Posts by Cassius

Quote from Mike Anyayahan

Therefore, pleasure (and happiness) is not simply produced by the absence of pain but out of a particular desire that demands no pain at all.

Mike I can see why you would say "no pain" because of the point that the two feelings are separate and distinct. But in terms of 'demanding no pain at all' you would also keep in mind that we sometimes choose pain in order to produce pleasure, so while they are not the same feeling, a pleasure that is purchased at the cost of a particular pain might be a pleasure that we would choose, despite the cost in pain, would it not?

Quote from Charles

Or is it instead that in his refutations he presented the original ideas and opinions of the Epicureans that have otherwise been lost to history?

I think the answer is almost exclusively this aspect - he is the best source for otherwise unpreserved material. We know also that Cicero was very good friends with Atticus, who was a very strong Epicurean, so I think it is fair to say that Cicero had some degree of restraint on him that he could not misrepresent Epicurus too strongly lest he lose credibility with Atticus and others of his friends, as Epicurus was very popular then.

Also Charles I highly recommend reading the full book of "On Ends." I think it is pretty well documented and accepted by the experts that Cicero was not himself a Stoic, but in fact a neo-Platonist, and he disliked Stoicism almost as much as Epicurus. And as much or more of "On Ends" is devoted to refuting the Stoics than to the Epicureans. In fact I think you will find that Cicero's anti-Stoic argument is probably at least as intense, and perhaps even more vicious (and effective), than his anti-Epicurean argument.

Cicero was a smart guy and probably quoting directly from Epicurean texts in order to make is compilation work manageable. But you are correct he was very antiEpicurean so that slant has to be kept in mind.

And yes other than Lucretius, the Torquatus narrative in On Ends, and the Velleius narrative in "On the Nature of the Gods, are the most extensive surviving texts on Epicurean positions other than the letters of Epicurus in Diogenes Laertius, and the wall of Diogenes of Oinoanda, which has not been as accessible over the centuries as has been the work of Cicero, which has possibly been more accessible even than Diogenes Laertius.

Which to some extent explains how this part of On Ends is now preserved as the Lorem Ipsum filler text.

Mike on this issue of ataraxia as the alleged highest pleasure I have summarized my research into the cites in THIS article: The Full Cup / Fullness of Pleasure Model

I have accumulated the cites that I have found that make clear that Epicurus was referring to pleasure in the same way we ordinarily understand that word, and I also point to links to the works of Plato which I believe explain why Epicurus developed the absence of pain terminology, as a means of logical refutation of the Platonic argument that pleasure cannot be the goal of life because pleasure allegedly is insatiable (has no limit): The Full Cup / Fullness of Pleasure Model

Several of the most clear text cites are this from Epicurus himself:

“It is observed too that in his treatise On the Ethical End he writes in these terms : “I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, of sex, of sound, and the pleasures of beautiful form.”

– Diogenes Laertius, Book X

and this from Torquatus, which makes clear that the best life is one surrounded by numerous and vivid pleasures:

The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement.

and this from Cicero himself, which shows how you can easily and logically link tranquility to ordinary vivid pleasures without any contradiction:

Cicero, In defense of Publius Sestius, 10.23: “He {Publius Clodius} praised those most who are said to be above all others the teachers and eulogists of pleasure {the Epicureans}. … He added that these same men were quite right in saying that the wise do everything for their own interests; that no sane man should engage in public affairs; that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures.

Quote from Charles

I believe the Stoics are looking for Eudaimonia, Ataraxia is much more Epicurean.I

I agree Charles, although I think what we're really saying is what words are associated with those schools today. Eusdaimonia definitely sounds Aristotelian today (as does "flourishing), and ataraxia is alleged to be Epicurean, but I perceived there's lots of crossover. And come to think of it I am not sure WHAT word is associated with Stoicism other than words maybe like glory that refer to their goal of virtue.

Yes that (the focus on tranquility / ataraxia / peace of mind as some unique kind of highest pleasure) is a common assertion that I reject, Mike, and I think you will find that Dewitt states it considerably differently. In fact I do not believe that either ataraxia or aponia are "kinds of pleasure." I believe they are adverbs that describe ways / contexts in which pleasure (ordinary pleasures of all kind) are experienced. In other words, the best way to experience any pleasure is "without distraction" (ataraxia) and "without pain" (aponia).

An illustration I would give would be applicable to any pleasure, but let's just choose "dancing." The best way to experience dancing would be not to be distracted from dancing (don't fall, don't bump into others, don't get called away to do something else) and without any pain mixed in (don't be distracted thinking about painful thoughts) while you are dancing.

I think that is the obvious and commonsensical interpretations of those words, and I think Epicurus was nothing if not common-sensical about the way he thought.

These people who elevate "ataraxia" to something unique in itself are basically playing the katastematic pleasure game of suggesting there is something different and better than pleasure as ordinarily understood.

