Posts by Cassius

You haven't derailed the thread yet as you are the first post Your goal seems excellent to me and that would surely be helpful if it is doable. I do much the same in citing Thomas Jefferson and Frances Wright, who specifically cited and endorsed Epicurus.

As I just added in point 8 in my list above, it seems to me that it is a telltale sign as to whether the writer specifically embraces the word "pleasure" and also specifically mentions Epicurus himself as uniquely the leader on this issue. Absent either one of these attributes I would be reluctant to call the writer "Epicurean," as clearly the Epicureans of the ancient world did both.

Quote from Oscar

Can you clarify the difference between happiness and pleasure.

That is exactly the point under discussion and it is not easy. What is clear is that (1) Epicurus stated that "pleasure" (using hedone or other Greek words) is the goal, not "happiness" (eudaimonia). Perhaps we should ask the Greeks what the difference is For now, the main point for philosophical discussion is that pleasure is a feeling, and happiness would be desirable because it is a type of pleasurable feeling, otherwise happiness would not be desirable. I do not think it would be appropriate to do the reverse, and describe pleasure as a type of happiness feeling. Nor would it be appropriate to attempt to define happiness as an abstraction which is the single goal of everyone's life, as Aristotle tried to do by defining precise requirements for happiness. Nature gave us only feelings to help us determine how to choose and to avoid, and did not define particular goals or give faculties other than pleasure and pain.

Quote from Oscar

It seems a lot of people are seeking happiness, how would you convince them that happiness is not the goal of life, that pleasure is the ultimate goal/chief good in life?

Same answer as above, for the moment: Pleasure is a feeling, and happiness would be desirable because it is a type of pleasurable feeling, otherwise happiness would not be desirable. I do not think it would be appropriate to do the reverse, and describe pleasure as a type of happiness feeling. Nor would it be appropriate to attempt to define happiness as an abstraction which is the single goal of everyone's life, as Aristotle tried to do by defining precise requirements for happiness.

Nature gave us only feelings to help us determine how to choose and to avoid, and did not define particular goals or give faculties other than pleasure and pain.

Quote from Oscar

actually, on second thought, a rocking chair can probably induce ataraxia, no need to wait

That's mostly a joke more than a precise philosophical statement but I "liked" it anyway Jokes are good!

Quote from Mike Anyayahan

In other words, pleasure and happiness are not the same thing while pleasure and the absence of pain are two different states as well.

I agree that these words are not describing identical things. Whether one or more of them is a "state" however may be a different question

Quote from Oscar

I don't view life along a spectrum or continuum and I caution anyone against that notion, because such notions impeded the development of biology for millennia; formally known as the chain of being.

Maybe it would be helpful to explain that statement. All I meant by being on a spectrum is the lack of a bright line difference that distinguishes them into some kind of ideal categories, so I presume you are making another point(?)

Quote from Oscar

We humans are animals (apparently this truth makes Texans especially uncomfortable). But it's also true that we humans are unique, in many respects, relative to the rest of life -- for the better and for the worse!

I was thinking about this very point earlier today. Once again I think precision is key. If by "unique" would be meant some kind of bright dividing line by which humans are of a different essential nature, or that humans have some kind of divine spark that ants (for example) do not, then I think that would be incorrect. I think the proper view would be that life exists on a spectrum, with humans occupying the most sophisticated intellectual role that we are currently aware of, but that there is no chasm/bright line/ difference in nature between humans and higher animals, all of which are on the same spectrum of "life." What do you think of that way of phrasing it?

The idea that humans are of some kind of unique higher nature that makes it cosmically special is inherent in Cicero's argument, and I think that argument must be held to fail.

Quote from Hiram

If we dismiss ataraxia without discussing what it is and what its role is, that does not serve the teaching mission.

I agree that we cannot dismiss ataraxia and leave it alone, because 98% of people studying Epicurus are confusing it for the end, and we must disabuse them of that notion if they are to understand that the goal is pleasure and not something else.

Quote from Hiram

To dismiss ataraxia is to impede our teaching from being contextualized and lived.

I would say this differently, and would say that "ataraxia as it is generally understood" is what impedes teaching Epicurus correctly as properly contextualized and lived.

Quote from Hiram

You can't live pleasantly if you don't study nature enough to understand that this is unnecessary. So ataraxia, the demeanor and disposition of someone who is without apprehensions about natural phenomena

This is an example of the problem. You are talking about ataraxia as if it is somehow outside the framework of pleasure as the goal. It is INSIDE the framework, and pleasure is not a threat to ataraxia properly understood. By backing away from pleasure you are implying that the framework is not solid and needs reworking.

