Posts by Cassius

I think most here agree that we don't have a prolepsis of atoms.

I would also say myself that your question is why DeWitt argues that Diogenes Laertius' description of prolepsis (examples as to humans and oxen) is at best incomplete and at worst just wrong as a description of prolepsis. And as you know DeWitt concludes that Cicero's understanding of the issue as expressed through Velleius (as something that exists BEFORE an individual's first exposure to an example) is much more accurate.

Our process of concluding that atoms exist is outlined at length by Lucretius in Book One. We come to the conclusion that atoms exist through deductive reasoning about things that we do see exist. I would say that is just how we come to the concept of humans and oxen as well. Our senses (trustworthy as without opinion, just like prolepsis) tell us that bodies in general exist. It is our minds that have to use reasoning to deduce the categories from atom to human and everything in between into which we place those bodies and assign names to them. As to the assignment of names that too arises from nature in the trial and error experience of men, and there is no god-given assignment of classes or names to them.

As to gods (divinity) or justice however, the two best-documented examples in the major surviving texts, those are more in the nature of abstractions of which we never touch or "see" or smell or hear examples directly. That is why deductive reasoning alone does not work for gods and justice. Did we not have some kind of faculty for recognizing the patterns involved, our five senses would never recognize that these relationships / abstractions exist.

Maybe an even better example would be lower organisms - all the way down to single cell amoeba. We would not expect - and do not associate in our minds - the actions of amoeba in competing for food to be just or unjust. We do not expect that amoeba have any appreciation at all for such issues, and for amoeba no justice or injustice exists.

Somewhere up the line of advancement living things become capable of "thinking," and at some point they begin to appreciate that there is an issue or question involved in their relationships to other living beings. Somewhere in that range they begin to have "prolepsis of justice" which allows them to even begin considering that their relationships with other living beings might be divided into categories of relationships, and they begin to consider whether one type of relationship is more productive for them than another type of relationship. At that point they begin to consider some things "just" and other things "unjust" - but those are just words that we assign to the concept. I would say that you are long past the "prolepsis" stage at that point.

But if the "prolepsis" of justice or gods did not exist, we would never begin considering or discussing those concepts in the first place.

It's much better in my view to start analyzing prolepsis from the point of view of philosophy and the Meno problem than it is to start with some particular clinical phenomena (like monkeys or beavers) and try to analyze the issue in terms of specific animals or their conclusions. Otherwise you just transfer to the monkeys the same question we ask about ourselves: "Where does the whole idea of "justice" come from in the first place?"

I will write more in response to Rolf''s question but my first comment would be that I think most of us agree that a prolepsis comes before any opinion or conclusion. So anytime the statement is something like "sharing food is fair" that is a conclusion and not a prolepsis.

If prolepsis is a PRE-conception, I would describe it more as "the ability to recognize that an issue is involved." The monkeys recognize that there is an unequal distribution of food in this example, but that in itself does not tell us or them what a "fair" distribution of food would be.

Lucretius argues that the gods could not have created the universe because it makes no sense that the gods had any inkling of the possibility of any kind of universe at all until there was first a universe of a kind to serve as an example from which they could recognize a pattern.

Further, the principal doctrines make clear that even "justice" is a very fluid concept, and that what appears to be just at one moment can be unjust at the next if circumstances change -- and that includes compacts not to harm or be harmed, which not all are even willing or able to make in the first place. We can recognize that justice as an issue exists, but we don't know what is just or unjust with evaluating in our reasoning minds particular contextual facts.

So the reason prolepsis is not an "objective morality" - I would say - is that prolepsis has no "objective" content (opinion, conclusion) within it. To say that the monkeys have prolepsis of justice does not mean that Nature gives them a correct conclusion as to whether they are getting a fair or just amount of food.

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Quote from Don

I'm going to maintain that effort - expending energy for a given purpose - has pain associated with it.

I think we definitely agree on that, and that's why it is so important to see happiness as a balance in which pleasure predominates over pain, rather than expecting that TOTAL absence of pain is going to be achievable in real life.

I see this as probably one of the most practical and important divisions in the way one will interpret Epicurus.

There is the "extinguish all pain at all cost" crowd, (which I suspect to be largely influenced by Buddhism and similar thought) who talk mostly about "ataraxia," without making much effort to define it, and think that what it means is something like tranquility and living as minimally and detached from the world as possible. This group has as their guiding light as the avoidance of pain - which they often translate into the avoidance of all "effort" of any kind.

And then there is the crowd (where I perceive most all of us to be) which perceives that Epicurus was happy even in the worst pain of kidney disease, just as the wise man can be happy even under torture. The group focuses on eudaimonia / happiness understood to mean the predominance of pleasure over pain, so the guiding light of this group is the intelligent choice or avoidance of pain, so we embrace pain when we expect that pain to produce a net gain in pleasure. We certainly don't go out of our way to look for pain that is unnecessary, but we recognize that "effort" is necessary to achieve the happiness we'd like to achieve in life, so we don't shrink from exerting that effort.

Episode 287 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today our episode is entitled: "The Fear of Pain Is Overrated, But Cicero and Epicurus Disagree As To Why."

