Posts by Cassius

From the Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, Epicurus was responding to Aristitotle's attacks on Atomism:

Quote from elli

That is why the poet thinks it may be better that he cannot find the windows – which are the causes that has to search and deepening in them – because, as he says, he may then be confronted with issues that he would rather not to know or has not to realize. Perhaps, the poet says : to find windows, to be finally a new state of the feeling of pain, and the truth that he wants so much to find, to be the cause of a crucial battle with himself, and this may, instead of rescuing him, it will bring him a greater agitation.

I think this gets very close to an ultimate issue that divides people who interpret Epicurus differently. I can certainly understand that there are times and circumstances where the pain of life is just so overwhelming that it seems like nothing is worth doing other than escaping agitation. But as bad as I feel for such people, I don't think that such a worldview is necessary for everyone in every circumstance, and I think Epicurus was part of the segment of humanity who sees life in Jefferson's phrase - "the greater part of life is sunshine." We can't measure the sunshine part in terms of length, or in any specific terms at all, other than that we FEEL that part to be why we are alive and how we want to spend our lives.

Those of us who see the world that way bear no ill will against anyone else who wants to focus on the dark side and the escape to what they want to call "tranqulity." But that doesn't seem to be a two way street, because many people who are focused on escaping from pain see those who are not so focused as an affront to themselves, and so they work very hard to invent all sorts of ways to "prove" that pleasure is an impractical guide to life, and that there are things in their minds that are so much more "worthy" than the pleasure of themselves and their friends.

To me it is no coincidence that both Nietzsche and Liantinis saw something important in Epicurus. I don't think either of them developed the connection deeply enough, but both of them express the depth of feeling that is (to me) the end result that is compelled by the Epicurean worldview.

This is a placeholder to start the discussion of indivisibility, by first going back to why it was an issue for Epicurus in the first place. What questions or positions was he addressing?

Here are some starting points, first from David Sedley's "Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom":

OK as to the points raised in the other posts by Elayne and Elli in the last 24 hours: there is a lot of background context to this discussion which may not be appropriate to explain further for this thread. On the other hand it "may" be appropriate, too, depending on whether one of the participants or someone reading it wants to discuss and learn from the details for more than just an unproductive desire to air unpleasantness. I can address any details as appropriate.

For now I think the basic point I want to make is that my reading of the history is consistent with Elli's and Elayne's interpretation of it. Elli goes almost as far back with Hiram as do I, so she has watched the situation over the years and knows it clearly. Elayne brings a fresh and quickly insightful perspective to evaluating where we are. It is clear to me that she expresses a justifiable frustration with the situation because as we have advanced in clarity over the years of study, the contradictions that might not have been quite so apparent years ago are now much more visible and easy to see. Elayne sees the contradictions and is working vigorously to deal with them, as we all should, regardless of pre-existing relationships.

Those of us who are committed to promoting Epicurus as he was understood "classically," as a mortal enemy of Stoic emotionlessness and Platonic idealism, are in a distinct minority. It is necessary for us to stick together cooperatively wherever and whenever possible. And that means that watering down the philosophy for the sake of appealing to its enemies, which we do when we compromise with the many variants of humanism, is a very negative thing that needs to be called out as such.

What rumbles beneath the surface here is a continuing struggle against humanism / idealism / stoicism that isn't going to go away, and isn't going to be fixed by finding some kind of middle ground or papering over the canyon between the opposing perspectives.

Quote from Elayne

I am uncertain about Philodemus' accuracy in representing Epicurus.

I am going to comment on several of the above posts but this comment I want to highlight. I agree that skepticism toward Philodemus is warranted for a number of reasons, but there is one reason that I want to highlight, and that is: Many of his works are in such a bad condition that much of what we are reading as the work of "Philodemus" is often little more than informed speculation based on reconstruction of words and passages so much out of contact that it is hardly possible sometimes to tell whether Philodemus is talking about Epicurean positions or "enemy" positions.

(And that's especially a problem because it's normal in a philosophical writing to quote the position you are attacking before you attack it. What if the part that survives is the quote from the position being attacked?)

And that fragmentary and out-of-context state means that scholars -- in many cases very contemporary scholars who have drunk deep from the Stoic-friendly interpretations of Philodemus - are making speculative reconstructions of what they *expect* Philodemus to have been saying, when what they "expect" is not what an ancient Epicurean would really have written.

I think some very valuable information can be gleaned from what we have on Philodemus, but it has to be done very carefully, and I agree with Elayne that I do not trust anything that we have from Philodemus that would carry any implication that cannot also be supported from Lucretius, Diogenes of Oinoanda, or other more faithful and less fragmentary sources.

Quote from Godfrey

I don't want to become a nuclear physicist but I think it's a fertile topic for study and discussion.

