Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

The whole prolepses thing is a hard nut to crack.

Yes it is, as is a lot of Epicurean philosophy. As to justice I am totally with you, because I cannot imagine that "justice" or any "virtue" is anything but a thought construct.

I tend to think that we aren't looking deeply enough at the big picture. I think Sedley is right that the issue of how images work and how the mind deals with them is important and has lots of facets. The joke from Cicero to Cassius in January 45 BC about the mind being struck by images seems right on point - and it is interesting that Cassius Longinus denies the aspect that Cicero is alleging:

Quote

For it somehow happens, that whenever I write anything to you, you seem to be at my very elbow; and that, not by way of visions of images, as your new friends term them, who believe that even mental visions are conjured up by what Catius calls spectres (for let me remind you that Catius the Insubrian, an Epicurean, who died lately, gives the name of spectres to what the famous Gargettian [Epicurus], and long before that Democritus, called images).

2 But, even supposing that the eye can be struck by these spectres because they run up against it quite of their own accord, how the mind can be so struck is more than I can see. It will be your duty to explain to me, when you arrive here safe and sound, whether the spectre of you is at my command to come up as soon as the whim has taken me to think about you - and not only about you, who always occupy my inmost heart, but suppose I begin thinking about the Isle of Britain, will the image of that wing its way to my consciousness?

[15.19] Cassius to Cicero

[Brundisium, latter half of January, 45 B.C.]

I hope that you are well. I assure you that on this tour of mine there is nothing that gives me more pleasure to do than to write to you; for I seem to be talking and joking with you face to face. And yet that does not come to pass because of those spectres; and, by way of retaliation for that, in my next letter I shall let loose upon you such a rabble of Stoic boors that you will proclaim Catius a true-born Athenian.

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Plutarch, Against Colotes, 17, p. 1117A: But what epithet do they deserve – with your “roars” of ecstasy and “cries of thanksgiving” and tumultuous “bursts of applause” and “reverential demonstrations,” and the whole apparatus of adoration that you people resort to in supplicating and hymning the man who summons you to sustained and frequent pleasures?

U183 Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 15, p. 1097C: One cannot ignore the man’s absurd inconsistency: he treads under foot and belittles the actions of Themistocles and Miltiades and yet writes this to his friends about himself: “The way in which you have provided for me in the matter of sending the grain was godlike and magnificent, and you have given tokens of your regard form me that reach to high heaven.” So if someone had taken that corn ration of his bread-stuff from our philosopher’s letter, the expressions of gratitude would have conveyed the impression that it was written in thanksgiving for the freedom or deliverance of the whole Greek nation or of the Athenian state.

OK I am at a stopping point for the moment but I want to conclude by agreeing with this paragraph from Jackson in most respects, except for the implication of the part underlined in red. I don't think the Epicureans thought that the the gods were real because it was important to think of them that way, I think the Epicureans thought the gods were real, and that it is important to think of them as real, because of the various arguments that they made in favor both of their existence and of the function that contemplating them serves for us.

With the caveat that the word "religion" is so polluted by connotations as to be almost useless, I do also agree with the observations that the Epicureans saw their philosophy not as anti-religion but as a purification of religion, purged of its absurdities.

Don thank you for posting that link and thanks again to Godfrey for posting the Jackson article. These two together really do provide a lot of material to think about. I have just spent the time to reread the majority of the Jackson article and have two comments:

1 - this seems to me to summarize Jackson's position and how he deals with Sedley:

And this references one of the most important reasons I side with Jackson:

It seems very very difficult to believe that we (speaking for Sedley) can be in a better position today to evaluate what Epicurus meant when we have so few reliable works left to us, while Philodemus and Lucretius and others mentioned in these articles in the ancient world had virtually (or fully) the whole library of Epicurean texts available to them for evidence. To me it is not persuasive to think that if Epicurus had held a strongly idealist interpretation as Sedley argues that we would not have more evidence of it, and at the same time if that were true it seems doubtful to me that we would have the testimony of Philodemus and Lucretius and others that this is not simply something going on within our minds.

So I personally continue to hold to a "both" position, with gods serving "both" as symbolic aspirational goals beneficial to contemplate, and also as beings for which Epicurus held there to be "real" evidence of their existence (but not through the standard 5 senses).

For that reason I would side with the view that the "images" perceivable only by the mind that benefit us to contemplate stream "from" and not "to" the gods, and that the contrary statement is a scribal error, but with one caveat: I think it's likely that Epicurus held "images" to be streams of "particles" constantly streaming in all directions from everything at once, so I would expect an ancient Epicurean to presume that even while particles are streaming toward us from other things (including but not limited to "gods") there are particles streaming outward from us (towards those "gods") as well.

I think there is a lot of room for additional deduction here about what these sources mean. And I think one of the underappreciated implications is that if the "gods" are deathless then they presumably had no starting point, as implied in the discussion of how "similarities" can be immortal. This "similarities" reference is new to me and probably deserves more attention.

I would expect this cannot mean "platonic ideal forms" or "conceptions" in our understanding of "mental conceptions" (which is what Sedley seems to be arguing the gods to be) so what would it mean?

I also think that this is a particularly important and perceptive paragraph, but I also think it's one which may be only part of the picture, because I doubt this is a good description of "any process of imagination," and he's not discussing how the mind would accomplish this. He's implicitly acknowledging DeWitt's view that Epicurus held the mind to be a "suprasensory organism" it seems to me without dealing with the issue of "etching" or unfolding of something that existed prior to the outside stimulus. Anyway I do think Sedley is right that we have to consider all this in the context of how the theory of images works generally.

Don thank you very much! That's a great contribution to this discussion. For anyone who just skims this thread and doesn't read the whole article, I made a few clips I thought were particularly important for giving a flavor of Sedley's opinions:

Sedley's comment in his conclusion in which he admits that the position he takes cannot be reconciled with the positions of "some" of his adherents (presumably including Philodemus and Lucretius) who he thinks were either deceived or participating in a tradition of keeping the ultimate truth about the gods close at hand among the inner circle:

Quote from Don

(1) There is no supernatural creator of the cosmos (The cosmos began and is sustained by the interplay of atoms and void), and (2) The gods have no interest in "governing" the cosmos nor in having interaction with humans.

Since I seem to be doing my best to extend and prolong minute details, here is another such comment:

I fully agree with item one and think it is very clear with no real room for ambiguity or confusion. Everything in Epicurean philosophy points to that conclusion and the philosophy would be nothing without that conclusion.

As to item two, I agree but would state these caveats:

First, I think we always have to be careful with the term "the gods" because (1) the Epicurean definition is very contrary to modern prevailing understanding of the attributes of such beings, and (2) we don't have as much information as we would like to be sure what they did mean. Did they consider Zeus and Venus and Mars to be the actual beings who are supposedly in the intermundia, or not? I think there's a good chance that they considered Zeus and Venus and Mars to be figments of human imagination rather than actual examples of the gods they thought lived in the intermundia, while at the same time holding that their versions of gods do in fact exist in the intermundia, just like they specifically held life to exist in other parts of the universe besides earth.

Second, yes it would have to be true that the gods in the intermundia have no interest in governing the cosmos or having interaction with humans, and yes it remains true that there are no supernatural creators over the universe of any kind. I don't think however that rules out by any means that there may be other phenomena/beings that are currently undiscovered that we may come into contact with who are not supernatural, and not "gods" by our Epicurean definition, but who are essentially space aliens or other phenomena such as we would appear to life on other planets. So I personally leave open the possibility that there are lots of other undiscovered phenomena, but in order to consider them as reasonably possible the suggestion would need to be "verifiable" in some ordinary way over time and between numbers of people and perhaps other criteria to eliminate fraud.

Ok it looks like for the "articles" which are listed at the bottom of the first page I am going to need to go through and create new "cover" images. May take a little time to do that, but I do think that's going to be an improved appearance. That's the kind of change that if you come across please let me know.

Ok I think the existing hearts will probably remain hearts unless they are changed by the user, but now the first reaction type is a thumbs-up!

Let me see what I can do!

OK I bet I can customize that - would people prefer an up-thumb like on facebook?

It looks like we've come through a significant upgrade of the forum without major issues, but I am sure there will be some details to clean up. Please let us know in this thread if you see any oddities of any kind. Thanks!

Great catch Godfrey - I know nothing of this! But what's not to like about a guy with a first name like he has: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximus_of_Tyre

Beyond his name I don't know much of anything about Victor Frankl, so I can't address that part at the moment.

As to suffering, I am writing this early in the morning so my response is not very deep - but I agree with what you've written in the post and I think you're ultimately seconding what is contained in "On Ends" as to the wisdom of enduring some pains in order to experience more pleasure / less pain.

I think maybe the issue is in thinking that suffering itself has some value, rather than the value coming through your prudent response to things that cause pain.

Now the "faculty of pain" is valuable in that if you did not have the faculty you would not have the information that it provides, and be able to adjust your choices accordingly.

On Ends:

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X. But I must explain to you how all this mistaken idea of reprobating pleasure and extolling pain arose. To do so, I will give you a complete account of the system, and expound the actual teachings of the great explorer of the truth, the master-builder of human happiness. No one rejects, dislikes or avoids pleasure itself, because it is pleasure, but because those who do not know how to pursue pleasure rationally encounter consequences that are extremely painful. Nor again is there anyone who loves or pursues or desires to obtain pain of itself, because it is pain, but because occasionally circumstances occur in which toil and pain can procure him some great pleasure. To take a trivial example, which of us ever undertakes laborious physical exercise, except to obtain some advantage from it? But who has any right to find fault with a man who chooses to enjoy a pleasure that has no annoying consequences, or one who avoids a pain that produces no resultant pleasure?

On the other hand, we denounce with righteous indignation and dislike men who are so beguiled and demoralized by the charms of the pleasure of the moment, so blinded by desire, that they cannot foresee the pain and trouble that are bound to ensue; and equal blame belongs to those who fail in their duty through weakness of will, which is the same as saying through shrinking from toil and pain. These cases are perfectly simple and easy to distinguish. In a free hour, when our power of choice is untrammelled and when nothing prevents our being able to do what we like best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every pain avoided.

But in certain emergencies and owing to the claims of duty or the obligations of business it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be repudiated and annoyances accepted. The wise man therefore always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects pleasures to secure other greater pleasures, or else he endures pains to avoid worse pains.

Welcome to Episode Forty-Six of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

For anyone who is not familiar with our podcast, please check back to Episode One for a discussion of our goals and our ground rules. If you have any question about that, please be sure to contact us at Epicureanfriends.com for more information.

In today's episode, we will cover roughly lines 634-740 from Book 3 of the Latin Text. The topic will be that living things inherit qualities of life from their parents, but they do not inherit immortal souls.

Podcast 46 - Living Things Inherit Qualities from Their Parents, but not souls that are immortal.

Latin Text Location 741- 829

Munro Notes:

741-775 : again why do animals inherit the qualities of their parents, unless the mind like the body comes from a fixed seed? if the soul is immortal and passes into different bodies, why do not dogs and stags, hawks and doves, men and beasts exchange dispositions? they say the immortal soul changes with the change of body: false; for what changes is broken up, and therefore dies : if it be urged, a human soul always passes into a human body, a horse's into a horse, why then is not the child as wise as the man, the foal as the horse? the mind grows young in the young body you say: then is it mortal, since it thus loses its former properties : or how can the soul come to maturity with the body, unless its partner from the beginning? or why does it seek to quit the aged body? it need not fear its ruin; for an immortal runs no risk.

776-783: again how absurd that immortal souls should be present at conception and fight who shall get the mortal body, unless indeed they bargain, first come first served!

784-829: again everything has its proper place assigned to it; and thus the mind cannot be out of the body away from sinews and blood : if it could be in the head or heels or any other part of the body (and this would be much more natural than that it should be out of the body altogether) there it would still be within the man : now as mind and soul not only are in our body, but have a fixed place in that body, it is still more inconceivable that they could exist wholly out of it; therefore the soul dies with the body: nay thus to join a mortal thing with an immortal is too absurd : but if you say the soul is immortal, because it is sheltered from all that would destroy it, that is not true; not only does it suffer with the body, but it has other ailments of its own, fears for the future, remorse for the past, madness and lethargy.

Browne:

Besides, why does fierce rage affect the sullen breed of lions? Why is craft derived to the fox, and flight to stags, from their sires, and paternal fear give wings to all their limbs? Whence comes other passions of this kind? Why do they belong to all creatures from their tender age, and seem born with them, if the peculiar powers of the soul were not produced from peculiar seeds in ever particular kind, and did not grow up together with the whole body? But were the soul immortal and used to change her body, creatures would be strangely confused in their dispositions and qualities; the fierce dog of Hircanian breed would fly the attack of the horned stag, and the fearful hawk would tremble in the air at the approach of a dove; men would be void of reason like brutes, and the savage race of beasts might become philosophers. But what is said in this case is supported by false reasoning, that the immortal soul is changed according to the different body it is united with, for what is changed is dissolved, and therefore dies, the parts are transposed, and vary in their situation. It follows therefore that the principles of it may be dissolved through the limbs, and may all perish together with the body. But they cry that the souls always pass into bodies of the same kind, the souls of men into the bodies of men. Then I would ask why a soul from being wise should become a fool, and a child is not made a privy counselor? And why a young colt has not the paces of a full-grown horse? If the peculiar powers of the soul were not produced from peculiar seeds in every particular kind, and did they not grow up together with the whole body? They’ll say perhaps that the mind becomes equally weak in a tender body; if so, they must allow the soul to be mortal because, when infused into the body it is so much changed it loses the life and sense it enjoyed before. And why should the powers of the soul desire passionately to grow and attain to a full maturity of age together with the body if it were not a companion with it from the very beginning? And why is she fond of flying away out of old decaying limbs? Is she afraid of being confined a close prisoner in a rotten body, and lest her old tabernacle, worn out by time and age, should all and crush her to pieces? But no danger can affect a nature that is immortal.

Besides, it is ridiculous to suppose that a flock of souls are ready hovering about, whilst brutes are in the act of lust, and drop their young, that they, immortal as they are, should attend upon perishing bodies, in troops without number, hurrying and coming to blows as it were, which first should get possession and enter in; unless perhaps they rather choose to agree among themselves that the first come should be first served, and there should be no further dispute about it.

Again, there are no trees in the sky, no clouds can be in the deep sea, nor can fish live in the fields, nor can there be blood in wood nor moisture in stones. It is fixed and established where every thing should grow and subsist. The soul therefore cannot come into being alone without the body, nor can she exist separately without the nerves and the blood; if this could be, the powers of the soul you would rather feel sometimes in the head or shoulders, or even in the very bottom of the feet, or in any other part of the body, and so you would perceive it diffusing itself through the whole body, as water poured into a vessel first covers one part, then spreads over the whole. Since therefore there is a proper and determinate place in this body of ours for the mind and soul distinctly to be and increase in, we have the more reason to deny that they can continue or be born without it; and consequently when the body dies, the soul, diffused through the whole body, must be allowed to die likewise. And then to join a mortal nature to an immortal, and to think that they can agree together, and mutually unite in their operations, is folly and nonsense. For what can be conceived more absurd, what can be more impracticable in itself, more disagreeing to reason, than a mortal nature joined to one eternal and immortal, and so united as to be liable to all the pains and distresses of human life?

Besides, whatever is immortal must be so either because it is solid, and cannot be affected by blows, so that nothing can pierce it, and break through the close union of its parts (such are the first seeds of matter, as we proved before) or it is eternal, and lasts forever, because it is free from stroke, as a void is, which is not liable to touch, nor affected by the force of blows; or lastly, because there is no space any way about it into which its broken parts can be dispersed, (in this sense the universe is eternal; beyond which there is no place where its parts may retire, nor any bodies to fall upon it, and dissolve and break it to pieces by mighty blows from without). But, as I said, the nature of the mind is not solid, because there is empty space in all compound beings; nor yet is it a void, nor are there wanting bodies forever beating upon it from without, and driving the whole frame of this mind by impetuous force into utter dissolution, or to distress it any other way with extremest danger; nor is there any want of place or space where the seeds of the soul may be dispersed, or where they may be dissolved by any violence whatsoever. The gate of death therefore is not barred against the soul.

But if you think she may rather be pronounced immortal, because she is placed secure from things that may destroy her being, or that things opposite to her safety never come out of her, or if they do, they are diverted by some cause before you perceive they have done her any signal injury, this is a great mistake, and far from the truth. For, not to mention how she sickens with the diseases of the body, how something happens that torments her about future events, how she is disordered by fear, and vexed by cares, and how the conscience of crimes past, many years ago, pierces her through; consider the peculiar distraction that affects the mind, how she forgets everything, and is overwhelmed by the black waves of a lethargy.

