Posts by Cassius

Godfrey as to whether to continue here or post new threads, of course that's up to you, but here's what I suggest: If you're talking mainly about improving the outline itself as a high-level summary, I would continue here. However in many cases you're going to likely want to go deeper into a particular subject, and in many cases those subjects already have a forum of their own, so it would be ideal to start new threads there. But don't worry too much about starting them in the wrong place, because it's easy to move threads to new locations after they get going.

The big benefit of this forum software as opposed to other methods is that enhances the ability to organize topics and find things easily later, but nothing's perfect. We'll always have the search box to help find things too. But if you haven't scrolled through the forum list, it would be good to spend a moment doing that just so you'll be aware of what is out there already,

Participants here should be aware that there are a significant number of controversies in how to interpret Epicurus. In many cases, academic orthodoxy has reached one conclusion, while writers outside the orthodoxy reach another. The major example of a non-orthodox-position writer is Norman DeWitt, who is rarely cited in modern academic articles because many of his ideas are outside the academic consensus.

The loss of texts, the complexity of the issues, and the fact that Epicurus' philosophical enemies have prevailed for centuries have all contributed to these controversies. As a result they are not easily resolved, and each reader must reach his own conclusion about who is correct. Nevertheless these controversies apply to almost all of the most interesting aspects of the philosophy, so you should be aware from the very beginning that they exist, and be alert to whether the position you are reading is truly unassailable.

I have prepared the chart in this blog article to summarize these controversies, without attempting to resolve them. Whether you start out with a background in the academic orthodoxy, or whether you start out reading DeWitt from the beginning, it will be of great help to you to know that these controversies exist.

Discussion of this chart can continue in this thread, or, if you prefer, start your own thread in the sub-forum devoted to this topic.

OOPS I should have asked you this: If you are a philosophy student in college somewhere, please let me know, because I don't want you to flunk out because you're reading DeWitt and all the teachers think he's full of bunk!

These three of course are both central and controversial:

- The ultimate good is life itself.

- Pleasure is the goal of life. This is because it is the end goal of all other goals.

- Pleasure is defined as: freedom from mental and physical disturbance.

Especially "Pleasure is defined as freedom from disturbance." That's perhaps true from some respects (in terms of quantity, I think, is likely) but probably not true in other respects (is it really fair to say that pleasure EQUALS IN EVERY RESPECT freedom from disturbance?)

That's the big issue of the nature of pleasure which is debated so much and is really worthwhile to explore. If you've not seen my page here, you'll find I've collected some references on that issue: https://newepicurean.com/foundations-2/…pleasure-model/

"- It is impossible to verify the existence of the gods through the senses, therefore knowledge of their existence or non-existence is based solely on the information of the preconceptions and the feelings and, after that, reason."

On this one, this is part of the big debate on gods on which there are many opinions. The majority academics argue that Epicurus' opinion that "gods" exist was based ONLY on perceptions through the senses, the opposite of what you wrote there. Of course DeWitt argues that the primary knowledge of gods come through preconceptions and presumably reasoning based on isonomia and "no single thing of a kind."

And another way to look at this is that Epicurus tended not to frame things in terms of "it is impossible to verify....." i think I am correct in saying that he starts with evidence, and builds on what is there, but he doesn't generally emphasize the impossibility of getting evidence later. What you're saying is no doubt generally correct, and would apply to things like "impossible to fly to the heavens to check them out. Or maybe it would be more accurate too to say "it's impossible (at least for now) to verify the existence of the gods through the FIVE senses."

Part of my hesitancy here too is there is a lot of discussion of "images" and perhaps the brain being able to receive non-visible images. Again, rather than trying to jump to my own conclusion, I'm trying to start like deWitt with thinking about the texts and what is actually said, rather than what's wrong or right. But this is just a minor point in your outline....

Another comment on this bullet point:

- Science needs to be studied only to the degree that it brings relief from fear.