Quote from Don

Sure, the motivation for the effort of learning a new skill or achieving a goal one wants is potentially pleasurable, but the effort experienced is painful in the form of repetitive exercises or practice. Frustration sets in that must be overcome. Feelings of inadequacy.

This comes very close, or is at least analogous, to the question of whether all "desire" should be seen to be painful.

My personal view is that not all desire is painful, and neither is all effort. And in the case of either desire or effort, even in those times where the desire or effort is painful, the ultimate question remains whether the resulting total pleasure is worth the total cost in pain.

Quote from Rolf

I suppose in a sense the answer is “as much effort as possible” - what else could be more important?

Bingo Rolf! Exactly what I hoped you were thinking.

Why art thou confused, Sir Rolf ? I would like to think I can predict your concern but I am not sure.

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Cassius

June 24, 2025 at 11:53 AM

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Our Sunday Zoom Meeting is held at 12:30 PM Eastern Time in the USA to allow maximum participation in the Western Hemisphere from California to Eastern Europe. Regular participants on the forum can post a request to participate in the thread here and we will add you to the list to receive the link.

What Don says is true and also a lot turns on what definition you give to "effort." Building a stone wall with an inscription about Epicurus takes a lot of a certain type of effort. So does composing six long books of a poem. So does writing 37 books on Nature and all the rest that Epicurus wrote. So does building a philosophical school that opposes and takes on the majority philosophical and religious orthodoxy.

If effort means intensity of focus and action, then those are examples of people putting tremendous effort into their pursuit of a correct philosophy, on which happiness depends, and I would say you put everything you've got into that effort to find pleasure and be happy.

The pleasures Don lists which can be achieved by "getting out of the way" of them is a valid approach if you are able to maintain those and have confidence in their continuance and your satisfaction with them, but there are also other pleasures that you will never experience if you do not pursue them vigorously. There is no god to tell you whether to pursue them or not, and no "ideal" pattern to follow. You yourself have to decide which to pursue. I would argue that there is no good Epicurean authority for the proposition that everyone should always choose those pleasures which take the least "effort." Epicurus says we will sometime choose pain in order to avoid a worse pain or achieve greater pleasure.

It is also arguable based on the sources that DeWitt cites that even the Epicurean gods have to take action to maintain their own blessedness, and certainly every Epicurean we know anything about went to lots of effort to promote their philosophy. There are no Epicurean examples I know of who were held up by the Epicureans as pursuing happiness through engaging in minimal effort in all aspects of life.

The reference to the gods needing to act to maintain their deathlessness is in Section 13 part 3 of DeWitt's book, including: "If deathlessness were inherent in their nature, they would be in another class by themselves. Since they do belong in the same class as man, it is a logical necessity to think of their incorruptibility as by some means preserved. Since in the cosmos of Epicurus, unlike that of Plato, this incorruptibility lacked a superior being to guarantee its continuance, the sole possibility was that the gods preserved it for themselves by their own vigilance. Thus it must be discerned that just as the happiness of man is self-achieved, so the happiness of the gods is self-preserved. However astonishing this doctrine may seem, it is well authenticated. Plutarch, for example, who, though hostile, wrote with texts of Epicurus before him, has this to say: "Freedom from pain along with incorruptibility should have been inherent in the nature of the blissful being, standing in no need of active concern." This manifestly implies that the Epicurean gods were unable to take their immunity from corruption for granted but must concern themselves for its perpetuation. The incongruity between this selfish concern for their own bodily security and their indifference to the good of mankind was certain to elicit condemnation from believers in divine providence, and this has not escaped record. Thus the Christian Eusebius quotes his Atticus as saying: "According to Epicurus it's good-bye to providence, in spite of the fact that according to him the gods bring to bear all diligent care for the preservation of their own peculiar blessings.")

That is a good idea but I don't think we have addressed that specifically before, at least in those terms, so we probably out to create a separate thread in the ethics forum so we can discuss it before distilling a FAQ answer. Can you do that please? Or point to a thread where we've already discussed this?

We're still in the early editing phase of this week's edition, but I think I will go ahead and post this link to a topic that Joshua introduces fairly early in this episode. Joshua's topic is the story of John Brown, and especially statements made by Henry David Thoreau in reaction which indicate that Thoreau's perspective had parallels with the perspective of Cicero.

Many people here are probably not aware of the story of John Brown, and while Joshua was certainly aware of the story he wasn't aware of this 1940 movie, in which John Brown is portrayed very effectively by the actor Raymond Massey. It's not a deep philosophical movie so don't bother about it if you don't find it to your liking, but the character and story of John Brown do provide an effective dramatization of what's at stake in choosing the source of one's moral decisionmaking.

As always, ifanyone has any issues, comments, or questions about any changes please let us know.

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During the course of the Trojan War, Ares, who had sided with the Trojans, was wounded by the Greek hero Diomedes who drove a spear into his side, sending him flying back to Olympos bellowing in pain. <<More>>

I don't think I was aware that Mars sided with the Trojans. I presume that would be a major point in his favor in the eyes of the Romans (and therefore Lucretius and Memmius).