As you say Godfrey this needs a thread of its own. As I understand the point, I too think that Epicurus would say that you don't want or need to become a nuclear physicist. The issue revolves more around what I understand to have been the logic games that the philosophers had been playing with infinite divisibility, relating too to the issue of questions like how it would be impossible to walk across a room because the distance could be looked as as always decreasing by half (poor summary but as you say - needs a different thread). I think this was an area that derives more from "it must be the case" deduction, just like the swerve of the atom. The very act of discussing it is what Epicurus advised too, because knowing that there are reasonable theories which explain things without the existence of supernatural gods goes a long way toward toward the peace of mind of all of us who are not, and never will be, nuclear physicists. And that's not to mention the peace of mind needed by the nuclear physicists themselves, who themselves do not know, and will never know "ultimate" answers.

Godfrey have you read any Victor Stenger? I know that Alex says that his physics books are very good and at least largely compatible with Epicurus, but I have not found the time to read them myself so I cannot verify that personally.

Quote from Hiram

that you just use my words to build a bigger wall between us, so it feel so pointless and I don’t feel like you will profit from anything I say anymore,

Hiram:

Building a wall between us is not my intent at all, and it is definitely not true that I do not profit from what you say.

As I see it, you have always had more of an emphasis on "building bridges to other traditions" while my emphasis has always been more on getting a more clear understanding of what Epicurus himself said without regard to bridges to other traditions.

I have been thinking about these issues in relationship to the sometimes competing goals of "truth" vs. "happiness." I think it is tempting for some people to start with "happiness" as their goal, and to think that it is not necessary to be concerned about whether the path to happiness aligns with "truth" or not. And then we have to overlay that with one of the issues we have discussed here, which is the issue of "objective" vs. "subjective" truth.

I cannot speak for other traditions, but I identify with Greco-Western traditions, and within that there is I think a dedication to the premise that while the "truth" may not always be happy, the best way to happiness is always going to be found by starting looking for the truth. That's why I think Epicurean philosophy starts with physics and epistemology (as did Lucretius) rather than by ethical conclusions. If it were "true" that the universe had been created by a supernatural god, then we would move heaven and earth to try to find out and conform ourselves to that divine will. And that is why Epicurus was considered a "dogmatist" -- even though we perceive the universe subjectively through our senses, we analyse the situation and have confidence that some observations (absence of a supernatural god creating the universe) are so well confirmed by the evidence that we can be "dogmatic" that we are correct on such issue.

It is only because we first start out by concluding that there ARE no supernatural gods that we conclude that feeling is the only proper goal. Now if that builds a wall between an Epicurean and all religious-based non-Epicureans, then so be it, as far as I am concerned. And to the best I can tell, that was Epicurus' attitude as well. It would be nice to expand our circle of Epicurean friends as far as possible, but not at the expense of the basic truth that the best path to happiness (a life guided by pleasure) comes by rejecting all pretence to the supernatural.

So while it is very tempting for me to stretch my understanding of the texts in an attempt to agree with you when I sense that we disagree, I think it is not a good choice to disguise the disagreement.

And that is where I think it is clear that I do profit from these exchanges with you.

As I see it, you frequently occupy an untenable middle ground between Epicurean philosophy and humanism, and I think that you sense that, but have simply decided to weigh in with humanism due to your personal preferences. I certainly have personal preferences myself, and at appropriate times and places I express them, but the reason we came together in the first place and collaborate has been the promotion of Epicurean philosophy in general, not particular applications of it with which you or I might personally disagree.

I hope for the future that we can have these discussions a thousand times over, with thousands of new people, because I think the issues we are confronting are crucial. And they are likely inevitable for many years to come. Everyone is going to have to decide whether the "truth" (which is that nature does not endorse their personal sense of pleasure) is more important than first acknowledging that it is the feeling of pleasure (which is not experienced in the same way for everyone) that is the guide, not any personal application of a specific pleasure that is the same for everyone. It is easy to have an organization dedicated to the pleasure of fishing, and within that group there can be all types of fishing which virtually everyone in the group can appreciate. But Epicurean philosophy teaches "the feeling of pleasure" as a replacement for false ideas of supernatural gods and universal ideals, rather than "pleasure as experienced by Americans" or "pleasure as experienced by Russians" or "pleasure as experienced by Saudi Arabians." And on and on -- the point is easy to see, but not to accept within the framework of supernatural religion or of idealistic one-size-fits-all theories like "humanism."

I think I see this same tension in the work of Catherine Wilson, whose recent books in many ways hark back more to the DeWitt model than to the Okeefe "absence of pain" nonsense. Wilson seems to throw her weight behind a common sense interpretation of pleasure, and she is willing to state fairly clearly that she is an Epicurean, and not a Stoic, despite what is no doubt a lot of peer pressure to "just get along" with everyone.