Yes I think that is a good summary of several textual references, but of course I personally would think that this statement must have had a context. Some people like to highlight the "ONLY" and use this to argue that Epicurus was disdainful of knowledge in general, but I think he had a consistent position that everything should bring happiness, and that he meant mental AND physical. Surely we need knowledge of medicine and other natural devices to make life easier and more comfortable, and I can't believe he would have written off those uses. So I tend to think that this is a reference to "theoretical knowledge" and wasn't intended as a slam at the practical sciences which do so much to make life more pleasant and happy.

Godfrey thank you for the time it took to post this! I will have more detailed comments but I see that you are interested in the anticipations aspect, and I have just tonight been exchanging some comments with Elayne, so this is a good place to post and preserve them. I have tried to edit this to make it less choppy, but here is sort of where we started, talking about anticipations and "justice."

We know (1) what Epicurus said explicitly in PD30-40 about justice and he referred to agreements, and we know (2) also the general background that there is a faculty of anticipations that operates to generate "preconceptions." I think also that we should analogize that anticipations work like the faculty of sight and all the others, for example in that the eyes report what they perceive, producing data that our **minds** then process and organize into higher-level information. (With the important point there being that opinion error occurs in the mind, and that the faculties are just reporting, not assembling conclusions. Remember that Epicurus referred to false conclusions from anticipations about the gods.)

We have to find a way to combine (1) and (2).

My first stab at organizing this would be to suggest that the leash law is an example of a high-level arrangement to which the people in that locality more or less "agree" to by the fact that they remain in the society and aren't in open revolt, even though they may not like or follow the leash law. To the extent that the neighbor has violated the leash law, that probably constitutes an "injustice" which would be analyzed as a species of the abstraction we call "justice."

But just like sight processes all kind of perceptions all the time, I would say that to consider anticipations as a faculty means that they are operating all the time as well. If anticipations are an "organizational faculty," (I'm using scare quotes, not quoting anybody) then organizing things that happen into relationships allows us to recognize that once we have met someone, shaken hands, exchanged gifts, etc, we are in the process of generating a relationship that leads to certain expectations. Then, if those expectations are violated, the anticipatory faculty would probably lead you to organize that violation into something that more or less approaches something you would eventually call injustice. Then as part of the process of organizing these potentially violation events into something that is recognizable (not necessarily fully formed concepts), the faculty of pleasure / pain has something to evaluate and process into a feeling of "painful."

I think the main point would be that if you didn't have a faculty of anticipations that predisposed you to begin to assemble handshakes and smiles and interactions into progressively more complex relationships, it would never occur to you to begin to categorized these events into a relationship which would eventually call for a label of "just" or "unjust" or "pleasurable" or "painful." So I agree with you that these things can happen at an "intuitive" level and that the reactions of pain and pleasure can occur even before the event is organized into the fully-formed concepted of "my neighbor violated the leash law."

In contrast, no matter how many times you pet the spider, the spider will never grasp that you are trying to be its friend and that you want a relationship of justice or injustice. (Possibly we may even need to go further down the line to be absolutely sure of that, but I've never been particularly fond of spiders so I doubt that they have much conceptual organizing power )

All this is just my opinion of course, as an attempt to organize the possibilities.

Then further I encourage Elayne to study this further and said:

Just please please please be prepared for the blowback, and remember that the DeWitt position on this (which I am channeling) is held in low esteem in the academic community. Of course maybe "low esteem" isn't accurate -- how about "banished from memory as if he never existed"? Whenever I say something like this don't think I am hedging, it's just that I am one of those people who believes that all of this is useless if we can't document our position, and if blur over the fact that disputes exist. I am fully persuaded that DeWitt is correct and the "anticipations are conceptions" majority is wrong, but at this point with the set of texts that are remaining it's certainly "possible" to argue both sides. I think it's clear why DeWitt argues as he does, and it's easy to see where it leads if we consider anticipations to equal conceptions - but there are many scholars who disagree.