No one is saying that absence of pain or absence of disturbance are irrelevant. The issue is the clear, correct, and well-articulated identity of the goal of life to avoid confusion for those who study Epicurus:

I will start then in the manner approved by the author of the system himself, by settling what are the essence and qualities of the thing that is the object of our inquiry; not that I suppose you to be ignorant of it, but because this is the logical method of procedure. We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil. This he sets out to prove as follows: Every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the Chief Good, while it recoils from pain as the Chief Evil, and so far as possible avoids it. This it does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of Nature's own unbiased and honest verdict.

So to be clear, Hiram, you agree that "pleasure," and not "ataraxia," is the goal of life articulated by Epicurus?

So Hiram, do you contend that "ataraxia" was the goal of life for Epicurus rather than pleasure?

Quote from Hiram

For the record, this is Cassius' view and is not shared by all. The sources that use ataraxia include Letter to Menoeceus:

There is no doubt that the term ataraxia is used occasionally and in certain contexts; that is not the issue. The issue is whether we should draw the conclusion that "ataraxia" is correctly identified as equivalent to a specific type of pleasure, or as a unique "highest pleasure," which I contend is not the case, nor do those cites establish that point. The goal of life stated over and over again by Epicurus and others is pleasure, not "ataraxia." Pleasure is the overriding ultimate term, ataraxia is a subordinate concept just like aponia.

This is true even in the letter to Menoeceus - all of these references here are to "pleasure," not to "ataraxia":

"And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good. And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided."

This is a stub to be rewritten into a long article. For the time being:

1. I am convinced that if a young person and/or someone who knows very little about Epicurus first reads DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy, then followed by Lucretius, Diogenes Laertius, DIogenes of Oinoanda, and the Epicurean sections of Cicero (Torquatus, Velleius), without reading any Wikipedia articles, books written after 1960, or Youtube videos, they would never become a "NeoEpicurean" in the first place. They would be grounded in Epicurean fundamentals and would never be tempted toward the Stoic / Eclectic / Neo-Epicurean approach.

For those however who have already been "corrupted" by the modern non-DeWitt academic consensus, and that includes probably 95% of the people who find their way to Epicurus because they are looking for "tranquility," there needs to be a path of study and rediscovery of what classical Epicurean philosophy was all about. That path would probably be something like this:

1. Read the Boris Nikolsky article "Epicurus on Pleasure" to see that there is a credible academic opinion which deviates from the "orthodoxy," and which holds that the katastematic/kinetic distinction is not Epicurean but a Stoic overlay.
2. Read the chapters devoted to Epicurus in the Gosling and Taylor book "The Greeks On Pleasure" to find a credible and thoroughly documented treatise which will explain in detail how Epicurus was focused on ordinary pleasure and not some ineffable "absence of pain" (which is essentially what is entailed in most "katastematic" arguments). (Note: the link is to only part of one chapter; the book is hard to find except in a library but well worth finding, because it traces the full history of philosophical debate about pleasure from the beginning of Greek philosophy up through Epicurus and slightly beyond. This is an excellent way of extending DeWitt's observation that Epicurus is essentially the ultimate anti-Platonism.)
3. Read the Wenham article "On Cicero's Interpretation of Katastematic Pleasure" for emphasis on how all goals of any significance to Epicurus must have been based on sensory experience (because absence of sensory experience is death).
4. These first three well-researched, well-documented, and academically-respectable sources ought to be sufficient to convince any fair-minded person, even in academia, that the academic consensus may be monolithic but ultimately is fatally flawed. With this new open-mindedness, it is then time to proceed back to DeWitt, who the academic reader would likely never have found previously, since he is effectively blacklisted in academia.
5. Now start at the beginning with DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy"and observe primarily how Epicurus was in rebellion against Platonism and Skepticism, and how these aspects - the erection of a logical argument derived from physics and canonics (epistemology) to identify and defend pleasure as the goal of life - are the true heart of the philosophy and the necessary prerequisite for understanding the ethics.
6. Then read Frances Wright's "A Few Days In Athens" and Thomas Jefferson's letters referencing Epicurus and Plato to see that some great past minds saw things much the same way (no obsession on "absence of pain" as the key to Epicurus).
7. Then go back into Lucretius and study the details of the analysis to see that as the Epicureans presented the philosophy to themselves, the key is physics, canonics, and pleasure as ordinarily understood, with no hint that "absence of pain" or "katastematic pleasure" is front and center in the philosophy, but rather how the methodology (a deductive process tied tightly to the observations made through the senses/feelings/anticipations) is the key to the entire structure.
8. From there I would include the warning to always be on the lookout and on guard against anyone who is shrinking back, or inventing reasons for, avoiding the word "pleasure." Unless the writer is embracing "pleasure" and defending it boldly, you can bet that the writer does not really either understand or endorse the Epicurean system, and that he or she is leading you down the path of NeoEpicureanism.

