Posts by Cassius

Quote from JJElbert

Concerning Epicurus, I have read Bayle's magnificent article in his Historical and Critical

Dictionary and Gassendi's work, De Vita et

Moribus Epicuri. With this equipment, I have become one of the disciples of the master.

OK this is a point we don't want to overlook. We now have access to the thomas stanley translation of Gassendi's work, so that is accessible.

But I have never heard, found or read "Bayle's magnificent article."

We need to go looking for that and presumably it will merit its own thread or subforum.

I remember reading that on one of the pages too somewhere - that NEAPKOY was the engraver, so that's what I am thinking too. Although I sometimes do have doubts whether the images that some say are Epicurus are really him. Some of the images can seem so generic that it's hard (for me) to be sure.

No picture yet but:

https://books.google.com/books?id=M0RAA…0Horace&f=false

I wonder if this was done per the ring:

https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_1914-0228-2525

Wow yes that is interesting about Horace. I have never heard of that. I wonder how it is they are confident it is Horace vs. someone else? We definitely ought to try to trace that down.

So far no luck with this search:

https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/sea…ce&keyword=ring

Also, I am sure you have already seen the "Lucretius" ring but I wonder if some kind of lettering in the otherwise blank areas would help make clear the identity. This is the drawing that Munro used, which is apparently a version made from the original in the second photo:

Withoutbox(1).jpg

But you're a far better artist than I ever will be so you of course do what you think works best to your eye. You've made a great start already.

Withoutbox(1).jpg

Here is the best photo I have of the probable Lucretius Ring (probably the one described by Munro):

I thought we had some photos in this thread. Here are some of Epicurus (stamp is for comparison)

I still post on other forums as a means of identifying new people who might be interested in the more rigorous approach to Epicurus that ought to be a goal of us here. The results are not always what I like, but can be amusing, and maybe point to areas of continuing interest where we can produce new material.

Here's my nomination for uninspiring response of the day (name deleted):

Here is an example of the conflict, in a place I saw this morning where i will need to genericize the message so as to maintain confidentiality.

The context is that one of us (not me) pointed out to a new contact (not someone who posts here as far as I know) that there were significant differences between Epicurus and Benthamite utilitarianism.

The post from "our side" was responding to a positive comment about Bentham, and made the point:

.... Bentham was not Epicurean-- Epicureans are most definitely not social utilitarians. The only reason we would want to "add to the sum total of human happiness" is if that was the most effective way to increase our individual pleasure. Personal pleasure always is central, which is the point I thought you were making on the post.


Below is the reply from this new person, which I believe to be incorrect, but which states the problem clearly. I have highlighted and underlined (this was not in the original) the point being made, which is the point that I do not believe can be supported by Epicurean philosophy, and in fact made impossible by it. While we can and I would say SHOULD choose this course in many cases, there is nothing in the philosophy that calls for this kind of "natural rights" conclusion. What would be the source of such a "right"? Who or what would vindicate it?

We can choose such a system because it may in our context give us pleasure to participate in it and pain not to do so, but would anyone really advocate that ALL people deserve such respect in ALL situations? It's easy to think about examples of people who we believe we justifiably detest, and to whom we would not recognize in them a "right" for them to experience pleasure in ways with which we violently disagree. The ultimate insight of Epicurean cosmology is that the universe doesn't say who is right and wrong, and that if we expect 'our' view of pleasure and pain to be implemented it is entirely up to us to do so.

Here's the excerpt of this person's reply:

"I don’t think that Bentham is in conflict with classical Epicureanism on any of these questions, and I don’t think his position is ‘counter’ to classical Epicureanism, but rather a development of it: an attempt to build a more universal system on solidly Epicurean foundations.

The problem with classical Epicureanism, and the one that Bentham sets out to solve, is what happens when one person’s pleasure conflicts with another’s.

The crucial and I think deeply ethical point is the egalitarianism in Bentham: the idea that MY pleasure should not take priority over YOURS, no matter who I am, what my status is, how rich I am, how intelligent I am, or whatever. Each individual has an equal right to have their happiness respected.

