Posts by Cassius

Wow that would be great. That reminds me that long ago set this up. So long I have forgotten about it, and I hate to think about how accurate (or not) I was then! It might serve as a help to someone to get started

https://www.xmind.net/m/SwVU/

A basic discussion of this topic will be included in Episode 10 (and several following episodes) of the Lucretius Today Podcast.

Episode Ten - The Lucretius Today Podcast [Pre-Production Phase]

Issues Surrounding the Void - Inoculating Students of Epicurus Against Error.

The following notes are of relevance to Episode 10. and to future passages in Lucretius about the void:

Letter to Herodotus: "Moreover, the universe is bodies and space: for that bodies exist, sense itself witnesses in the experience of all men, and in accordance with the evidence of sense we must of necessity judge of the imperceptible by reasoning, as I have already said. And if there were not that which we term void and place and intangible existence, bodies would have nowhere to exist and nothing through which to move, as they are seen to move. And besides these two, nothing can even be thought of either by conception or on the analogy of things conceivable such as could be grasped as whole existences and not spoken of as the accidents or properties of such existences. (Link to Bailey text with Greek)

Wikipedia Article on Void in Philosophy

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Western philosophers have discussed the existence and nature of void since Parmenides suggested it did not exist and used this to argue for the non-existence of change, motion, differentiation, among other things.^[5] In response to Parmenides, Democritus described the universe as only being composed of atoms and void.^[6]

Aristotle, in Book IV of Physics, denied the existence of the Void (Greek: κενόν) with his rejection of finite entities.^[7]

The View of the Stoics: The Universe Consists of Matter and GOD

(quote below is from David Sedley's "Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom" which quotes Diogenes of Oinoanda)

Note however, this in the wikipedia article on Void quoted above, so the Stoics were slippery:

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Stoic philosophers admitted the subsistence of four incorporeals among which they included void: "Outside of the world is diffused the infinite void, which is incorporeal. By incorporeal is meant that which, though capable of being occupied by body, is not so occupied. The world has no empty space within it, but forms one united whole. This is a necessary result of the sympathy and tension which binds together things in heaven and earth. Chrysippus discusses the void in his work On Void and in the first book of his Physical Sciences; so too Apollophanes in his Physics^[8] , Apollodorus^[9] , and Posidonius in his Physical Discourse, book ii."^[10]

Wikipedia Article on Eleatic Philosophers who denied the existence of void: bold emphasis added

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The Eleatics rejected the epistemological validity of sense experience, and instead took logical standards of clarity and necessity to be the criteria of truth. Of the members, Parmenides and Melissus built arguments starting from sound premises. Zeno, on the other hand, primarily employed the reductio ad absurdum, attempting to destroy the arguments of others by showing that their premises led to contradictions (Zeno's paradoxes).^{[citation needed]}

The main doctrines of the Eleatics were evolved in opposition to the theories of the early physicalist philosophers, who explained all existence in terms of primary matter, and to the theory of Heraclitus, which declared that all existence may be summed up as perpetual change. The Eleatics maintained that the true explanation of things lies in the conception of a universal unity of being. According to their doctrine, the senses cannot cognize this unity, because their reports are inconsistent; it is by thought alone that we can pass beyond the false appearances of sense and arrive at the knowledge of being, at the fundamental truth that the "All is One". Furthermore, there can be no creation, for being cannot come from non-being, because a thing cannot arise from that which is different from it. They argued that errors on this point commonly arise from the ambiguous use of the verb to be, which may imply actual physical existence or be merely the linguistic copula which connects subject and predicate.^[2]

Though the Eleatic school ended with Melissus of Samos (fl. c. 450 BC), and conclusions of the Eleatics were rejected by the later Presocratics and Aristotle, their arguments were taken seriously, and they are generally credited with improving the standards of discourse and argument in their time. Their influence was likewise long-lasting; Gorgias, a Sophist, argued in the style of the Eleatics in On Nature or What Is Not, and Plato acknowledged them in the Parmenides, the Sophist and the Statesman. Furthermore, much of the later philosophy of the ancient period borrowed from the methods and principles of the Eleatics.^{[citation needed]}

Wikipedia on Parmenides

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Parmenides claimed that there is no truth in the opinions of the mortals. Genesis-and-destruction, as Parmenides emphasizes, is a false opinion, because to be means to be completely, once and for all. What exists can in no way not exist.

