Posts by Cassius

And video too!

I have just posted a couple of items on an article by David Sedley entitled "Diogenes of Oenoanda on Cyrenaic Hedonism." The abstract of the article does not give much indication of its content, and certainly not its full value. Now that I have had the chance to read it, I see several aspects that are important not to miss:

1. It contains an excellent argument against those who try to argue that since Epicurus held virtue and pleasure to be so closely related, it is OK for us to aim at virtue as a goal. I am going to clip the heart of Sedley's attack on that view and attach it here, because this error is a continuing problem.

2. What the article is really about is that Sedley argues that some of the parts of the Inscription that are otherwise confusing make more sense when read as an attack on the Cyreniacs, rather than on the Stoics. He focuses on the section on causes that precede, concur with, or follow the pleasures they generate as targeted not at Stoics, but at Cyreniacs. Sedley makes a lot of sense, and for those of us who are into the details, the article is well worth reading for this material.

3. In making the point that Martin Ferguson Smith probably has his reconstruction (or at least his commentary) slightly off, Sedley is providing an excellent example of how we need to be **very** careful in working with fragmentary texts. If so excellent an expert as MFS can misconstrue fragmentary texts, how easy it is for those of us who have not devoted our lives to study of the texts to make errors of our own when the texts that we have are in pieces or missing!

If there is enough interest in the Cyreniacs we may open a new section of the forum devoted only to them, but for now let's talk about them under "Hedonism."

I've just read the following article by David Sedley entitled "Diogenes of Oenoanda on Cyreniac Hedonism."

The main thrust of the article is that Sedley believes that Martin Ferguson Smith is wrong in thinking that several sections of the Inscription are targeted against the Stoics. He believes, rather, that they are targeted against the Cyreniacs -- particularly this section:

This is an excellent article and affirms the hazards in textual reconstruction from mutilated original texts.

The following observation comes from David Sedley's Diogenes of Oenanda on Cyrenaic Hedonism. It provides an excellent response to people who want to argue that since Epicurus held virtue to be inseparable from the happy life, that he also held that virtue is desirable for itself.

Being a Roman history fan I had to look up the history of the location, so this would have been known to the ancient Epicureans as "Sena Gallica":

"Senigallia was first settled in the 4th century BC by the gallic tribe of the Senones who first settled this coastal area . In 284 BC, the settlement was taken over by Romans, who established the colony Sena Gallica there. "Sena" is probably a corrupted form of "Senones" and "Gallica" (meaning "Gaulish") distinguished it from Saena (Siena) in Etruria.

In the prelude to the battle of the Metaurus between Romans and Carthaginians in 207 BC, Sena Gallica was the southernmost point of Carthaginian General Hasdrubal Barca's invasion of Italy. Senigallia was ravaged by Alaric during the decline of the Roman Empire and fortified when it became part of the Byzantine Empire. It was again laid waste by the Lombards in the 8th century and by the Saracens in the 9th. It was one of the five cities of the medieval Adriatic duchy of Pentapolis. "

Wow that is great Michele!

Do you happen to have a form of the program on a web page that we can run through Google translate when we post on English pages?

Also, looking forward to an English translation of your book some day!

Good go hear from you Joshua - Happy 20th to you too!

Happy Twentieth of July!

At the time of Epicurus, the most advanced criticism against Pleasure as the Good was probably Plato's Philebus, which is thought to be one of Plato's last major works.

For this Twentieth, here is a perceptive paragraph by Benjamin Jowett, the translator of the standard English edition of Philebus, in which Jowett explains the great resistance to the idea of pleasure as the greatest good.

Here Jowett, after summarizing the argument in Philebus, emphasizes to us that the Platonists of the world will never leave Epicureans in peace, and will always fight against it:

Quote

There have been many reasons why not only Plato but mankind in general have been unwilling to acknowledge that 'pleasure is the chief good.' Either they have heard a voice calling to them out of another world; or the life and example of some great teacher has cast their thoughts of right and wrong in another mould; or the word 'pleasure' has been associated in their mind with merely animal enjoyment. They could not believe that what they were always striving to overcome, and the power or principle in them which overcame, were of the same nature. The pleasure of doing good to others and of bodily self-indulgence, the pleasures of intellect and the pleasures of sense, are so different:—Why then should they be called by a common name? Or, if the equivocal or metaphorical use of the word is justified by custom (like the use of other words which at first referred only to the body, and then by a figure have been transferred to the mind), still, why should we make an ambiguous word the corner-stone of moral philosophy? To the higher thinker the Utilitarian or hedonist mode of speaking has been at variance with religion and with any higher conception both of politics and of morals. It has not satisfied their imagination; it has offended their taste. To elevate pleasure, 'the most fleeting of all things,' into a general idea seems to such men a contradiction. They do not desire to bring down their theory to the level of their practice.

