Posts by Cassius

i went looking for that part and will need to look further. Maybe the word is so important that it deserves a section heading of its own?

In philosophical discussion we frequently confront word games, especially in arguments that deal in Stoic/Platonic dialectical trickery. Some people love to make contentions that appear sound when read in a limited context, but are ridiculous when considered in full context of human life.

Here is a phrase that captures this rule: "We must reject literal interpretations that are literally absurd."

It would be useful to collect other "sayings" or quotes for the same proposition. Below is one that is on point by Mark Twain. If you know of others, please add them here, as we frequently have need to make use of them.

Thinking about this discussion in clinical terms reinforces in my mind that this entire line of thought is as simple as can be. The lives of most people contain a mixture of pleasures and pains. The way any person improves their life to the best possible is to remove the pains he faces and replace them with pleasures. Nothing more complex or mysterious whatsoever is expressed or implied.

And no one would even think of saying anything so basic unless they perceived that there was a contrary viewpoint which required the obvious to be stated.

I am convinced also that we find that contrary viewpoint in "Philebus" and that we need to spend more time articulating it clearly. Not because the argument in Philebus is persuasive, but because unless we are aware of it we tend to think "there must be something more going on here than meets the eye."

And there is.

We are going to find at root that the Philebus issue is a "logic game" involving the alleged insatiability and insufficiency of the feeling of pleasure as the guide of life, and its alleged inferiority to "reason."

But there is a lot more work to be done to explain that. Only then can we reclaim PD3 and similar statements as the validation of our patron goddess "Venus" (as referenced in Philebus) rather than a call to asceticism.

Maybe the "pleasurable feeling of freedom..." or something to that effect (?) With the point being that ataraxia is a subset of pleasurable feelings , (it's something like a mental feeling of being without any disturbances at all), and not a separate type of "fancy pleasure" on its own,

OK as to the issue of whether every experience generates a discernable feeling of pain or pleasure, I do not have a strong opinion or reason to argue for or against that. My perception is that the ultimate issue is just that nature gave us feelings of pain and pleasure as a guide, and not any other kind of feeling for a guide, so I don't think it is necessary philosophically to take the position that every experience must generate a registered feeling of pain or pleasure. I guess I have an open mind as to whether this might explain your reference earlier to feelings which we might not be sure are pleasure or pain. But I don't think this causes any philosophical problem so I doubt it is a significant issue.

It is possible that some of this issue of "low grade" feeling may be explainable by referring to the greek wording, and perhaps Elli could help us with that. I gather we are talking about some variation of "Pathos" and I sometimes wonder if there is a distinction between Pathos/feeling and "sensation." Does every sensation generate a pathos/feeling? Does everything that comes to our attention generate a pathos/feeling? Or is part of the natural programming of pain and pleasure is that it does not weigh in on EVERY experience? Just because every pain or pleasure is an experience, does that mean every experience generates pleasure or pain?

OK comments from here are directed at draft two. I will post several here as I read through for the first time.

Quote from Elayne

Ataraxia is freedom from anxiety and emotional disturbance, sometimes called “tranquility”

Should this be: "Ataraxia is a feeling of freedom from anxiety and emotional disturbance, sometimes called "tranqility.""

Quote from Elayne

If you are having a feeling and are not 100% sure that it is pleasurable, it is not pleasure. Pleasure is unmistakable. Even a newborn can feel it.

Would this be true of pain too? Are we introducing an ambiguity by implying that there are feelings which we cannot tell are either pleasure or pain? How would we explain that?

Quote from Elayne

What are Pain and Pleasure?

It is not necessary to mention this but as I finish reading this section I see you are discussing things i think DeWitt classifies under the "unity of pleasure" -- that pleasure is all of a similar type (as I gather pain is too)

Looks like it requires permission to view...

Here are several clips from a chapter of Gosling & Taylor's "The Greeks on Pleasure" which appear relevant.