And yet she laces her Epicurean writings with her own personal political preferences that contradict the core issue that we are talking about -- that EVERYONE has personal political preferences because everyone is an individual with a different experience of what is pleasing to them -- and Wilson undercuts her credibility and effectiveness by not acknowledging that.

Epicurean philosophy is not "humanism" and in many ways it is the *opposite* of humanism, which is just as "universalistic" and "absolutist" in nature as is Christianity, Judaism, or any variation of Abrahamic religion.

These are the issues that I see dividing us, but I don't take them personally and I hope that you will not either. We may well take them in different directions, which as I keep saying I think is inevitable since specific experience of pleasure is not the same for everyone. But let me be clear that when I say that I am not inviting a "split" -- what I am hoping for over time is that we will have communities of Epicureans worldwide who will acknowledge that while they have their own respective views of the happiest way to live, that the basic insights of Epicurus about the nature of the universe, and the pursuit of happiness being justified by nature, gives them truly a shared basis for working out their differences in a much better way than supernatural religion or absolutist humanism would ever allow.

Apparently not much....

https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/23549227/frances-wright

Quote from JJElbert

Frances Wright is interred in—of all places!—Cincinnati, OH.

I never thought to look this up and my first thought is "What is on her gravestone?"

Oscar maybe you will uncover some things in your research that will shed some light on DeWitt's views of Christianity. In many cases the connections that Martin point out are focused on "organization" issues (use of letters, missionary style, social arrangements perhaps....), and I don't think that he goes too far (at least most of the time) on trying to reconcile the inconsistencies. It seems to me that those who try to make Epicurus out to be a stoic go *much* further than DeWitt did in trying to make the Epicurean movement seem like a precursor to the Christian movement.

Maybe in fact that's the way it seems to me that DeWitt draws the strongest analogies -- between them as "movements."

Even in "St Paul and Epicurus" I don't recall that DeWitt said too much overtly in praise of Christianity or Christian ethics, and I don't recall DeWitt EVER stating open disagreement with Epicurus on something, certainly not in the way Cyril Bailey regularly did.

It would be very interesting to know if DeWitt has anywhere ever publicly stated his own belief in Christianity or particular Christian doctrines, was a member of a church, or things like that. Seems unlikely that that level of detail is discoverable today, but if you happen upon anything that would be good to know.

Welcome Happy-Go-Lucky! Thanks for joining us! When you get a chance, please tell us about yourself and your background in Epicurean philosophy.

It would be particularly helpful if you could tell us (1) how you found this forum, and (2) how much background reading you have done in Epicurus. As an aid in the latter, we have prepared the following list of core reading.

We look forward to talking with you!

----------------------- Epicurean Works I Have Read ---------------------------------

1 The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.

2 "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt

3 "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius

4 Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

5 Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

6 The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

7 "A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

8 Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus (3) Others?

9 Plato's Philebus

10 Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

11 "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

The blog looks good Oscar! Great to have you back and I look forward to hearing all your comments, but especially whatever you have turned up in your research into DeWitt.

Good to have you back Oscar!

Quote from Hiram

Since you're not exactly "amenable to frank criticism" as Philodemus would put it, I will excuse myself from giving you parrhesia unless requested

I presume that is addressed to me and will say that of course I do not want you to hold back your "frank criticism." Obviously while we agree on a considerable number of things we disagree strongly on other things. The best way for everyone to move forward it to discuss things as clearly as possible to sharpen the differences. Yes those differences may lead us at some point to going totally (as opposed to partially) different ways, but if that were to happen then even that would still be for the best if it is due to legitimate differences rather than misunderstandings.

Welcome JLR and thank you for the detailed background info! You are welcome to hang out and read and participate at whatever pace you like. If you are not already aware of it you will soon see that I am a big advocate of Norman Dewitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy" as a very different "take" on Epicurean philosophy.

At this point rather than dive into any of the details of what you wrote I would urge you to take up Dewitt's book as soon as / if you have the opportunity, because I believe you will quickly see why and how his take is different -- how it will embrace some or even much of what you wrote, but from a fairly significantly different perspective.

There are also a couple of scholarly articles that I think you will find bolster DeWitt's take: especially the sections on Epicurus in Gosling & Taylor's "The Greeks on Pleasure," and the

Boris Nikolsky article "Epicurus on Pleasure."

I hope you'll have a long and productive stay with us, but even if something comes up and you get deflected away, I think if you pick up the DeWitt book and compare it to what you already know about Epicurus you will gain a lot that you might not have come across if you hadn't made your way here.

Welcome Lee ! And thanks for joining us! When you get a chance, please tell us about yourself and your background in Epicurean philosophy.