Someone at FB posted this link, which I don't recall seeing before: https://dailystoic.com/epicureanism-vs-stoicism/

Here are my major objections/issues with it on first reading. i quote the statement about Epicurus that I think needs clarification or is incorrect and then give my comment:

** They believed in thermodynamic entropy (it’s easier to destroy arrangements of atoms than for the arrangements to be made, thus the universe is ageing towards a state of complete disorganization). <<<< I don't believe this is correct from the texts. Yes decay takes place in parts of the universe, but in other parts the atoms are coming together, and this offsets the decay, so in total the different parts of the universe remain constantly cycling, not decaying overall.

** Pain and suffering were bad, happiness and fulfillment were good. <<< This may be true, but how in the world did he write that sentence without using the word PLEASURE? Using words like "fulfilment" is a typically Stoic way of avoiding the premise that Nature gives us the feeling of pleasure as the guide rather than abstraction like fulfilment, and that is why Epicurus talked about pleasure in general rather than using euphemisms or terms that are more narrow and indicative of a particular limited type of pleasure (e.g., '"fulfillment').

** It’s a certain medieval christian bias that led to the interpretation of Epicureanism as the pursuit of sensual pleasure. <<<< No, this is not true, because Epicurus DID advocate the pursuit of sensual pleasure. The inaccuracy is that he advocated the pursuit of ALL KINDS of pleasure, including mental / emotional, and not ONLY sensual.

** What is important is the Greek term Eudaimonia, which is often translated as happiness, but has little to do today with what we call happiness (the bubbly, pleasurable sensation that accompanies agreeable outcomes and events). Perhaps a better translation would be “Flourishing of life.” <<< This is misleading. Epicurus focused on PLEASURE as the guide of life. Eudaimonia and flourishing are terms associated with Aristotle and other Greeks, not the Epicurean perspective.

** Accordingly, the Epicureans advocated moderation in things, and a balanced, “agreeable” life that pursued the “higher pleasures” of fraternity, self improvement, and freedom from the fear of death, which they thought would result in the freedom of all fear. <<<< False in several respects. Again, "moderation" is Aristotle - there is no advocacy of "moderation" in Epicurus. In fact it is the opposite, pleasure is the goal, and it should be pursued with all the vigor possible, but that means prudently so that in fact the pleasure is maximized, not run amuk and creating needless pain. Also, there are no "higher" pleasures ranked by Epicurus. Friendship is one of the greatest tools for achieving pleasure, but it is given no "ranking" as superior kind of pleasure - nor is any other type of pleasure-- pleasure is pleasure.

**They saw anxiety as the great thorn in mankind’s side, and their philosophical project was to rid themselves of it. <<< Partially true but misleading. Anxiety is certainly to be diminished, as is all pain, but the focus is on achieving pleasure, and we will at times choose pain in order to achieve greater pleasure.

Well, we certainly can and should use reason to achieve pleasure, and we can take pleasure in our reasoning, but in fact pleasure itself IS irrational, is it not? And Epicurus' lowering of the "rank" of reason, and not including it in the canon of truth, is indication of the secondary place "reason" holds in the Epicurean estimation.

Found them! I have several and will post them here in this post as I find them:

Yes, in my sarcasm I am referring to Cicero stating that the philosophy of Epicurus is better suited to an animal than a human. That's a cite I don't recall to mind readily enough, but I will eventually find it and paste it here. Possibly from On Ends but perhaps Tusculan Disputations (or maybe even another work)

Maybe this ought to be in the music section, or even the section on Romantic love, but due to the title, and I think also to the "feeling" that the music conveys, I think it belongs equally here as an anthem to the topic:

Quote from Mike Anyayahan

And Epicurus wouldn't tell us to live with pleasure if only the removal of pain is the end.

I could not have said it better myself!

Quote from Mike Anyayahan

I agree. I don't believe in anything static as well.

And one reason that Epicurus himself wouldn't believe in anything static either is that one of the very first and most fundamental principles of his physics is that the atoms (and therefore everything, ultimately) is constantly in motion, and NOTHING is ever actually "static."

That's the kind of observation deriving from physics that I am convinced shows how the ancient Epicureans would never have accepted such an argument. They were grounded, like Lucretius, from the beginning in the study of nature, and of atomism, and thus once they were taught that nothing exists for long periods of time without resolving back into their originating atoms, which are constantly in motion, the idea that there was something important that could be "static" in the sense of unmoving and unchanging would simply be "inconceivable."