First, this one may seem to be a little confusingly written, but the context here is that G&T are saying that they are opposing ALL of the views stated in the rest of paragraph, and not just the views stated in the second part of the first sentence. The second and following sentences are a continuation of the view that they oppose, not a statement of their own views. G&T are opposing all the views stated in this paragraph, as made clear by the final sentence, which states that they are going to provide four objections which "such views" have to meet.

They conclude in the end that the Katastematic /Kinetic distinction was not important to Epicurus, and that gave Nikolsky the idea for his article cited later in this post:

Here is a clip stating that Cicero's interpretation that there is an internal conflict is defective and can be explained away. Note that G&T say that Cicero's interpretation "is not supported by the extant writings of Epicurus" and "attributes views to him [Epicurus] which ought to be surprising."

And here is the most clear statement of the Gosling & Taylor conclusion: "what is important is to get a life of sensory pleasure untainted by pain." (a reflection of Cicero's "nothing was preferable to a life of tranquillity crammed full of pleasures" from Defense of Publius Cestius)

Here is the conclusion by Nikolsky that Epicurus is far from seeing pleasure in a neutral state, and that both Cicero and Diogenes Laertius were both forcing Epicurus into a mold of their own which was not justified by what Epicurus himself had written:

And here is Matthew Wenham reaching the same conclusion, that pleasure is an EXPERIENCE / sensation of pleasure, not some kind of "static" / "katastematic" state from which feeling is absence.

So to condense these last posts down into a concrete suggestion, I am suggesting that the article should probably contain a section something like:
Why does Epicurus talk about limits of pleasure and purity, what does he say about them, and what was his conclusion about how these matters affect our pursuit of pleasure as the goal of life?

We are today in much the same position as Epicurus in 300 BC. We know these arguments are being used against holding pursuit of pleasure as the goal of life, and not only in their original form. The original form of the argument is still being used, with this new addition: Epicurus' own statements seem to say that we should limit pleasure to the purest and least painful forms. If that interpretation is accepted, Epicurus himself seems to be laying the groundwork for living in a cave on bread and water.

If we don't address the arguments that we know are on their way, then we haven't equipped members of the Epicurean school to defeat them.

In both the quantity and purity issues I have collected the references that seemed to me to be most relevant at this page: https://newepicurean.com/foundations-2/…pleasure-model/

With these four graphics as an aid to focusing on the issue:

To these I would now add my draft net pleasure maximization worksheet - A Draft Epicurean Pleasure Maximization Worksheet

These graphics and these points don't do nearly enough to explain the issue in full, and I hope that the article Elayne is drafting will in the end bring all the different points together in a coherent whole.

And so that we can throw everything into the pot before we cook it --- in addition to the above on “limits,” you have the closely related issue of “purity.”

PD12. It is impossible for someone to dispel his fears about the most important matters if he doesn't know the nature of the universe but still gives some credence to myths. So without the study of nature there is no enjoyment of pure pleasure.

Here is another excerpt from Philebus that I think explains why purity is an issue. If you take the following sentence, and instead of “whiteness” you read “pleasure,” you see some immediate implications for why Epicurus was concerned about the purity of pleasure, and why it is very important to discuss pleasure unmixed with any pain whatsoever.Take this sentence and try that:

SOCRATES:* True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful?

PROTARCHUS: Right.

To me you get almost a direct reflect of the first part of PD3 when you do that; “PD3. The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain.”

Here is more context to give you the background:

SOCRATES: And now, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those which may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our description of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no measure, but that those which are not in excess have measure; the great, the excessive, whether more or less frequent, we shall be right in referring to the class of the infinite, and of the more and less, which pours through body and soul alike; and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure.

PROTARCHUS: Quite right, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures.

PROTARCHUS: What is it?

SOCRATES: When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess, abundance, greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these terms stand to truth?

PROTARCHUS: Why do you ask, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Because, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and knowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure and impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and by me and by all of us.

PROTARCHUS: Most true.

SOCRATES: Let us investigate all the pure kinds; first selecting for consideration a single instance.