"For this view, that That Which Is Not exists, can never predominate. You must debar your thought from this way of search, nor let ordinary experience in its variety force you along this way, (namely, that of allowing) the eye, sightless as it is, and the ear, full of sound, and the tongue, to rule; but (you must) judge by means of the Reason (Logos) the much-contested proof which is expounded by me. "(B 7.1–8.2)

...

The traditional interpretation of Parmenides' work is that he argued that the every-day perception of reality of the physical world (as described in doxa) is mistaken, and that the reality of the world is 'One Being' (as described in aletheia an unchanging, ungenerated, indestructible whole. Under the Way of Opinion, Parmenides set out a contrasting but more conventional view of the world, thereby becoming an early exponent of the duality of appearance and reality. For him and his pupils, the phenomena of movement and change are simply appearances of a changeless, eternal reality.

Wikipedia on Zeno's Paradoxes:

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Zeno's paradoxes are a set of philosophical problems generally thought to have been devised by Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea (c. 490–430 BC) to support Parmenides' doctrine that contrary to the evidence of one's senses, the belief in plurality and change is mistaken, and in particular that motion is nothing but an illusion. It is usually assumed, based on Plato's Parmenides (128a–d), that Zeno took on the project of creating these paradoxes because other philosophers had created paradoxes against Parmenides' view. Thus Plato has Zeno say the purpose of the paradoxes "is to show that their hypothesis that existences are many, if properly followed up, leads to still more absurd results than the hypothesis that they are one."^[1] Plato has Socrates claim that Zeno and Parmenides were essentially arguing exactly the same point.^[2]

Achilles and the Tortoise:

In a race, the quickest runner can never over­take the slowest, since the pursuer must first reach the point whence the pursued started, so that the slower must always hold a lead. — as recounted by Aristotle, Physics VI:9, 239b15

Arrow Paradox:

If everything when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if that which is in locomotion is always occupying such a space at any moment, the flying arrow is therefore motionless.[15] — as recounted by Aristotle, Physics VI:9, 239b5

The Paradox of Place:

From Aristotle: If everything that exists has a place, place too will have a place, and so on ad infinitum.

The Paradox of a Grain of Millet:

Description of the paradox from the Routledge Dictionary of Philosophy: The argument is that a single grain of millet makes no sound upon falling, but a thousand grains make a sound. Hence a thousand nothings become something, an absurd conclusion.[19]

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Quote from Elayne

Eugenios, and I think this is an extremely important issue to understand, in order to thoroughly grasp this philosophy. Once you have fully gotten it, you won't have trouble recognizing when people aren't understanding it.

... and you will get lots of practice recognizing it! As for myself I have a harder time telling whether people don't understand it, or whether they just refuse to accept it. This is think is related to the widespread injection of "humanism" into Epicurean discussions. Everyone (me included) has personal preferences as to how we would like to see the world work, but the humanist seeks to universalize his or her conclusions into a single "best" system for everyone.

To be fair to Epicurus and to understand him, I think we need to recognize that Epicurus wasn't in the business of creating a political system.

Epicurus won't deliver a god-like pronouncement as to whether - to take a current example - the Greeks should fling open the gates to the Syrian refugees, or whether the Syrian refugees should even be trying to get into Greece. Epicurus was in the business of understanding the universe so that EVERYONE, Greek and Syrian, could - if they cared to - evaluate their personal situation according to reality and then act accordingly.

