Posts by Cassius

Fragment 108 of the Wall of Diogenes of Oinoanda reads, according to Martin Ferguson Smith: "Fr. 108: [One] must [regard] wealth [beyond] what is natural [as of no more use than water] to a container that is full [to] overflowing. We can look at the other people’s possessions [without envy] and experience [purer] pleasure than they can; for [we are free from cravings].

I suggest that it is important to be careful with fragments taken out of context, and which are partly or wholly "reconstructed" - the portion within the brackets is partly or wholly missing. Martin Ferguson Smith is one of he greatest living scholars of Epicurus, but how certain is he that his reconstruction is correct?

Asserting that wealth beyond what is "natural" is no more use than water to a container that is overflowing does ring true to references to "natural and necessary" in the letter to Menoeceus and in "On Ends," but the purpose of my posting this is to ask you to think about what that really means, precisely.

And without intending to be flippant or disrespectful to anyone, as we consider what "wealth [beyond?] what is natural would mean, I suggest you ask yourself:

"How many slaves are natural / necessary to have?"

Because all of us today would quickly answer "zero" --- and yet we know that Epicurus himself had numbers of slaves, as we know with certainty from his will, in which he freed some but not all (it is unclear how many he had in total).

Are we just to write off Epicurus' slaves as evidence that he was a total hypocrite? I suggest we can discount that as a serious possibility because total hypocrites don't usually attain the status of one of the most respected philosophers of the ancient world. If that is not the answer, then there is some kind of sliding scale at work in the terms "natural and necessary" in general and "wealth [beyond?] that which is natural" in particular.

How do you think that sliding scale might be generally described in a way that is useful to everyone?

It's my job to try to keep everyone civil. One possible more neutral way to consider that question might be:

1 - I can't imagine a devoted Epicurean gladly choosing to live in a hyper-supernatural religious society or any kind, unless he/she was truly deprived of better options. In which case, choosing to live in Mecca might be preferable to being dead (maybe / probably / possibly?). Anyone disagree?

2 - If it were possible to have a "secular-islamic" society, along the lines of our modern non-fundamental Sunday-only Christians, would a dedicated Epicurean still have major objections to living within such a society, and if so, why?

Aside from the famous "What will this babbler say?" in regard to Paul of Tarsus, which was said by an Epicurean or possibly a Stoic, there are few if any texts representing the views of an ancient Epicurean on the early Christians. The only example other than Acts 17:18 which known to me is the commentary of Lucian (who was Epicurean either in reality or in spirit) in his "Death of Peregrine":

"It was now that he came across the priests and scribes of the Christians, in Palestine, and picked up their queer creed. I can tell you, he pretty soon convinced them of his superiority; prophet, elder, ruler of the Synagogue--he was everything at once; expounded their books, commented on them, wrote books himself. They took him for a God, accepted his laws, and declared him their president. The Christians, you know, worship a man to this day,--the distinguished personage who introduced their novel rites, and was crucified on that account. Well, the end of it was that Proteus was arrested and thrown into prison. This was the very thing to lend an air to his favourite arts of clap-trap and wonder-working; he was now a made man. The Christians took it all very seriously: he was no sooner in prison, than they began trying every means to get him out again,--but without success. Everything else that could be done for him they most devoutly did. They thought of nothing else.

Orphans and ancient widows might be seen hanging about the prison from break of day. Their officials bribed the gaolers to let them sleep inside with him. Elegant dinners were conveyed in; their sacred writings were read; and our old friend Peregrine (as he was still called in those days) became for them "the modern Socrates." In some of the Asiatic cities, too, the Christian communities put themselves to the expense of sending deputations, with offers of sympathy, assistance,and legal advice. The activity of these people, in dealing with any matter that affects their community, is something extraordinary; they spare no trouble, no expense.

Peregrine, all this time, was making quite an income on the strength of his bondage; money came pouring in. You see, these misguided creatures start with the general conviction that they are immortal for all time, which explains the contempt of death and voluntary self-devotion which are so common among them; and then it was impressed on them by their original lawgiver that they are all brothers, from the moment that they are converted, and deny the gods of Greece, and worship the crucified sage, and live after his laws. All this they take quite on trust, with the result that they despise all worldly goods alike, regarding them merely as common property. Now an adroit, unscrupulous fellow, who has seen the world, has only to get among these simple souls, and his fortune is pretty soon made; he plays with them."

