Posts by Cassius

Yes I am looking for a place to move this thread now, but before i forget I need to comment on this:

Quote from Philos Armonikos

By my division here, I satisfy both and would therefore classify myself as a neo-Epicurean, in the particular sense that I am for seeking a revival of the Epicurean tradition and also a revision of some of the conclusions of the physics.

Philos, you are the first in a while (perhaps ever) to come into our circle so intensely focused on physics. The origin of the labels and the materials on this website on the "Neo-Epicureans" is primarily that there are large numbers of people in academia who reject almost every significant conclusion of Epicurus, but adopt his name in their efforts, because they want to redefine "pleasure" as the equivalent of "absence of pain." That is a HUGE problem and is the core of most every dispute or division that we have ever had in our "circle."

The word "circle" is relevant to your sentence that I quoted. Given that there is no formal "Epicurean School" anymore (Don's point) it is not really logically possible to "revise some of the conclusions of the physics." The Epicurean physics are what they are, and no one is really qualified to say "we are revising position X and it is now position Y."

This is closely related to the issue that you will read about if you refer to the thread entitled Discussion of the Society of Epicurus' 20 Tenets of 12/21/19

Since we don't have a formal organization with a formal set of mandatory beliefs, it's not really up to us to say what is or is not Epicurean on a very detailed basis.

We've never had a real problem in the past, and I hope and expect in your case it will be the same, accommodating each other on issues like the size of the sun, infinity, indivisibility,etc., because we are not in the business of writing a physics textbook or the like.

None of us (including me) see any real problem with believing that the universe is infinite or atoms are indivisible or not, except as the reasoning process for those conclusions might indicate some form of skepticism or other process that would lead to problems later - and even then we haven't even begun to approach such a point of concern.

You will see some of these issues discussed when we release the latest podcast (32) that we recorded this morning.

But to repeat and re-emphasize the same point, our "Not Neoepicurean" position papers are almost entirely directed toward the "absence of pain" "be a minimalist" "run from all politics" "go live in a cave" approach which is either explicit or implicit in the academic version of Epicurean philosophy prevalent today.

I think I can already firmly predict from the intensity of your views and the things you have said so far that the "neo-epicurean" issues are not a problem for you personally.

And I am surrounding myself by so many scientists that I am beginning to feel outnumbered and questioning my own assessment of the world situation.

But at least at the moment I am still confident that what i wrote earlier about not letting the physicists war with the philosophers is still the best way to go. I remain convinced that outside the "halls of science" the vast majority of the world is taken in by these issues that are primarily "philosophical" rather than physics-oriented.

As we go forward we need a way to articulate this approach that does not involve constantly repeating "On physics point A Epicurus was wrong, on physics point B Epicurus was wrong, on physics point Epicurus was wrong ad infinitum. If we do that, we really undercut the way our presentation will effect the majority of people. Yes those points are valid and should be made at the proper time and place, but the global issues of supernatural gods, reward/punishment after death, the assertion that all human action is controlled by a hard deterministic fate, the true nature of "virtue" and its role in making decisions, the role of "abstract logic" and how to weigh it against the sensations, anticipations, and feelings -- all of those are HUGE issues and for better or worse the primary effort and attention of the forums needs to be primarily devoted to those.

Not exclusively, by any means, but just like with "politics" it would be a great pity if we allow ourselves to be too divided on details of physics unless they truly impact these bigger issues.

Here is one example that I see of the kind of attitude that is appropriate for an Epicurean to take even when we don't have the amount of evidence we would like to have, as illustrated by what Lucian thought was the proper Epicurean attitude toward a religious imposter, from "Aristotle the Oracle Monger"

And at this point, my dear Celsus, we may, if we will be candid, make some allowance for these Paphlagonians and Pontics; the poor uneducated ‘fat-heads’ might well be taken in when they handled the serpent—a privilege conceded to all who choose—and saw in that dim light its head with the mouth that opened and shut. It was an occasion for a Democritus, nay, for an Epicurus or a Metrodorus, perhaps, a man whose intelligence was steeled
against such assaults by skepticism and insight, one who, if he could not detect the precise imposture, would at any rate have been perfectly certain that, though this escaped him, the whole thing was a lie and an impossibility.

