Posts by Cassius

Excellent summary Charles!

Melkor the "ultimate" differences are probably much more in the "ethics" side of things than in the physics, so long as the physics interpretations remain vigorously non-supernatural.

It might be easiest to address your concerns if you have specific areas in mind (just as you mentioned the physics) but I think it is fair to say that we've tried to capture the most important issues in this article here:

Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean

In Elayne's article here there is more detail on the pleasure aspect: On Pain, Pleasure, and Happiness (07/15/19)

And I think you'll find that the issues that most frequently come to the surface in the ethics are represented by the view on pleasure, which is a matter discussed here: The Full Cup / Fullness of Pleasure Model

It's always interesting and educational for me to discuss this issue, because it does seem like it really isn't as mysterious or difficult to get a handle on as it might appear.

Lately, we've had some discussions that focus me in the direction of seeing that the issue of "happiness" is near to the center. Because the question is "What is happiness?" and what is the relationship of happiness to "virtue" and to "pleasure." Why did Diogenes of Oinoanda feel the need to SHOUT this formulation:

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into “what is the means of happiness?” and they wanted to say “the virtues” (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not “what is the means of happiness?” but “what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?,” I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.

I do not believe that this passage refers only to the issue of "virtue" but also to ambiguities in the use of the term "happiness" itself. The word "happiness" can mean just about anything to anyone, and is too high-level a concept to be used without explanation, which I think is what Diogenes in Oinoanda was exercised about.

If there is one reliable guide that has stood the test of time in my experience as the most reliable indicator of whether someone is really in tune with the ancient view of Epicurus, or whether that person is in danger of sliding down the slope into the abyss of "NeoEpicureanism" it is the issue of "pleasure." How frequently does the person refer to pleasure, how central a role does the person see "pleasure" to play in Epicurus, and how willing is the person to accept Epicurus' view that pleasure needs no definition, and means exactly what we think it means, and that it does NOT mean (in full) "absence of pain."

It's my experience and view that Issues of physics and other questions of "fact" about the workings of nature are ultimately resolvable in good faith so long as there is no opening of the door to supernaturalism. I recognize that there are differences of opinion on some epistemology issues (as to anticipations, and as to "dogmatism," which really revolves around our definitions of "truth" and "certainty" and things like "confidence.") But I think all of those are ultimately resolvable as we study the texts and keep in mind the limitations of "dialectical logic" and "reason abstracted away from the senses." I think most of us who get into Epicurus in the first place at lease sense where Epicurus was going in his attacks on Plato and abstract logic, so those issues are resolvable in virtually every case.

But the issue of "pleasure" can be significantly deeper. No doubt there are people who just want to avoid the issue, and use a generic word like "happiness" so as to appeal to wider numbers of people, and I understand and accept their motivation in at least certain circumstances. But there is a limit to what can be achieved to such approach, and the next level of understanding to me hinges on the issue that it is FEELING that is indeed at the center of human life. The issue is not really "types of pleasure" or even "how to achieve pleasures efficiently and safely." The issue really is that Feeling / Pleasure holds the place in Epicurean philosophy that supernatural gods hold in the field of religion, and that "logic" holds in the field of expert academia. The Epicurean Canon is not just a means of achieving the goals that are set by religion and logic, the Epicurean Canon is a FULL REPLACEMENT and FULL COMPETITOR to religion, and to "expert logic." I believe that many people who start out with Epicurus sense that this conflict exists and it is at the root of the controversies, but they are either unwilling to proceed to grapple with it, or else they abandon the field and decide that their flag is either religion or "logic" or some Aristotelian combination of the two.

I'll close for now by repeating that this is very important material to discuss and I hope you'll continue the thread with anything that seems worth discussing.

Quote from Charles

I'm still convinced of the rich history of French Materialism and its result in the complete revival of Epicurean Philosophy.

Unless there are British writers we just don't seem to know about, the French experience - though far from totally faithful to Epicurus - seems much more faithful than the British.

Those are very interesting quotes, Godfrey, thank you! He certainly is pretty far along the road of seeing pleasure very broadly, which I think is essential to interpreting Epicurus correctly. I just don't think he's on the right path however by trying to segment it into "lower" and "higher," and he ought to see that because he himself is talking about the consequences.

Yes indeed. The commentators I have seen discuss it presume that Cicero largely transcribed an existing Epicurean text, but that's very speculative, and even if he did transcribe one, there's no doubt (in my mind anyway) that he did so selectively.

Followup crossposting:

Elli:

"Duty or obligations" in certain emergencies... and that's how with these two words, as used by Torquatus, you can see some of the shades with some of the differences among the Romans and Hellenes

Of course, I fully trust the Roman Torquatus when he defends our philosophy to Cicero, and on what he said, but if he would be alive, I would like to ask him this : Why dear epicurean friend Torquatus to not use words such as "personal responsibility" which is extending to "social responsibility" in certain emergencies?

Words such as duty and obligation do not point out so much our power to do a constant measurement while we observe and examine the phenomena as they are proceeding and maybe the usage of such kind of words will lead us to a kind of necessity.

Cassius:

Elli I I wish we had more translations of On Ends to go by other than Rackham. I see that Rackham himself in another edition avoided the word "emergencies" and went with "circumstances."

In the point you raise I see the Latin is "officiis debitis" and the "officiis" is generally translated as "duties" (His De "Officiis" is generally translated "On Duty"). But I wonder if we really have the full sense of it as he intended, or just the stoicized oversimplification. In Cicero's own case it might be natural to suspect that "office" as in governmental office might be the more natural implication. And of course we have this through Cicero so it's hard to say whether his Epicurean contemporaries would have used that term or not. Another thought: I have a lot more trouble with "duty" than I do with "obligations." Though they are pretty close, at least the way we use them today "obligations" alone seems a little more oriented toward things that result from our own actions, while "duty" still has the stoicized sense of obligations to god or morality or to other aspects of "fate" which cross over a line toward religion.

Elli:

Maybe Torquatus, addressed to Cicero says : The so-called by you (i.e. the platonists and stoics) such as duty or obligations. And here. maybe,Torquatus did a kind of compromisation and used " the nice to ears" words for being more understandable to Cicero. Because Cicero does not understand the "swerve", the usage of the Canon, and its criteria of truth. For Cicero virtue was the goal and at the same time, this was his blindness to not understand what Epicurus with his philosophy proclaims.

Cassius:

Yes I agree Elli. The foundation of the analysis here is that in times when nothing prevents us from being able to do what we like best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every pain avoided. But when the times DO prevent us from being able to do what we like best, then we will have to defer or even repudiate certain pleasures while we embrace things that we find painful, always in the service of looking to the full and complete ramifications of our choices. And that means not just long range vs short range (the time question) but also what we value the most or the best, which is independent of time, as in the example of where we will sometimes give our life for a friend. It's this last part that people seem to struggle with, because they infer that we are talking about "sensual-bodily" pleasures alone, while Epicurus specifically held that mental pleasures, which come in a boundless variety of mental / emotional forms (such as our pleasures of friendship for which we may even give our own life as per the example) are frequently more significant than bodily ones..

So the Epicurean analysis is not primarily some Stoic-like (or dare I say "British like") "grin and bear it" or "keep a stiff upper lip," but a full analysis of the entire situation. And the full analysis is performed and geared toward taking whatever **action** is required in pursuit of the ultimate end, which is not the suppression of emotion and sensation, but the best "enjoyment" or emotion and all other sensations, whether bodily or mental during whatever time is available to us. Sometimes "grinning and bearing" or "keeping that stiff upper lip" will be helpful toward that goal, and sometime it will be positively the worst thing you can do. Only someone who rejects the Epicurean view of the universe is going to get confused and think that the choice in that regard is *always* the same.

Elli:

I would like to add again in our discussion, this excerpt from the book of Dimitris Liantinis entitled “Stoa & Rome".

The three sections of the Stoa is Physics, Logic, and Ethics. But the core of their system is the moral act. The stoic basically is the team member, the part of the organization, the man of indoctrination. The moral imperative is his main instrument: the currency of the transactions. For this reason, the most important concept-word, created by the Stoa, is the word DUTY and to its roman extension is OFFICIUM.

The obligation (kathekon=duty) to act for this reason, and not otherwise, for this reason, is the big light that illuminates all the shadows and the colonnades of the Stoa. It appears immediately and remotely that the two main features of the stoicism : it is a system and that is moral: and it denounced as an invention rather than PURELY Greek.

For the Stoics, apathy means more than temper or neutrality or amethexia. Apathy means stopping to have passions because you uproot them. You decapitate their animal gushing and then you burn the root of the wound, as Iolaus burned heads of Lernea Hydra. And at this point, the Stoa is from classical ethics of Greeks, as the NEARBY is from the DISTANT. Since the Greeks built their Cosmotheasis and culture on their passions and then educated them with their prudence. All the evidence is on their Attic tragedy.

Because...what is the man without his passions? Without his passions, man is like a lame runner and an athlete discobolus without hands. It is like Cicero without tongue, a sailor without the sea, and a eunuch stallion. Our passions rouse us for the great things of the creation. For create the doll as a woman and the bridge as a passage, and the monk as Papaflessas (*)…]

(*) Papaflessas was a monk who fought in the greek revolution of 1821 against the Ottoman empire.

I too am thinking that just diving into his writings may be good enough as a start, especially ON ENDS, which I find extremely helpful to the big picture of the philosophical conflicts as of Cicero's time. Probably those philosophical works can best be read before reading a biography, but I am thinking that diving into the letters would be best done after at least some introduction to a "Major Events In the Life of CIcero" timeline of some kind.

In discussing Epicurean reactions to emergencies like the Coronavirus episode, it is helpful to refer to reliable Epicurean texts where emergencies in general are discussed in ethical terms. Here is one of the most memorable, from the Torquatus narrative of Epicurean Ethics in "On Ends," this version as translated in the 1931 Loeb edition by H. Rackham.

Full text here: https://archive.org/details/defini…age/36/mode/2up

IF you figure it out please let me know as i have the same issue. I highly recommend the ENTIRE book of 'on ends' in terms of philosophy, but i don't have a broad grounding like I would like. At one time I even bought the Taylor Caldwell "Pillar of Iron" which I understand to be sort of a biography, but I did not very far in it. I am beginning to think that it is going to be necessary just to start to read through his letters, but no doubt a biography which can relate the details to the wider scheme of events would give essential perspective.

Thank you Eugenios!

In this week's episode we are talking about Heraclitus and the error of thinking that all things are made of fire. This probably relates as well to the issue of the Stoics thinking that everything is "divine fire."

This texts contains the memorable line:

Quote

For fools laud and love all things more which they can descry hidden beneath twisted sayings, and they set up for true what can tickle the ear with a pretty sound and is tricked out with a smart ring.

If anyone has particular thoughts to be sure we cover in discussing this text, please be sure to post them so they can be incorporated into the episode.

Welcome to Episode Seventeen of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who lived in the age of Julius Caesar and wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

Before we start with today's episode let me remind you of our three ground rules.

First: Our aim is to go back to the original text to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, not simply repeat for you what modern commentators teach about it today.

Second: We won't be talking about modern political issues in this podcast. Epicurean philosophy is very different from Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, and Marxism - it must be understood on its own, not in terms of any conventional modern morality.

Third: The physics presented by Lucretius is the essential base of Epicurean philosophy. When you study this, you will see that Epicurus taught neither luxury nor minimalism, but that feeling - pleasure and pain - are the guides that Nature gave us to live by rather than supernatural gods, idealism, or virtue ethics. More than anything else, Epicurus taught that there is nothing supernatural whatsoever, and that means there's no life after death, and any happiness we will ever have must come in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Remember that our home page is LucretiusToday.com, and there you can find a free copy of the versions of the poem we are reading.

In this Episode 17, we will discuss how All things are not made of a single element, such as fire, contrary to what some philosophers asserted - such as Heraclitus, who held all things are made of fire.

Now let's join the discussion with Elayne reading today's text.

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Note: In previous episodes we have discussed:

• (1) Venus / Pleasure As Guide of Life: That Pleasure, using the allegory of Venus, is the driving force of all life; That the way to rid ourselves of pain is to replace pain with pleasure, using the allegory of Venus entertaining Mars, the god of war;

• (2) The Achievement of Epicurus: That Epicurus was the great philosophic leader who stood up to supernatural religion, opened the gates to a proper understanding of nature, and thereby showed us how we too can emulate the life of gods;
• (3-4) So Great Is The Power of Religion To Inspire Evil Deeds! That it is not Epicurean philosophy, but supernatural religion, which is truly unholy and prompts men to commit evil deeds;
• (5) On Resisting The Threats of Priests And Poets: That false priests and philosophers will try to scare you away from Epicurean philosophy with threats of punishment after death, which is why you must understand that those threats cannot be true; That the key to freeing yourself from false religion and false philosophy is found in the study of nature;
• (6-7) Step One: Nothing Comes From Nothing. The first major observation which underlies all the rest of Epicurean philosophy is that we observe that nothing is ever generated from nothing.
• (8) Step Two: Nothing Goes To Nothing. The second major observation is that nothing is ever destroyed completely to nothing.
• (9) The Evidence That Atoms Exist, Even Though They Are Unseen. The next observation is that we know elemental particles exist, even though we cannot see them just like we know that wind and other things exist by observing their effects.
• (10-11) The Void And Its Nature. We also know that the void exists, because things must have space in which to move, as we see they do move.
• (12) Everything We Experience Is Composed Of A Combination of Matter And Void. Everything around us that we experience is a natural combination of atoms and void.
• (13) The Things We Experience Are Properties and Qualities Of Atoms And Void And Cease To Exist When Their Atoms Disperse. All things we experience around us are either (1) the properties (essential conjuncts; essential and unchanging) or qualities (events; inessential and changing depending on context) of bodies. All these arise from the nature, movement, and combinations of the atoms, and cease to exist when the atoms which compose the bodies disperse. Therefore it is incorrect to think that ideas or stories such as that of the Trojan war have any permanent existence.
• (14-15) Atoms Are Solid And Indestructible, And Therefore Eternal. The argument that atoms are solid and indestructible and therefore eternal.
• (16) The Atoms Are Never Destroyed, they Provide Continuity To All Nature, and there is a strict limit on Divisibility of All Things.

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Here is the text that will be covered in Episode Sixteen. The Latin version of Book One has this as beginning at approximately line 625 of the Daniel Brown Edition and of the Munro Latin Edition here. 

There are a total of about 1115 lines in book one, so we approximately halfway through.

Daniel Brown 1743 Edition:

[621] Lastly, if nature, parent of things, had not compelled all things that perish then to be resolved into least parts, she could from them repair nothing that dies; for bodies that are formed of various parts can never be endued with properties, which the first seeds of things ought to possess, as union, weight, and force, agreement, motion, by which all things act.

[627] And yet, suppose that nature had allowed no end to bodies being divided, yet some bodies from eternity must have been, which by no force could ever be subdued. But bodies that are formed of brittle seeds, and to be broken, could not have remained for ages infinite, vexed as they have been with endless blows, but must have been dissolved.

[635] Wherefore, those sages who have thought that fire is the first principle of things, and from that alone the whole is formed, do greatly err from the true rule of reason. The champion of these, Heraclitus, enters first the lists, more famed for dark expression among empty Greeks than with the wise, who search for truth; for none but fools admire, and love what they see couched in words abstruse; and that they take for truth which quaintly moves the ear, and painted over effects by witty jingling of the sound.

[646] For how such various beings could arise, I ask, if formed from pure and real fire? To say, that the hot fire is now condensed, and sometimes rarified, would nought avail; the several parts must still retain the nature of fire, the same which the fire had when whole; the heat would be more fierce, the parts condensed, more languid when divided and made rare. There's nothing more than this you can derive from causes such as these; much less so great variety of things can be produced from fire or flame, condensed or made rare.

[656] Indeed, would they admit in things a void, fire then might be condensed or rarified; but this, because it contradicts their other schemes, they murmur at, and will allow in things no empty space: So, while they fear to grant this difficult truth, they lose the way that's right, nor do they see, by not allowing there is in things a void, all bodies would be dense, and out of all one only would be made, which could by force emit nothing without itself, as the hot fire emits both light and heat, which shews it is not composed of crowded parts, without a void.

[666] But if they think that a fire in all its parts may be extinguished, and so its body change; if they insist that this may once be done, then the whole fire must be resolved to nothing, and things new-form from nothing must arise; for whatsoever is changed, and breaks the bounds of its first nature, dies, and is no more what must still remain whole and unhurt, lest things to nothing should perfectly return; and then revive, and should again from nothing be restored.

[676] But now, since there remain some certain seeds that keep their nature still the same, whose absence or their presence, and their change of order change the nature of compound bodies, you must not think that these first seeds are fiery; if they were, what would it signify what seeds are absent, or what retire, what others take their place, how others may their rank and order change, since all would still be in their nature fire, and beings formed from them must wholly be of fire? But, as I think, the case is thus: some certain seeds there are by whose concussion, motion, order, site, and figure, fire is formed; and when their order is changed, they change the nature of this fire; but these first seeds have nothing fiery in themselves, nor of such a nature are they as to send forth bodies to be perceived by sense, or be the object of our touch.

[691] And now to say that every thing is fire, and no true thing in nature does exist but fire, as this man does, is madness all; he contradicts his senses by his sense, and overthrows those tests of truth by which all things are known: for 'tis by them we know what thing which he calls fire, and this sense concludes, it truly knows the nature of this fire; but then all other things it will deny, which equally are true. This is to me a vain and foolish way to judge; for to what shall we apply? And what can be more sure than our senses to us, by which we fully know falsehood and truth?

[702] Besides, why any one should all things else disclaim, and only fire allow, or say there's no such thing as fire, and all things else allow, either of this is in vain, and equal madness to believe.

[706] Wherefore, those sages who contend that fire is the first principle, and that of fire all things consist, and those who make he air the first seeds of bodies, and such who lay the water is the sole cause of beings, or that the Earth all things creates, and can infuse itself into the nature of all things, do strangely err, and wander wide from the truth.

Munro:

[621] Once more, if nature, creatress of things, had been wont to compel all things to be broken up into least parts, then too she would be unable to reproduce anything out of those parts, because those things which are enriched with no parts cannot have the properties which begetting matter ought to have, I mean the various entanglements, weights, blows, clashings, motions, by means of which things severally go on.

[635] For which reasons they who have held fire to be the matter of things and the sum to be formed out of fire alone, are seen to have strayed most widely from true reason.At the head of whom enters Heraclitus to do battle, famous for obscurity more among the frivolous than the earnest Greeks who seek the truth. For fools admire and like all things the more which they perceive to be concealed under involved language, and determine things to be true which can prettily tickle the ears and are varnished over with finely sounding phrase.

[646] For I want to know how things can be so various, if they are formed out of fire one and unmixed: it would avail nothing for hot fire to be condensed or rarefied, if the same nature which the whole fire has belonged to the parts of fire as well. The heat would be more intense by compression of parts, more faint by their severance and dispersion. More than this you cannot think it in the power of such causes to effect, far less could so great a diversity of things come from mere density and rarity of fires.

[656] Observe also, if they suppose void to be mixed up in things, fire may then be condensed and left rare; but because they see many things rise up in contradiction to them and shrink from leaving unmixed void in things, fearing the steep, they lose the true road, and do not perceive on the other hand that if void is taken from things, all things are condensed and, out of all things is formed one single body, which cannot briskly radiate anything from it, in the way heat-giving fire emits light and warmth, letting you see that it is not of closely compressed parts.

[666] But if they haply think that in some other way fires maybe quenched in the union and change their body, you are to know that if they shall scruple on no side to do this, all heat sure enough will be utterly brought to nothing, and all things that are produced will be formed out of nothing. For whenever a thing changes and quits its proper limits, at once this change of state is the death of that which was before.

[676] Therefore something or other must needs be left to those fires of theirs undestroyed, that you may not have all things absolutely returning to nothing, and the whole store of things born anew and flourishing out of nothing. Since then in fact there are some most unquestionable bodies which always preserve the same nature, on whose going or coming and change of order things change their nature and bodies are transformed, you are to know that these first bodies of things are not of fire.For it would matter nothing that some should withdraw and go away and others should be added on and some should have their order changed, if one and all they yet retained the nature of heat; for whatever they produced would be altogether fire. But thus methinks it is: there are certain bodies whose clashings, motions, order, position, and shapes produce fires, and which by a change of, order change the nature of the things and do not resemble fire nor anything else which has the power of sending bodies to our senses and touching by its contact our sense of touch.

[691] Again to say that all things are fire and that no real thing except fire exists in the number of things, as this same man does, appears to be sheer dotage.For he himself takes his stand on the side of the senses to fight against the senses and shakes their authority, on which rests all our belief, ay from which this fire as he calls it is known to himself; for he believes that the senses can truly perceive fire, he does not believe they can perceive all other things which are not a whit less clear.Now this appears to me to be as false as it is foolish; for to what shall we appeal? What surer test can we have than the senses, whereby to note truth and falsehood?

[702] Again why should any one rather abolish all things and choose to leave the single nature of heat, than deny that fires exist, while he allows any thing else to be? It seems to be equal madness to affirm either this or that.

[706] For these reasons they who have held that fire is the matter of things and that the sum can be formed out of fire, and they who have determined air to be the first-beginning in begetting things, and all who have held that water by itself alone forms things, or that earth produces all things and changes into all the different natures of things, appear to have strayed exceedingly wide of the truth;

Bailey:

[621] And again, if nature, the creatress, had been used to constrain all things to be dissolved into their least parts, then she could not again renew aught of them, for the reason that things which are not enlarged by any parts, have not those powers which must belong to creative matter, the diverse fastenings, weights, blows, meetings, movements, by which all things are carried on.

[635] Wherefore those who have thought that fire is the substance of things, and that the whole sum is composed of fire alone, are seen to fall very far from true reasoning. Heraclitus is their leader who first enters the fray, of bright fame for his dark sayings, yet rather among the empty-headed than among the Greeks of weight, who seek after the truth. For fools laud and love all things more which they can descry hidden beneath twisted sayings, and they set up for true what can tickle the ear with a pretty sound and is tricked out with a smart ring.

[646] For I am eager to know how things could be so diverse, if they are created of fire alone and unmixed. For it would be of no avail that hot fire should condense or grow rare, if the parts of fire had the same nature which the whole sum of fire has as well. For fiercer would be the flame, if the parts were drawn together, and weaker again, were they sundered and scattered. But further than this there is nothing which you can think might come to pass from such a cause, far less might the great diversity of things come from fires condensed and rare.

[656] This too there is: if they were to hold that void is mingled in things, the fires will be able to condense or be left rare. But because they see many things to thwart them, they hold their peace and shrink from allowing void unmixed among things; while they fear the heights, they lose the true track, nor again do they perceive that, if void be removed from things, all things must condense and be made one body out of many, such as could not send out anything from it in hot haste; even as fire that brings warmth casts abroad light and heat, so that you may see that it has not parts close-packed.

[666] But if perchance they believe that in some other way fires may be quenched in union and alter their substance, in very truth if they do not spare to do this at any point, then, we may be sure, all heat will perish utterly to nothing, and all things created will come to be out of nothing. For whenever a thing changes and passes out of its own limits, straightway this is the death of that which was before. Indeed something must needs be left untouched to those fires, lest you find all things returning utterly to nothing, and the store of things born again and growing strong out of nothing.

[676] As it is then, since there are certain bodies most determined which keep nature safe ever the same, through whose coming and going and shifting order things change their nature and bodies are altered, you can be sure that these first-bodies of things are not of fire. For it would be no matter that some should give place and pass away, and others be added, and some changed in order, if despite this all retained the nature of heat; for whatever they might create would be in every way fire. But, I trow, the truth is this; there are certain bodies, whose meetings, movements, order, position, and shapes make fires, and when their order changes, they change their nature, and they are not made like to fire nor to any other thing either, which is able to send off bodies to our senses and touch by collision our sense of touch.

[691] Moreover, to say that fire is all things, and that there is no other real thing in the whole count of things, but only fire, as this same Heraclitus does, seems to be raving frenzy. For on behalf of the senses he fights himself against the senses, and undermines those on which all that he believes must hang, whereby he himself has come to know that which he names fire. For he believes that the senses can know fire aright, but not all other things, which are no whit less bright to see. And this seems to me alike idle and frenzied. For to what shall we appeal? What can be surer for us than the senses themselves, whereby we may mark off things true and false?

[702] Besides, why should any one rather annul all things, and wish to leave only the nature of heat, than deny that fire exists, and grant in its stead that another nature exists? For it seems equal madness to say the one or the other.

[706] Wherefore those who have thought that fire is the substance of things, and that the whole sum may be built of fire, and those who have set up air as the first-beginning for the begetting of things, or again all who have thought that moisture fashions things alone by itself, or that earth creates all and passes into all the natures of things, seem to have strayed very far away from the truth.

Episode 16 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In this episode, we discuss the indestructibility of atoms and how they provide continuity to nature. In the second half of this episode, we revisit the subject of Epicurean gods, and discuss how the "Organians" in the episode "Errand of Mercy" from the Star Trek original series may provide a useful analogy to thinking about the non-supernatural Epicurean "gods." As always we invite you to leave us your comments and suggestions in the thread below.

Episode 15 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. We hope you will enjoy this episode and that you will leave us comments, suggestions and questions in the thread below.

Welcome to Episode Sixteen of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who lived in the age of Julius Caesar and wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

Before we start with today's episode let me remind you of our three ground rules.

First: Our aim is to go back to the original text to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, not simply repeat for you what modern commentators teach about it today.

Second: We won't be talking about modern political issues in this podcast. Epicurean philosophy is very different from Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, and Marxism - it must be understood on its own, not in terms of any conventional modern morality.

Third: The physics presented by Lucretius is the essential base of Epicurean philosophy. When you study this, you will see that Epicurus taught neither luxury nor minimalism, but that feeling - pleasure and pain - are the guides that Nature gave us to live by rather than supernatural gods, idealism, or virtue ethics. More than anything else, Epicurus taught that there is nothing supernatural whatsoever, and that means there's no life after death, and any happiness we will ever have must come in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Remember that our home page is LucretiusToday.com, and there you can find a free copy of the versions of the poem we are reading.

In this Episode 16, we will discuss how The Atoms Are Never Destroyed, that the Atoms Provide Continuity To All Nature, and that there is a strict limit on Divisibility of All Things.

Now let's join the discussion with Martin reading today's text.

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Note: In previous episodes we have discussed:

• (1) Venus / Pleasure As Guide of Life: That Pleasure, using the allegory of Venus, is the driving force of all life; That the way to rid ourselves of pain is to replace pain with pleasure, using the allegory of Venus entertaining Mars, the god of war;

• (2) The Achievement of Epicurus: That Epicurus was the great philosophic leader who stood up to supernatural religion, opened the gates to a proper understanding of nature, and thereby showed us how we too can emulate the life of gods;
• (3-4) So Great Is The Power of Religion To Inspire Evil Deeds! That it is not Epicurean philosophy, but supernatural religion, which is truly unholy and prompts men to commit evil deeds;
• (5) On Resisting The Threats of Priests And Poets: That false priests and philosophers will try to scare you away from Epicurean philosophy with threats of punishment after death, which is why you must understand that those threats cannot be true; That the key to freeing yourself from false religion and false philosophy is found in the study of nature;
• (6-7) Step One: Nothing Comes From Nothing. The first major observation which underlies all the rest of Epicurean philosophy is that we observe that nothing is ever generated from nothing.
• (8) Step Two: Nothing Goes To Nothing. The second major observation is that nothing is ever destroyed completely to nothing.
• (9) The Evidence That Atoms Exist, Even Though They Are Unseen. The next observation is that we know elemental particles exist, even though we cannot see them just like we know that wind and other things exist by observing their effects.
• (10-11) The Void And Its Nature. We also know that the void exists, because things must have space in which to move, as we see they do move.
• (12) Everything We Experience Is Composed Of A Combination of Matter And Void. Everything around us that we experience is a natural combination of atoms and void.
• (13) The Things We Experience Are Properties and Qualities Of Atoms And Void And Cease To Exist When Their Atoms Disperse. All things we experience around us are either (1) the properties (essential conjuncts; essential and unchanging) or qualities (events; inessential and changing depending on context) of bodies. All these arise from the nature, movement, and combinations of the atoms, and cease to exist when the atoms which compose the bodies disperse. Therefore it is incorrect to think that ideas or stories such as that of the Trojan war have any permanent existence.
• (14-15) Atoms Are Solid And Indestructible, And Therefore Eternal. The argument that atoms are solid and indestructible and therefore eternal.

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Here is the text that will be covered in Episode Sixteen. The Latin version of Book One has this as beginning at approximately line 550 of the Daniel Brown Edition and of the Munro Latin Edition here. 

There are a total of about 1115 lines in book one, so we approximately halfway through.

Daniel Brown 1743 Edition:

But still, if nature had prefixed no bounds in breaking things to pieces, the parts of matter, broken by every passing age, had been reduced so small that nothing could of them be formed that would in any time become mature; for things we see much sooner are dissolved than are again restored; and therefore what an infinite tract of ages past has broken, and separated and dissolved, in future time can never be repaired; so that certain bounds of breaking and dividing must be set, because we see each being is repaired, and stated times are fixed to every thing in which it feels the flower of its age.

And yet, though the first seeds of things are solid, all beings that are compounded, such as air and water, earth and fire, may be soft, (however made, or by what power formed) and from them be produced, because there is a void still mixed with things; and, on the contrary, if these first seeds were soft, what reason can there be assigned whence hardened flints and iron could be formed, for nature would want the proper principles to work upon; and therefore these first seeds must simple solids be, by whose union close and compact all things are bound up firm, and so display their strength and hardy force.

Again, because each being in its kind has certain bounds prefixed to its increase, and to the preservation of its life, and since by nature's laws it is ordained to each how far their powers to act or not extend; since nothing changes, and every thing goes on as it began, each kind of birds, most steady in their course, shew the same colors painted on their wings, the principles of matter whence they spring must be fixed and unchangeable; if the seeds of things could change by any means, it would be unknown what could be formed, what not; by what means every being is limited, and stops short within the bounds it cannot break; nor could the course of time in every age, the nature, motion, diet, and the manners of the old sire impress upon the young.

Besides, because the utmost point or the extreme of every body something is the eye cannot discern, it is not made of parts, but is in nature what we call the least; which never exists of itself, divided from body, nor ever can, because it is the very first and last of something else. For 'tis by heaping up such parts as these, one by another, that complete the being of every body. Since then they can't subsist apart, and separate, they must needs stick close, nor be divided by the utmost force. These seeds therefore are in their nature solid, and simple, formed of smallest parts bound close; not tied together by united seeds of various kinds, but in themselves entire, eternally unmixed and pure, from which nature will suffer nothing to be forced or lessened, reserving them as first seeds, to form and to repair those things that die.

Again, suppose there was no least, the smallest bodies must be composed of parts boundless and infinite; the half of every being must then contain another half, so there would be no end of still dividing; and where would be the difference between the smallest and the largest bodies? None in the least; for though the whole be entirely infinite, yet bodies that are smallest would contain infinite parts alike, which, since true reason exclaims against, nor will allow the mind to give assent, you must, convinced, profess that there are bodies which are void of parts, and are by nature least; since such there are, you must admit them solid and eternal.

Munro:

[552] Again if nature had set no limit to the breaking of things, by this time the bodies of matter would have been so far reduced by the breaking of past ages that nothing could within a fixed time be conceived out of them and reach its utmost growth of being. For we see that anything is more quickly destroyed than again renewed; and therefore that which the long, the infinite duration of all bygone time had broken up demolished and destroyed, could never be reproduced in all remaining time. But now sure enough a fixed limit to their breaking has been set, since we see each thing renewed, and at the same time definite periods fixed for things each after its kind to reach the flower of their age.

[566] Moreover while the bodies of matter are most solid, it may yet be explained in what way all things which are formed soft, as air water earth fires, are so formed and by what force they severally go on, since once for all there is void mixed up in things. But on the other hand if the first-beginnings of things be soft, it cannot be explained out of what enduring basalt and iron can be produced; for their whole nature will utterly lack a first foundation to begin with. First-beginnings therefore are strong in solid singleness, and by a denser combination of these all things can be closely packed and exhibit enduring strength.

[?] Again if no limit has been set to the breaking of bodies, nevertheless the several bodies which go to things must survive from eternity up to the present time, not yet assailed by any danger. But since they are possessed of a frail nature, it is not consistent with this that they could have continued through eternity harassed through ages by countless blows.

[578] Again too since a limit of growing and sustaining life has been assigned to things each after its kind, and since by the laws of nature it stands decreed what they can each do and what they cannot do, and since nothing is changed, but all things are so constant that the different birds all in succession exhibit in their body the distinctive marks of their kind, they must sure enough have a body of unchangeable matter also. For if the first-beginnings of things could in any way be vanquished and changed, it would then be uncertain too what could and what could not rise into being, in short on what principle each thing has its powers defined, its deep-set boundary mark; nor could the generations reproduce so often each after its kind the nature habits, way of life and motions of the parents.

[593] Then again since there is ever a bounding point [to bodies, which appears to us to be a least, there ought in the same way to be a bounding point the least conceivable to that first body] which already is beyond what our senses can perceive: that point sure enough is without parts and consists of a least nature and never has existed apart by itself and will not be able in future so to exist, since it is in itself a part of that other; and so a first and single part and then other and other similar parts in succession fill up in close serried mass the nature of the first body; and since these cannot exist by themselves, they must cleave to that from which they cannot in any way be torn.

First-beginnings therefore are of solid singleness, massed together and cohering closely by means of least parts, not compounded out of a union of those parts, but, rather, strong in everlasting singleness.

From them nature allows nothing to be torn, nothing further to be worn away, reserving them as seeds for things.

[609] Again unless there shall be a least, the very smallest bodies will consist of infinite parts, inasmuch as the half of the half will always have a half and nothing will set bounds to the division.Therefore between the sum of things and the least of things what difference will there be? There will be no distinction at all; for how absolutely infinite soever the whole sum is, yet the things which are smallest will equally consist of infinite parts. Now since on this head true reason protests and denies that the mind can believe it, you must yield and admit that there exist such things as are possessed of no parts and are of a least nature. And since these exist, those first bodies also you must admit to be solid and everlasting.

Bailey:

Again, if nature had ordained no limit to the breaking of things, by now the bodies of matter would have been so far brought low by the breaking of ages past, that nothing could be conceived out of them within a fixed time, and pass on to the full measure of its life; for we see that anything you will is more easily broken up than put together again. Wherefore what the long limitless age of days, the age of all time that is gone by, had broken ere now, disordering and dissolving, could never be renewed in all time that remains. But as it is, a set limit to breaking has, we may be sure, been appointed, since we see each thing put together again, and at the same time fixed seasons ordained for all things after their kind, in the which they may be able to reach the flower of their life.

[566] There is this too that, though the first-bodies of matter are quite solid, yet we can give account of all the soft things that come to be, air, water, earth, fires, by what means they come to being, and by what force each goes on its way, when once void has been mingled in things. But on the other hand, if the first-beginnings of things were to be soft, it will not be possible to give account whence hard flints and iron can be created; for from the first all nature will lack a first-beginning of foundation. There are then bodies that prevail in their solid singleness, by whose more close-packed union all things can be riveted and reveal their stalwart strength. Moreover, if no limit has been appointed to the breaking of things, still it must needs be that all the bodies of things survive even now from time everlasting, such that they cannot yet have been assailed by any danger. But since they exist endowed with a frail nature, it is not in harmony with this that they have been able to abide for everlasting time harried through all the ages by countless blows.

[578] Once again, since there has been appointed for all things after their kind a limit of growing and of maintaining life, and inasmuch as it stands ordained what all things severally can do by the laws of nature, and what too they cannot, nor is anything so changed, but that all things stand so fast that the diverse birds all in their due order show that the marks of their kind are on their body, they must also, we may be sure, have a body of unchanging substance. For if the first-beginnings of things could be vanquished in any way and changed, then, too, would it be doubtful what might come to being, what might not, yea, in what way each thing has its power limited and its deepset boundary-stone, nor could the tribes each after their kind so often recall the nature, habits, manner of life and movements of the parents.

[593] Then, further, since there are extreme points, one after another [on bodies, which are the least things we can see, likewise, too, there must be a least point] on that body, which our senses can no longer descry; that point, we may be sure, exists without parts and is endowed with the least nature, nor was it ever sundered apart by itself nor can it so be hereafter, since it is itself but a part of another and that the first single part: then other like parts and again others in order in close array make up the nature of the first body, and since they cannot exist by themselves, it must needs be that they stay fast there whence they cannot by any means be torn away. The first-beginnings then are of solid singleness; for they are a close dense mass of least parts, never put together out of a union of those parts, but rather prevailing in everlasting singleness; from them nature, keeping safe the seeds of things, suffers not anything to be torn away, nor ever to be removed.

[609] Moreover, if there be not a least thing, all the tiniest bodies will be composed of infinite parts, since indeed the half of a half will always have a half, nor will anything set a limit. What difference then will there be between the sum of things and the least of things? There will be no difference; for however completely the whole sum be infinite, yet things that are tiniest will be composed of infinite parts just the same. And since true reasoning cries out against this, and denies that the mind can believe it, you must be vanquished and confess that there are those things which consist of no parts at all and are of the least nature. And since these exist, those first-beginnings too you must needs own are solid and everlasting.

Quote from Godfrey

Attempting to understand the reasons for the widespread acceptance of Plato and of religion is an illuminating but exceptionally frustrating exercise to come to grips with how humanity wasted so much potential.

Seems to have frustrated Jefferson too, especially in his question as to why Cicero would have accepted it. I don't have any ultimate answers but I do think this question is near the root of everything, and the best vehicle for getting to the bottom of that root, and "rooting it out" is through Epicurus. He's our primary connection to a chain of 2000 years of fighting back against this problem.

That's a great list of important topics Godfrey. Some of the material like the noble lie and so forth seems to be pretty well known, but I don't think Plato's analysis of pleasure is nearly enough talked about in our Epicurean circles.

As I've said before I think it's key to look back at Plato to understand what Epicurus was talking about in "absence of pain" and other passages that seem "stilted" to us.

If we don't understand that Plato had taken these specific positions about there being true and false types of pleasure, then we don't understand the emphasis that Epicurus put on ALL pleasure being desirable, because it is pleasure.