---------

If anyone knows of other ancient examples, please post them.

http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/luc/wl4/wl420.htm

Another Admin note -- I just pasted post 27 into this thread, which makes it slightly out of context from the flow above it. Please keep that in mind and do not consider it an immediate response to the post above it.

I will do my best to moderate this thread consistently with the purpose of the forum for the overall promotion of Epicurean philosophy. While I often share the feeling included within the Emma Goldman quote above, one man's bigotry is another man's highest virtue, and it cannot be the purpose of this forum to have full-scale conflict between which of opposing sides of any specific cultural conflict is "correct." It is in fact my view that given PDs 30-40 it is very difficult to see how an Epicurean argument can be advanced in "proof" that any single perspective on an ethical issue is in fact "correct." There are only the people involved, and their varying views of what is pleasant in life, and their decision as to what will make them happiest within their limited lifespans. As Epicurus stated, and as probably ought to be the heart of this discussion, "there was never such a thing as absolute justice...."

Oscar as we exchanged in private messages, I will set up a new thread and move all or part of this one to something more descriptive. However I think we all would be well served to remember that we are skirting the kind of modern politics that is so divisive and disruptive as to produce much more pain than pleasure, and much more disruption than assistance if our common purpose is the advancement of Epicurean philosophy.

If we are going to be able to stay within the confines of our common purposes, we're going to need to be very careful about how we proceed from here. Obviously the ancient texts from Epicurean sources are fully in play, and it ought to be possible to discuss how these issues should be approached without name-calling on any side, or unnecessary specific references to modern politics.

I realize that it will be difficult to achieve this however, so we'll likely have to accept that some topics are just not consistent with the purpose of this forum.

Another thing I want to do to is to pull together the cites from the surviving texts that would most closely bear on this topic, which is really not "Islam" as much as it is something more general - such as discussion of the benefits and hazards of the identity of cultures and nations, or something like that.

Here is a preliminary list that immediately occurs to me:

Epicurus PD10: (As to the invalidty of considering something monstrous if it allows the person involved to successfully live pleasurably) "10. If the things that produce the pleasures of profligate men really freed them from fears of the mind concerning celestial and atmospheric phenomena, the fear of death, and the fear of pain; if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, we should never have any fault to find with such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasures from every source and would never have pain of body or mind, which is what is bad."

Diogenes Laertius: (as to some men being our enemies) "Epicurus used to call ... the Cynics the 'enemies of Greece"

Diogenes of Oinoanda: (as to making generalizations about cultural groups) :

"A clear indication of the complete inability of the gods to prevent wrong-doings is provided by the nations of the Jews and Egyptians, who, as well as being the most superstitious of all peoples, are the vilest of all peoples."

Diogenes of Oinoanda:(as to considering false religion to be a disease coexisting with the idea of love of humanity) "Now, if only one person or two or three or four or five or six or any larger number you choose, sir, provided that it is not very large, were in a bad predicament, I should address them individually and do all in my power to give them the best advice. But, as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, and their number is increasing (for in mutual emulation they catch the disease from one another, like sheep) moreover, [it is] right to help [also] generations to come (for they too belong to us, though they are still unborn) and, besides, love of humanity prompts us to aid also the foreigners who come here."

Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus: (As to the best life being spent among like-minded friends) "Exercise yourself in these and related precepts day and night, both by yourself and with one who is like-minded; then never, either in waking or in dream, will you be disturbed, but will live as a god among men. For man loses all semblance of mortality by living in the midst of immortal blessings."

Epicurus Doctrines on Justice (following PD10 that there is no absolute standard of right and wrong other than the pleasurable living of the people involved, so that when there is no agreement, there is no concept of justice):

32. Those animals which are incapable of making binding agreements with one another not to inflict nor suffer harm are without either justice or injustice; and likewise for those peoples who either could not or would not form binding agreements not to inflict nor suffer harm.