It would be particularly helpful if you could tell us (1) how you found this forum, and (2) how much background reading you have done in Epicurus. As an aid in the latter, we have prepared the following list of core reading.

We look forward to talking with you!

----------------------- Epicurean Works I Have Read ---------------------------------

1 The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.

2 "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt

3 "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius

4 Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

5 Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

6 The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

7 "A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

8 Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus (3) Others?

9 Plato's Philebus

10 Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

11 "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

Quote from Elayne

Hiram, this is the major pitfall of proof-texting Epicurus.

Elayne I think it is very clear from the context what you are talking about, but it might help the discussion if you could elaborate on the term "proof-texting" because it seems clear that you have a specific aspect in mind, and the method we use to evaluate the texts is so important. We have a chicken and egg problem that the best way to avoid following some fragment down a rabbit hole is to compare it against what we know about the philosophy in total, but the problem is that there is so much wide divergence that there is no agreement on what the philosophy as a whole means. That's why I find it useful to refer back to DeWitt's book and his summarizes, because in my experience his high-level analysis seems the best way to unite all the varying threads and fragments. (And of course that's why I think reference to DeWitt is so conspicuously absent and even frowned upon by modern academics -- they know that his high-level analysis makes their own views of Epicurus seem ridiculous, in many cases, by comparison.

SOE1: “Objective” nature is knowable via the sensations.

Objection To SOE1: The relevant definition of "objective" in dictionary.com is: "not influenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice; based on facts; unbiased." In this context, the most likely way a normal person will interpret the phrase "objective nature," despite the scare quotes around "objective," is that this tenet is saying that there is a reality of nature that is knowable in a way that is not influenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice. While that can be interpreted in a reasonable way to mean that what you are talking about are observations of a factual nature that can be confirmed by repeated experiment, even that is very ambiguous and overbroad and does not define the context of the point being made. In a philosophic list like this the implication is going to be taken that there are abstract ethical principles existing in nature apart from and independent of human observation. That position is the opposite of the position taken by the Epicurean texts. Per Epicurus the universe has no center, no organizing supernatural or outside force, and nothing exists eternally unchangeable within nature other than the elements and void. The most controversial issues in human life that Epicurus addressed is whether there are things such as "virtue" or "good" or "moral worthiness" or "supernatural gods" that exist for all people at all times and all places. This is where people like Catherine Wilson, and Hiram in many of his writings, get Epicurus wrong. Epicurus held clearly (explicitly in PD 30-40, and many other places implicitly) that there is no absolute or "objective" morality of any kind. Starting off the list with a sentence that can be read to imply that objective morality exists, or even that there is a single perspective from which any matter of any kind can be viewed as always the same over time and place, undercuts this key aspect of Epicurean thought.

SOE2: “Subjective” nature is knowable via the value-setting pleasure and aversion faculties, by which we know what is choice-worthy and avoidance-worthy.

Objection To SOE2: Much of my objection to SOE1 is relevant here because dividing observations between objective and subjective on an ambiguous and broad basis simply reinforces majority existing religious / secular humanist error that there is a single "good" or proper way to live that is valid for all people at all places and all times. Further, to the extent we are now talking in a way that acknowledges that people *necessarily* view nature through their subjective faculties, pleasure and pain are not the only faculties by which nature is knowable - Epicurus set out the full list of the five senses, the feelings (pleasure and pain) and the anticipations. In this context the word "value" can also be ambiguous, because it can be read to imply that pleasure and pain should be used to develop abstractions ("values"?) that then take the place of the feelings as an absolute rule. If Epicurus stood for anything in the field of ethics, it is that the faculty of feeling, which is purely contextual and changes over time and place and is never exactly the same between individuals, must always be understood to take precedence in choices and avoidance. Even the use of the terms choice-WORTHY and avoidance-WORTHY carries an implication that is non-Epicurean. There is no action or avoidance that is *always* to be chosen or *always* to be avoided regardless of context, and any description that implies that a course of action should be taken or avoided apart from the particular results that it brings is unEpicurean. The term "worthy" and "worthiness" is to my observation generally associated in most discussion with absolutist religious/secular humanist/ idealist systems.

SOE3: While sensations tell us that something IS or exists, it does not tell us WHAT it is. For THAT cognitive process, we must rely on a faculty tied to both language and memory. The faculty of anticipation helps us to recognize abstractions and things previously apprehended.

Objection to SOE3: This formulation sounds uncomfortably close to Ayn Rand, and suffers from the same ambiguities. The issue is not that everything can be placed into an abstract Aristotelian or Kantian category that floats in the air and to which all must confirm. The issue is that "what" a thing is ultimately comes down to "how it relates to us." Language and memory and the faculty of anticipations do not put us in touch with a cosmic system by which we can categorize everything to tell us "what it is" apart from our own existence. The essential point here is that since we are talking about epistemology here, the fundamental must always be kept first that we perceive nature subjectively through our individual faculties, and that there is in fact no cosmic catalog of things or ideas to which we must conform our observations.