The point people don't like to hear is that the facts of nature don't take sides, and Greeks and the Syrians both could take exactly the same starting points as to philosophy and come to all sorts of different conclusions -- from coexistence to separation to all out war -- based on their own personal considerations.

And the fact of nature that we have to live with as to Epicureans is that Nature doesn't "care" about the result, and doesn't care whether the Greeks or the Syrians win or whether they all exterminate each other. There are no gods or "ideals of virtue" to look to either to tell us which side to root for, other than any we might choose to create for ourselves. We ultimately each as individuals have to look to our own feelings of pleasure and pain, and then act accordingly.

It's really hard to keep a clear distinction between our own personal preferences, and our understanding of what Nature and philosophy can answer for us. Really hard. But I think we can sense strongly in the surviving texts of Epicurus, especially in parts like PD10 and the PD's stating that there is no absolute justice, that this individual contextual analysis is exactly what Epicurus was saying.

Quote from Eugenios

Living pleasurably is not the same as feeling pleasure. A prisoner (who is not an Epicurean) can feel pleasure intermittently, but I would contend that they aren't living pleasurably. Someone living in abject poverty (who is not an Epicurean) can feel pleasure intermittently, but I would contend that they aren't living pleasurably. The feeling of pleasure alone is not a sufficient reason to contend that someone is living a pleasurable life.

As I reread your post I don't know that we really have much disagreement on the fundamental points as much as we are on that conclusion and the implications of it. On this "Living pleasurably is not the same as feeling pleasure." I would say that clearly seems to be a problem, maybe mostly because of the implications it raises without answering them. Because this sentence "The feeling of pleasure alone is not a sufficient reason to contend that someone is living a pleasurable life" can hardly mean anything other than that there is some reason OTHER than the feeling of pleasure to contend that someone is living a pleasurable life. Clearly the person asserting such a position has something OTHER than the feeling of pleasure to assert as the standard of a pleasurable life.

Maybe it would help if you would explain what that standard might be, but I cannot imagine that asserting that "the standard of a pleasurable life is something other than pleasure" could lead to much that would be consistent with Epicurus.

But I am all ears

Some comments on specific points from your post Eugenios:

Quote from Eugenios

However, I think an argument could be made that their brains are "wired" differently than the majority of people. In which case, are their feelings of pleasure reliable guides for them? Why else would medications be prescribed for some?

Yes indeed their brains are wired differently, and yes indeed we try to treat them with medication, but that does not change the fact of nature as to what they are experiencing. (I understand that you agree with this point.) Yes we are substituting our judgment for theirs in how they should live, and yes I understand that we think we are doing so for their own best interest. But that is not something that Nature gives us an absolute sanction to do, and there are neither gods nor ideal forms to sanction it either. We do so because we choose to do so, and we do so for good or bad result at our own peril, and so we should be clear as to why we are doing it.

Ok now I am back. We could start with all the statements in the letter to Menoeceus about "pleasure" being the alpha and omega, but I think the place to focus at the moment is on the point that feeling is the ultimate guide, beyond which there is no other, and nothing else to make a thing worth choosing and avoiding. I like to look to two places for this explanation:

(1) PD2: "2. Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us." This is a statement that nothing which is no a subject of sensation is of any relevance to us. That would take out of the argument any abstraction which does not ultimately resolve back to a positive or negative sensation, which means pleasure and pain. I do not believe there is any more fundamental proposition in Epicurean philosophy, even PD1 as to the nature of the gods, than this one that all good and evil comes to us through sensation, which I believe translates into "feeling" in the context in which we are discussing things. If a thing cannot ultimately be "felt" in some way, then that thing is of no relevance to us. Even the issue of the gods in PD1 is relevant to us only because of the feelings that the issue of gods generates in our lives.