Munro:

Again, why does untamed fierceness go along with the sullen brood of lions, cunning with foxes and proneness to flight with stags? And to take any other instance of the kind, why are all qualities engendered in the limbs and temper from the very commencement of life, if not because a fixed power of mind derived from its proper seed and breed grows up together with the whole body? If it were immortal and wont to pass into different bodies, living creatures would be of interchangeable dispositions; a dog of Hyrcanian breed would often fly before the attack of an antlered stag, a hawk would cower in mid air as it fled at the approach of a dove, men would be without reason, the savage races of wild beasts would have reason. For the assertion that an immortal soul is altered by a change of body is advanced on a false principle. What is changed is dissolved, and therefore dies: the parts are transposed and quit their former order; therefore they must admit of being dissolved too throughout the frame, in order at last to die one and all together with the body. But if they shall say that souls of men always go into human bodies, I yet will ask how it is a soul can change from wise to foolish, and no child has discretion, and why the mare’s foal is not so well trained as the powerful strength of the horse. You may be sure they will fly to the subterfuge that the mind grows weakly in a weakly body. But granting this is so, you must admit the soul to be mortal, since changed so completely throughout the frame it loses its former life and sense. Then too in what way will it be able to grow in strength uniformly with its allotted body and reach the coveted flower of age, unless it shall be its partner at its first beginning? Or what means it by passing out from the limbs when decayed with age? Does it fear to remain shut up in a crumbling body, fear that its tenement, worn out by protracted length of days, bury it in its ruins? Why, an immortal being incurs no risks.

Again for souls to stand by at the unions of Venus and the birth-throes of beasts seems to be passing absurd, for them the immortals to wait for mortal limbs in number numberless and struggle with one another in forward rivalry, which shall first and by preference have entrance in; unless haply bargains are struck among the souls on these terms, that whichever in its flight shall first come up, shall first have right of entry, and that they shall make no trial at all of each other’s strength.

Again a tree cannot exist in the ether, nor clouds in the deep sea nor can fishes live in the fields nor blood exist in woods nor sap in stones. Where each thing can grow and abide is fixed and ordained. Thus the nature of the mind cannot come into being alone without the body nor exist far away from the sinews and blood. But if (for this would be much more likely to happen than that) the force itself of the mind might be in the head or shoulders or heels or might be born in any other part of the body, it would after all be wont to abide in one and the same man or vessel. But since in our body even it is fixed and seen to be ordained where the soul and the mind can severally be and grow, it must still more strenuously be denied that it can abide and be born out of the body altogether. Therefore when the body has died, we must admit that the soul has perished, wrenched away throughout the body. To link forsooth a mortal thing with an everlasting and suppose that they can have sense in common and can be reciprocally acted upon, is sheer folly; for what can be conceived more incongruous, more discordant and inconsistent with itself, than a thing which is mortal, linked with an immortal and everlasting thing, trying in such union to weather furious storms?

But if haply the soul is to be accounted immortal for this reason rather, because it is kept sheltered from death-bringing things, either because things hostile to its existence do not approach at all, or because those which do approach, in some way or other retreat discomfited before we can feel the harm they do, [manifest experience proves that this can not be true]. For besides that it sickens in sympathy with the maladies of the body, it is often attacked by that which frets it on the score of the future and keeps it on the rack of suspense and wears it out with cares; and when ill deeds are in the past, remorse for sins yet gnaws: then there is madness peculiar to the mind and forgetfulness of all things; then too it often sinks into the black waters of lethargy.

Bailey:

Again, why does fiery passion go along with the grim brood of lions and cunning with foxes; why is the habit of flight handed on to deer from their sires, so that their father’s fear spurs their limbs? And indeed all other habits of this sort, why are they always implanted in the limbs and temper from the first moment of life, if it be not because a power of mind determined by its own seed and breed grows along with the body of each animal? But if the soul were immortal and were wont to change its bodies, then living creatures would have characters intermingled; the dog of Hyrcanian seed would often flee the onset of the horned hart, and the hawk would fly fearful through the breezes of air at the coming of the dove; men would be witless, and wise the fierce tribes of wild beasts. For it is argued on false reasoning, when men say that an immortal soul is altered, when it changes its body: for what is changed, is dissolved, and so passes away. For the parts are transferred and shift from their order; wherefore they must be able to be dissolved too throughout the limbs, so that at last they may all pass away together with the body. But if they say that the souls of men always pass into human bodies, still I will ask why a soul can become foolish after being wise, why no child has reason, why the mare’s foal is not as well trained as the bold strength of a horse. We may be sure they will be driven to say that in a weak body the mind too is weak. But if that indeed comes to pass, you must needs admit that the soul is mortal, since it changes so much throughout the frame, and loses its former life and sense. Or in what manner will the force of mind be able along with each several body to wax strong and attain the coveted bloom of life, unless it be partner too with the body at its earliest birth? Or why does it desire to issue forth abroad from the aged limbs? does it fear to remain shut up in a decaying body, lest its home, worn out with the long spell of years, fall on it? But an immortal thing knows no dangers.

Again, that the souls should be present at the wedlock of Venus and the birth of wild beasts, seems to be but laughable; that immortal souls should stand waiting for mortal limbs in numbers numberless, and should wrangle one with another in hot haste, which first before the others may find an entrance; unless by chance the souls have a compact sealed, that whichever arrives first on its wings, shall first have entrance, so that they strive not forcibly at all with one another.

Again, a tree cannot exist in the sky, nor clouds in the deep waters, nor can fishes live in the fields, nor blood be present in wood, nor sap in stones. It is determined and ordained where each thing can grow and have its place. So the nature of the mind cannot come to birth alone without body, nor exist far apart from sinews and blood. But if this could be, far sooner might the force of mind itself exist in head or shoulders, or right down in the heels, and be wont to be born in any part you will, but at least remain in the same man or the same vessel. But since even within our body it is determined and seen to be ordained where soul and mind can dwell apart and grow, all the more must we deny that it could continue or be begotten outside the whole body. Wherefore, when the body has perished, you must needs confess that the soul too has passed away, rent asunder in the whole body. Nay, indeed, to link the mortal with the everlasting, and to think that they can feel together and act one upon the other, is but foolishness. For what can be pictured more at variance, more estranged within itself and inharmonious, than that what is mortal should be linked in union with the immortal and everlasting to brave raging storms?

Moreover, if ever things abide for everlasting, it must needs be either that, because they are of solid body, they beat back assaults, nor suffer anything to come within them which might unloose the close-locked parts within, such as are the bodies of matter whose nature we have declared before; or that they are able to continue throughout all time, because they are exempt from blows, as is the void, which abides untouched, nor suffers a whit from assault; or else because there is no supply of room all around, into which, as it were, things might part asunder and be broken up—even as the sum of sums is eternal—nor is there any room without into which they may scatter, nor are there bodies which might fall upon them and break them up with stout blow. But if by chance the soul is rather to be held immortal for this reason, because it is fortified and protected from things fatal to life, or because things harmful to its life come not at all, or because such as come in some way depart defeated before we can feel what harm they do us [clear facts show us that this is not so]. For besides that it falls sick along with the diseases of the body, there comes to it that which often torments it about things that are to be, and makes it ill at ease with fear, and wears it out with care; and when its evil deeds are past and gone, yet sin brings remorse. There is too the peculiar frenzy of the mind and forgetfulness of the past, yes, and it is plunged into the dark waters of lethargy.

Episode Forty-Five of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available.
As always we invite your comments and suggestions.

At first I was thinking that taking the original seemed a little overboard, but I suppose in that day they were actually doing the owner a favor by giving them a newer version that might last longer?

Quote from JJElbert

If the inbound ship was found to contain any books, they were seized by the port authority for copying.

Wow I have never heard that either! I wonder what the source of that information is - any possibility that that also is a "conceit" rather than historical fact?

Joshua what / who do they focus on instead? People like Pythagorus and Plato? Or do they just generally give little attention to philosophy?

I think I am the one who introduced Roger Penrose into the thread, and unfortunately (or should I say, as usual) I haven't had time to follow through on reading up on him in detail.

However to add this to the mix here is a link that is critical of at least some of Penrose's positions: https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Quantum_c…s#Roger_Penrose