SOE4: We may infer the unseen / un-apprehended based on what has been previously seen / apprehended by any of our faculties; and we may re-adjust our views based on new evidence presented to our faculties.

Objection to SOE4: First I objection to the use of the word "may." We in fact "must" make judgments (or decide to suspend judgment) if we are going to survive, or hope to live pleasantly. In order to live happily in the face of religion and our questions about the nature of the universe and life after death, we must infer the nature of atoms and void, which are imperceptible, from those things which are perceptible. Also we "must" adjust our views to conform to evidence, and that means both being firm and confident about those things which we have observed to be reliable in the past, while also taking into account new evidence that may come to our attention. The point that this tenet is obscuring is the issue of dogmatism and confidence in our conclusions. Not all conclusions are likely to be subject to change and it is not appropriate to take the modern majority position that in almost any question "anything is possible." For all of human existence there is no reliable evidence that anything has ever been created from nothing, and it is not appropriate to fail to separate questions such as that from questions that are clearly beyond all human knowledge and on which we have no information whatsoever. As written SOE4 avoids that issue of when to have confidence in our opinions, which is the most important of all.

SOE5: Our words and their meanings must be clear, and conform to the attestations that nature has presented to our faculties.

Objection to SOE5: Of course we should be as clear as possible in using words. The issue is what is meant by clarity, and how we go about being clear. The issue that I detect in this tenet is that it carries the implication that nature has "testified" ("attested") some particular abstract truth that is the same for everyone. No, nature has not done that. Nature has simply provided us a set of faculties, including the ability to form abstractions (including words) and it is entirely up to us to convey meaning through the use of words or other methods that have been established in the past by agreement to be assignable to certain observations. Nature has not attested to anyone the meaning of "yellow." Nature has simply set up circumstances in a particular time and place that most humans visualize in a similar way under similar conditions, and to these conditions certain people have assigned the word "yellow" while certain others in other languages have assigned other totally different words. The point that Epicurus was making about clarity, and avoiding going on infinitely without reaching any conclusions, is tied totally to the fundamental that observations are contextual and that different people experience things differently. Clarity comes through examples, not by connection with some abstraction made by supernatural gods, ideal forms, etc.

SOE6: All bodies are made of particles and void.

Objection to SOE6: There is a component to this that was essential to Epicurus and is controversial, and that is the issue about whether the elemental particles are themselves indivisible. Epicurus appears to have held that indivisibility is essential for a number of reasons, most apparently leading to to the need to point to something that is ultimately unchanging in order for the regularity we see in the universe to be grounded in nature and not in supernatural gods. I agree with him that the issue of indivisibility is critical and needs to be explicitly stated.

SOE7: Bodies have essential properties and incidental properties.

Objection to SOE7: This one also is probably too broad. The Epicurean physics is explicitly that there are indivisible elemental bodies which are not composed of anything smaller, AND there are "bodies" which are composed of more than one elemental particle and void. Elemental particles don't really have "essential" properties and they certainly don't have "incidental properties. Elemental bodies have shape and size and the few other characteristics that Epicurus listed, but those properties never change. It might be ok to call those fundamental properties "essential" with some definitions to explain that, but elemental particles never have "unessential" properties so talking about "essential properties" of elemental properties is probably wrong. As i read the texts and commentaries the term "bodies" is generally used to refer to those combinations of elemental properties that eventually rise in size to become perceptible to our senses. It is at that level that "essential" and "incidental" really comes into play, at the point when you can add and subtract attributes to a thing and make decisions about what is "essential" or not. Freedom or slavery, war or peace, are definitely incidental qualities that can come and go without changing the underlying nature of the thing being discussed (such as society, individuals, groups, or whatever). But it is probably a very different question to evaluate "essential properties." We might say that water is wet and can't be made un-wet without changing it's character, but who gets to say what is "Essential" and what is not? Is "essential" not a matter of human decision and definition? The word "essences" is regularly attached to Aristotelian discussions of "essences" as opposed to Plato's "ideal forms," but both "ideal forms" and "essences" are invalid concepts in Epicurean terms.

SOE8: Nothing comes from nothing.

Objection to SOE8: This is very close to the way it is stated in the texts and I see no reason to object to this. I will say that Lucretius attaches this to the statement "at the will of the gods" so that he is emphasizing that "nothing comes from nothing at the will of the gods." I need to go back and look at Herodotus to see if the same thing is stated there, but definitely "nothing comes from nothing" is a correct Epicurean statement.