On the other hand anyone who takes on the assignment of supporting Epicurus in giving the central role to "pleasure" will probably find the argument about anticipations to be a tea party in comparison.

And --

David Sedley is a well-known Epicurean scholar and he wrote an article called "Epicurus' Theological Innatism" in which he explores the Epicurean argument for the existence of gods and how that relates to anticipations. We can get that article for you if you'd like it but like most academic articles it really just explores the issues without coming to many conclusions. I recall that there was a subsequent article after that, commenting on Sedley's views of anticipations, and I'll look that up and post a reference. I have it now, it is a 2016 article by Voula Tsouna entitled "Epicurean Preconceptions."


Godfrey I post all that to encourage you to continue to read DeWitt's explanation as the best introduction, but to prepare you for the controversy about this that you will read in other sources. If you read only the academic sources, you will think DeWitt never existed, and his arguments don't even merit mentioning.

Let me stop there for the moment and comment on the articles:

It has been a while since I read the Tsouna article and I recall being dissatisfied with it, but I do think I recall that it dealt somewhat fairly with the argument I am describing as Dewitt's I think I am correct in saying "of course, she never mentions that DeWitt exists...." yep, I thought I remembered this -- her position is "preconceptions are concepts" --

While I am not sure that Tsouna summarizes him correctly, she does address the "innatist" argument by addressing Sedley:

Here she states what is I think pretty close to the DeWitt position:

but then she goes off into the necessity for visual input, which is the point of contention, really, so in the end she digs in to the "preconceptions are concepts formed after exposure to evidence" position. But here I'll leave you -- it is a fascinating argument i think!

I'll just leave you with the thought that I think "predispositon" is the key word here, and that if in fact it is a true "predisposition" then that predisposition is something that exists BEFORE exposure to any sensory examples, which I analogize to "when I was born I was born made up in such a way that I would eventually find vanilla ice cream pleasing before I ever tasted ice cream" or "when I was born I was born predisposed to see light between certain wavelengths before I ever opened my eyes" or whatever.

Thanks a good suggestion and thanks particularly for the link!!

Thanks to godek for this reference to someone I've not read before:

Saint-Evremond has an interesting take with which I someone agree, except for the implication that Epicurus changed his position over time. S.E. points out that Epicurus embraced BOTH active and "restful" pleasures (as we tend to discuss them) but he attributes that to different phases of Epicurus' age. There's no need to look to age for the answer, however, because it's right in front of him that Epicurus taught that we should pursue the pleasures that are available and suit our circumstances -- and some pleasures are more available with less pain during youth, some more appropriate to old age. So I think S.E. is wisely rejecting the austerity view of Epicurus, he's just not quite there in viewing the arguments sympathetically and seeing that there is no contradiction. Overall I think this SE letter is a very worthwhile read. Here's the concluding paragraph:

Link to Google Books

I presume this is who we are talking about, although the name is slightly different: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_de_Saint-Évremond

It might be asked: "If justice applies to people who consent, why would it not be seen as injustice to enforce rule over those that do not consent? Or does justice not apply to compact/consent at all?"

I don't think enforcing a rule over those who do not consent would be a matter of justice, would it? Probably that would be called "force" or something like that, but if the people involved have never consented to the agreement, then forcing them to do something is not a matter of "justice" at all, would it be? The point being that unless there has first been consent to an agreement, "justice" is not something that has any applicaion, because unless there has first been an agreement to bring into relevance a discussion of justice, then "justice" does not apply, as it does no exist in the air.

Also: "So if injustice is a term applied to those who withdrew consent, the individual who never consented to a compact could claim fault with an authoritarian system, but cannot claim it as "injustice" but rather must define the specific acts, like extortion or aggression etc.?"