33. There never was such a thing as absolute justice, but only agreements made in mutual dealings among men in whatever places at various times providing against the infliction or suffering of harm.

34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which is associated with the apprehension of being discovered by those appointed to punish such actions.

36. In general justice is the same for all, for it is something found mutually beneficial in men's dealings, but in its application to particular places or other circumstances the same thing is not necessarily just for everyone.

37. Among the things held to be just by law, whatever is proved to be of advantage in men's dealings has the stamp of justice, whether or not it be the same for all; but if a man makes a law and it does not prove to be mutually advantageous, then this is no longer just. And if what is mutually advantageous varies and only for a time corresponds to our concept of justice, nevertheless for that time it is just for those who do not trouble themselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts.

38. Where without any change in circumstances the things held to be just by law are seen not to correspond with the concept of justice in actual practice, such laws are not really just; but wherever the laws have ceased to be advantageous because of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for that time just when they were advantageous for the mutual dealings of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when they were no longer advantageous.

(As to excluding from our lives people who cannot coexist with us):

39. The man who best knows how to meet external threats makes into one family all the creatures he can; and those he can not, he at any rate does not treat as aliens; and where he finds even this impossible, he avoids all dealings, and, so far as is advantageous, excludes them from his life.

(As to the desirability of being able to defend ourselves by force from threats against us, and living among people who share our values)

40. Those who possess the power to defend themselves against threats by their neighbors, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee of security, live the most pleasant life with one another; and their enjoyment of the fullest intimacy is such that if one of them dies prematurely, the others do not lament his death as though it called for pity.

Epicurus Letter to Menoeuces: (As to the best life as one being spent among -like-minded friends): "Exercise yourself in these and related precepts day and night, both by yourself and with one who is like-minded; then never, either in waking or in dream, will you be disturbed, but will live as a god among men. For man loses all semblance of mortality by living in the midst of immortal blessings."

Torquatus / Cicero: (As to some men being non-reformable and thus requiring restraint by force: "Yet nevertheless some men indulge without limit their avarice, ambition and love of power, lust, gluttony and those other desires, which ill-gotten gains can never diminish but rather must inflame the more; inasmuch that they appear proper subjects for restraint rather than for reformation."

Torquatus / Cicero: (As to the "safety of our fellow citizens" and defending our country in time of war can be essential to our own wellbeing) "Can you then suppose that those heroic men performed their famous deeds without any motive at all? What their motive was, I will consider later on: for the present I will confidently assert, that if they had a motive for those undoubtedly glorious exploits, that motive was not a love of virtue in and for itself.—He wrested the necklet from his foe.—Yes, and saved himself from death. But he braved great danger.—Yes, before the eyes of an army.—What did he get by it?—Honor and esteem, the strongest guarantees of security in life.—He sentenced his own son to death.—If from no motive, I am sorry to be the descendant of anyone so savage and inhuman; but if his purpose was by inflicting pain upon himself to establish his authority as a commander, and to tighten the reins of discipline during a very serious war by holding over his army the fear of punishment, then his action aimed at ensuring the safety of his fellow citizens, upon which he knew his own depended."

Lucian - "Aristotle the Oracle-Monger" (as to Epicureans confronting false religion) - ""The prosperity of the oracle is perhaps not so wonderful, when one learns what sensible, intelligent questions were in fashion with its votaries. Well, it was war to the knife between him and Epicurus, and no wonder. What fitter enemy for a charlatan who patronized miracles and hated truth, than the thinker who had grasped the nature of things and was in solitary possession of that truth? As for the Platonists, Stoics, Pythagoreans, they were his good friends; he had no quarrel with them. But the unmitigated Epicurus, as he used to call him, could not but be hateful to him, treating all such pretensions as absurd and puerile."

