiing that there may be inborn dispositions to certain types of behavior, that can be encompassed under the Epicurean theory of "anticipations," but as for the desirability or undesirability of those actions there is no automatic gauge but pleasure and pain.

It seems that you are suggesting that there is a foolish Epicurean and an intelligent Epicurean, but to the extent someone sets a goal with anything other than ALL the effects (including over time) in his calculation, then that person is not accurately following the teachings of Epicurus.

"Now if we accept rationality as a guide for action, along with pleasure and pain, we may get sucked into a Kantian ethical theory which decides to take rationality as the guiding principle of action, instead of pleasure and pain... But that's a bit off-topic (would be interesting to explore elsewhere)." >>> I think you are exactly correct in your prediction where that would lead, so it is not off topic. Ultimately, as Hiram says, rationality can assist us in making all sorts of important calculations, but rationality cannot tell us what "better" means.

All I have time for at the moment but look forward to continuing.

Hi Pivot - You addressed Hiram but I will go ahead with my own comments to your post.

As to each of your analogies - ( the husband leaving the family; the wallet in the dark alley; the sociopath who escapes detection) all of those are difficult cases, but still not exceptions to the rule.

Let's up the ante - a sociopath develops a method of spending his entire life killing innocent babies for fun, but due to his method is never caught.

Does that change the fact of nature that there is no supernatural god? Does that change the fact of nature that there is no evidence to support any kind of "ideal form" or "essences" or "virtue in the air" to which to look for a standard, those remain invalid reference points.

What Epicurus was saying was that in the absence of valid "absolute" reference points we must look to whatever Nature gives us as a guide, and ultimately she gives us nothing more than pleasure and pain by which to judge the desirability of all things.

So in each of your examples it is entirely possible that results that we consider "bad" may take place, but that doesn't mean that there are gods or absolutes of any kind that tell us that we are right and the "bad actor" in any of those cases are wrong. If we think that some mechanism ought to be in place to discourage those results, then we organize communities and nations and police forces and armies, to enforce those rules, but in the absence of our doing so, there are no absolute forces anywhere which will enforce our preferences for us.

So that is one major aspect of what is going on here, about which Epicurus was realistic.

And so when you reach points such as "It just seems like this sort of valuation, as a means to an end, is the wrong kind." The key issue there is "wrong kind" - and the question is "Wrong by what standard?" Epicurus rejects false standards that do not really exist except in our minds, and Epicurus suggests that if we wish to look for "justification" for our own view of right and wrong, we can look nowhere else but to Nature if we
want some kind of sanction outside ourselves. And the only guidance Nature has provided - to all living things - is the faculty of pleasure and pain.

Pivot I agree with Hiram's post but would add this. If indeed your calculation of how to pursue happiness ends up not achieving happiness, then you have by definition miscalculated your means. And by concluding that there are a certain set of tools that should be pursued in themselves, rather than with your eye on the goal, then you are again making the classic mistake of putting means before the end, guaranteeing that you will in fact miss the mark (since the mark is not your goal).

It sounds like you have probably read the extended discussion of this topic under the name of Torquatus in "On Ends" or at Epicurus.net but if you have not that is one of the best explanations of this issue.

The essential point is that there is really no contradiction in the Epicurean procedure. Happy living is pleasurable living - the dominance of pleasure over pain over the course of a lifetime. And that includes all kinds of pleasure, both physical and mental -- every kind you can think of, including the pleasures of the relationships you are talking about. If you walk away from your relationships to pursue short-term hedonism, then you will be plagued with the regrets and emotional pains of the consequences of your action for the rest of your life. Epicurus also indicates that for example if you betray a friend your life will be thrown into such disarray at times you should give up your own life for that of a friend.

So I think an Epicurean would respond to your analysis by affirming two points: (1) that Epicurus was very clear that we are talking about long term net pain over time - not the pleasures of the moment, and (2) that Epicurus was also very clear that pleasure means ALL KINDS of pleasure, including mental/emotional pleasures of all kinds, and that indeed mental / emotional pleasures can often be more intense and of greater concern that physical pleasures.

So your conclusion that "virtue ethics" are of use to you in attaining happiness does not contradict Epicurus at all, as you would already suspect due to PD5 "It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and honorably and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and honorably and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives honorably and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life."

But if you ever make the mistake of forgetting that virtue ethics are a means to the greater end of pleasure, and not an end in themselves, then you are setting yourself up for disappointment by "freezing in" intermediate tools that may work at one moment, but be disastrous at the next moment. And it is inevitable that no tool is ALWAYS going to work, because there is no "fate," no "god-given laws" that apply at all times and places and to all people.

And all this is why we quote Diogenes Laertius' formulation so often:

"If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end. Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point."

Please follow up with us on your thoughts in response to these points because this is one of the most important aspects of Epicurean philosophy.

Definitely the much more mature garden at the end adds to the allegory that this is a sort of "stages of life" illustration.

I am very pleased with the way it is going.

We probably need to prepare a list of the people who are portrayed, so at the moment it is (by panel)

1

2 - Zeno the Stoic

3 - Plato (?)

4 - Unclear to me - (the face in the mirage)

5 - Marcus Aurelius

6 - Christoper Hitchens

7 - Diogenes Laertius and Thomas Jefferson

8 - Lucretius

9 - Epicurus

10

Maybe time for a new FB thread to highlight the project as is now?

Excellent Nate!

Actually I realize that I don't recognize the faces on either side of Jefferson? If you need verified busts of Hermarchus or Metrodorus or a couple of other definite Epicureans those are readily available

Nate I really think that the transition from the baby animals to animals with adult Epicurean heads adds a lot! In the analogy we gain all the benefits of our adult mental powers while never leaving behind the part of us that remains strictly physical / animal. It's really an illusion to think that birth to death is the same as growing from physical to pure mind.

It is as if the allegory of the oasis in animal terms has a reverse negative allegory - -- the allegory of the illusions that we can or should turn into pure mental beings devoid of physics / action.

To some extent that is what Plato's cave stands for -- Plato wants to persuade us that we can leave our senses behind and become purely mental beings in touch with some illusional mental world.

Also: I probably shouldn't say this because I don't want to be negative about him, but I like the placement of Hitchens as the first of the mature correct heads -- as Hitchens did make some Epicurean statements but probably wasn't nearly as far along as Jefferson or certainly Lucretius or Metrodorus or Hermarchus. In that way he serves as a sort of transitional figure.