SOE9: All things operate within the laws of nature, which apply everywhere.

Objection to SOE9: The concept of "laws of nature" is very troublesome today. Itis my opinion that this is regularly interpreted to be the equivalent of saying "laws of nature's god" or even "laws of god" in the sense that it implies that there is some being "Nature" which has adopted a set of rules about how everything must work. I think the proper statement is that the universe operates according to the properties of the essential particles, motion, and void, and that everything that we see arises from the interactions of those three things. There really is no such thing as a "law of nature" that applies everywhere; perhaps if you can somehow stipulate that under exactly the same conditions then the elements will respond the same way, but that seems very different from saying that "the laws of nature apply everywhere."

SOE10: All that exists, exists within nature. There is no super-natural or unnatural “realm”; it would not have a way of existing outside of nature. Nature is reality.

Objection to SOE10: I think this one is essentially a correct statement of the Epicurean position.

SOE11: The end that our own nature seeks is pleasure. It is also in our nature to avoid pain.

Objection to SOE11: "Nature" in general has no "end." The inanimate/nonliving part of nature has no relation to pleasure. The animate/living part of nature is guided by pleasure and repelled by pain. "Our own nature" -- does that mean we as individuals? If so yes, but that applies to all living things too.

SOE12: There are three acceptable interpretations of the Epicurean gods: the realist interpretation, the idealist interpretation, and the atheist interpretation.

Objection to SOE12: What does "acceptable" mean? Acceptable so as to be a member of Society of Epicurus? Acceptable so as to not be considered an enemy of Epicurus? These categories listed here have no generally accepted definitions so would require explanation. I cannot imagine that any interpretation that implies that Epicurus was intentionally being less than honest with his statements on gods would be acceptable to a "Society of Epicurus." And Epicurus' statements were very specific -- he used the term "gods" to refer to naturally-occurring, non-supernatural, non-omnipotent beings which he held do exist somewhere in the universe, but not here on Earth, and having no concerns about us whatsoever, but about which we are able to either perceive or conceive aspects of pleasurable living that can serve as worthwhile things for us to contemplate and emulate. Obviously much has been lost and is unclear but no interpretation that does not accept that Epicurus meant what he said should be acceptable (in my opinion) to a society modeling itself after Epicurus.

SOE13: The goal of religion is the experience of pure, effortless pleasure.

Objection to SOE13: This statement seems to me to have no foundation in the Epicurean texts whatsoever. Are you saying "should be" rather than "is"? In that case the goal of a "proper" religion would be to promote pleasure and avoid pain, just as the purpose of every tool would ultimately be the same. But unless I am mistaken you are certainly not meaning to imply that this "is" the goal of every current world religion.

SOE14: Death is nothing to us because when we are, death is not and when death is, we are not. Since there is no sentience in death, it is never experienced by us.

Objection to SOE14: As stated I think this is a pretty accurate summary of the Epicurean position, especially the first sentence. The second sentence is also true, but we do experience death by observing it occur in other living things, and this would probably be the appropriate point to discuss something else that is extremely important: that the "issue of death" is hugely important to us (Epicurus was referring to "the state of being dead" not the many other issues surrounding death). Many many other texts tell us to live aggressively, not waste our time, think about death in the future, etc. with the point being that it is critical to remember that we are going to die so that we are properly motivated not to waste our time.

SOE15: Under normal circumstances, we are in control of our mental dispositions.

Objection to SOE15: The "under normal circumstances" probably is so ambiguous that it negates any benefit from this tenet. The Epicurean point in my understanding is that we should work to remain in control of our mental dispositions (like we work to control everything else) so that we maximize pleasure and minimize pain. By mentioning mental dispositions without really stating anything significant about them, the implication is that you are endorsing some kind of Stoic mind control that leads to suppression of emotions. Presumably you would only want to suggest that painful emotions should be kept under control, but even that would likely be a non-Epicurean interpretation, since it is recorded in DIogenes Laertius that Epicurus said that the wise man feels his emotions more deeply than others, and this is no hindrance to his wisdom.

SOE16: Choices and avoidances are carried out successfully (that is, producing pleasure as the final product) if we measure

advantages/pleasures versus disadvantages/pains over the long term. This means that we may sometimes defer pleasure in order to avoid greater pains, or choose temporary disadvantage, but only and always for the sake of a greater advantage or pleasure later.