Lucian - "The Death of Peregrine" (as to Epicurean criticism of Christianity) - "It was now that he came across the priests and scribes of the 11 Christians, in Palestine, and picked up their queer creed. I can tell you, he pretty soon convinced them of his superiority; prophet, elder, ruler of the Synagogue--he was everything at once; expounded their books, commented on them, wrote books himself. They took him for a God, accepted his laws, and declared him their president. The Christians, you know, worship a man to this day,--the distinguished personage who introduced their novel rites, and was crucified on that account. Well, the end of it was that Proteus was arrested and thrown into prison. This was the very thing to lend an air to his favourite arts of clap-trap and wonder-working; he was now a made man. The Christians took it all very seriously: he was no sooner in prison, than they began trying every means to get him out again,--but without success. Everything else that could be done for him they most devoutly did. They thought of nothing else. Orphans and ancient widows might be seen hanging about the prison from break of day. Their officials bribed the gaolers to let them sleep inside with him. Elegant dinners were conveyed in; their sacred writings were read; and our old friend Peregrine (as he was still called in those days) became for them "the modern Socrates." In some of the Asiatic 13 cities, too, the Christian communities put themselves to the expense of sending deputations, with offers of sympathy, assistance, and legal advice. The activity of these people, in dealing with any matter that affects their community, is something extraordinary; they spare no trouble, no expense. Peregrine, all this time, was making quite an income on the strength of his bondage; money came pouring in. You see, these misguided creatures start with the general conviction that they are immortal for all time, which explains the contempt of death and voluntary self-devotion which are so common among them; and then it was impressed on them by their original lawgiver that they are all brothers, from the moment that they are converted, and deny the gods of Greece, and worship the crucified sage, and live after his laws. All this they take quite on trust, with the result that they despise all worldly goods alike, regarding them merely as common property. Now an adroit, unscrupulous fellow, who has seen the world, has only to get among these simple souls, and his fortune is pretty soon made; he plays with them."

Aside: I am not sure that "Welcome Daniel" is an adequate reflection of the subject matter anymore. At some point I'll find a way to split off the thread to a new heading.

In this part of the discussion I think this passage from book three about the nature of men is relevant, in which generalizations are made about the natures of animals and of men. Now while we would not today talk in terms of the same forces leading to these generalizations, Lucretius/Epicurus seem very comfortable with generalizing, while at the same time saying that reason can still allow us to living lives worthy of the gods despite these generalizations being true. This is the Bailey translation

Moreover the mind possesses that heat, which it dons when it boils with rage, and the fire flashes more keenly from the eyes. Much cold breath too it has, which goes along with fear, and starts a shuddering in the limbs and stirs the whole frame. And it has too that condition of air lulled to rest, which comes to pass when the breast is calm and the face unruffled. But those creatures have more of heat, whose fiery heart and passionate mind easily boils up in anger. Foremost in this class is the fierce force of lions, who often as they groan break their hearts with roaring, and cannot contain in their breast the billows of their wrath. But the cold heart of deer is more full of wind, and more quickly it rouses the chilly breath in its flesh, which makes a shuddering motion start in the limbs. But the nature of oxen draws its life rather from calm air, nor ever is the smoking torch of anger set to it to rouse it overmuch, drenching it with the shadow of murky mist, nor is it pierced and frozen by the chill shafts of fear: it has its place midway between the two, the deer and the raging lions.

So is it with the race of men. However much training gives some of them an equal culture, yet it leaves those first traces of the nature of the mind of each. Nor must we think that such maladies can be plucked out by the roots, but that one man will more swiftly fall into bitter anger, another be a little sooner assailed by fear, while a third will take some things more gently than is right. And in many other things it must needs be that the diverse natures of men differ, and the habits that follow thereon; but I cannot now set forth the secret causes of these, nor discover names for all the shapes of the first atoms, whence arises this variety in things. One thing herein I see that I can affirm, that so small are the traces of these natures left, which reason could not dispel for us, that nothing hinders us from living a life worthy of the gods.

Quote from Oscar

But I won't generalize and dehumanize and monstrosize people. I won't. We know where that ends, Epicureans should know better. We are all individuals at the end of the day.

Oscar that sentence strikes me as an interesting one to discuss philosophically. What part of the philosophy would you point to in support of "Epicureans should know better" than to generalize about people? "Dehumanizing" and "monstrosizing" are extremes, but are not many generalizations perfectly appropriate, even (or especially) about the ramifications of religion?