Yes that is the way that I see Epicurus' formulaton applying. By no means am I suggesting that the person who never consented should not act to revolt against the authoritarian system, I am suggesting that the person who revolts should not view his actions in the prism of "justice" because that is a limited absract construction. The true and real analysis of all that matters in life is considered in terms of pleasure, pain, an

I think most of us would agree that this analysis of "justice" is largely foreign to modern minds. We tend to think there is something called "justice" floating in the air, which is absolute and to which we can look for sanction or disapproval of our actions. But there's no such thing as absolute justice anymore than there is "divine law," or Platonic "ideal forms," or Aristotelian "essences."

Someone asked me: Cassius, does the term compact = consent to you? 36 suggests to me that, although many people consent or compact with a State Government, there are minorities in that territory, which do not give consent or compact to the State government, thus are facing an injustice?

Here's my response:

Let's see -- thinking back to the prior statement in 32 as a starting point".....and likewise for those peoples who either could not or WOULD NOT not form binding agreements not to inflict nor suffer harm." In your question, you are talking about the common situation where not everyone agrees to the form of government. If they withhold their consent, then they withhold their consent, and the issue is what to label the situation. I think what Epicurus is saying that "justice" is a term that applies only to people who have consented to an arrangement. So in an example where there is a minority which does not agree to an arrangement, they will presumably react in various stages from silence to full-blown revolution, but whatever that reaction is, it is not something to be analyzed in terms of "justice or injustice." Meaning they should revolt or not, as they determine is best for them, but in doing so they do not appeal to "justice" as their reasoning, but to other factors, presumably their own view of the best way to their own happiness, which is all the justification they need in Epicurean terms.

Now if they originally agreed, but then withdraw their consent, then that might be closer to "injustice," but I also think that what they should do would hinge on the circumstances, because Epicurus makes clear that when circumstances change, then the aspects of "justice" change to.

In the end it seems "justice" appears to Epicurus to be just a variation of what we might consider to be contract law. Breach of contract is considered to be "unjust" in contract terms, but for those who have never entered a contract in the first place, there can be no breach. Which is as it should be, because that's the way Epicurus views all "virtues" such as "justice" - either they are instrumental toward happiness, or they are largely worthless.

Also:

Couple of things there -- to some extent some animals *can* make "compacts" with us, so that needs to be considered. Even to those animals that aren't subject to domestication or similar "compacts" there will still be a significant issues of pleasure and pain, just as you suggest. So again the main point is that there may be many ramifications to consider in dealing with a particular biting dog, but those ramifications do not include any concept of "justice" tied to supernatural beings or absolute standards of morality.

As to whether a particular action with a particular animal will lead to greater long-term pleasure or less long-term pain, that's going to be like most decisions -- subject to the circumstances and conditions then and there existing. I suspect your suggestion makes a lot of sense in most cases we ordinarily confront, but I would suggest also that it's generally dangerous to prejudge whether forgiveness or punishment is more likely to be the best course. That's because if you overgeneralize you are skirting near the error of thinking there is an absolute rule. It's always important to know the facts and not let rule-making get too abstract.

This thread is the place for discussion of the FAQ found here.

Can You Suggest A Reading List For New Students of Epicurus?

Please consult the links and material on this page, keeping in mind the following preliminary recommendation:

The ancient Epicurean texts that remain to us today are available freely on the internet in many different translations. There are many websites and articles available on the internet with many varying opinions as to the true teachings of Epicurus and many varying evaluations of the merit of those teachings. Unless you are already familiar with the major issues of Greek philosophy, it is very helpful to start the study of Epicurus with a sympathetic overview which attempts to present the full picture of Epicurean philosophy as an ancient Roman or Greek would have known it. That overview can be found in Norman DeWitt’s Epicurus And His Philosophy. Only when you have heard the Epicurean side presented fairly are you equipped to deal with the legions of critics of Epicurus, and only then can you develop your own fair verdict on Epicurus’ conclusions. A taste of Professor DeWitt's approach and assessment of Epicurus can be found in his article “Philosophy For The Millions.”