If we don't understand that Plato took the position that there is a neutral state, and the implications of that, then we don't have a clue as to why Epicurus wrote PD3 the way he did, and took the position that there IS no neutral state, and that only the two feelings (pleasure and pain) exist, and that where one is, the other is not.

You made the comment about "Absence of pain" in your original post in this thread and this is why that subject is so maddening to me. "Absence of pain" does make perfect sense as a perfectly valid phrase once you understand the framework of the analysis, but until you see that framework as a response to plato it's pretty much hopefully confusing, and leads you right into Plato's hands because you presume that it has to mean something and you "know" it can't mean pleasure, so you end up being a Platonist by default and think it means some higher type, or different kind, of pleasure, when that is explicitly ruled out in the part of Epicurean analysis that you've never been introduced to if you've only read the letter to Menoeceus!

But CLEARLY, or at least it seems clear to me, that this kind of analysis is the way forward.

Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, July 5, 1814:   (Full version at founders.archives.gov)

…. I am just returned from one of my long absences, having been at my other home for five weeks past. Having more leisure there than here for reading, I amused myself with reading seriously Plato’s Republic. I am wrong, however, in calling it amusement, for it was the heaviest task-work I ever went through. I had occasionally before taken up some of his other works, but scarcely ever had patience to go through a whole dialogue. While wading through the whimsies, the puerilities, and unintelligible jargon of this work, I laid it down often to ask myself how it could have been, that the world should have so long consented to give reputation to such nonsense as this? How the soi-disant Christian world, indeed, should have done it, is a piece of historical curiosity. But how could the Roman good sense do it? And particularly, how could Cicero bestow such eulogies on Plato! Although Cicero did not wield the dense logic of Demosthenes, yet he was able, learned, laborious, practised in the business of the world, and honest. He could not be the dupe of mere style, of which he was himself the first master in the world. With the moderns, I think, it is rather a matter of fashion and authority. Education is chiefly in the hands of persons who, from their profession, have an interest in the reputation and the dreams of Plato. They give the tone while at school, and few in their after years have occasion to revise their college opinions. But fashion and authority apart, and bringing Plato to the test of reason, take from him his sophisms, futilities and incomprehensibilities, and what remains? In truth, he is one of the race of genuine sophists, who has escaped the oblivion of his brethren, first, by the elegance of his diction, but chiefly, by the adoption and incorporation of his whimsies into the body of artificial Christianity. His foggy mind is forever presenting the semblances of objects which, half seen through a mist, can be defined neither in form nor dimensions. Yet this, which should have consigned him to early oblivion, really procured him immortality of fame and reverence.

The Christian priesthood, finding the doctrines of Christ levelled to every understanding, and too plain to need explanation, saw in the mysticism of Plato, materials with which they might build up an artificial system, which might, from its indistinctness, admit everlasting controversy, give employment for their order, and introduce it to profit, power and pre-eminence. The doctrines which flowed from the lips of Jesus himself are within the comprehension of a child; but thousands of volumes have not yet explained the Platonisms engrafted on them; and for this obvious reason, that nonsense can never be explained. Their purposes, however, are answered. Plato is canonized; and it is now deemed as impious to question his merits as those of an Apostle of Jesus. He is peculiarly appealed to as an advocate of the immortality of the soul; and yet I will venture to say, that were there no better arguments than his in proof of it, not a man in the world would believe it. It is fortunate for us, that Platonic republicanism has not obtained the same favor as Platonic Christianity; or we should now have been all living, men, women and children, pell mell together, like beasts of the field or forest. Yet “Plato is a great philosopher,” said La Fontaine. But, says Fontenelle, “Do you find his ideas very clear?” “Oh no! he is of an obscurity impenetrable.” “Do you not find him full of contradictions?” “Certainly,” replied La Fontaine, “he is but a sophist.” Yet immediately after he exclaims again, “Oh, Plato was a great philosopher.” Socrates had reason, indeed, to complain of the misrepresentations of Plato; for in truth, his dialogues are libels on Socrates.

One passage in "A Few Days In Athens" I have always found a little hard to parse is where (in Chapter 14) Frances Wright discusses the doctrine of "necessity." It seems to me that she leaves her own view of Epicurus' opinion a little ambiguous, because in the phrase I always remember she has Epicurus say: "we will not now traverse the ethical pons asinorum of necessity - the most simple and evident of moral truths, and the most darkened, tortured, and belabored by moral teachers."

The clip below contains the exchange, and the full chapter is here. I would be very interested in any comments on what you think Frances Wright believed Epicurus' position on this to be. Is she stating the same position that Epicurus writes in the letter to Menoeceus? Is she varying that position? If so, how? If not, why do you think that she does not make the position more clear? Or is this in fact clear and I just personally find it difficult for some reason?

Below is theBailey translation of an excerpt from the letter to Menoeceus:

He understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfill and easy to attain, whereas the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain; he laughs at (destiny), whom some have introduced as the mistress of all things. (He thinks that with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity) and some by chance, and some are within our control; for while necessity cannot be called to account, he sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame. For, indeed, it were better to follow the myths about the gods than to become a slave to the destiny of the natural philosophers: for the former suggests a hope of placating the gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity which knows no placation. As to chance, he does not regard it as a god as most men do (for in a god’s acts there is no disorder), nor as an uncertain cause (of all things) for he does not believe that good and evil are given by chance to man for the framing of a blessed life, but that opportunities for great good and great evil are afforded by it. He therefore thinks it better to be unfortunate in reasonable action than to prosper in unreason. For it is better in a man’s actions that what is well chosen (should fail, rather than that what is ill chosen) should be successful owing to chance.

And a clip of the PDF:

Episode 14 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. We hope you will enjoy this episode and that you will leave us comments, suggestions and questions in the thread below.