I think that there is an interesting distinction between a) taking responsibility for something, b) working towards something, and c) respecting the right to something.

A) I can only take responsibility for my own happiness. This is in fact a Stoic doctrine, other people’s happiness is outside your control and you should not be suckered into trying to deliver it.

I can work towards the happiness of those around me. I think we can all agree that this is a wise course of action as this happiness is reflected back. I think you agree on this.

C) I respect the equal right of other people to pursue their own happiness. (As you can see ‘equal’ means in society at large, not in my own personal priorities: there’s a difference). In fact, your message above also agrees with this: when you say ‘some will be counter-protesting for their own pleasure’, and you don’t condemn this action, you are in fact recognizing that equal right.

So given this a/b/c set of values, there is no conflict at all between Epicurus and Bentham: one is simply a rational extension of the other.

---------------

End of excerpt

This is the kind of issue we come back to again and again and again, and need to think clearly about so we understand the implications.

Of course I wake up this morning thinking about this thread and have another comment: I am very much in the camp that is sort of captured by "you only live once" - but that doesn't really capture the issue. Given our Epicurean understanding that life is so short in comparison with the infinity of time when we will not exist, how can we possibly NOT want to use our lives as productively as possible? Of course the initial question has to be asked as to what "as productively as possible means" but that is where Epicurus points us to the answer in a way that virtually no one else does. Do we really want to get to the end of our lives and think that we spent our brief lives "avoiding pain"? That the best use of our time was to be bunkered down in our cave, even with a few friends, with bread and water?

I will repeat again there is NO WAY I can imagine Epicurus advocating such a position. That is pure Stoicism!

Epicurean philosophy is the creed of a fighter, not a coward.

Vatican Saying 47. I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and I have closed off every one of your devious entrances. And we will not give ourselves up as captives, to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who cling to it maundering, we will leave from life singing aloud a glorious triumph-song on how nicely we lived.

Note 47. Translation by C.Yapijakis, Epicurean Garden of Athens, Greece .Bailey: “I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and entrenched myself against all thy secret attacks. And I will not give myself up as captive to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for me to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who vainly cling to it, I will leave life crying aloud a glorious triumph-song that I have lived well.”

Quote from Don

This opportunity to talk through these issues is truly one of the values in finding this forum.

Definitely!

Quote from Don

. I consider something like equality for all genders and races to be universal.

Ok here is my interpretation, I think "slavery" as you mentioned is probably the ultimate emotional test, but these are good too.

I think where Epicurus was going is to recognize BOTH that:

(1) Our feeling is the ultimate guide for life, and that means that we will die for things that we feel to be important enough to us like friends, or whatever we happen to feel at that level of intensity, which would include our political values of equality or whatever we feel intensely about. The "friends" example is the one I use here because Epicurus explicitly is recorded to have said that we will on appropriate occasions die for our friends.

(2) That despite the intensity of our feelings and our personal willingness on appropriate occasions to fight and die for our feelings, we still have to admit that these are OUR feelings, and that they aren't sanctioned by "God" or even by some cosmic "Nature." The ultimately is no prime mover / supernatural / teleological "right" and "wrong" in the universe, and we justify our actions based on the only guide we have - our individual senses of pleasure and pain, just like all other animals do.

This is ultimately why I react so strongly against the "passivist" or the "tranquility above all" view of Epicurus, because that conflicts totally with the view that we stake all our actions to the flag of feeling. There is no way that I could accept that Epicurus (or we) would turn our backs on our friends, or on the basic values that motivate us, just so we could eke out a few extra moments of "tranquility" in our cave with our bread and water and cheese. There is NO WAY that Epicurus advocated such a position. We could go on and on listing and arguing the reasons for that conclusion, and that is in fact why I spend so much time on it and think it is so essential, but ultimately I think Epicurus would tell us that we grasp this not really intellectually, but through feeling.

I know that it is shocking to a lot of people to give up the argument that there is some "higher sanction" for their personal views of right and wrong, but I can't think of anything in the Epicurean physics (the nature of the universe) that would allow such a position. In fact everything in it goes in the opposite direction - that the universe is truly ultimately reducible to combinations of matter and void that are constantly changing, and in such a system there is no room for Platonic ideals or any other kind of "universal" or "absolute" rules of right and wrong.