How do you think an Epicurean would approach the question of deciding when to generalize about people, and what types of generalizations are valid and not valid?

Thank you for the detailed reply, Oscar.

Largely I'll just repeat my view from earlier, that I think in an atomistic universe where different people have different experiences, and where there is no absolute justice, then it is important that we - as you indicated earlier - not overgeneralize.

One of the important lessons I think from Epicurus is that your experiences and observations and feelings are valid for you, which the experiences and observations and feelings of others are valid for them.

In your experience you have had primarily pleasant dealings with your islamic neighbor. Other people in other situations are known to exist who cannot or will not say the same. Your conclusions have worked out for you, and likewise others who take a different view will say that their conclusions are valid for them.

It would not only not solve anything to compare the different sets of experiences and argue that one is superior, but I would go further and say that it would not be sound Epicurean philosophy. Raising one set of experiences in a matter such as this and abstracting it so as to say that one position or the other should be universal, would I think contradict the Epicurean worldview. Only if there were Fate or a Supernatural god would we be able to say that one set of preferences is "wrong" and another is right.

As I struggle to interpret and apply Epicurean principles such as the last ten Principal Doctrines, each of which is based on an understanding that there is no absolute justice, I don't think the direction it points could lead in any other direction.

Quote from Elayne

The only case I can think of where the recommended action was not specific was at his death. If he had morphine, I feel like he would have used it.

I think I have heard Elli talk about how the warm wine he drank was intended to be in that department, but my personal knowledge of alcohol is very limited so maybe Elli has info from other sources about what they used in ancient Greece as pain-killers.

Quote from Elayne

However, if the pleasure from tasting cake was as intense as the pleasure from escaping death, as long lasting as the knowledge of peace and safety, and could also be spread over the whole body including the amygdala, then eating cake (or whatever else is easy) would be the only thing one ever needed to do.

Yes, and that is exactly how I interpret PD10!

Quote from Elayne

Epicurus gave specific pleasures to remove specific pains

Yes I think that is excellent analysis. I feel sure that if we had more of the texts, many of them would be devoted to practical advice like this. It would not be like Epicurus to leave the discussion of anything at an abstract level, he would tie it to specific observations with which we are familiar. That's why I view the letter to Menoecus, as DeWitt says, as an extremely high-level summary that is technically correct as written, but which is tied tightly to the details from which it was derived, which is how it avoids becoming so ambiguous as to be meaningless. And the loss of those details, plus the flood of propaganda to the contrary, is why so many people have a hard time with the absence of pain discussion. It makes perfect sense if you keep the rest of the details in mind, but sounds bizarre, and is interpretable in bizarre ways, if you don't keep it connected to its foundation.

As to dreams, I think Clive you're talking more in the area of "images" (which would also be made of atoms, however). The extended discussion of that is in Lucretius Book IV, and I gather that the Epicureans thought it was essential to discuss images not only as they relate to dreams, but because the movement of atoms back and forth through our eyes, ears, nose, touch, etc is how the senses work.

Clive:

The great majority of the Oinoanda inscription as translated by your fellow Brit Martin Ferguson Smith is here for free: http://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html

As to Haris Dimitriadis, I communicate with him via Facebook, and I like him very much. He sent me a copy of his book and I agree it is very good -- a good combination of both theory and practical application.

You've probably picked up that I am much more a fan of your sort-of-fellow-countryman Norman DeWitt (Canadian) than I am of Alain De Botton, because I think DeWitt's version of Epicurean philosophy is far more accurate. But anything that gets one started in Epicurus is good because I think most people will eventually be able to dig themselves through sorting out the controversies for themselves.

For what it's worth my collection of on-line book resources is here: https://newepicurean.com/resources/library/

This thread may give us one of our first opportunities to deal with strong differences of opinion on important details while still focusing on the core aspects of profiting from Epicurean philosophy, and also helping to reignite interest in Epicurus via broad areas in which we can agree.