If I recall correct this is where Elayne's article discusses "fancy pleasure."

And this is related I think to DeWitt's discussion of the "unity of pleasure." All pleasure is unified in that it "feels pleasurable" which is what makes it pleasure. With such a sweeping definition there is no room for some kind of "special pleasure" which is so uniquely the best that it is of a different type than the rest of pleasure.

Again, the unifying characteristic of all pleasure (and in fact the only common characteristic that describes all pleasures) is that it "feels good." So to repeat there's no unique experience of painlessness that has a feeling of it's on. Also on this point is the Wenham article, which focuses on pleasure as an "experience." So it is obvious and saying nothing new to say that pleasure is best experienced without interruptions, and without pain.

I think Elayne's article makes a lot of good points on this. I also think that there are a lot of intricate side questions, starting with something as obvious as pointing out that "happiness" is not a Greek word and not the therefore not the exact word that Epicurus used, so we have to be careful of two thousand years of potential changes in shades of meaning, plus translation issues, at the very beginning.

We've had extensive discussions about this in the past and we will probably be discussing these issues as long as we remain interested in philosophy. In the end we have to try to reduce the discussion to something workable, and we know that Epicurus held "pleasure" to be the guide of life, the alpha and omega, and all that, and he did not use the word "happiness" in that context.

In trying to sum up conclusions about the relationship to happiness and pleasure it seems to me that that observation has to ultimately be the test by which we sum up Epicurean philosophy in an understandable outline.

So we have to come to grips with why "pleasure" and not "happiness" occupies the central keystone role in Epicurean philosophy.

If I recall correctly, in addition to Ayn Rand, he's very much into Nietzsche as well (maybe more so)

Yes I would like to hear Elli too. My own impression is generally very favorable, but I do think he probably leans in some "traditional" directions as to absence of pain that I personally don't agree with. But I haven't read his pages in detail lately and my favorable impression is much the stronger.

Quote from Hiram

Indifference is not a qualifier to us.

Yes that's exactly the point I agree with.

Just to be clear, i am agreeing with you and what Metrodorus is saying, Charles. I am just saying that Metrodorus would not use the term "preferred indifferents" to express that weath is not INTRINSICALLY valuable. I think Metrodorus would say that of course wealth CAN have value, in order to purchase things for pleasure, but it may NOT have value if it used in a way that brings pain. That is how an Epicurean would evaluate any tool or any choice, contextually, rather than whether it fits in some artificial category of "preferred indifferent" which is Stoic terminology.

Are we together or still not yet? We may be talking about different things.

Excellent Charles, thank you!

Quote from Charles

Metrodorus views (natural) wealth as a preferred indifferent of some sort.

I suspect Metrodorus would view this statement, as I do, as fairly ridiculous. No action or tool is "intrinsically" a pleasure, unless it is some form of pleasure itself. So Metrodorus would never call ANYTHING a "preferred indifferent" which is a peculiarly Stoic manner of talking in fairly ridiculous terms -- not terminology an Epicurean would use -- only someone who likes talking in pretzels, like the Stoics love to do.

Quote from Charles

on the contrary, the greatest pleasure according to us is that which is experienced as a result of the complete removal of pain.

If you are focusing on THIS part, then that is the old question that we debate continuously and would presumably relate to the quantity argument -- given that absence of one is presence of the other.

But bottom line is that there is no contradiction.

Quote from Charles

I'm of the opinion that the school held both (methods of arriving at pleasure) in high regard.

Charles yes that it is absolutely clear (that pleasure is both mental and bodily). I am not sure if you are making a point here that disagrees with the point that "a life of happiness is a life of pleasure" because I see no difference.... (?)

Thanks Mike! Just as you were posting that comment I was pasting the same thing into an updated version. That is one of the most clear statements of the proposition that I am aware of.

Updated to incorporate your suggestion Charles - thank you.

Charles I am going to copy this into the FAQ thread on pleasure here: Glossary - What is the Epicurean Definition of "Pleasure?"

Note: Each entry will have its own thread so please make suggestions about the details here: FAQ Answers And Discussion

This is thread for discussion of this FAQ Question.

Yes excellent suggestion Mike.

That one is going to take more work. In the meantime I will point to Elayne 's article on this but coming up with a short summary would be desirable!

One thing that I think makes strong sense to include up front would be the issue of whether happiness is an abstraction vs pleasure being a feeling, or whether happiness is a particular type of pleasure (I do NOT think we can say that pleasure is a particular kind of happiness).

But I am not sure there is an authoritative text that distinguishes between the two (we can cite Diogenes of Oinoanda for the issue of "what is happiness? - life of pleasure...) but I think we need to be careful making claims on this without strong texts to point to.

Because in a glossary where we are defining happiness, the issue is not so much "the relationship between happiness and pleasure" as it is "What is happiness?"