(1) The most clear explanation of this issue is in the opening of the Torquatus section in On Ends, which even hints at the objection which I think you are making, Eugenios, and indicates that some Epicureans ("some members of our school) fell away from Epicurus on this point, which I believe was fatal to Epicurean development (and DeWitt talks about the danger of this divergence too):

"We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil. This he sets out to prove as follows: Every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the Chief Good, while it recoils from pain as the Chief Evil, and so far as possible avoids it. This it does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of Nature's own unbiased and honest verdict.

Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, be thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature.  What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?

Some members of our school however would refine upon this doctrine; these say that it is not enough for the judgment of good and evil to rest with the senses; the facts that pleasure is in and for itself desirable and pain in and for itself to be avoided can also be grasped by the intellect and the reason. Accordingly they declare that the perception that the one is to be sought after and the other avoided is a notion naturally implanted in our minds. Others again, with whom I agree, observing that a great many philosophers do advance a vast array of reasons to prove why pleasure should not be counted as a good nor pain as an evil, consider that we had better not be too confident of our case; in their view it requires elaborate and reasoned argument, and abstruse theoretical discussion of the nature of pleasure and pain."

For now I will focus only on the part in bold, but I included the "some members of our school" to point out how acute the danger is.

Ultimately the issue comes down to sensation (feeling of pleasure and pain, as shown by the equation of those things in the sentence structure) being the only judge that Nature gives us as to what is our guide for choice and avoidance.

Now the common objection here is that we choose unwisely at times, and we end up suffering more pain and pleasure. (That too is set out by Torquatus as the issue.) The answer to that issue is not that there is a god, or that there is an ideal form of pleasure which is always preferable to other forms of pleasure. The answer to that question is "Whether you like it or not, this is the way Nature operates, so you can choose to accept the natural order, or you can rebel against Nature and set up some other standard. If you do, good luck, because there is no god, no ideal form, and no outside sanction or authority whatsoever for your decision in doing that. You're on your own."

Now you Eugenios are framing the question in terms of people who are insane or "psychopathic" or "sociopathic" and asking about the apparent problems with those situations. The answer there is that NATURE has no problems with those situations whatsoever - Nature doesn't care. It's only real living people who have feelings and sensations, and it is up to them to pursue their lives with whatever circumstances they are given. Calling people psychopathic or sociopathic or using whatever terms of medicine or politics or religion or culture that we want to use as branding someone as depraved does not in any way invoke special authority from gods or Platos realms of ideals or any absolute standard of virtue whatsoever. Those people are as they are, just like cats are like cats and dogs are like dogs and rarely see things eye to eye - to the point of killing each other in many cases. That is simply the way nature operates.

Now we can as humans of course observe and recognize and take steps to deal with the consequences of those problems. We can keep rabid dogs on leashes and we can identify and restrain (restraint being another reference in Torquatus) those who would kill us either because they are in some way "-pathic" or because they just don't like the color of our skin or the way we cut our hair. If we don't act to prevent harm from those sources, then often we will suffer from that harm and pay the consequence of our failure to observe and to act.

But I am now very far downstream into the consequences. The real answer to your question is in Epicurus' "What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?"

For those people who experience pleasure at things that we consider -pathic in some way, they are experiencing the feeling of pleasure just as we are. They are not likely to succeed at their path for very long, because the NORMAL part of the universe generally outnumbers them in any context, and the normal part is not likely to take kindly to their -pathic behavior for very long. It is correct for you to point out that ultimately they will fail to live pleasurably for very long, but you have to remember that LENGTH OF TIME is not the standard for living pleasurably. That is stated explicitly in the letter to Menoeceus a there is no reason from any other passage to infer that length of time is the overriding factor in judging pleasure. You would be right to say that "neither is intensity the overriding factor either" but the real answer is that there IS no absolute standard in Nature for how to judge pleasure. Nature is not going to smile on you because you gathered flowers in fields for 50 years instead of living for 30 years as a mountain-climber and downhill skier. There IS no absolute standard for pleasant living - no external standard at all that is sanctioned by Nature. We each get to make our own decisions as to what life will bring us the most pleasure, because only we are the ones feeling the result.