We will address some of these issues in the podcast that was recorded today in a way that most should find satisfactory.

To the extent that "some" in Philos' comment refers to me, the point I am making is that physics does not exist alone in its own world. Epicurus confronted in his day, and we confront today, arguments that are based on "words" - "logic" - and that those arguments are of concern to many people. We are always going to be faced with questions that are essentially "You don't know because you haven't personally been there / done that / seen that / etc." It is important to understand how we respond to those questions, what is involved in "waiting," what kind of standards of "certainty" we should expect to hold ourselves to, and what is an appropriate level of skepticism to hold toward various things.

Those who are primarily immersed in scientific pursuits are not generally going to be as concerned with those contentions as those who are not. However in Epicurus' day it was considered a serious philosophic argument to contend that it was impossible to walk across a room, and even today there are all sorts of logical and ontological arguments for the existence of god and similar questions waiting to trap the unwary.

Not everyone needs help in those areas, but there are a lot of people who get concerned with arguments like those who need help in responding. For them, no amount of "physics" is going to be enough.

So when Philos says:

Quote

The Epicurean physics needs to have a modern adjustment, while at the same time not losing any of the most important consequences for the ethics.

I would say that Epicurean philosophy is ultimately not about any particular and precise physics position (and in that I think we are agreed). The issue is more that Epicurean physics were derived using a particular approach to knowledge (the canonical faculties vs "rationalism") and if we don't learn the details of that method then we'll never understand the appropriate consequences for the ethics.

It is very important to observe the resistance that Epicurus displayed toward accepting contentions based on mathematics, geometry, or other aspects of logical modeling. Such conclusions can actually or apparently contradict what we observe through the senses, and that is why we are talking about these issues and need to continue to do so.

Studying the reasoning behind "the swerve," for example, will always be more useful for understanding Epicurus' thought process than it will ever be for explaining the movement of atoms.

The same goes for the infinite universe, life on other words, immutability, indivisibility, and the rest. That is why these issues cannot be dropped as if they were unimportant to talk about.

I'll close this comment by observing that in my ten years of internet involvement in Epicurus, I do see this as a recurring issue. People who approach Epicurus purely from the scientific perspective don't tend to appreciate the "logical" issues. People who approach Epicurus from a "history of philosophy" perspective or an "ethics" perspective don't tend to appreciate the physics of Epicurus and Lucretius, and they hardly spend any time at all on the letters to Herodotus or Pythocles, or on Lucretius' poem.

Both perspectives are important to understanding Epicurus, and we should not let the varying perspectives become at war with one another.

From Chapter 15 of A Few Days In Athens:

To conceive of mind independent of matter, is as if we should conceive of color independent of a substance colored: What is form, if not a body of a particular shape? What is thought, if not something which thinks? Destroy the substance, and you destroy its properties; and so equally — destroy the properties, and you destroy the substance. To suppose the possibility of retaining the one, without the other, is an evident absurdity."

Context:

"Our young friend," observed Metrodorus, "lately made use of an expression, the error involved in which, seems to be at the root of his difficulty. In speaking of matter," he continued, turning to Theon, "you employed the epithet inert. What is your meaning? And what matter do you here designate?"

"All matter surely is, in itself, inert."

"All matter surely is, in itself, as it is," said Metrodorus with a smile; "and that, I should say, is living and active.

Again, what is matter?"

"All that is evident to our senses," replied Theon, "and which stands opposed to mind."

"All matter then is inert which is devoid of mind. "What then do you understand by mind?"

"I conceive some error in my definition," said Theon, smiling. "Should I say — thought — you would ask if every existence devoid of thought was inert, or if every existence, possessing life, possessed thought."

"I should so have asked. Mind or thought I consider a quality of that matter constituting the existence we call a man, which quality we find in a varying degree in other existences; many, perhaps all animals, possessing it. Life is another quality, or combination of qualities, of matter, inherent in — we know not how many existences. We find it in vegetables; we might perceive it even in stones, could we watch their formation, growth, and decay. We may call that active principle, pervading the elements of all things, which approaches and separates the component particles of the ever-changing, and yet ever-enduring world — life. Until you discover some substance, which undergoes no change, you cannot speak of inert matter: it can only be so, at least, relatively, — that is, as compared with other substances."

"The classing of thought and life among the qualities of matter is new to me."

"What is in a substance cannot be separate from it. And is not all matter a compound of qualities? Hardness, extension, form, color, motion, rest — take away all these, and where is matter? To conceive of mind independent of matter, is as if we should conceive of color independent of a substance colored: What is form, if not a body of a particular shape? What is thought, if not something which thinks? Destroy the substance, and you destroy its properties; and so equally — destroy the properties, and you destroy the substance. To suppose the possibility of retaining the one, without the other, is an evident absurdity."

"The error of conceiving a quality in the abstract often offended me in the Lyceum," returned the youth, "but I never considered the error as extending to mind and life, any more than to vice and virtue."

"You stopped short with many others," said Leontium. "It is indeed surprising how many acute minds will apply a logical train of reasoning in one case, and invert the process in another exactly similar."

"To return, and if you will, to conclude our discussion," said Metrodorus, "I will observe that no real advances can be made in the philosophy of mind, without a deep scrutiny into the operations of nature, or material existences. Mind being only a quality of matter, the study we call the philosophy of mind, is necessarily only a branch of general physics, or the Study of a particular part of the philosophy of matter."

Related issue: events vs properties, from Book One:

Philos the reason for my turning this thread into a FAQ is that it is indeed frequently asked in varying forms and will best be found in the future by a title which describes the topic. Were the issue here solely your personal question it would not rise to the level of general interest, and were the issue personal to you and not in need of a FAQ I would not have been able to devote so much extended effort to discussing it with you as I have done. Thanks for posting your comment as that can serve as your caveat that the way the question is phrased was not your intent. That's why I explained in the opening post the nature of the topic I intended to address, on a broader level. I will add to the opening post a note with a link to your comment and I think I can modify it to help with your concern.

Thank you Philos!

Cassius:

"If the elementary particles are quanta, for example, would pleasure cease being the foundation of human morality? I think not." That is a great example of an update in physics that does not change the conclusions an iota. On the other hand, if the elementary particles are found to be inscribed "Best wishes, Jehova" then that would be a scientific discovery that WOULD change the conclusions rather dramatically. As humans we will never see these elementary particles ourselves, so we need a framework for having confidence in our conclusions in the absence of seeing them with our own naked eyes. Are we to say to ourselves, "Yes it's POSSIBLE that they are so inscribed, because I haven't seen them"? I feel confident that even given our advances to date, Epicurus would still say "no." One might want to qualify that with "reasonably possible" or other hedge words, but at some point you're simply playing a word game rather than dealing in useful concepts, because once you truly believe that "anything is possible" then you're a long way toward totally losing touch with human reality.

Alan to Ilkka:

Ilkka I agree with all of that. I only disagree with those who vehemently say that we need the swerve to have agency or even that the swerve of Epicurean atoms really truly exists in the very precise context that Epicurus stipulated them to serve in. You're not saying that, so we don't have a disagreement. The swerve of Epicurean atoms is a very different thing than the random motion of particles in a gas or fluid or the superposition of quantum states or the fundamental inability to register both a particles position and momentum to arbitrary accuracy (all those things that I suggested above that could be considered a 'modern swerve').