But at the same time, we do and should fight to the death, just like all other animals do, for our ultimate feelings about what is important to us in life.

That's why the tranquilist view is to me not just intellectually and factually "incorrect" based on the record, but totally unacceptable and irreconcilable at a basic feeling / emotional level with the thrust of Epicurean philosophy.

Ok this moves us as expected into the area of interpreting "natural justice."

Do we all here agree that there is no absolute standard of natural justice? And that the "harmed or be harmed" reference is simply something similar to a statement of virtue, which much be translated into the "pleasure" of the people involved? And that when the individuals no longer agree on their pleasures, there is no longer any natural justice involved in the issue of "harmed or be harmed"?

I suspect that in this discussion so far everyone will largely agree that the answer to that question is "yes, there is no absolute justice" - but probably not without hesitation. I think in most all discussions of this we find that this is one of the least discussed areas of the PDs because many people do not want to see the clear statement here that Epicurus is saying that no individual's version of "justice" is applicable to all times and all people and all places. And of course since most people are dedicated to their pre-existing absolute standards of "virtue" they find these impossible to accept as written. The temptation is therefore to think that there is an absolute standard of "harm or be harmed" but that is not likely at all to be the case given the nature of the Epicurean universe, where there are no absolute standards other than the pleasure and pain of the people involved, correct?

33. Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.

34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions.

35. It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if, at present, he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.

36. In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.

37. Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.

38. Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage.

In the spirit of keeping it coming, I think:

(1) the view that it is important to "pursue" pleasure is pretty clear, we all agree on it, and stating it is not particularly controversial, at least in our circles.

(2) What is HUGELY controversial, has profound implications, and is probably NOT a consensus view, expect maybe in our smallest circle here, is the part where we say something like:

"The only proper way of comparing pleasures is from the perspective. "I feel this pleasure is more pleasing to me than that pleasure."

Huge numbers of people (almost Everyone outside our inner circle of people who are trying to interpret Epicurus rigorously) default to interpeting "virtue" as having objective content, and the worst offense in the world in their eyes is to suggest that the individual has any type of sanction from Nature to pursue "his/her own" pleasure apart from social/universal norms.

So therefore when we discuss issues like ".... maximizing pleasure in our lives over time in the present and the future and talking about maximum pleasure of any one pleasurable event. The latter can't be measured by definition because we're talking about subjective phenomena."

Then we have at least a couple of levels of analysis ---

(1) The issue of being clear in our technical discussions about "ranking" and "divisions" and "types" of pleasure. Here we have a fascinating and important discussion that can be pursued with a wide variety of types of people (both inside and outside the Epicurean framework) without too much pressure from emotional issues.

But we also have :

(2) The issue of the apparent subjective/relativistic nature of pleasure, the acceptance of which is explosively rejected outside the Epicurean framework of Nature. In fact it is hard to even discuss personal attitudes toward pleasure without first coming to terms with the practical implications of concluding that people will disagree on how to pursue pleasure. That probably takes us off into the infrequently discussed issues such as the last ten PDs, and this issue (which might be the most important of which) has to be kept tightly tied to the Epicurean framework for us to make progress on dissecting it. Talking about this issue with people outside the basic Epicurean framework is hardly even possible because you run into immediate and emotional issues about what "should" be the best pleasures, and if you can't agree that that "objective" framework makes no sense then you can hardly even get off the ground.

Here is a link to the "geocentric model" (which Epicurus rejected) that we discuss during this episode:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geocentric_model

In astronomy, the geocentric model (also known as geocentrism, often exemplified specifically by the Ptolemaic system) is a superseded description of the Universe with Earth at the center. Under the geocentric model, the Sun, Moon, stars, and planets all orbited Earth.^[1] The geocentric model was the predominant description of the cosmos in many ancient civilizations, such as those of Aristotle in Classical Greece and Ptolemy in Roman Egypt.