PROTARCHUS: What instance shall we select?

SOCRATES: Suppose that we first of all take whiteness.

PROTARCHUS: Very good.

SOCRATES: How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is that purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours?

PROTARCHUS: Clearly that which is most unadulterated.

SOCRATES: True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful?

PROTARCHUS: Right.

We can do the same substitution exercise with this example from Socrates: “How can there be purity in [pleasure/whiteness], and what purity? Is that purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of [pain/ other colours]?

Answer: “clearly, that which is most unadulterated.”

So the implication of the analogy is that the purest/highest pleasure is not that which is the greatest quantity, but that which is unadulterated with pain, just as the purest white is not the most quantity of white, but that which is not mixed with other colors.

Does that mean that because sleep, for example, is frequently something that gives us pleasure without any mixture of pain, we should consider sleep to be the highest pleasure and sleep as much as possible?

I don't think so. Once again, i think that Epicurus is dealing with "pure pleasure" in a way that shows how logical arguments that pleasure as a faculty cannot be the guide to the best life, not calling us to select only those simplest activities which produce only pleasure.

Speaking of the context of looking to numbers and geometry for the meaning of life, Cicero in On Ends does not seem very interested in that topic. Is it possible that Cicero was able to argue that Epicurus' discussion of limits of pleasure did not make sense because he knew that in the intervening 200 years the philosophical emphasis on geometry had dissipated? Or that the Romans were simply not impressed with the Platonic / Pythagorean fascination with the mystical significance of numbers and limits?

Certainly today the whole issue of "that which is best must be of a type which has a limit" is not something we hear much about.

However in Epicurus' day, issues of quantity and limits were considered crucial. We see that here from Philebus, where Socrates lays the trap of which ultimately defeats Protarchus, the advocate of pleasure as the goal. Here Socrates lays the foundation that things which can always be increased are "in the class of the infinite.". This later compels Protarchus to say that because pleasure can always be increased, it is in the class of things that can be better or lesser - and this means that Pleasure cannot be in the class of things that can be " best.":

SOCRATES: Then, says the argument, there is never any end of them, and being endless they must also be infinite.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true.

SOCRATES: Yes, my dear Protarchus, and your answer reminds me that such an expression as ‘exceedingly,’ which you have just uttered, and also the term ‘gently,’ have the same significance as more or less; for whenever they occur they do not allow of the existence of quantity—they are always introducing degrees into actions, instituting a comparison of a more or a less excessive or a more or a less gentle, and at each creation of more or less, quantity disappears. For, as I was just now saying, if quantity and measure did not disappear, but were allowed to intrude in the sphere of more and less and the other comparatives, these last would be driven out of their own domain. When definite quantity is once admitted, there can be no longer a ‘hotter’ or a ‘colder’ (for these are always progressing, and are never in one stay); but definite quantity is at rest, and has ceased to progress. Which proves that comparatives, such as the hotter and the colder, are to be ranked in the class of the infinite.

It doesn't seem reasonable to us that some logical argument by Plato would be as worrisome an error as supernatural gods or suffering after death, but then, we are not living in Athens in 300 BC devoting our life to teaching philosophy, surrounded by a den of logicians who held that the meaning of life can be expressed in numbers and geometry and calculated limits.

Sometimes the most important thing we can do is to forge ahead and force discussions on topics that the masses have been taught to fear, or to reject. Sometimes diplomacy doesn't work, and attacking those errors head on is the only way to free ourselves "from the prison of public education and politics."

Maybe that is why Epicurus chose this "confrontational" method of presentation. It certainly seems to me today that the way forward will not come from discussing food and wine and music and dance, but will come only through direct confrontation with errors that are held very dearly by "the public" - errors that people are often afraid to discuss.

That "fear to discuss" is the real prison of public education and politics.

As we continue to discuss and refine this, I think it is very important to incorporate an explanation for why Epicurus is so concerned about "limits." Such an explanation needs to consider what is going on n PD 19 - 21.