The study of Epicurus has never been a matter of food and drink and dance and song; it is been the struggle of those who push religion and idealistic political goals against the idea that people should live to pursue happiness.

When we study Epicurus we need to be aware that we are not simply studying the kind of "how-to-be-happy" self-help book that get thrown around like lightweight "Chicken Soup For the Soul" pop advise. We are talking about a philosophy which has been in rebellion and regimented establishment forces for 2000 years, and will remain so as long as those forces continue to claim the right to rule over other people.

Epicurus understood that the world was against him. When we read Epicurus we need to realize that they were written in a context with many bitter enemies arrayed against them, and if we don't understand the arguments against pleasure, we won't fully understand the arguments for pleasure in surviving texts.

Yes Godek the point is that the senses do not have opinions of their own. They report honestly what they receive. The conclusions that we draw from them are in the mind, not in the senses. When evidence of the senses is unclear or distorted or simply insufficient we must wait til we have enough clear evidence before we pick a single answer as true. Epicurus said that until then any theory which fits the facts and is not contradicted should be considered possible.

And what is more, the ultimate validation of any theory comes eventually through the senses, or the theory remains speculation.

Yes Godek I think you are on the wrong track with your comments about "dogma" - I think Godfrey's quote is good but I would say it sounds Epicurean (as he did too, in another place) as I am not sure that autarchy deals with issues of knowledge.

Quote from Godfrey

But of interest to me was the contention that uncertainty is the greatest contributor to stress and some discussion of removing uncertainty, which sounded a lot like autarchy.

Godek in Diogenes Laertius you will recall that:

Quote

[The wise man] will found a school, but not in such a manner as to draw the crowd after him; and will give readings in public, but only by request. He will be a dogmatist but not a mere skeptic; and he will be like himself even when asleep. And he will on occasion die for a friend.

Of course you also have to recall that you are going to keep an open mind on things where proof is not clear:

Quote

24. If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to distinguish between opinion about things awaiting confirmation and that which is already confirmed to be present, whether in sensation or in feelings or in any application of intellect to the presentations, you will confuse the rest of your sensations by your groundless opinion and so you will reject every standard of truth. If in your ideas based upon opinion you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, you will not avoid error, as you will be maintaining the entire basis for doubt in every judgment between correct and incorrect opinion.

And in those times you are going to "wait" as against stated by DL.

But much of book four of Lucretius, especially the very important part about how knowledge is based on the senses, is targeted to the conclusion that we can and should have confidence in things that are clear, and that we should actually scorn those who allege that knowledge (which means our confidence in a certain fact) is impossible.

These are not witty, but they are appropriate rules to keep in mind when trying to piece together philosophical meaning from the ancient texts (and thereby avoid getting tripped up by word games):

(1) Whole-Text Canon. The text must be construed as a whole.

(2) Presumption of Consistent Usage. A word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout
a text; a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning.

(3) Surplusage Canon. If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect (verba cum effectu sunt accipienda). None should be ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.

(4) Harmonious-Reading Canon. The provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory.

(5) General/Specific Canon. If there is a conflict between a general provision and a specific provision, the specific provision prevails (generalia specialibus non derogant).

(6) Irreconcilability Canon. If a text contains truly irreconcilable provisions at the same level of generality, and they have been simultaneously adopted, neither provision should be given effect.

(7) Predicate-Act Canon. Authorization of an act also authorizes a necessary predicate act.

(8) Noscitur a sociis - Associated-Words Canon. Associated words bear on one another’s meaning.

(9) Ejusdem Generis Canon. Where general words follow an enumeration of two or more things, they apply only to persons or things of the same general kind or class specifically mentioned (ejusdem generis).

(10) Distributive -Phrasing Canon. Distributive phrasing applies each expression to its appropriate referent
(reddendo singula singulis).

(11) Prefatory -Materials Canon. A preamble, purpose clause, or recital is a permissible indicator of meaning.

(12) Title-and-Headings Canon. The title and headings are permissible indicators of meaning.

(13) Interpretive-Direction Canon. Definition sections and interpretation clauses are to be carefully followed.