One of the hallmarks of the ancient Epicureans appears to have been frankness of speech, so I will be frank and observe that my own personal experience and observation is much in line with Daniel's perspective. I consider Abrahamic religion in all its variations to be poison which pollutes thought and discussion and makes it impossible for fundamental Epicurean perspectives to grow. I would cite Lucian's "Alexander The Oracle Monger" and his comments in "Peregrine" about Christians for support of that, but obviously the topic is immense.

However rather than completely agree with this "Rationality cannot be integrated with faith; nor reason with anti-reason; nor, in philosophy, fact with fantasy" I would be a little more cautious. Clearly Epicurus was strongly against the excesses of Platonic dialectical logic, and yet he said also that the wise man governs his life by reason. I'm not sure anyone is explicitly "anti-reason" in the modern world, but I agree that Abrahamic religion teaches exactly that (anti-reason on the most fundamental issues of life). And I am no fan of fantasy, but the limits and uses of speculation can get complex.

So to repeat my personal experience and viewpoint is very close to what Daniel is suggesting. But to simply say "I agree with X" doesn't advance the ball. I think all of us would agree that the world is in a terrible mess due to poor thinking on these issues, and I don't hear or see anyone in the modern world suggesting a way out of the problem. That's where I think Epicurus and Epicurean philosophy comes in, but we need to start at a deeper level and establish the issues on which we can agree before we jump too fast into those areas where we disagree. And I that I think that I sense that I agree with Oscar, that it is very important not to overgeneralize. In my personal life most of the people who are closest and most important to me are Christian. I abhor their religion, and yet I understand how they got to where they are, and I know it's not possible to address the problems overnight - and in many cases it's impossible to address them.

So where I'd like to think that we can contribute to the bigger problem, while at the same time profiting ourselves, is to start deeper and work on seeing where we agree and disagree on Epicurus' fundamental views on religion and the nature of the universe.

And at that level, there ARE NO SUPERNATURAL GODS, and anyone or any institution which promotes otherwise is ultimate going to be the enemy of Epicurean philosophy and Epicureans - whether we consider them to be OUR enemy, or not.

One good place for the textual analysis is this: http://wiki.epicurism.info/Principal_Doctrine_9/

I don't always agree with the Epicurism wiki perspective, but in this case I do think it makes sense that "Epicurus presents here a logical defense for his belief that the various pleasures are in an important sense independent: if, he hypothesizes, all pleasures could be somehow "condensed", so that their sum total could be experienced all at the same time, then one pleasure would not differ from any other. Yet the pleasures do differ, Epicurus implies, since they cannot be thus condensed -- another syllogism by negative hypothesis, demonstrating that the opposite is in fact true."

I definitely agree that Epicurus regularly uses syllogisms by negative hypothesis on a regular basis. And as the last part of the analysis indicates, there is probably some complicated context involved here.

Getting back to a point of the original post on which I have not commented, I think this is important:

Quote from Elayne

PD 9 states “If every pleasure were alike condensed in duration and associated with the whole organism or the dominant parts of it, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Is there another quote in which Epicurus uses that word "condensed"?

I haven't had time to check back in the sources, but I don't think there is much else - this seems to be the main and perhaps only use of the term. Let's tag Elli and she if she is aware of any other occurrences.

If indeed this is the only or main one, that would be another reason to be cautious about reading too much into it. I tend to think that in *most* cases Epicurean philosophy is pretty simple and direct and that words that might seem like they are obscure or technical (such as "ataraxia") really are NOT so obscure or technical. And what goes with that is that people who try to take a word and make it into something difficult are in dangerous
territory.

It would seem to me that Epicurus might have used the word "extended" rather than "condensed" and meant pretty much the same thing, as what he seems to be talking about is "filling the experience" so that there's nothing sensed/felt except the pleasure that is under consideration.

Likewise the word translated as "every" -- would that be the same as "each" or "any" in this context?

What I am reading into this is pretty much something to the effect of:

If any single pleasure were to so expand/extend in time, and be felt throughout the whole organism, so that in terms of both time and intensity the organism felt nothing but this single pleasure, then the full experience of that pleasure would be no different than the full experience of any other pleasure. And as a result, for example, if the pleasure of eating an apple filled the entire human experience and crowded out every other feeling for the life of the person, then the person would never have any need for anything other than eating that apple.