Up the line in this thread I promised a cite to a David Sedley article with an interesting description of how Sedley thinks Epicurus came up with the swerve, more from a "Determinism" standpoint rather than simply due to physics theory. Your mileage may vary, but in my experience Sedley is one of the most perceptive commentators on Epicurus alive today. The article is "Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism" and can be found here:

File

Sedley: "Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism"

1983 Paper which is the one of the best treatments of Epicurus' view of the Free Will / Agency / Determinism issue available.

Cassius

June 3, 2020 at 8:40 AM

Ilkka to Alan:

Alan, the swerve is "random movement by a particle". Whatever consequences it has further down the line, it also has a physical definition. I'm sure that Epicurus didn't have any of those things you listed in mind when he formulated the swerve, but that doesn't change the fact that there is random movement. Several different kinds in fact, if I've understood it correctly.

Swerve was an attempt to ground the self evident facts, of compound objects and choice making, in the physical structure of the world. It was the best that could have been done at the time, and something we're still trying to figure out. Maybe we should cut the ancients some slack in matters not settled yet.

Cassius: (to Alan)

"This is all well and good, but it is not what Epicurus originally had in mind." <<< Well, it's probable also that Epicurus had more than one thing in mind when he suggested the theory of the swerve. In apparently making no effort to explain the "mechanism" of the swerve, he was simply stating the effect rather than speculating as to a cause or even really a manner of operation. I am all for further exploration and discussion of possible mechanisms, as I am sure that Epicurus would be -- the point I keep emphasizing is that in engaging in speculation we should never lose site of the big philosophical picture, nor should we open the door in our own minds, or specially in the minds of those who are not trained in the speculative sciences, that we are suggesting that Jehovah or Allah are possible explanations.

I know that you personally are committed to not doing that, but there are many scientists (apparently) who are all too willing to make those connections, and we need to be careful in consideration of our own peace of mind, plus (or more) that of others who are neither equipped nor disposed to deal with these issues. Standing in the theatre and yelling "the atoms are divisible and they are on fire and may explode at any second" would be improper from many perspectives. Of course YOU Alan are not doing that in any way shape or form, but the world got to the mess it is in today in large part because there are so many people who ARE willing to do that, and no debate ever takes place in a totally contextless vacuum.

alan:

Ilkka - I agree with everything you said except for the "still swerving" statement, as specifically applied proactively in the context of modern physics. What you are suggesting is a basic redefinition of what we mean by the swerve, and I would also be for that. The swerve as first formulated by Epicurus (that is, the reason for why there are macroscopic objects and why we have free-will in an otherwise deterministic universe) is not attested to by modern physics. What you are now suggesting we understand the swerve to be is perhaps quantum indeterminacy, or perhaps Brownian motion, or perhaps Heisenberg uncertainty. This is all well and good, but it is not what Epicurus originally had in mind.

Ilkka:

I've never had any trouble integrating modern particle physics and Epicurean philosophy... But I'm not a physicist.

It's only an accident of history that we use "atom" in a different way than Epicurus did. It would have saved us a lot of confusion if we didn't. Modern meaning and the ancient one are two different things.

In the context of Epicurean philosophy we can say atom and be understood to mean "the smallest possible particle". In the context of modern physics that statement is false, because we know that there are smaller particles than those that physicists call atoms.

I think that we as modern Epicureans should -- in the interest of clarity -- use modern terms.

It seems to me that there is no difference in saying "atoms and void" or "mass-energy and space-time". These statements are synonymous.

We should also remember that while Epicurean ethics rest on the study of nature, both rest on epistemology. The physical theories must change with new knowledge, and so must the ethical theories.

But what has actually changed in practical, human terms?

If the elementary particles are quanta, for example, would pleasure cease being the foundation of human morality? I think not.

Similarly the fact that the universe is billions of years old is in practice an eternity. The numbers remain so staggeringly large as to be unfathomable. When we assign 14.3 as the age of the universe we're creating a mirage that we think we understand: we know that a mirage is a reflection... but what we see is an image hovering in the air.

If quantum theory is true, the particles are still moving randomly. Still swerving. As far as I the layman can make out...

