We are now requiring that new registrants confirm their request for an account by email. Once you complete the "Sign Up" process to set up your user name and password, please send an email to the New Accounts Administator to obtain new account approval.
. Man was born to think & to act, & Philosophy is made to regulate the understanding & the will of man: everything that deviates from this goal is frivolous.
Wow that is quite a non-Epicurean start, in my humble opinion! I have not had a chance to read the full article but I will. Thanks for posting this Charles because I think it is very helpful to post and go through as many of the older "encyclopedia" entries that we can find.
If I am delayed in responding to more posts in the next 24 hours or so don't be concerned:-) My area had a tornado come through with a wide power outage and I am having to ration my cell phone battery!
Edit: I first added this as a comment in the thread on Chapter 2, but I see it needs to be here on Chapter One more so than on Chapter two:
I now realize that part of what we may be observing here is that DeWitt wrote the early chapters, as he says, following the model of Epicurus himself, starting with a synopsis of the whole, at a higher level of outline, while reserving the details of his analysis for later chapters. So DeWitt's reasoning on "sound mind - sound body" takes place much later in the book, under Chapter TWELVE - "The New Hedonism" - rather than in the highest-level outline, which is Chapter One. He makes the assertion in Chapter one, but reserves the backup detail for Chapter twelve.
Rather than being a defect this is intentional and I think beneficial. The Epicurean model was to make sure that the final conclusions were not buried under mounds of notes and academic verbiage. You play fair with the reader by telling him very early where you are going. Then if the reader wants to stick around for the evidence that supports the detail, he can do so, but the primary outline of Epicurean philosophy is not buried under tons of words that only the hard-core academic is going to dig out. That's the way life is - we only get a short time to engage with any one person before they tend to move along to something else, so you need to tell them as quickly as possible what is important about the detail, so they can choose whether they want to pursue it.
So that's the most general answer to this comment:
Quote from Eugenios DeWitt's penchant for making assertions with no context or citations or context.
- Yes, I can see how what you observe in Chapter one could be confusing when contrasted with the academic approach, but this is the "multi-level outline" model as suggested by Epicurus himself in the letter to Herodotus:
But those also who have made considerable progress in the survey of the main principles ought to bear in mind the scheme of the whole system set forth in its essentials. For we have frequent need of the general view, but not so often of the detailed exposition. Indeed it is necessary to go back on the main principles, and constantly to fix in one’s memory enough to give one the most essential comprehension of the truth. And in fact the accurate knowledge of details will be fully discovered, if the general principles in the various departments are thoroughly grasped and borne in mind; for even in the case of one fully initiated the most essential feature in all accurate knowledge is the capacity to make a rapid use of observation and mental apprehension, and this can be done if everything is summed up in elementary principles and formulae. For it is not possible for anyone to abbreviate the complete course through the whole system, if he cannot embrace in his own mind by means of short formulae all that might be set out with accuracy in detail.
This is what I recall as to "sound mind in sound body" --
I now realize that part of what we may be observing here is that DeWitt wrote the early chapters, as he says, following the model of Epicurus himself, starting with a synopsis of the whole, at a higher level of outline, while reserving the details of his analysis for later chapters. So the quoted part takes place much later in the book, under Chapter TWELVE - "The New Hedonism" - rather than in the highest-level outline, chapter one.
Rather than being a defect this is intentional and I think beneficial. The Epicurean model was to make sure that the final conclusions were not buried under mounds of academic verbiage. You play fair with the reader by telling him very early where you are going. Then if the reader wants to stick around for the evidence that supports the detail, then he can do so, but the primary outline of Epicurean philosophy is not buried under tons of words that only the hard-core academic is going to dig out. That's the way life is - we only get a short time to engage with any one person before they tend to move along to something else, so you need to tell them as quickly as possible what is important about the detail, if they choose to pursue it.
So that's the most general answer to this comment:
DeWitt's penchant for making assertions with no context or citations or context.
- yes that's the "multi-level outline" model as suggested by Epicurus himself in the letter to Herodotus.
As far as Arnobius, Lactantius, and Augustine, I read the essence of the criticism to be that you are saying that DeWitt implies that they "had Epicurean affinities." I don't recall in my reading of DeWitt that this was confusing - everyone knows that the early "fathers" were bitter enemies of Epicurus, and Dewitt is just making the point that they sometimes expressed grudging respect for Epicurean social values. I did not come away from these references thinking that DeWitt was over the line or confusing the points, both of which (they were bitter enemies; they respected certain non-theological aspects) would appear to be true.
As far as a sound mind in sound body I thought I remember DeWitt saying explicitly that this phrasing does not occur, but that it is a logical implication of Epicurean philosophy, which it certainly seems to me to be. I wouldn't doubt also that Juvenal could sound Stoic, as I have not read him in detail, but I do not think that Juvenal's being of mixed mind would undercut DeWitt's point. Were it not for DeWitt stressing the differences between Epicurus and the Stoics, as he does throughout the book, many readers of Epicurus would be stuck in the modern "they're essentially the same" mindset.
As far as persuading "human nature" rather than nature" I recall that section being rather clear too, that he was making the point that Nature has no mind and is thus not something that can logically be persuaded, but that "human nature" is the sum of individual human minds and thus is the only logical meaning of a reference to "persuading."
-----
In general sum at the moment I do want to say that I do think it is great that you are writing up these concerns in detail and I think it will be a valuable contribution to address any and all of them, so thank you! By no means do I think that the DeWitt book is perfect so it is helpful to be able to discuss and look into all details. The value of the DeWitt book is not that it is perfect, but that it raises issues and arguments that are almost totally excluded from contemporary writing about Epicurus. We just have to read and judge for ourselves how much value those arguments have. As for me, they are hugely valuable, and made the difference between my writing off Epicurus as a passive decadent, as I read Nietzsche to have done, vs. reading him as a philosophical and social revolutionary, worthy of deep and extensive study, as DeWitt saw him. Quite possibly it depends on one's background as to how one reacts to DeWitt's interest in comparing Epicurus with Christianity. My personal background led me to find his "St Paul and Epicurus" very interesting and helpful, but ultimately the implications of Epicurus far transcend the issue of whether early Christians viewed Epicurus as an antichrist. On this I take the side I perceive DeWitt and Nietzsche both to be on, which is that Epicurus was aggressively battling in pre-existing forms the worst corruptions that plague human existence, and that it is the opposite of the truth to see Epicurus as essentially leading a bunch of elderly people in a nursing home justifying their having wasted their lives by fancying that they should be satisfied with a cave, bread, water, and a couple of friends (the modern non-DeWitt consensus).
The items I've found just through Chapter 2 give me pause and make me feel that I can't quite take what he writes at face value.
As general comments on all of the post, until I have time to come back to the details - it is certainly true that no reader should take any commentator on Epicurus at face value without reading into the details and judging for himself. The allusions to Christianity in DeWitt are a direction I personally would not have gone, but no one who understands Epicurus is going to be confused about Epicurus' attitude toward supernatural religion, which is the ultimate point. The references I remember from deWitt relate mainly to issues of social relationships and interactions and those strike me as at least partially true, but ultimately largely irrelevant to the big picture. The ultimate question in evaluating DeWitt is whether he gives the reader the broader understanding that people are just not going to get if they fixate on the ethics of "absence of pain" and ignore the rest of the philosophy and the history.
As to "enemy of religion" I would have to look at particular passages but as a general rule I think DeWitt was making an important point - the Epicureans viewed "religion" as differently as they viewed "gods" and within their context they were devoutly religious. We may have difficulty explaining that to modern ears but that's not necessarily a fault of the Epicureans.
As far as the comments on the missionary / evangelizing aspect, I find DeWitt's comments to be generally consistent with what I read in other commentators, as there seems to be a general consensus that Epicureans were very interested in spreading the word to others, not the least of the evidence in support of which appears to be the many books of Epicurus and Lucretius' poem itself. To me, it is natural that this perspective creates in the person who digs into it a desire to talk about it to others, obviously not indiscriminately, but to anyone you are seriously concerned about as a friend.
And as to Stoicism, I think DeWitt is primarily referring to it as an organized school consistent with the founding. Modern Stoics hardly deserve the name at all, and even Marcus Aurelius was a hodgepodge of conflicting ideas. In fairness to DeWitt I would interpret his comments as referring to the end of the organized school coinciding with the emergence of Christianity or whatever period seems consistent with the end of its pure form. As to Epicurean philosophy one could also take the position that the essence of Epicurus is found in the atomistic non-supernatural universe, which was not so amenable to being melded in with the emergence of Christianity. What came afterward in the vague adoption of "happiness" as the goal of life hardly deserves the name of Epicurean philosophy any more than does the modern version of Stoicism deserve the name Stoic.
Hello and welcome to the forum @moldovanyi !
This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.
Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.
All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.
One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.
In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.
It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.
And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.
Welcome to the forum!
1. No, you can't go back to reading De Rerum Natura until you're finished reading the Norman DeWitt book! 
2. Based on my limited knowledge of Buddhism I do see why you draw the similarities, which I recall doing in this podcast with Elayne. As more time goes by my perception is that the big point is not so much that there are technical similarities on these points as in the place where you end up after factoring in the details. My perception (unfair or fair as it might be) is that the Buddhists end up in a place of "Stoic-like" acceptance and resignation that becomes hard to distinguish from passivity and resignation. Whether this results from their conclusion being that they are somehow one with the universe and just want to accept their fate, or not, I leave to someone who knows better, but that is my perception of the demeanor and attitude that I associate with Buddhism.
And I see that same attitude in the "Tranquility" emphasis that some want to read in Epicurus. My own perception of Epicurus is that the tranquility angle is not correct, or at least it is by no means the majority, and that Epicurus meant what he said about (1) pleasure, and (2) the shortness of life, so that rather than passivity and resignation and acceptance of fate, an Epicurean will "seize the day" and make the best of the life that is available to him or her, seeking to fill the life that is available with the most pleasant experiences as they subjectively judge those to be valuable to them.
But I also think now that there is no way to dig in and then unravel these details without solid grounding in the physics, which if accepted totally disabuse one of any post-death existence, or any reason to live whatsoever but for pleasure, and someone who doesn't start with that orientation will happly sit round the campfire, arm in arm with a Stoic on one side and a Buddhist on the other chanting "cum-bay-ya my lord" til dawn. To each his own, but that is not how I want to spend *my* life, and I don't think that's what most ancient Epicureans understood the message to be either.
Thank you for listening and for the very helpful comments!
Episode 13 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In this episode, we discuss how Lucretius explains the Epicurean analysis of the things we experience as either being properties or qualities of the bodies that arise from combinations of atoms. We'll discuss how we use this knowledge to come to an understanding of how human experiences are subjective, while the atoms themselves exist independently of our experience. And we'll apply this perspective to analyzing how human events such as the Trojan War, no matter how significant, do not have an eternal separate existence of their own. We hope you will enjoy this episode and that you will leave us comments, suggestions and questions in the thread below.
A thorough review of all of Horace and Virgil would no doubt produce tremendous numbers of interesting and relevant quotes. Also, I know I have learned so much from reading the full "On Ends" by Cicero that I want to try to read as many of his works as possible. I wish my college reading in classics had been much better or I had a new lifetime to devote to it. Please be sure to post whatever you find.
Who is the translator, Joshua?
I don't often post screen clips from other locations, but I don't think this person participates here, and I have to preserve his comment along with my response:
There was a major disagreement between Epicurus and Aristotle/Plato as to the role of "reason" and "logic" in the determination of "truth."
This is described clearly in the following excerpt written by Phillip DeLacy in his book "Philodemus - On Methods of Inference." I have underlined in red the critical parts, in which DeLacy concludes that Aristotle held that "knowledge can be obtained only through a combination of observation and reason" and "inferences from signs are not reliable except in cases where the inferences may be converted into valid syllogisms."
Compare that to the position of Epicurus as stated by Diogenes Laertius, in which "reason" is not a part of the "Canon of truth," and "it is the reality of separate perceptions that guarantees the truth of our senses," as well as "For all our notions are derived from perceptions, either by actual contact or by analogy, or resemblance, or composition, with some slight aid from reasoning."
You can decide for yourself whether you agree with Epicurus and how to apply this distinction, but this difference in viewpoint has huge implications in seeing how far Epicurus diverged from the other Greek philosophers.
References:
Here is the appendix of Philodemus: On Methods of Inference by Phillip and Estelle De Lacy
Here is a direct link to its location in the PDF. The basic point De Lacy is making is that Aristotle (and even more strongly, Plato) held that "truth" can only be established "where the inferences may be converted into valid syllogisms." This leads to the conclusion that "knowledge can be obtained only through a combination of observation and reason.
But first before reading DeLacy remember the position of Epicurus, as stated by Diogenes Laertius, here in the RD Hicks translation, that "reason" is not a part of the canon of truth:
Now here is the De Lacy commentary on Aristotle, showing that reason/logic is essentially the ULTIMATE test of "truth":
I could have reviewed the text, but didn't.
And of course getting people interested in reviewing the text is ONE, but not the ONLY one, of the goals of the quiz. Lot's of balancing to do here; thanks for calling it to my attention.
Godfrey yes as to question 5, Episode two, I can see how that one is not so easy. I think that Elayne helps stress in that episode how the issue with Agamemnon's example is not "all child sacrifice is offensive" because that would be an absolute bright line that would imply an absolute morality. The issue is much more: "child sacrifice offends our feelings at least in most cases." That focuses on feeling as the root of Epicurean morality and gives us an emotional example that no matter how strong our feelings are in a particular situation, that never crosses over into a bright line that "all killing of children at all times for all reasons by all people in all places" is intrinsically "bad" or "evil."
And that is a huge point to be made and drilled in for a proper understanding of Epicurean ethics.
I can see that that one is difficult, especially given the way I wrote the option regarding Agamemnon. That's an example of how I will need to weigh and balance the purpose of the quiz and how easy we want scoring to be. I'll definitely mark that one as one to consider as we move forward.
Thanks for letting me know! Definitely the "which are not" are going to be more tricky. Let me look into the individual questions and also think about how "hard" they should be, our target audience, etc.
This is a thread for general discussion of the use and revisions to the quiz function of the forum. I would appreciate over time if people would let us know comments, questions, suggestions, etc, about this function. And here's one good use of this thread: I just recently added the first two quizzes for the Lucretius review. I checked the results and see this for the BOOK ONE PART ONE Quiz result:
Uh-oh, for Eugenios and Godfrey to get exactly the same 77.8 percent result, there must be a particular question or two that may be weirdly worded or even wrong. I am not sure that I have the ability to check individual test results to see what questions caused the issues. Can you guys let me know if I have a question or two you disagree with?
One of these days I will move these questions into a full-blown "Moodle" or similar computerized learning format, so anytime someone sees a particular question which could be improved, let me know.
1 - Wow that is great work on looking for appearances of the word eudaimonia. I know Elli and I have discussed this several times and I think that she largely feels the way you do about the word.
2 - My concern, or maybe better stated as lack of commitment to emphasizing that word, stems from the first point, which is the discussion of whether everyone can reach "the goal." Yes I very much agree with you that the Epicurean "way of life" is for everyone, and is at least in some sense achievable by everyone. The reason I hesitate to describe it as "reaching the goal" is the implication that has been drummed into us that there is a single goal or a single set of achievements in life that can be met by everyone. I am of course getting into the issue of all sorts of desirable things, such as long life, many friends, large family/circle, good health, etc etc that not everyone is going to succeed in doing. I would say that poor health or many other unfortunate circumstances do not prevent them from pursuing the same goal, and from in a strong sense achieving it by living prudently in the pursuit of pleasure, but I also think it's important to stress that those who do not have the most supportive circumstances should still follow Epicurean philosophy. Perhaps this is why Jefferson's phrase "pursuit of happiness" is in fact more sound than "happiness."