(14) Absurdity Doctrine. A provision may be either disregarded or judicially corrected as an error (when the correction is textually simple) if failing to do so would result in a disposition that no reasonable person could approve.

Source: Scalia and Garner

This task could consume all our attention so we have to make a decisions on how far to go and how not to go.

Also: I am not sure how much reading Elli has put into Philebus, so she may know more about this than I do, but I am going to try to absorb at least the commentary on Philebus that starts the standard English translation, by Benjamin Jowett. I copied the Gutenberg version and placed it here.

Already I see this point below ,which I think is related to what we have been discussing as the target which PD3 and "absence of pain" are intended to address. But this observation from Jowett lends more specificity.

The point made here is that when we see the ancient Greeks discussing the issue of "infinite" or "something which has no limit," we should be thinking not wholly in terms of extent, but in terms of "definiteness." If Jowett is correct, Plato's problem with pleasure being infinite is not so much (or not only) that it can never be quenched in extent, but that it is INDEFINITE; UNTHINKABLE; UNKNOWABLE; OF WHICH NOTHING CAN BE AFFIRMED; CHAOTIC;..... The very act of placing Pleasure in the category of those things of which there are lesser or greater amounts paints it with all sorts of negative implications which could not possibly be consistent with the ultimate good of life.

That would mean that in asserting that pleasure has a limit (the full extent of the individual's experience) then Epicurus is saying that pleasure as a goal is "definite," "thinkable," "knowable," "capable of being affirmed," "ordered," etc.

This is fully consistent, but a deeper slant, with the idea that the vessel can be filled in quantity. This would go further and affirm that pleasure is something that is not only attainable, but definite enough to be understood, at least in terms of it serving as the goal / guide of life.

Quote

The first of Plato's categories or elements is the infinite. This is the negative of measure or limit; the unthinkable, the unknowable; of which nothing can be affirmed; the mixture or chaos which preceded distinct kinds in the creation of the world; the first vague impression of sense; the more or less which refuses to be reduced to rule, having certain affinities with evil, with pleasure, with ignorance, and which in the scale of being is farthest removed from the beautiful and good. To a Greek of the age of Plato, the idea of an infinite mind would have been an absurdity. He would have insisted that 'the good is of the nature of the finite,' and that the infinite is a mere negative, which is on the level of sensation, and not of thought. He was aware that there was a distinction between the infinitely great and the infinitely small, but he would have equally denied the claim of either to true existence. Of that positive infinity, or infinite reality, which we attribute to God, he had no conception.

The Greek conception of the infinite would be more truly described, in our way of speaking, as the indefinite. To us, the notion of infinity is subsequent rather than prior to the finite, expressing not absolute vacancy or negation, but only the removal of limit or restraint, which we suppose to exist not before but after we have already set bounds to thought and matter, and divided them after their kinds. From different points of view, either the finite or infinite may be looked upon respectively both as positive and negative (compare 'Omnis determinatio est negatio')' and the conception of the one determines that of the other. The Greeks and the moderns seem to be nearly at the opposite poles in their manner of regarding them. And both are surprised when they make the discovery, as Plato has done in the Sophist, how large an element negation forms in the framework of their thoughts.

Jowett raises lots of issues and problems contained in Philebus which I don't begin to understand, and I haven't even read through his commentary once. But all this fits in the category that I would loosely refer to as "Why is Ataraxia/Aponia Important?" / "Why are Limits Important?" / "Why Talk in Terms of Absence of Pain Rather than Positive Pleasures?" / "Why PD3 and Related Comments Do Not Make Epicurus an Ascetic" /

It also helps fit PD3 and PD4 in the same category of "antidotes" such as PD1 and PD2 which help us understand the context of enemies Epicurus was facing:

(1) Why would one be concerned about false doctrines of divinity unless false priests were spreading mischief? And what is the doctrine that serves as the antidote to all such allegations? The true nature of divinity as perfection and self-sufficient)

(2) Why would one be concerned about what happens after death unless false priests were spreading mischief about a heaven and hell? And what is the doctrine that serves as the antidote to all such allegations? Death is the end of sensation and all evil must come through sensation.

(3) Why would one be concerned about whether pleasure has a "limit," or about defining pleasure as "absence of pain," unless false philosophers where spreading mischief that (1) pleasure is unlimited and therefore indefinite and insatiable and not competent to be the highest good, and (2) that pleasures can be divided up and ranked and categorized so that we can through reason alone decide which are worthy of choice? And what is the antidote to all such allegations? That the feeling of pleasure has a definite end-point which we can understand (A. that we can fill our experience with pleasure, after which we have no further need of MORE pleasure, and B. that there is a unity of pleasure in that all pleasure is pleasing, so we can choose any activities (and not just those deemed "worthy," which to us seem pleasurable as a way to fill up our vessel / expel all pain.)