Objection to SOE16: I strongly object to the implication that there is a weighty Epicurean preference for "the long term" in general, over the short term in general. As stated in the Letter to Menoeceus the wise man chooses of that which is best, not which is most plentiful. In Epicurean pleasure terms this is going to back to the point that "time" is not at all the only, or the most important, way to measure pleasure. Epicurus did not provide specific methods of measuring pleasure, presumably because Nature did not establish a uniform rule for doing so. We can say that we want to "maximize" pleasure or pursue the "most" pleasure, and minimize pain and pursue the least pain, but those words do not tell us anything about time or intensity or any other specific universal way to minimize pleasure. Is it "worth it" to climb to the top of Mt Everest if you die at the summit? There is no Epicurean universal answer to that question - it is an individual choice. In that case, you only get to make that choice once (if you die at the summit) so you better be right! But there is no Epicurean way to say that the person is "wrong" who chooses to make the climb knowing he will never return.

SOE17: To live pleasantly, we must have confident expectation that we will be able to secure the chief goods: those things that are natural and necessary for life, happiness, and health. Therefore, whatever we do to secure safety, friendship, autarchy, provision of food and drink and clothing, and other basic needs, is naturally good.

Objection to SOE18: "Chief goods" is not a term that Epicurus employed and implies that there is an outside ranking of pleasure which does not exist. The natural and necessary observations are helpful for analysis because it helps us consider the result, but WE weigh the result and make our own determinations of how much pleasure and pain is worthwhile - nature does not do that for us and there is no uniform rule established by nature. All of the things you have listed (especially / even autarchy and friendship) are tools that are generally useful in the pursuit of pleasure, but for every single one of these there are going to be times when we forgo or avoid these in our own pursuit of pleasure. Even food and water are to be avoided when fasting is necessary for survival or better health; air to be avoided when holding one's breath to escape danger is necessary; etc. And so it is explicitly wrong to imply that such things are "naturally good" in each and every circumstance. The only thing that Epicurus said is **always** desirable is pleasure itself, which is the result of activities that are themselves always contextual and sometimes to be chosen and sometimes to be avoided.

SOE18: Autarchy furnishes greater possibilities of pleasure than slavery, dependence, or relying on luck; The unplanned life is not worth living, and we must make what is in our future better than what was in our past.

Objection to SOE18: This formulation screams out for a "generally" qualification, for the reasons stated above. Yes these observations are generally seen to be likely to produce the most pleasurable results, but Epicurus was very clear in presenting his philosophy as contextual, and the elevation of social choices like autarchy or independence (which implies a kind of radical individualism to many people) is likely to lead to confusion on the broader point. the Epicureans were careful even to evaluate "friendship" in terms of the pleasure it brings, and not as an end in itself.

SOE19: Friendship is necessary for securing happiness. It is advantageous to promote Epicurean philosophy in order to widen our circle of Epicurean friends.

Objection to SOE19: As just stated in relation to 18, it is perilous to imply that "friendship" as an abstraction is necessary for happiness. The Epicurean texts are clear that everything is contextual, even friendship, and this statement is not contextual - no individual example of "friendship" or any particular "friend" is stated in the Epicurean texts to be across-the-board necessary. The second sentence in this tenet seems to me to clearly be true, but it is a much more narrow statement than the first sentence.

SOE20: Human relations should be based on mutual benefit.

Objection to SOE20: This one pretty well sums up what I see as the major problem with the analysis behind most of the objections above, because it has "humanism" written all over it. Epicurus did not write in terms of "human relations" but in terms of humans pursuing pleasure individually and in groups. The last ten PD10's make absolutely clear that while "justice" is an agreement not to harm or be harmed, it is also absolutely clear that there is no way to enumerate such agreements in absolute terms, and it is also clear that such agreements are to be broken immediately when they become disadvantageous to either party's pursuit of pleasurable living. The clear point of these final PD's is that there IS NO Epicurean "Golden rule" that we must always treat others as we would want to be treated ourselves because each decision is going to be based on the circumstances of the individuals involved: there are no ideal virtues, no supernatural morals, no across-the-board rules for which there is any authority to say that we should always follow them. In this formulation, "mutual benefit" is not only hopelessly vague, but the "mutual" part has absolutely no foundation whatsoever and in fact the clear thrust of many other doctrines is the opposite. PD10 emphasizes that depravity has no absolute definition; that everything must be judged by its result, and the only standard that nature has set is that we find pleasure desirable and pain undesirable. This is the same issue where Catherine Wilson is hopelessly off base when she injects her on social preferences into Epicurean philosophy. In referring to her I give her credit in the recent podcast interview that she admits that she is outside Epicurean orthodoxy in doing so, but the matter isn't just being "outside' orthodoxy -- it turns Epicurean philosophy on its head for ANYONE at ANY TIME to suggest that their own moral or ethical preferences are anything but personal to them.

Quote from Hiram

This view has some merit, and deserves further consideration and discussion. It is one thing to say "ethics is eternal", which is not a clear statement, but it's another thing to say "we know better", with the implication being that some societies are more enlightened and therefore have conventions that generate more pleasure / less suffering to people than others, which is an undeniable fact.