If you do not have immediate access to DeWitt's book, a second source that provides a very accessible picture of the sweep of Epicurean Philosophy is Frances Wright's A Few Days In Athens. The full book is available here

Wright's book is a fictional story about a young student in ancient Athens attempting to pick from several competing schools, and she does a great job of contrasting Epicurus with the alternatives, especially with stoicism. Wright's book is highly recommended, and like DeWitt does not lead the reader off into a rabbit chase after ataraxia / "absence of pain" as the goal of life.

So as an initial list in the order I would suggest a new student of Epicurus start, I would list:

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt - If you are already "into" philosophy and want a sweeping textbook approach.
2. "Living For Pleasure" by Emily Austin - If you are new to philosophy and want a conversational, engaging, and easy-to-read approach.
3. "A Few Days In Athens" by Frances Wright - If you would prefer to read a fictional story written by a dynamic woman who was a friend of Thomas Jefferson and far ahead of her time.

Recommended Reading List (books and texts). We have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following:

• "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
• The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
• "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
• "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
• The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
• Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
• Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
• The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
• A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
• Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
  Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

As a starting point, DeWitt's introduction in the opening chapter of his book can be read for free here or in article form here.

Here is a "library" page with links to many primary sources available for free on the internet.

This thread is for discussion of the FAQ entry here.

Can You Provide A Simplified Outline of The Most Important Principles Of The Epicurean System?

1. The Universe Operates on Natural Principles And There Are No Supernatural Gods
   1. Gods Are Never Observed to Create Something From Nothing Or Destroy Anything to Nothing
   2. The Universe Operates Through Natural Processes Based On Combinations Of Matter And Void
   3. The Universe As A Whole Is Eternal And Was Never Created From Nothing
   4. The Universe Is Infinite In Size And There Are No "Gods" Outside Of it
   5. True Gods Would Be Self-Sufficient And Would Not Meddle In the Affairs Of Men
2. There Is No Life After Death
   1. All Things In The Universe Which Come Together Eventually Break Apart
   2. The Soul Is Born With The Body And Cannot Survive Without It
   3. Death Is The End of All Sensation, And There Is No Consciousness Without Sensation
   4. There Is After Death No Heaven or Hell For Reward or Punishment
   5. Life Is Short And Therefore Our Time Is Too Precious To Waste
3. The Standards of Truth Are the Senses, The Anticipations, and the Feelings, Assisted By Reason
   1. He Who Argues That Nothing Can Be Known Contradicts His Own Argument
   2. Reasoning Is Based On The Senses And Is Not Valid Without Them
   3. The Sensations Are Without Reason, Incapable of Memory, And Do Not Inject Error Through Opinion
   4. The Reality Of Separate Sensations Is the Guarantee of The Truth Of Our Senses
   5. Not Only Reason, But Life Itself, Fails Unless We Have the Courage To Trust The Senses
4. The Guide of Life is Pleasure
   1. Pleasure, Along With Pain, Is A Feeling, One Of The Three Standards Of Truth
   2. Pleasure and Pain Include All Types of Physical And Mental Experiences
   3. The Mental Pleasures And Pains Are Frequently More Intense Than The Physical
   4. Feelings Of Pleasure Are Desirable And Serve As The Guide of Life
   5. Pain Is To Be Avoided But Is Accepted For The Sake of Greater Pleasure Or Lesser Pain
5. The Goal of Life Is Happiness -
   1. Happiness Is a Life In Which Pleasure Predominates Over Pain
   2. If We Have Happiness We Have All We Need; If We Lack Happiness We Do Everything To Gain It
   3. There Is No Absolute Virtue, Piety, Reason, Or Justice To Serve As the Goal of Life
   4. Virtue, Piety, Reason and Justice Are Valuable Only Insofar As They Bring Happiness
   5. All Actions Are To Be Judged According To Whether They Bring Happiness

This thread is for discussion of the FAQ entry here.

This thread is for discussion of the FAQ entry here.

This thread is for discussion of the FAQ here

Given the feedback so far I have switched the default at least temporarily to dark. Over time if the remarks change it is easy to switch back.

This is a chart I prepared some time ago and featured at NewEpicurean.com.