As a final note I'd like to ask a question: What do you think Epicurus would do if he was presented with the evidence we have available to us?

I think he would rejoice... and update his physics.

Cassius:

Ok this tangent and your example of your feeling the chair means we are over a pretty big hump I think

Now as to the existence of an afterlife, there are also going to be numerous places we have to check, and I am going to have to start by just listing a couple first. I think you are asking for more detail that just the statement that death is nothing to us because it means absence of sensation, you are probably looking for the extended discussion of how spirit and atoms cannot form an eternal bond that continues after death disperses the atoms of the body.

I am tempted to suggest that we start a different thread since this is such an important and deep topic as well. Let's do that, and that will help us call in others for assistance and extend us over into tomorrow.

What Arguments Did Epicurus Use To Prove the Non-Existence of Life After Death?

Alan:

Cassius Hm, okay I agree with that. Epicurus absolutely did, at least according to DeWitt, use the structure of a syllogistic argument to prove the swerve.

As you say, what we are delving into now is a separate issue, but also important. I disagree with the rationalists and would affirm that certain truths can be ascertained from direct sensation, for example: I am now sitting in my chair at my desk and I feel the chair under me, therefore the chair exists. This is not a syllogism because there is only one premise.

So to expand my question from earlier, how would Epicurus have proved the nonexistence of the afterlife either by way of direct empirical experience or by using a syllogistic argument form as he did with the swerve and the infinity of the universe?

Cassius:

As Ilkka said upstream, the physics is based in large part on epistemology, and Epicurus' epistemology is a rejection of Platonic and Aristotelian rationalism, so we are now in a discussion of even greater significance than the astrophysics we were discussing earlier.

Cassius:

Alan as I interpret what DeLacy is conveying, you are correct when you say "If you say that Epicurus did not use a syllogism to prove the swerve than you are not accepting the standard definition of a syllogism." I interpret DeLacy to be saying that ultimately Plato and Aristotle were both rationalists who contended that truth comes essentially ONLY through reason, and that conclusions based fundamentally in sensory data can never be true unless they can be converted into syllogisms. This is a huge issue separate and apart from where we started today on physics, so we need to keep that in mind.

- Edit yes absolutely, the two pages at the link are near the beginning of the point, but this appendix article in full is an excellent summary of the epistemological revolution Epicurus was engaged in. I have not found a better summary of these issues than this article. It is unfortunately not something that is easily distilled into a couple of sentences.

Alan:

Cassius, Okay, I've done the reading. I think that Aristotle is wrong here. Empirical experience is a candidate for truth, which is attested in the sensations of the Canon. Not sure how the rest of what follows is relevant to our discussion.

Again we are not using the same terms for the same things. What I mean by a syllogism is the standard definition, here from Oxford as "an instance of a form of reasoning in which a conclusion is drawn (whether validly or not) from two given or assumed propositions (premises), each of which shares a term with the conclusion, and shares a common or middle term not present in the conclusion (e.g., all dogs are animals; all animals have four legs; therefore all dogs have four legs )."

If you say that Epicurus did not use a syllogism to prove the swerve than you are not accepting the standard definition of a syllogism. I explicitly laid out the premises and the conclusion in an earlier comment.

There is no truth content in the syllogism itself. The syllogism is just a relational structure. The deduction that arises from the syllogism only bears truth if and only if its premises are valid and also true, as attested to by other criteria, such as empirical experience.

Cassius:

Well first of all and most importantly, in asking for a syllogism and suggesting that only through syllogism is truth obtained, you are directly contravening a core Epicurean position in which Epicurus fought against Plato and Aristotle. This is explained at length in the Delacy commentary to Philodemus on methods of inference. I will come back here and add a page reference in just a moment. I am attaching a clip of a core part of the discussion where DeLacy is explaining aristotle's view - unfortunately it will be necessay to read this in some detail to see his explanation of how Epicurus rejected this. This can be found at the following link:

https://archive.org/stream/philode…ge/126/mode/2up