No I don't think it is undeniable and I would deny that as written. i would say that I CASSIUS or YOU HIRAM can make the statement that I or YOU consider that some societies are more "enlightened" than others, but i think Epicurus' point is precisely that there is NOT an objective point from which we can say that our judgment on these matters is the last word.

And i say that especially since the main implication of saying "more pleasure/less suffering to PEOPLE" is that this formulation implies "greatest good for the greatest number."

I see absolutely no justification in Epicurus for "greatest good of the greatest number" or even "Greatest pleasure for the greatest number." Only the individual can say whether he himself considers the pleasure of some number of people (presumably his friends) more important than the pain of a million times larger that same number of people.

Any other attempt to stack up the pleasure and pain of groups of people is unalterably going to run into the question: "Who says so?" And PD10 and many other statements explicitly rule out there being a single correct answer to that question.

I presume Hiram you picked this part out because you know how controversial these conclusions are, and how they fly in the face of "secular humanism." But that's exactly what they do -- they flatly contradict "humanism" and that's the kind of choice a person has to make when they decide whether they are an Epicurean or a humanist or something else.

More comments / observations after watching the whole thing. Before getting into the details, I think the major issues with her approach are contained in her statements at item 19 that she thinks that moral standards are timeless. This flies in the fact of the last ten PD's in regard to justice not being absolute (in fact in the entire interview, in which there is much discussion of justice, she never mentions these issues):

(3) She says that getting into Epicurus was a pure intellectual exercise for her originally.

(4) At about the 12:30 part I applaud how they focus and reinforce that nothing can come from nothing.

(5) At 13:30 she says that it isn't clear what the Epicureans thought about color?

(6) At 15:00 she does a very good job of pointing out that the Epicurean position that atoms cannot themselves be conscious.

(7) At 16:25 she talks about "deserving" not playing a role in Epicurean ethics. Strikes me as very good. However she says there is a principle of "not doing harm to others" which is NOT correct. She takes this down the political rabbit hole for several minutes.

(8) At 19:12 talks about the need to take risks -- very good.

(9) At 20:30 there is a discussion about how to balance long and short term -- "pleasure seeking does not work well"???

(10) 22:03: Distinction between happiness and meaningfulness?

(11) 23:00 - distinction between Epicurus and Stoicism. Pretty good distinctions, especially on suppression of emotion.

(12) 26:57. She "absolutely" follows Epicureanism more than Stoicism.

(13) 27:00 Says stoicism found acceptance among people who were politically engaged. Says Epicurean advice was to stay out of politics and ** admits she is going outside Epicureanism to talk about politics.**

(14) 27:30 Talking about "rights" confuses the issues and is not helpful. (This is good.)

(15) (28:18) talks about abortion in Epicurean terms -- she says abortion is permissible but not infanticide. (questionable, in the sense of whether a general law applies to all, because she is emphasizing "Who is in human society - a political argument).

(16) 33:34 Euthanasia and physican-assisted suicide -- Epicurus discouraged. "Nothing sacred about life because nothing is sacred." good.

(17) 36:34 jeffrey epstein 'suicide' Her feelings about that case are "complicated." "If I were Jeff Epstein I would want to kill myself." and she feels compassion for him. As an Epicurean she doesnt believe in "deserts" - what he deserves. Were his crimes horrific crimes - she says no.

(18) 40:46 He would not put Robert E Lee in the same category of Hitler or Goebels. She brings up history of slavery (doesn't mention Epicurus' slaves).

(19) 43:27 He asks about applying modern moral standards to the past and she says "I think moral standards are timeless." HUGE PROBLEM

(20) 47:00 "the government needs to do something about reparations"

(21) 47:51 - again on the issue of judging past by present standards, she says: again she repeats "ethics is timeless" on the other hand she thinks it is a matter of "information" or "amount of discussion." (she is not sympathetic to the Joe Biden example he raises).

(22) 52.00 -- he again asks about universal ethics; her answer really not clear, but from his followup it is clear that she is really taking the "they should have known better" approach.

(23) 56:40 - He argues for eternal moral truths and says the universe is moving in that direction.

(24) 56:26 - She criticizes Epicurus' view of death in part but seems to generally endorse it. Endorses view that "purpose of life is to have lived."

(25) 1:00:00 - Question about epistemology. Her answer appears to be that she is endorsing confidence in science even where evidence is not complete. He misstates and suggests Epicurean position was "all things in moderation."

(26) 1:00:02 - She states the position that Epicureans were "abstemious"

(27) 1:04:00 - Question about meaningful life. She says that she does not "try for it." And she says pursuit of pleasure and meaning is not a good strategy!" She says engagement with things that speak to you.