Posts by Cassius

Eugenios I think when this passage is discussed comments are often made to the effect that this passage means that a life of pleasure which is within reach of us is not inferior (at least, not necessarily inferior) to a life in which time is unlimited.

I think also this is one of those occasions when we have to be very careful about the meaning of the word "limit."

So when you say this I think you are precisely correct:

Quote from Eugenios

Pleasure remains pleasure, but, if we were ruled entirely by our σαρξ we would feel we deserve - indeed, are due! - infinite pleasure which entails the requirement that we need infinite time and must therefore see death as an evil.

But in this next sentence I think some people are going to think we are avoiding the real issue, and interpret it in ways that would vary widely (what is the BEST life?) and so additional clarity would be desirable.

Quote from Eugenios

However, our διάνοια allows us to make choices and rejections based on a goal of leading both the complete and the best life right here and right now.

What would you say to the question:

"Ok, I understand that you are telling me that I don't need to live an infinite time to live the best life. What are you telling me about how much time DO I need, and how am I to spend that time in order to reach that best life?"

I think that's good critical thinking, Samj. However there are so many variables that it's hard to say how determinative that would be.

One of the lines in the DeWitt book that has stuck with me the most was the opening (second line):

"At the very outset the reader should be prepared to think of him at one and the same time as the most revered and the most reviled of all founders of thought in the Graeco-Roman world."

I think that is still true today and was in Bligh's time too. It is dangerous to associate oneself publicly with the name Epicurus. At best Epicurus is considered an irresponsible partier by most people; at worst - if they know the truth - Epicurus is considered to be strongly anti-religious and to be condemned by any standard moralist or Christian.

Thus for example with Jefferson - were it not for his private letters, we would not have much way of guessing that he was explicitly a fan of Epicurus.

So while the presence of documented connections to Epicurus is the best possible evidence, I don't think we can be surprised that many people are going to keep their personal affection for Epicurus private.

I agree Joshua. This guy looks to me more like someone I want on my side in a fight, or don't want to meet in a dark alley. Could still be Epicurus though - If I were an artist I would prefer to depict him in his prime rather than elderly-looking, so that might explain this version.

Also, it seems to me that Marcus Aurelius is usually portrayed with actual "curls" rather than just wavy hair. This figure we are talking about comes pretty close to that, but I don't think the face and neck structure really looks like Aurelius.

1 - Never seen this one -- the person has significantly longer hair than Epicurus is generally portrayed: https://www.worthpoint.com/worthopedia/19…ouros-154876705

2 - Yes this one of Aurelius does remind me much more of the Bligh ring - http://www.thejewelleryeditor.com/images/the-top…-eventually-se/

3 - I can't shake the idea that this ring looks "stockier" and therefore in my mind more "vigorous" than Epicurus or a philosopher is generally portrayed, which is why I thought of Hercules, but don't know that Hercules was on any rings. Just seems to me given Joshua's notes that Bligh probably was more into military leaders or fighters than Epicurus, but very hard to say.

4 - As to this sentence "All this isn't to say that the museum doesn't know for a fact that the ring is Epicurus. They may very well have proof or more provenance that I haven't found." -- I see that the card says "thought to be" so that may be more of a hedge than is apparent.

Wow and I just got finished praising Eugenios' research, and now this! Very good thoughts all, Joshua.

Another name that flashed in my mind that MIGHT appeal to someone like Bligh was Hercules, but I am not sure how he is depicted. For some reason something about the appearance to me makes Aurelius seems less likely. Seems like I have heard of Hadrian rings - I wish we had access to an expert on Greek and Roman coins because that would probably help.

Eugenios you are clearly in another league in your research abilities - thank you! What is your view on the resemblance and whether that is intended to be Epicurus? I looked at it again and it still seems to me that the figure looks "stockier" than Epicurus is generally portrayed, but I am still on the fence. You?

I am pretty sure I at least glanced at "Upon the Gardens of Epicurus" and I remember not being particularly impressed. However that was in a phase when I was trying to identify and skim through material to organize for future readings, so I may have misread it -- would be happy to find that I did.

For some reason this calls to my mind how someone on facebook asked me if I had ever read "A Few Days In Athens." I thought at that point that I had identified most of the important material out there, so I was prepared to be disappointed once again, and then - pow - AFDIA turned out to be in my view phenomenally good.

I am sure there are many good works out there still to be identified.