No matter how dramatically we illustrate the horrific results of what we see as depravity in the world, if you accept that Nature gives no standard other than pleasure and pain for how to live, then the result is the same, and the dramatizations may be colorful, but they all lead to the same conclusion:

10. If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky, and death, and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires (and of pains), we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full, with pleasures from every source, and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.

Eugenios you have stated your view very clearly and summarized it well in that last sentence

"The feeling of pleasure alone is not a sufficient reason to contend that someone is living a pleasurable life."

Unfortunately I am out and going to be delayed in responding in full but my understanding of Epicurus is that he would completely disagree with that statement. I believe Epicurus would say that feeling itself is the ultimate standard, and there is no outside authority which can second guess it - which I believe to be the clear implication of PD10 and many other sayings, all of which provide the context for interpreting PD5 in a consistent way.

More soon.....

Thanks Elayne! Well stated.

On rereading the post I can see why Elayne reacted the way she did, but I read the key as being in the last paragraph where I thought Eugenios [ edit - now Don] was dealing with both rest and action. Definitely I would not want to imply either that "rest" was preferable. I am definitely guilty of "skimming" when I read sometime, and I didn't look up the Epicurus wiki post, but I think we're all mostly and maybe totally together on this - the saying is aimed at how most people botch both rest and activity because they do not prudently follow pleasure as the guide of life.

EXCELLENT CHART - Thank you Eugenios!!!!

Charles when you get a chance check out the Nikolsky article in particular. He explains how Laertius could be way off base, and of course Laertius was writing - what - at least 300 years after Epicurus?

And I am going to go ahead and edit the name of this thread!

Yes agreed - but - it may well be too the case that this is one of Epicurus' most clear statements against "virtue" but citing the opposite - by your translations we see that he is citing the "worst" possible type of person, and saying that these characterizations alone are insufficient to label their way of life as undesirable -- and that is in their results that we should judge them, just as we should judge harshly those who claim to follow "virtue" but who end up creating boatloads of pain.

I agree that's probably the best interpretation (You're lacking something you want, something you feel that you deserve), but I think this is one of those areas that we can sense a perspective that is different from ours, so we need to be on guard that we don't just unthinkingly presume an answer that might not be exactly what Lucretius/Epicurus was saying.

Thank you Eugenios -- "grudging" is surely in line with most of those other terms (except for Martin Ferguson Smith who apparently didn't like the idea )

I am not sure I am with you though on what you think it means. You included "wanting" in your list, and to me that means "insufficient" or "inadequate" but the other terms (greedy, envious) imply something different - at least to me.

Envious, greedy, grudging, all carry (to me) the implication that there is some force/entity that is deliberately holding back something.

So I think the same issue that we discussed is still in play -- what is behind Lucretius in "personalizing" the faculty of vision as if it had some intent to hold us from seeing more?

And do you think this is related to the opening part which referred to "the fast bars of nature’s portals" (Munro) / "the close-set bolts upon the doors of nature" (Bailey)?

And even if the answer to that last question is yes, that just make the questions more important to answer: "Who is standing between us and nature? How? Why?"

Great analysis thank you!

Yes, beautifully stated and I think very accurate to what Epicurus was saying!

Welcome indeed Nicola, and thank you for posting! Over the last month, strangely enough, we've been getting new registrations using names similar to "antivirus software" products, and when I saw "Nico Lab" that sounded kind of similar We look at and welcome every new member individually, so that's how your welcome got customized with that "post or out!" remark

You sound like a great addition to the forum so thanks for adding yourself. Please look around and post in or on whatever topics interest you. No question is too basic because that's how we do things here - talking to others about details and issues is the best way to learn things for ourselves.

Again - welcome!

Episode Nine is now released!