"We have to understand what were the issues that Epicurus had confronted, in his era, - and not only in his era, but what issues we have to confront in our era too "

How would you summarize the issue in a few words?

That there is an effort to convince everyone that there is a goal higher than pleasure, and that that pleasure is mental contemplation, which is a food in itself? And that the attempt to focus on absence or pain or other ambiguous mental concepts is an attempt to nudge / restrain us in that direction?

We need multiple ways of saying this but it is essential that it be brief and understandable.

i went looking for that part and will need to look further. Maybe the word is so important that it deserves a section heading of its own?

In philosophical discussion we frequently confront word games, especially in arguments that deal in Stoic/Platonic dialectical trickery. Some people love to make contentions that appear sound when read in a limited context, but are ridiculous when considered in full context of human life.

Here is a phrase that captures this rule: "We must reject literal interpretations that are literally absurd."

It would be useful to collect other "sayings" or quotes for the same proposition. Below is one that is on point by Mark Twain. If you know of others, please add them here, as we frequently have need to make use of them.

Thinking about this discussion in clinical terms reinforces in my mind that this entire line of thought is as simple as can be. The lives of most people contain a mixture of pleasures and pains. The way any person improves their life to the best possible is to remove the pains he faces and replace them with pleasures. Nothing more complex or mysterious whatsoever is expressed or implied.

And no one would even think of saying anything so basic unless they perceived that there was a contrary viewpoint which required the obvious to be stated.

I am convinced also that we find that contrary viewpoint in "Philebus" and that we need to spend more time articulating it clearly. Not because the argument in Philebus is persuasive, but because unless we are aware of it we tend to think "there must be something more going on here than meets the eye."

And there is.

We are going to find at root that the Philebus issue is a "logic game" involving the alleged insatiability and insufficiency of the feeling of pleasure as the guide of life, and its alleged inferiority to "reason."

But there is a lot more work to be done to explain that. Only then can we reclaim PD3 and similar statements as the validation of our patron goddess "Venus" (as referenced in Philebus) rather than a call to asceticism.

Maybe the "pleasurable feeling of freedom..." or something to that effect (?) With the point being that ataraxia is a subset of pleasurable feelings , (it's something like a mental feeling of being without any disturbances at all), and not a separate type of "fancy pleasure" on its own,

OK as to the issue of whether every experience generates a discernable feeling of pain or pleasure, I do not have a strong opinion or reason to argue for or against that. My perception is that the ultimate issue is just that nature gave us feelings of pain and pleasure as a guide, and not any other kind of feeling for a guide, so I don't think it is necessary philosophically to take the position that every experience must generate a registered feeling of pain or pleasure. I guess I have an open mind as to whether this might explain your reference earlier to feelings which we might not be sure are pleasure or pain. But I don't think this causes any philosophical problem so I doubt it is a significant issue.

It is possible that some of this issue of "low grade" feeling may be explainable by referring to the greek wording, and perhaps Elli could help us with that. I gather we are talking about some variation of "Pathos" and I sometimes wonder if there is a distinction between Pathos/feeling and "sensation." Does every sensation generate a pathos/feeling? Does everything that comes to our attention generate a pathos/feeling? Or is part of the natural programming of pain and pleasure is that it does not weigh in on EVERY experience? Just because every pain or pleasure is an experience, does that mean every experience generates pleasure or pain?

OK comments from here are directed at draft two. I will post several here as I read through for the first time.

Quote from Elayne

Ataraxia is freedom from anxiety and emotional disturbance, sometimes called “tranquility”

Should this be: "Ataraxia is a feeling of freedom from anxiety and emotional disturbance, sometimes called "tranqility.""

Quote from Elayne

If you are having a feeling and are not 100% sure that it is pleasurable, it is not pleasure. Pleasure is unmistakable. Even a newborn can feel it.

Would this be true of pain too? Are we introducing an ambiguity by implying that there are feelings which we cannot tell are either pleasure or pain? How would we explain that?

Quote from Elayne

What are Pain and Pleasure?

It is not necessary to mention this but as I finish reading this section I see you are discussing things i think DeWitt classifies under the "unity of pleasure" -- that pleasure is all of a similar type (as I gather pain is too)