That web site has a ton of interesting material. I don't get the idea that Mars was viewed as demonic in any way, as Abrahamists might view "Satan." He certainly appears to be as subject to doing weird things as are the other Greek gods, but I also don't get the idea that he was any more "irrational" than they were either.

I think I'm mainly looking at this in perspective of the recent material we've discussed in the podcast as to whether pain is "evil," and/or whether a "god of war" would be viewed as "evil" vs Venus being viewed as "good." I gather from these anecdotes that Venus was far from being Ms. Goody-Two-Shoes herself.

Quote from Don

You can't have Venus without Mars. Old things must be destroyed, must die, for new things to be created. Otherwise, nothing would change; everything would be static.

Yes I am thinking in that direction. The depictions I am seeing in Greek and Roman art show Mars as a warrior but not necessarily an "ogre" or "ugly" or "horrible" as we might do today in portraying some kind of monster. Along the lines of death not being something to fear, then we might also see Mars as what you are saying - a necessary part of nature whose presence we need to understand more subtly, rather than something that is acting "maliciously" toward us.

This whole line of thought is fairly specialized and not of immediate significance to me, but over in the Facebook group a user wrote:

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"But as an Epicurean, I see it plainly: war is the collapse of reason and the triumph of unnecessary desire."

While I would think in many cases that statement is probably true, I am thinking it is probably overbroad, as it would be overbroad (I think) to characterize Mars as a wholly negative figure. To some extent Mars might be analogizable to a "gun" -- something very dangerous and to be handled carefully but sometimes having beneficial uses. No doubt the circumstances are going to override everything else, but in the it is only pain that is in itself always undesirable (even though we sometimes choose it) and a "god of war" might be also in the same category.

Quote from Joshua

Mars, less complex, represents:

Whole world systems hurtling into ruin
Death, pain, strife, war, disease (like the plague with which Lucretius ends his poem), and so on

As to Mars, that's the type of conclusion I am questioning. The tendency now is to see Mars as wholly negative, whereas it does not appear that he was viewed in such a wholly negative way in Greco-Roman mythology. Are these conclusions about Mars what we are reading into Lucretius because of our current views, or did Lucretius view Mars exactly the same way we do? Is Mars something always to be feared and hated, or something to be accepted and viewed as natural, and channeled into productive ways when possible, as Venus apparently sometimes worked with Mars in mythology?

Links to various Aphrodite myths, including "The Trojan War in which she supported her favourites Paris and Aeneas and was wounded in the fighting. <<More>> (which stikes me as particularly relevant to Lucretius given that the poem starts out referring to Venus as "mother of the Roman line":

https://www.theoi.com/Olympios/Aphrodite.html

"I. THE ILIAD : PERSUADES ARES TO SUPPORT THE TROJANS

At the outset of the Trojan War the gods took sides. Ares promised his mother Hera and Athena that he would side with them and support the Greeks, but Aphrodite persuaded him otherwise and he joined the Trojan faction."

In regard to the opening of Lucretius referring to interaction between Mars and Venus, I know personally that I've always associated the allusion to mean something like "Venus - good / Mars - bad." However I now see that the original Greek mythology behind their relationship appears to be more subtle, with Venus being at one point in love with Mars, and that they were sometimes cooperative in ancient artwork.

I've collected several references, and I'm starting this thread to discuss whether there are subtleties in this relationship which would give us a deeper understanding of Lucretius' depiction of their relationship. I would especially appreciate comment by Elli or others who are more well-read on Greek mythology.

Ares & Aphrodite - Ancient Greek Vase Painting

https://www.theoi.com/image/K9.1Ares.jpg

Representation of Ares and Aphrodite, accompanied by loves playing with the weapons of the god. Fresco from the Villa de Mars and Venus in Pompei. 1st century AD. Archaeological Museum of Naples

Representation of Ares and Aphrodite, accompanied by loves playing with the weapons of the god. Fresco from the Villa de Mars and Venus in Pompei. 1st century…

www.meisterdrucke.us

https://www.meisterdrucke.us/kunstwerke/1260px/Roman_-_Representation_of_Ares_and_Aphrodite_accompanied_by_loves_playing_with_the_weapo_-_%28MeisterDrucke-946356%29.jpg

This wikipedia article in particular is helpful:

"Aphrodite The Warlike"

Aphrodite Areia (Ancient Greek: Ἀφροδίτη Ἀρεία) or "Aphrodite the Warlike" was a cult epithet of the Greek goddess Aphrodite, in which she was depicted in full armor like the war god Ares.^[1] This representation was found in Sparta and Taras (modern Taranto). There were other, similarly martial interpretations of the goddess, such as at her Sanctuary at Kythira, where she was worshiped under the epithet Aphrodite Urania, who was also represented as being armed. The epithet "Areia", meaning "warlike", was applied to other gods in addition to Aphrodite, such as Athena, Zeus, and possibly Hermes.^[1]

Aphrodite Areia - Wikipedia

https://ancientrome.ru/art/img/7/7684.jpg