I feel sure that this understanding of "pursuit" was implicit in Epicurus and that you and he and I would agree on this.
Ha now I remember this point - that I also have an aversion to using untranslated Greek words as if there is no adequate English translation. Maybe I sound like Cicero here, but I think everyone must internalize the philosophy in their own language and understanding in order to be able to apply it properly, so I don't like to talk about a goal using a word that is meaningless or confusing to most people, especially since there is such debate over what the word means.
Epicurus saw eudaimonia as equivalent to leading a joyous, pleasant, and complete life
So that's why when I discuss the Epicurean goal of life I like to describe it as "a joyous, pleasant, and complete life" rather than as "eudaimonia" or having a good demon, or a good spirit
As usual I don't think we are very far apart at all, and I realize that my view here is just personal preference.
Welcome to Episode Fifteen of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, author of "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.
I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt. Find out more about the nature and goals of our podcast at Lucretiustoday.com, where you can download a copy of the text that we read from each week.
Remember that our home page is LucretiusToday.com, and there you can find a free copy of the version of the poem from which we are reading, and links to where you can discuss the poem between episodes at Epicureanfriends.com.
In today's episode we are going to take a break from reading our next passage from Lucretius, and Charles, Martin, and I will hold a brief general discussion on aspects of where we are in the reading so far.
Next week we will have more of our panelists back and we will continue in book one. In the meantime I hope you'll enjoy today's discussion.
Welcome to Episode Fourteen of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, author of "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.
I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt. Find out more about the nature and goals of our podcast at Lucretiustoday.com, where you can download a copy of the text that we read from each week.
In previous episodes we have discussed:
In Episode 14, we move to the argument that Atoms Are Solid And Indestructible, And Therefore Eternal, and By Means of These Living Things Continue Their Kind. Once again we continue to discuss how the atoms constitute the "seeds" of all things, and thus how the regularity we see around us occurs without the need for any supernatural forces to guide them.
Here is the text that will be covered in Episode Fourteen:
Review the prior sections of Book 1 of Daniel Browne by clicking here.
1743 Daniel Browne Edition (click link for English and Latin):
Lastly, bodies are either the first seeds of things, or formed by the uniting of those seeds. The simple seeds of things no force can strain, their solid parts will never be subdued. Though it is difficult, I own, to think that any thing in nature can be found perfectly solid; for heaven's thunder passes through the walls of houses, just as sound or words; iron in the fire grows hot, and burning stones fly into pieces by the raging heat; the stiffness of the gold is loosed by fire, and made to run; the hard and solid brass, subdued by flames, dissolves; the heat and piercing cold passes through silver; both of these we find as in our hand we hold a cup, and at the top pour water hot or cold: so nothing wholly solid seems to be found in nature. But because reason and the fixed state of things oblige me, hear, I beg, while in few verses we evince that there are beings that consist of solid and everlasting matter which we call the seeds, the first principles of things, from whence the whole of things begin to be.
And, first, because we find two sorts of things unlike in nature, in themselves distinct, body and space, 'tis necessary each should be entire, and separate in itself; for where there is a space which we call void, there nothing is of body; so were body is, there nothing is of empty space: and therefore such things are as solids and first seeds, which nothing in them can admit of void.
Besides, because in all created things there is a void, 'tis necessary some solid matter should still include this void; nor can you prove, by any rule of reason, that any thing contains within itself an empty space, unless you will allow what holds it in is perfect solid; and this is nothing else but the close union of the first seeds, which bind and do confine within themselves this void. Matter therefore composed of solid parts eternal is, when all things else must die.
Further, if there was no such thing as we call void, every thing would be solid; then again, unless there were some things solid to fill up the space they hold, all would be empty space. Body from space therefore is in itself distinct; for all is neither full, nor is all void; and therefore there are solid seeds which make a difference between full and space.
These solid seeds by no force from without can be dissolved, nor can they be destroyed by being pierced within, nor made to yield by any other means, as proved before. For nothing can be bruised without a void, or broken or by force be cleft in two, or receive moisture, or the piercing cold, or searching fire which all things else destroys. And the more of void the solid seeds confine, the sooner when they are struck will they dissolve and fall to pieces; therefore, if these first seeds are solid, free from void, they, as I said, must be eternal, and from death secure.
Again, if matter had not been eternal, long before now all beings had returned to nothing, and each being we behold again had been restored from nothing; but, as before I proved, nothing from nothing can be made, and what was once in being can never to nothing be reduced; it follows, those first seeds must be composed of principles immortal, into which at last each being must dissolve, and thence supply an everlasting stock of matter to repair the things decayed. These first seeds therefore are solid and simple, else they could not last entire through ages past and infinite, to repair beings perished and dissolved.
But still, if nature had prefixed no bounds in breaking things to pieces, the parts of matter, broken by every passing age, had been reduced so small that nothing could of them be formed that would in any time become mature; for things we see much sooner are dissolved than are again restored; and therefore what an infinite tract of ages past has broken, and separated and dissolved, in future time can never be repaired; so that certain bounds of breaking and dividing must be set, because we see each being is repaired, and stated times are fixed to ever thing in which it feels the flower of its age.
And yet, though the first seeds of things are solid, all beings that are compounded, such as air and water, earth and fire, may be soft, (however made, or by what power formed) and from them be produced, because there is a void still mixed with things; and, on the contrary, if these first seeds were soft, what reason can there be assigned whence hardened flints and iron could be formed, for nature would want the proper principles to work upon; and therefore these first seeds must simple solids be, by whose union close and compact all things are bound up firm, and so display their strength and hardy force.
Again, because each being in its kind has certain bounds prefixed to its increase, and to the preservation of its life, and since by nature's laws it is ordained to each how far their powers to act or not extend; since nothing changes, and every thing goes on as it began, each kind of birds, most steady in their course, shew the same colors painted on their wings, the principles of matter whence they spring must be fixed and unchangeable; if the seeds of things could change by any means, it would be unknown what could be formed, what not; by what means every being is limited, and stops short within the bounds it cannot break; nor could the course of time in every age, the nature, motion, diet, and the manners of the old sire impress upon the young.
[484] Bodies again are partly first-beginnings of things, partly those which are formed of a union of first beginnings. But those which are first-beginnings of things no force can quench: they are sure to have the better by their solid body. Although it seems difficult to believe that aught can be found among things with a solid body. For the lightning of heaven passes through the walls of houses, as well as noise and voices; iron grows red-hot in the fire and stones burn with fierce heat and burst asunder the hardness of gold is broken up and dissolved by heat; the ice of brass melts vanquished by the flame; warmth and piercing cold ooze through silver, since we have felt both, as we held cups with the hand indue fashion and the water was poured down into them. So universally there is found to be nothing solid in things. But yet because true reason and the nature of things constrains, attend until we make clear in a few verses that there are such things as consist of solid and everlasting body, which we teach are seeds of things and first-beginnings, out of which the whole sum of things which now exists has been produced.
[504] First of all then since there has been found to exist a two-fold and widely dissimilar nature of two things, that is to say of body and of place in which things severally go on, each of the two must exist for and by itself and quite unmixed. For wherever there is empty space which we call void, there body is not; wherever again body maintains itself, there empty void no wise exists. First bodies therefore are solid and without void.
[512] Again since there is void in things begotten, solid matter must exist about this void, and no thing can be proved by true reason to conceal in its body and have within it void, unless you choose to allow that that which holds it in is solid. Again that can be nothing but a union of matter which can keep in the void of things. Matter therefore, which consists of a solid body, may be everlasting, though all things else are dissolved.
[520] Moreover, if there were no empty void, the universe would be solid; unless on the other hand there were certain bodies to fill up whatever places they occupied, the existing universe would be empty and void space. Therefore sure enough body and void are marked off in alternate layers, since the universe is neither of a perfect fulness nor a perfect void. There are therefore certain bodies which can vary void space with full.
[525] These can neither be broken in pieces by the stroke of blows from without nor have their texture undone by aught piercing to their core nor give way before any other kind of assault; as we have proved to you a little before. For without void nothing seems to admit of being crushed in or broken up or split in two by cutting, or of taking in wet or permeating cold or penetrating fire, by which all things are destroyed. And the more anything contains within it of void, the more thoroughly it gives way to the assault of these things. Therefore if first bodies are as I have shown solid and without void, they must be everlasting.
[541] Again unless matter had been eternal, all things before this would have utterly returned to nothing and whatever things we see would have been born anew from nothing. But since I have proved above that nothing can be produced from nothing, and that what is begotten cannot be called to nothing, first-beginnings must be of an imperishable body, into which all things can be dissolved at their last hour, that there may be a supply of matter for the reproduction of things. Therefore first-beginnings are of solid singleness, and in no other way can they have been preserved through ages during infinite time past in order to reproduce things.
[552] Again if nature had set no limit to the breaking of things, by this time the bodies of matter would have been so far reduced by the breaking of past ages that nothing could within a fixed time be conceived out of them and reach its utmost growth of being. For we see that anything is more quickly destroyed than again renewed; and therefore that which the long, the infinite duration of all bygone time had broken up demolished and destroyed, could never be reproduced in all remaining time. But now sure enough a fixed limit to their breaking has been set, since we see each thing renewed, and at the same time definite periods fixed for things each after its kind to reach the flower of their age.
[566] Moreover while the bodies of matter are most solid, it may yet be explained in what way all things which are formed soft, as air water earth fires, are so formed and by what force they severally go on, since once for all there is void mixed up in things. But on the other hand if the first-beginnings of things be soft, it cannot be explained out of what enduring basalt and iron can be produced; for their whole nature will utterly lack a first foundation to begin with. First-beginnings therefore are strong in solid singleness, and by a denser combination of these all things can be closely packed and exhibit enduring strength.
Again if no limit has been set to the breaking of bodies, nevertheless the several bodies which go to things must survive from eternity up to the present time, not yet assailed by any danger. But since they are possessed of a frail nature, it is not consistent with this that they could have continued through eternity harassed through ages by countless blows.
[578] Again too since a limit of growing and sustaining life has been assigned to things each after its kind, and since by the laws of nature it stands decreed what they can each do and what they cannot do, and since nothing is changed, but all things are so constant that the different birds all in succession exhibit in their body the distinctive marks of their kind, they must sure enough have a body of unchangeable matter also. For if the first-beginnings of things could in any way be vanquished and changed, it would then be uncertain too what could and what could not rise into being, in short on what principle each thing has its powers defined, its deep-set boundary mark; nor could the generations reproduce so often each after its kind the nature habits, way of life and motions of the parents.
[484] Bodies, moreover, are in part the first-beginnings of things, in part those which are created by the union of first-beginnings. Now the true first-beginnings of things, no force can quench; for they by their solid body prevail in the end. Albeit it seems hard to believe that there can be found among things anything of solid body. For the thunderbolt of heaven passes through walled houses, as do shouts and cries; iron grows white hot in the flame, and stones seethe in fierce fire and leap asunder; then too the hardness of gold is relaxed and softened by heat, and the ice of brass yields beneath the flame and melts; warmth and piercing cold ooze through silver, since when we have held cups duly in our hands we have felt both alike, when the dewy moisture of water was poured in from above. So true is it that in things there is seen to be nothing solid. But yet because true reasoning and the nature of things constrain us, give heed, until in a few verses we set forth that there are things which exist with solid and everlasting body, which we show to be the seeds of things and their first-beginnings, out of which the whole sum of things now stands created.
[504] First, since we have found existing a twofold nature of things far differing, the nature of body and of space, in which all things take place, it must needs be that each exists alone by itself and unmixed. For wherever space lies empty, which we call the void, body is not there; moreover, wherever body has its station, there is by no means empty void. Therefore the first bodies are solid and free from void.
[512] Moreover, since there is void in things created, solid matter must needs stand all round, nor can anything by true reasoning be shown to hide void in its body and hold it within, except you grant that what keeps it in is solid. Now it can be nothing but a union of matter, which could keep in the void in things. Matter then, which exists with solid body, can be everlasting, when all else is dissolved.
[520] Next, if there were nothing which was empty and void, the whole would be solid; unless on the other hand there were bodies determined, to fill all the places that they held, the whole universe would be but empty void space. Body, then, we may be sure, is marked off from void turn and turn about, since there is neither a world utterly full nor yet quite empty. There are therefore bodies determined, such as can mark off void space from what is full.
[525] These cannot be broken up when hit by blows from without, nor again can they be pierced to the heart and undone, nor by any other way can they be assailed and made to totter; all of which I have above shown to you but a little while before. For it is clear that nothing could be crushed in without void, or broken or cleft in twain by cutting, nor admit moisture nor likewise spreading cold or piercing flame, whereby all things are brought to their end. And the more each thing keeps void within it, the more is it assailed to the heart by these things and begins to totter. Therefore, if the first bodies are solid and free from void, as I have shown, they must be everlasting.
[541] Moreover, if matter had not been everlasting, ere this all things had wholly passed away to nothing, and all that we see had been born again from nothing. But since I have shown above that nothing can be created from nothing, nor can what has been begotten be summoned back to nothing, the first-beginnings must needs be of immortal body, into which at their last day all things can be dissolved, that there may be matter enough for renewing things. Therefore the first-beginnings are of solid singleness, nor in any other way can they be preserved through the ages from infinite time now gone and renew things.
[552] Again, if nature had ordained no limit to the breaking of things, by now the bodies of matter would have been so far brought low by the breaking of ages past, that nothing could be conceived out of them within a fixed time, and pass on to the full measure of its life; for we see that anything you will is more easily broken up than put together again. Wherefore what the long limitless age of days, the age of all time that is gone by, had broken ere now, disordering and dissolving, could never be renewed in all time that remains. But as it is, a set limit to breaking has, we may be sure, been appointed, since we see each thing put together again, and at the same time fixed seasons ordained for all things after their kind, in the which they may be able to reach the flower of their life.
[566] There is this too that, though the first-bodies of matter are quite solid, yet we can give account of all the soft things that come to be, air, water, earth, fires, by what means they come to being, and by what force each goes on its way, when once void has been mingled in things. But on the other hand, if the first-beginnings of things were to be soft, it will not be possible to give account whence hard flints and iron can be created; for from the first all nature will lack a first-beginning of foundation. There are then bodies that prevail in their solid singleness, by whose more close-packed union all things can be riveted and reveal their stalwart strength. Moreover, if no limit has been appointed to the breaking of things, still it must needs be that all the bodies of things survive even now from time everlasting, such that they cannot yet have been assailed by any danger. But since they exist endowed with a frail nature, it is not in harmony with this that they have been able to abide for everlasting time harried through all the ages by countless blows.
[578] Once again, since there has been appointed for all things after their kind a limit of growing and of maintaining life, and inasmuch as it stands ordained what all things severally can do by the laws of nature, and what too they cannot, nor is anything so changed, but that all things stand so fast that the diverse birds all in their due order show that the marks of their kind are on their body, they must also, we may be sure, have a body of unchanging substance. For if the first-beginnings of things could be vanquished in any way and changed, then, too, would it be doubtful what might come to being, what might not, yea, in what way each thing has its power limited and its deepset boundary-stone, nor could the tribes each after their kind so often recall the nature, habits, manner of life and movements of the parents.