Very interesting thank you! I wonder if others here think that is Epicurus. The neck seems a little thick, but it does give a pretty general sense of the other rings we have seen. Thank you!!!

To be sure I connect directly:

Quote from Eugenios

IF our "Choices and Rejections" make it possible for us to discern and decide which pleasures to choose and which pains to reject (and vice versa), is the "faculty" that *allows* us to make those choices and rejections (wisdom? prudence?) more important than the pleasures themselves? Or are the pleasures themselves (once they are chosen) that will lead to more pleasures the important part?

In other words: The Goal, the Telos, the Greatest Good is Pleasure; BUT the way to achieve the goal - the way to walk the path - is through the wisdom to make those choices and rejections. Pleasure = Goal; Wisdom (to make choices/rejections) = Instrumental Means... like Virtue is a Means to the Goal.

Have I answered my own question? Thoughts?

As to the faculty that allows us to make these choices and avoidances, that is likely to be considered in Epicurean terms to be the "canon of truth," which in its three legs INCLUDES pleasure itself as one of the legs (feeling) along with the five senses and the anticipations.

Thus "the wisdom to make those choices and rejections" becomes intelligent application of the canon of truth, where "intelligent" means that we apply the three legs properly after learning how they operate, including through images, and the study of the three legs themselves.

I think you've pretty much answered your own questions properly. Wisdom is just like virtue, a tool toward the goal, which is made necessary due to human nature being what it is, which requires us to act in certain ways to pursue pleasure and avoid pain successfully.

Good way of asking the question. Well I think in answering that we have to consider this PD:

16. In but few things chance hinders a wise man, but the greatest and most important matters, reason has ordained, and throughout the whole period of life does and will ordain.

And as I understand it there are multiple / many references in Lucretius to "true reason."

So we are in no way at war with "reason" -- we are at war with TYPES of reason, and/or versions of abstract logic, which deprecate connections to the senses by saying that their results cannot be tested by the senses, or which are "true" despite what the senses can ever confirm. (And when we say senses we are also talking about observations of consequences, like wind against our skin, that we can observe either directly or with instruments, even though we cannot observe the thing itself.

So I think Epicurus makes clear that reason of a certain type is critical -- would that not be prudence too? And of course this is why DeWitt goes on and on about how ridiculous it is to consider Epicurus to be a strict empiricist, when so much of his philosophy is based on DEDUCTIVE reasoning.

The best extended discussion of this argument is probably the Torquatus dialogue, but we can never forget this too from Book Four:

(1743 version):

Many more things of this kind we observe and wonder at, which attempt to overthrow the certainty of our senses, but to no purpose - for things of this sort generally deceive us upon account of the judgment of the mind which we apply to them, and so we conclude we see things which we really do not; for nothing is more difficult than to distinguish things clear and plain from such as are doubtful, to which the mind is ready to add its assent, as it is inclined to believe everything imparted by the senses.

Lastly, if anyone thinks that he knows nothing, he cannot be sure that he knows this, when he confesses that he knows nothing at all. I shall avoid disputing with such a trifler, who perverts all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards.

And yet allow that he knows this, I would ask (since he had nothing before, to lead him into such a knowledge) from whence he had the notion what it was to know, or not to know; what was it that gave him an idea of Truth or Falsehood, and what taught him to distinguish between doubt and certainty?

You will find that knowledge of truth is originally derived from the senses, nor can the senses be contradicted, for whatever is able by the evidence of an opposite truth to convince the senses of falsehood, must be something of greater certainty than they. But what can deserve greater credit than the senses require from us? Will reason, derived from erring sense, claim the privilege to contradict it? Reason – that depends wholly upon the senses,which unless you allow to be true, all reason must be false. Can the ears correct the eyes? Or the touch the ears? Or will taste confute the touch? Or shall the nose or eyes convince the rest?

This, I think, cannot be, for every sense has a separate faculty of its own, each has its distinct powers; and therefore an object, soft or hard, hot or cold, must necessarily be distinguished as soft or hard, hot or cold, by one sense separately, that is, the touch. It is the sole province of another, the sight, to perceive the colors of things, and the several properties that belong to them. The taste has a distinct office. Odors particularly affect the smell, and sound the ears. And therefore it cannot be that one sense should correct another, nor can the same sense correct itself, since an equal credit ought to be given to each; and therefore whatever the senses at any time discover to us must be certain.

And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all Certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.

Lastly, as in a building, if the principle rule of the artificer be not true, if his line be not exact, or his level bear in to the least to either side, every thing must needs be wrong and crooked, the whole fabric must be ill-shaped, declining, hanging over, leaning and irregular, so that some parts will seem ready to fall and tumble down, because the whole was at first disordered by false principles. So the reason of things must of necessity be wrong and false which is founded upon a false representation of the senses.

I am sorry we haven't gotten more discussion on it, but we've been otherwise occupied I am afraid. I am hoping that one day soon we can prevail on Elli to do a media version of this or one of her other articles so we can hear her voice at least as we consider what she has to say

Yes, and when we get to that point it will be oh-so-easy for the antiEpicureans to simply push a button and all but erase Epicurean history from human consciousness.

In this context you really have to admire Diogenes of Oinoanda for inscribing it in stone. More of that needs to be planned for the future.

Despite (or maybe because) it is in the land of unicorns and centaurs, the thought experiment does serve a useful purpose, though not always with the result intended by its proponents. It does force us to take a stand on the nature of pleasure as the guide of life by dramatizing the question. Many who are faint-of-heart will draw back from the logical implications of Epicurean theory and look for a way out - a way to water down pleasure as the goal. Probably the most predominant way of doing so is to retreat to "happiness," the always-ambiguous word that means anything anyone wants it to mean. Such is also the motivation, in my mind, behind the dominant interpretation of "absence of pain." NOBODY knows what that means, so it's even safer than happiness!

I am of the opposite mindset as to Pleasure (or for this purpose, better stated as Our Patron Goddess Venus, as that will irritate the Platonists and other non-Epicureans even further):

Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!

Quote

SOCRATES: Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure.

PROTARCHUS: Very good.

SOCRATES: The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the gods is more than human—it exceeds all other fears. And now I would not sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; let her be called what she pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was just now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is. She has one name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and yet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance,—that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike!

[NOTE FROM CASSIUS --- An attempt to intimdate Philebus, ultimately successful, because he does not insist, as did Epicurus, that PLEASURE IS PLEASURE - ALL PLEASURE IS GOOD, BECAUSE IT IS PLEASING - " letter to Menoeceus: And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided.]

....

PHILEBUS: You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god.

SOCRATES: And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question.

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Hello and welcome to the forum melkor !

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.
2. "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt
3. "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius
4. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
5. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
6. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
7. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
8. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
9. Plato's Philebus
10. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
11. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

elli, Nate and Dernga like this.

Eugenios then as usual we are not so very part after all. You are focusing on the aspect of the machine as bypassing of the natural sense mechanisms by implanting directly in the brain, which removes the natural functioning controls. In that context then I can see more application of "true and false" to pleasures, but if we are talking within the terms of the hypothetical then all bets are off anyway and the discussion is just a pure mind game with all the downside that is inherent in such activity. Here is the machine as stated at Wikipedia:

So now we are talking issues as to how much of the hypothetical to accept, and how far to go along with its premises. The further we go, the more hazardous it is to switch back and forth between real life and the hypothetical, or to draw real life conclusions from the hypothetical.

The issue that I would want to emphasize is that in real life there is no such thing as "true" or "false" pleasure. Pleasure is pleasure, and the question is much more focused on "Is it sustainable?"

So the danger in allowing the pleasure machine hypothetical to lure us into abstracting out the characteristics of pleasure, so as to consider there being true and false types, and they sliding that distinction back into the real world. So long as we guard against that we are ok, but we are now squarely into the realm of "Stay away from hypotheticals!" that Elayne has emphasized.

Here from Book I line 640 or so (Munro) is one of the reasons that we face the task of dealing with imaginary hypotheticals like this -- and the problem is not limited to "fools."

It is a natural human condition that we are fascinated with things - such as this hypothetical - that seem obscure, and conceal things under involved language, and can "tickle the ears and are varnished over with finely sounding phrase."

References to the absence of a "pattern" (blueprint / specification / objective standard), even in the hands of the gods:

Following up with Elli, in regard to machines, someone can say that there is a 'specification/blueprint' by which all machines of a particular kind are intended to be manufactured, and in that sense a particular machine as created by men can deviate from the specification/blueprint.

But with Nature and humans, a "specification/blueprint" is exactly what does NOT, and CANNOT (given our understanding of the Nature of the universe), exist!