PD 18 The pleasure in the flesh is not increased, when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind.

PD 19 Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures by reason the limits of pleasure.

PD 20 The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited, and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time: but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short in any way of the best life.

PD 21 He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want and makes the whole of life complete is easy to obtain, so that there is no need of actions which involve competition.

Unless we have a theory of the importance of "limits" that does not require the conclusion that the simplest life is the best, that is the direction that these sayings seem to lead.

And this drives me back to thinking that:

(1) the most clear way of expressing this issue is as a conflict between "maximum net pleasure vs. minimum net pain."

(2) the explanation that unwinds the problem is that the limit idea is itself limited to stating a *theoretical* limit of quantity alone. The "limit" theory is itself limited to its context, which is the realm of logic, and it was developed solely to refute the logical argument of Plato et al. that the highest good must be something that cannot be exceeded. It serves the secondary benefit of giving us a logical argument to reconcile us with death by helping us see that living forever would only be repetitive, not give us access to any better pleasure than we already have had the chan e to experience.

But the limits argument is subject to exactly the limitation that Elayne sees in the spreadsheet model - feeling cannot be *adequately* expressed in quantitative terms. It can be useful to think of it in those terms in limited situations, such as refuting Plato or planning your daily calendar, but a theory can never replace or completely capture the experience of living.

Also: Considering PD3 and 4 in this way highlights them as targeted logical arguments - targeted at specific errors - just like PD 1 is targeted at supernatural religion and PD2 is targeted at fears of death. None of these are positive statements of what type of pleasure to pursue, all of them concern obstacles to seeing pleasure as the goal of life.

The default forum theme is set to ColorPlay Blue, which is a "dark" theme. Some people prefer a lighter theme, and at the bottom of each page in the footer there is a "change style" link that lets you select others. Each of the "Nexus" themes is lighter and should work well.

Unfortunately it appears that links in the Announcement box can be hard to see on some color variations. If that presents an issue for you, choose the "Nexus Gray" theme and those should be very readable in that color variation.

If others have tips and/or suggestions for fine-tuning of the forum, please post in this thread.

Sounds good to me. As an aside I don't know that there are specific virtues that are distinctly Epicurean, although it is probably fair to say that there are some virtues that Epicurus stressed more than other in the surviving records.

(1) As to the spreadsheet graphic, I want to hear what Martin has to say and I will still want to get more feedback from others. I fully agree with the problem of reducing feelings to numbers, but I think that there is a subset of people who won't cringe but who will find the exercise useful. But I could be wrong I am not sure whether there is a better way to approach it than to test it more widely. As for Elayne's objection I know where she is coming from and I appreciate it. However with other people I suspect that the hot button I am going to hit is not "how dare you reduce feelings to numbers!" but rather "how dare you suggest that minimizing pain is not the goal!" That second group is my intended target.

(2) As to the alternate wording, I do think your suggestions are helpful. However I am also thinking that (maybe in the same way as with the spreadsheet?) we are bombing different targets. I think that "neutral state" is probably not what most people are wondering about. Definitely some do worry about that, and I think "neutral state" is important for discussing the logical problem of whether there is a third feeling besides pleasure and pain. But I think most people are not thinking "Pleasure, pain, and neutral" - they are thinking that Epicurus taught "pleasure, pain, and 'a higher pleasure he called ataraxia." They aren't fascinate by it because it is neutral, they are fascinated by it because they think that he was describing some kind of "higher" pain. On this point I don't generally like to discuss untranslated greek words because I think that obscures the issue, but in this context maybe we should talk about "ataraxia" because that is part of the Okeefe game. Not only imply that it something higher than pleasure, but always give it the fancy Greek name to imply that they have some kind of esoteric knowledge that no one else has.

Elli: Given what you just wrote how do you explain to someone that the letter to Menoeceus seems to say " when.. we mantain ...pleasure... we do not mean.... but freedom from pain the the body and trouble in the mind"

"When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind."