Posts by Cassius

This is the kind of research that takes time and lots of effort to pursue, so maybe over time we can figure it out.

I think it's pretty clear that the Epicurean material in Cicero's "On Ends" and "On the Nature of the Gods" was probably never lost to the world for any considerable length of time, and I get the impression that Diogenes Laertius, which has the bulk of the core stuff, was generally available too.

We seem to get the impression in talking about the recovery of Lucretius that the atomic theory was brand new upon its "rediscovery," but if Diogenes Laertius was available (as appears so) then the core of the teaching was available through the Letter to Herodotus.

Charles this question comes up in my mind due to our posts today about Voltaire. Have you been able to pin down where La Mettrie stood on whether the universe was supernaturally created - i.e. whether he was a "deist?"

There's also a related question of whether he makes any direct statement on life after death.

No doubt there's a great deal to be learned from anyone who is writing about Lucretius, but as I think about it and as we explore these writers from this period, these are probably among the first questions we ought to ask about them, and post it early in our threads as we discuss them, to put them in context.

Otherwise, like Ninon, we may be ending up diverting ourselves into foundation-less assertions about ethics (even those discussing "happiness" or "pleasure") which ultimately are not of tremendous use since they would rest on our deciding to accept the assertions of the author rather than being grounded back in a world view of the fundamental nature of the universe.

Note: It might be better if we end up moving La Mettrie out of this "Leaders In Epicurean Philosophy" subforum into the same subforum as Voltaire. That's probably a better place for people who had lots of important things to say about Epicurean philosophy, but who seems to have been essentially a Deist. At this point without knowing the answers to these questions about La Mettrie's positions I am not at all sure.

Quote from Hiram

1. He was unfamiliar with Epicurus as a direct source. His familiarity was with Lucretius, which was a popular document in the intellectual life of anti-clerical intellectuals of his day.

2. Much of what he wrote were commentaries on Lucretian ideas.

Hiram so you are saying that as far as you can tell La Mettrie did not have access to Diogenes Laertius?

If I recall correctly much of Gassendi was based on Diogenes Laertius, so that would seem unlikely, but maybe so, as I am totally unfamiliar with his writing.

I know Dewitt argues that anticipations are hardly mentioned, if at all, in Lucretius, so if La Mettrie was not incorporating what Diogenes Laertius had to say, and what Cicero has Velleuis say about anticipations in "On the Nature of the Gods," then that would be a severe limitation on La Mettrie's analysis, at least at to the nature of "anticipations" themselves.

"Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum" (So great the evils to which religion could prompt!)

Do we have any Voltaire experts who would know where to get the complete quote where Voltaire wrote that this famous line from Book 1 of Lucretius would last as long as the world? I am looking for the full quote with context in a work of Voltaire. I see it referenced several places but I can't find the original version despite a long session of googling. This clip is from Martin Ferguson Smith's edition of Lucretius:

Charles:

While not entirely relevant, I found a paper from Catherine Wilson about Lucretius' influence on the Enlightenment, Voltaire wasn't mentioned in the abstract or introduction, but he was included in my key word search, so clearly he's mentioned. Sadly its behind an academic paywall.

Cassius:

Yes Charles I am seeing many references to Voltaire writing to Frederick the Great about this too, but I am not finding the precise original text where Voltaire describes this as a line that "will last as long as the world."

Charles:

A short praise of Epicurus and Lucretius from Voltaire can be found here as well. https://history.hanover.edu/texts/voltaire/volfinal.html

Don't worry, it's well into the public domain

Cassius:

From that link you posted, Charle, I see this below. I did not realize that Voltaire was a deist, and that lowers my estimation of him significantly -- plus it's probably not a coincidence that his characterization here of Epicurus ethics is also truncated and insufficient:

Cassius:

Charles that sounds like that will be something to check in your reading of La Mettrie and the others you are pursuing -- if they were "deists" then they clearly were rejecting a central foundation of Epicurean philosophy and I would not even call them "Epicureans" at all. For some reason I do not have the impression that Frederick the Great was a deist, but I am not at all sure on that.

Although it's probably always a good idea to be careful in saying a person "is an Epicurean" or "is not an Epicurean," in my mind I have little doubt that in general terms the classical Epicureans would never have considered anyone to be a true Epicurean who did not rule out the creation of the universe by supernatural forces. And that would rule out most of the "Deism" movement, including people like Thomas Paine, who didn't specifically embrace Epicurus like Thomas Jefferson or Frances Wright did.

In this Episode three we probably have enough material to stick with the Iphianassa passage before going forward. Let's use this to highlight the general topic of the Epicurean theme that supernatural religion is not necessary for happy living, and that in fact it detracts from that goal. I think there are other relevant passages in Epicurean literature that we can draw on, so let's try to list them here. The first one that come to mind is from Diogenes of Oinoanda:

Fr. 20

[So it is obvious that wrong-doers, given that they do not fear the penalties imposed by the laws, are not] afraid of [the gods.] This [has to be] conceded. For if they were [afraid, they] would not [do wrong]. As for [all] the others, [it is my opinion] that the [wise] are not [(reasoning indicates) righteous] on account of the gods, but on account of [thinking] correctly and the [opinions] they hold [regarding] certain things [and especially] pains and death (for indeed invariably and without exception human beings do wrong either on account of fear or on account of pleasures), and that ordinary people on the other hand are righteous, in so far as they are righteous, on account of the laws and the penalties, imposed by the laws, hanging over them. But even if some of their number are conscientious on account of the laws, they are few: only just two or three individuals are to be found among great segments of multitudes, and not even these are steadfast in acting righteously; for they are not soundly persuaded about providence. A clear indication of the complete inability of the gods to prevent wrong-doings is provided by the nations of the Jews and Egyptians, who, as well as being the most superstitious of all peoples, are the vilest of all peoples.

On account of what kind of gods, then, will human beings be righteous? For they are not righteous on account of the real ones or on account of Plato’s and Socrates’ Judges in Hades. We are left with this conclusion; otherwise, why should not those who disregard the laws scorn fables much more?

So, with regard to righteousness, neither does our doctrine do harm [not does] the opposite [doctrine help], while, with regard to the other condition, the opposite doctrine not only does not help, but on the contrary also does harm, whereas our doctrine not only does not harm, but also helps. For the one removes disturbances, while the other adds them, as has already been made clear to you before.

Are there other Epicurean texts directly on point on the corrupting power of religion?

Am I also not remembering that someone famous in the Middle Ages made a comment about Lucretius' line "So great is the power of religion to persuade to evil deeds!" being one of the most memorable of the poem that would live forever? or as long as poetry survives.... or something like that?

This below is a hint of it, but not the full quote:

"When a single day brings the world to destruction, only then will the poetry of the sublime Lucretius pass away." This judgment by the Roman poet Ovid , written in the generation after Lucretius's death, has been echoed by such writers as Voltaire and George Santayana; the author of De rerum natura (On the Nature of Things) holds a place in world literature as one of the great philosopher-poets.

Another hint of it:

The most obvious and famous result of this attitude is Lucretius’ extreme hostility to traditional religion—which, in his view, is neither reasonable or natural and is the source of endless anxiety and cruelty. And responses to his poem often begin and end with that. Voltaire, as one might expect, enthusiastically approved the most famous line in the poem attacking traditional religion: “That shows how much/ religion can turn mankind to evil” (1.134), and the energy of that endorsement is matched by any number of people who turned away from Lucretius in horror for this irreligious stance.

Good to hear from you Michael.

My personal take on this is that there are at least a couple of very important points that need to be considered separately:

(1) We know from pretty reliable sources that the Epicureans advised people to "think about death," so the meaning of the phrase is not "death is totally irrelevant to us so don't even think about it." Given how much of Epicurean advice is about dealing with reality and overcoming fear that is unjustified, it would not be consistent for the Epicureans to hold that the subject is totally irrelevant, and in fact Lucretius (and thus Epicurus in On Nature) devoted a lot of time to exploring the subject.

(2) To me personally, the heart of the issue has always been better stated in English as something like "the state of being dead is nothingness." The starting point is that all good and evil is experienced through sensation, and there is no sensation after we die, so there is no way to experience anything good or evil, or to experience anything at all, after we are dead. I think that is the main point of the doctrine, and as a result it emphasizes not only the absence of any reason to fear being dead, it also emphasizes the importance of using our time wisely so as to experience the most pleasurable life that we can while we are alive.

(3) We know that Epicurus had a will and that he planned for what would happen after he died. This was not a contradiction of PD2 but shows us how to apply it reasonably and in full context of the rest of the philosophy. By planning for his inevitable death he minimized he kind of present worry and concern that you mention in your question.

The second episode of the LucretiusToday podcast is now available for download. Lots of work went into preparing this episode, so please let us know your comments, suggestions, criticisms, etc.

If you have questions you would like us to cover in the next episode, please place them in a comment or send us an audio file and we will try to incorporate that into a future show. Ongoing future discussion of the episode will take place here: Episode Two - The Lucretius Today Podcast

This second program covers approximately lines 62-80 (from the 1743 Edition):

Indeed mankind, in wretched bondage held, lay groveling on the ground, galled with the yoke of what is called Religion; from the sky this tyrant shewed her head, and with grim looks hung over us, poor mortals, here below; until a man of Greece, with steady eyes, dared look her in the face, and first opposed her power. Him not the fame of Gods, nor thunder’s roar, kept back, nor threatening tumults of the sky; but still the more they roused the active virtue of his aspiring soul, as he pressed forward, first to break through Nature's scanty bounds. His mind’s quick force prevailed; and so he passed by far the flaming limits of this world, and wandered with his comprehensive soul over all the mighty space; from thence returned, triumphant; told us what things may have a being, and what cannot; and how a finite power is fixed to each; a bound it cannot break. And so Religion, which we feared before, by him subdued, we tread upon in turn. His conquest makes us equal to the Gods.

As to the reference Mike to "On Methods of Inference" I agree that you will probably find that interesting. I have read in full and highly recommend both the translation but particularly the commentary by Philip De Lacey

I have found De Lacey's discussion in the appendix of the epistemology issues between Epicurus, the Stoics, Plato, and Aristotle to be among the most helpful I have every read.

This is an important question about which there are several sections of Cicero criticizing Epicurus for not paying enough attention to it. I gather that the Epicureans did not admit that he omitted this, but that he denied the analysis being given to it by the logicians and asserted another approach to it that he held to be superior.

So this part quoted below may not be something that the ancient Epicureans admitted to "dispensing" with - but asserted that they dealt with in a different way:

Quote from Mike Anyayahan

categorization, logic, and abstraction are indispensable especially when communicating with others our subjective experience and the knowledge we get out of it.

So the challenge is to articulate the Epicurean counterpoint, and probably not to admit the approach to or the priority of these subjects suggested by the Platonists.

Great to hear from you - post whenever you can. So you've move from truck-driving to surveying? Quite a move there must be a story behind how you picked surveying!

Quote from JJElbert

"the shining borders of the light",

Interesting that you picked that reference because it is one that interests me too. I think i have seen it rendered as well "shores of light" as if a reference to a seacoast, and it has always made me wonder what was being implied by the allusion. I gather that it generally is used in context of certain atoms coming together into bodies which then become visible - which were not visible before due to their size - but it seems to have been a metaphor for birth or something else that we ought to recognize as significant given that the phrase is used regularly - and I bet this is worth discussion to bring out the subtext.

For those who are reading along in this thread, I've had some discussions about scheduling an open session for next Wednesday night, the 29th of January, at 8PM Eastern time, so you might want to pencil that into your calendar. I'll post an agenda but pursuant to my latest thinking I suspect the best thing to do would be to devote at least part of the beginning to starting to talk about the letter to Herodotus, but then of course it would be great to hear general thoughts and commentaries and any brief "getting to know you" info material you'd like to share. More details to come.

I trust that everyone here reading this is at least largely on the same page as to general approach to things, so it might be preferable for us to open up the invitation in stages. It would probably be a good idea for the first stage to be those of us here at Epicureanfriends as the first invitees, perhaps with some selected people at Facebook, rather than simply posting a public notice on FB or other locations.

If you haven't joined us before we've been using Skype, so that will be the way to join at least for the first event or two.

Hiram I did a quick word search for philology in that PDF but I don't see a form of it there. Am I missing it or are you inferring that from something DeWitt said.

For purposes of this I'll take this to be the definition of philology:

I don't have an elaborate comment on Mike's suggestions at this moment but i suspect that a large part of the answer relates to DeWitt's discussion of "anticipations" in Chapter 13 of his book, along with the opening of the letter to Herodotus:

For those who are unable, Herodotus, to work in detail through all that I have written about nature, or to peruse the larger books which I have composed, I have already prepared at sufficient length an epitome of the whole system, that they may keep adequately in mind at least the most general principles in each department, in order that as occasion arises they may be able to assist themselves on the most important points, in so far as they undertake the study of nature.

But those also who have made considerable progress in the survey of the main principles ought to bear in mind the scheme of the whole system set forth in its essentials.

For we have frequent need of the general view, but not so often of the detailed exposition. Indeed it is necessary to go back on the main principles, and constantly to fix in one’s memory enough to give one the most essential comprehension of the truth.

And in fact the accurate knowledge of details will be fully discovered, if the general principles in the various departments are thoroughly grasped and borne in mind; for even in the case of one fully initiated the most essential feature in all accurate knowledge is the capacity to make a rapid use of observation and mental apprehension, and this can be done if everything is summed up in elementary principles and formulae.

For it is not possible for anyone to abbreviate the complete course through the whole system, if he cannot embrace in his own mind by means of short formulae all that might be set out with accuracy in detail.

Wherefore since the method I have described is valuable to all those who are accustomed to the investigation of nature, I who urge upon others the constant occupation in the investigation of nature, and find my own peace chiefly in a life so occupied, have composed for you another epitome on these lines, summing up the first principles of the whole doctrine.

First of all, Herodotus, we must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning.

For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference.

And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen.

Quote from Godfrey

What may be intended as humor instead becomes a redefinition or repudiation.

I very much agree with that. I feel sure that the Epicurean texts could not have been totally straight and humorless - that would contradict everything we should expect. No doubt they would be earnest, but also incorporate humor and joking.

Thanks Trey. Episode two in a couple of days, certainly by the weekend.

Quote from Lee

True, said I. But do you, then, deny that pain is evil, and pleasure is good, in an abstracted sense?

Further, I would probably agree with Barwis that the answer to this question is "No" if we are talking "pain = evil" and "pleasure = good." Just as Barwis said, "that must depend upon the signification we give to the word good" and issues of terminology are important to honor, just as we have to deal with terminology issues in "absence of pain" not being equal to "pleasure" in every respect.

If Barwis were wanting to replace John Locke's blank slate by a strong call to return to "religion" or to "virtue in the Platonic/Stoic sense" in a way that Epicurus would have strongly objected to, this passage, here at the end of the book, is where Barwis would have hammered home the point.

And ONE MORE THING! You did not quote the FINAL WORDS OF THE DIALOGUE! ---->

Here we were interrupted by the presence of the ladies who came out to meet us; when our conversation turning upon more agreeable things, our discourses on these subjects ended, and were not renewed during my stay in the country.

FINIS

No hammering home of the virtues of religion and devotion to god and religion - instead they turn to the ladies, and to more agreeable (pleasing!) discussions, and the conversations "were not renewed during my stay in the country."

I do think that ending speaks legions as to what Barwis really thought!

Boy that reminds me of how much I like that Dialogue, and consider it almost to be a work of art in itself!

Excellent question Lee. No, certainly not fully consistent, but I think if you re-read from the beginning of the dialog, and especially if you were to read the "Three Dialogues on Liberty" that are similar in form, you would conclude as I do that Barwis' is at best a Deist and maybe not even that, and that his religious references are more superficial than fundamental. In fact in Three Dialogues on Liberty he makes lots of references to how religion is a foe to liberty.

Further, on this precise question, he also seems to be dealing with the definitions of "good" and "evil" which need to be dealt with. It seems to me that while he is admitting that pleasure and pain are the fundamental drivers, he is trying to carve out a caveat for the words "good" and "evil" as more broad terms, maybe in the way that we can describe physical exercise as good (in being productive of ultimate pleasure) while being painful while we do it. It seems to me that he wants to use good and evil to describe "actions" to account for the fact that the same action as we know can sometime be pleasurable and sometimes be pleasurable.

So in the end I think to answer the question by asking Barwis whether, if he is not referring good to pleasure, what IS he referring it to? And in reading the text he does not give a clear answer, other than maybe some lofty words. Now lofty words are trademarks of Stoicism / Platonism / Religion, so I would not argue with someone who wants to fault him for that. But my guess after reading this many times is that the kind of fault that he deserves is the kind that belongs to someone who knows the truth, but doesn't want to express it straightforwardly for reasons of his own. (Afraid?)

So yes taking this passage out of context it definitely rings with problems. But when you look at the rest of the text, and see that the purpose of the work is to undercut the "blank slate" theory by focusing on feeling, without giving any real credit to standard religion or standard idealism, I think the final result is something that I do think is very helpful for someone who is thinking about how to apply the Epicurean insight that "feeling" is the real standard of Nature.

Thanks Godfrey, I have not heard of that. Is that a phone OS program? I think the key is getting the podcast listed in the main central providers, and that is what I need to investigate next.

In the meantime I am pleased to say that we have Episode 2 of the Lucretius podcast recorded and it should be ready in a couple of days.

Yes I am thinking there is a root concept of will/wish/desire that probably is at the core, which is why "desire" and "pleasure" seem so interchangeable even today in many contexts

Amen! Anesthesia is not "therapy" at all. It is dumbing and numbing yourself down to destruction.

And all for what? For "VIRTUE"!