It seems to me that its obvious that pleasures do differ in intensity, and in the duration over which we experience them. And I would think that they differ in many other respects as well, EXCEPT for the unifying point (and this is what I gather is what DeWitt is talking about in "Unity of pleasure") that all pleasures are the same in this one respect -- THEY FEEL GOOD.

Regardless of whether what I am saying is correct, I think we need to dig into the implications of the statement not only in respect of time and intensity, but in other terms as well. And we need to think about what it could mean to imply that sex and eating a cookie would not differ from each other if they filled the entire human experience. And we also need to keep in mind that when something doesn't appear to make pretty clear sense, we need to scrutinize various options for translating the text, or even question whether the text is really intact.

Key passages:

Epicurean self-sufficiency and adjustment to living within our means of the moment is not so that we may ratchet ourselves to a lower and lower existence, but to *change* our circumstances.

Behold! Just like the retreat of the Spartans in the battle of Plataea, at a time that was favorable to them they made a U-turn and thereafter they were victorious!

And the Epicureans? Are they trained to endure and withstand ultimately only to adjust to the necessary external conditions?

... What am I saying? That is the national anthem of the Stoics!

He who is self-sufficient is skilled and strong enough to act on his own, without being dependent on others.

And the Epicurean is self-sufficient.

The swerve allows him to not just adjust to the necessity, but to CHANGE it.

"As an Epicurean, I'd have gladly lived in the Islamic world over Judeo-Christian world."

I thumbs-upped that last post but I should clarify on the last sentence that it would depend a lot on the particular circumstances of the jews/christians/muslims involved !

Quote from Oscar

I know this is asking a lot, post the specific attributes and sensations that Epicurus gives to his God(s)?

It would be interesting to try to address this specifically, although it is dangerous to tease too much out of isolated passages, single words, translations, etc.

1. Blessed

2. Immortal

We have then a preconception of such a nature that we believe the gods to be blessed and immortal. For nature, which bestowed upon us an idea of the gods themselves, also engraved on our minds the belief that they are eternal and blessed.

3. Human shape

4. Not corporeal, but resembling a bodily substance

5. Not containing blood, but the semblance of blood

“For the divine form we have the hints of nature supplemented by the teachings of reason. From nature all men of all races derive the notion of gods as having human shape and none other; for in what other shape do they ever appear to anyone, awake or asleep? But not to make primary concepts the sole test of all things, reason itself delivers the pronouncement. For it seems appropriate that a being who is the most exalted, whether by reason of his happiness or of his eternity, should also be the most beautiful; but what disposition of the limbs, what cast of features, what shape or outline can be more beautiful than the human form? You Stoics at least, Lucilius, (for my friend Cotta says one thing at one time and another at another) are wont to portray the skill of the divine creator by enlarging on beauty as well as the utility of design displayed in all parts of the human figure. But if the human figure surpasses the form of all other living beings, and god is a living being, god must possess the shape which is the most beautiful of all; and since it is agreed that the gods are supremely happy, and no one can be happy without virtue, and virtue cannot exist without reason, and reason is only found in the human shape, it follows that the gods possess the form of man. Yet their form is not corporeal, but only resembles bodily substance; it does not contain blood, but the semblance of blood.

Not part of description but of our perception of them

6. "....an endless train of precisely similar images arises from the innumerable atoms and streams towards the gods,"

7.In number, at least as many gods as there are humans:

From this principle it follows that if the whole number of mortals be so many, there must exist no less a number of immortals, and if the causes of destruction are beyond count, the causes of conservation also are bound to be infinite

8. How they spend their time:
... how they pass their days. The answer is, their life is the happiest conceivable, and the one most bountifully furnished with all good things. God is entirely inactive and free from all ties of occupation; he toils not neither does he labor, but he takes delight in his own wisdom and virtue, and knows with absolute certainty that he will always enjoy pleasures at once consummate and everlasting.

9. Somewhere it is stated that they speak Greek, or a language like Greek, but I am not sure of the cite for that.