While, on the other hand, the notion of something as "static" perfectly fits the Platonic/Stoic notions of an unchanging "god" and his realm of "virtue" and similar ideals.

"Static" has "Stoic" written all over it

Yes I am convinced that is the main point Mike. I know we are hitting you with a lot of material in terms of the DeWitt book and now these other articles such as Nikolsky, and I presume you have a life outside this philosophy work, plus you have to worry about a volcano!

But over time I hope you will keep an eye on this particular issue. It's something we are going to face with every new person who comes down the road, because the mainline summaries of Epicurus are so focused on this point. It is the strategy they use to back up their argument that Epicurus was not REALLY a hedonist after all, because what he really advocated was this "fancy pleasure" which really isn't pleasure as ordinary people understand it at all.

DeWitt actually does not deal with it a lot, primarily i think because - since he was so systematic in approaching first through the physics and the epistemology - he wasn't sidetracked on something that would never occur to a "normal person" to be an issue. When you are grounded first in the natural order of things, that pleasure guides all life, as illustrated in the opening of Lucetius, the person of common understanding would never naturally go off into exploring some ineffable "nothingness" as a legitimate form of pleasure, and certainly not the "highest pleasure."

But the seeds of this argument were planted centuries ago, at least as far back as Cicero, and now it is the standard way used to explain what Epicurus was supposedly all about. The ancient Stoics and Epicureans didn't think that way, because they fought to the end, but the argument has gained a lot of steam in more recent centuries because Stoicism has achieved such a sweeping victory that people are afraid of emotion, afraid of pleasure, and do all they can to explain the viewpoint away. Such things are good enough to be the guide of all OTHER forms of life, but not humans -- no not humans! -- because we are the "rational animal" and we are "better" than that! (I am being sarcastic, of course)

It's probably worth pasting here the summary from the Nikolsky article:

Mike I will be interested in your comments if / when you are able to read the Nikolsky article, and the section of Gosling and Taylor on katestematic pleasure, and the Wenham article...

Quote from Mike Anyayahan

I am referring to static pleasure that is produced by the absence of pain.

... because i am not at all sure that such as think as this exists. If there is a change in state, as in removal of pain, then there is some action going on that explains the source of the pleasure. I do not believe that "absence of pain" alone is an activity, any more than "calmly" expresses an activity. As per the argument in these articles, especailly Wenham perhaps on this particular point, all pleasure comes through sensation, and absence of sensation is death. If you are sensing pleasure, you are sensing "something' -- even if your mind is merely contemplating, which you find enjoyable. The pleasure in that moment is from your mind contemplating, a positive action, not an "absence of" anything. i think it ends up being a non-sequitur, and essentially a sophisticated attack on the feeling of pleasure itself, to talk in terms of "absence of" as describing the positive experience of pleasure.

That's why this entire issue of katastematic pleasure is so important, and why Nikolsky and gosling and taylor and Wenham write to refute it. As Nikolsky state most explicitly, the entire issue of "static pleasure" was likely invented by a later stoic (Carneades) as part of their categorization obsession, and it seems to me very likely that Epicurus would have rejected the classification if he himself had been asked about it.

But this is a deep subject where you need to expose yourself to the arguments that are stated in much more detail in these articles than I can do. If you have the time, I recommend Nikolsky first, then the Gosling and Taylor article (by which Nikolsky was inspired to write his) then followed by Wenham.

The metaphor that makes the most sense to me is the filling of a vessel, for example with a liquid. You fill the tank of your car with gasoline, and in doing so the air is expelled. The maximum that the tank can hold is when all the air is expelled. This is the point of maximum gasoline, and minimum air. But the nature of the gasoline is not changed when it reaches the maximum point of being filled.

Thus so, a life of pleasure has reached its height when it is filled with the experience of ordinary pleasures, of whatever type, and when the experience of your life has no further component of pain.

But there is nothing magic about the expelling of the last ounce of pain. The dancing and eating and drinking and appreciation of art and thinking and friends etc is just the same at the point of maximum pleasure as it is all along the way in the course of being filled -- the only difference is at the point of maximum pleasure there is no longer any distraction whatsoever from pain or turbulence.

in Cicero's words, nothing is better than a life of tranquility, crammed full of pleasures. That is the description of the moment when the person's experiences nothing but pleasures, and nothing can be better than that because the feeling - the experience - of the person is completely consumed with pleasures, and there is no room left -- no ability to experience anything else - beyond that.