This is one of the few texts I can think of that refers to a superlative experience of pleasure ("jubilation unsurpassed"):

Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 7, p. 1091A: Not only is the basis that they assume for the pleasurable life untrustworthy and insecure, it is quite trivial and paltry as well, inasmuch as their “thing delighted” – their good – is an escape from ills, and they say that they can conceive of no other, and indeed that our nature has no place at all in which to put its good except the place left when its evil is expelled. … Epicurus too makes a similar statement to the effect that the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: “That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about {a jibe at the Peripatetics}, prating meaninglessly about the good.”

Now would it be desirable to live every moment of life experiencing "jubilation unsurpassed"? I think so, and I think this example does stand for the ability to rank some pleasures as more pleasing than others. And it may be there there is no "legitimate" "absolute" standard by which you can say that one pleasure is more pleasing than another other than saying. "I feel this pleasure is more pleasing to me than that one, or those."

But there's a lot to consider about these points.

It "might" be true, but would also be very important to flesh out and explain, that it is a core Epicurean principle that:

There there is no standard by which you can say that one pleasure is "objectively" more pleasing than another, for all people at all times, and from any "absolute" perspective. The only proper way of comparing pleasures is from the perspective. "I feel this pleasure is more pleasing to me than that pleasure."

Would that be correct?

Quote from Godfrey

For a different perspective, hopefully not too different, there is the idea of the best life being the pleasantest life.

A large part of the question seems to be "How do we measure, or define, 'most pleasantest'?"

Episode 20 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available.

Probably need a post in this thread devoted to Aristotle's views, which would likely definitely have been rejected by Epicurus:

Unchanging forms

Main articles: Hylomorphism and Great chain of being

Aristotle did not embrace either divine creation or evolution, instead arguing in his biology that each species (eidos) was immutable, breeding true to its ideal eternal form (not the same as Plato's theory of Forms).^[4][5] Aristotle's suggestion in De Generatione Animalium of a fixed hierarchy in nature - a scala naturae ("ladder of nature") provided an early explanation of the continuity of living things.^[6][7][8] Aristotle saw that animals were teleological (functionally end-directed), and had parts that were homologous with those of other animals, but he did not connect these ideas into a concept of evolutionary progress.^[9]

In the Middle Ages, Scholasticism developed Aristotle's view into the idea of a great chain of being.^[1] The image of a ladder inherently suggests the possibility of climbing, but both the ancient Greeks and mediaeval scholastics such as Ramon Lull^[1] maintained that each species remained fixed from the moment of its creation.^[10][9]

^{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism}

^{Hylomorphism From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigation Jump to search This article is about the concept of hylomorphism in Aristotelian philosophy. For the concept in computer science, see Hylomorphism (computer science). Hylomorphism (or hylemorphism) is a philosophical theory developed by Aristotle, which conceives being (ousia) as a compound of matter and form. The word is a 19th-century term formed from the Greek words ὕλη hyle, "wood, matter", and μορφή, morphē, "form".}

The "Lack of Pattern" argument is in Book Five, here is Bailey:

Quote

For it is clear that he must take joy in new things, to whom the old are painful; but for him, whom no sorrow has befallen in the time gone by, when he led a life of happiness, for such an one what could have kindled a passion for new things? Or what ill had it been to us never to have been made? Did our life, forsooth, lie wallowing in darkness and grief, until the first creation of things dawned upon us? For whosoever has been born must needs wish to abide in life, so long as enticing pleasure shall hold him. But for him, who has never tasted the love of life, and was never in the ranks of the living, what harm is it never to have been made? Further, how was there first implanted in the gods a pattern for the begetting of things, yea, and the concept of man, so that they might know and see in their mind what they wished to do, or in what way was the power of the first-beginnings ever learnt, or what they could do when they shifted their order one with the other, if nature did not herself give a model of creation? For so many first-beginnings of things in many ways, driven on by blows from time everlasting until now, and moved by their own weight, have been wont to be borne on, and to unite in every way, and essay everything that they might create, meeting one with another, that it is no wonder if they have fallen also into such arrangements, and have passed into such movements, as those whereby this present sum of things is carried on, ever and again replenished.