Posts by Cassius

Here is an example of the conflict, in a place I saw this morning where i will need to genericize the message so as to maintain confidentiality.

The context is that one of us (not me) pointed out to a new contact (not someone who posts here as far as I know) that there were significant differences between Epicurus and Benthamite utilitarianism.

The post from "our side" was responding to a positive comment about Bentham, and made the point:

.... Bentham was not Epicurean-- Epicureans are most definitely not social utilitarians. The only reason we would want to "add to the sum total of human happiness" is if that was the most effective way to increase our individual pleasure. Personal pleasure always is central, which is the point I thought you were making on the post.


Below is the reply from this new person, which I believe to be incorrect, but which states the problem clearly. I have highlighted and underlined (this was not in the original) the point being made, which is the point that I do not believe can be supported by Epicurean philosophy, and in fact made impossible by it. While we can and I would say SHOULD choose this course in many cases, there is nothing in the philosophy that calls for this kind of "natural rights" conclusion. What would be the source of such a "right"? Who or what would vindicate it?

We can choose such a system because it may in our context give us pleasure to participate in it and pain not to do so, but would anyone really advocate that ALL people deserve such respect in ALL situations? It's easy to think about examples of people who we believe we justifiably detest, and to whom we would not recognize in them a "right" for them to experience pleasure in ways with which we violently disagree. The ultimate insight of Epicurean cosmology is that the universe doesn't say who is right and wrong, and that if we expect 'our' view of pleasure and pain to be implemented it is entirely up to us to do so.

Here's the excerpt of this person's reply:

"I don’t think that Bentham is in conflict with classical Epicureanism on any of these questions, and I don’t think his position is ‘counter’ to classical Epicureanism, but rather a development of it: an attempt to build a more universal system on solidly Epicurean foundations.

The problem with classical Epicureanism, and the one that Bentham sets out to solve, is what happens when one person’s pleasure conflicts with another’s.

The crucial and I think deeply ethical point is the egalitarianism in Bentham: the idea that MY pleasure should not take priority over YOURS, no matter who I am, what my status is, how rich I am, how intelligent I am, or whatever. Each individual has an equal right to have their happiness respected.

I think that there is an interesting distinction between a) taking responsibility for something, b) working towards something, and c) respecting the right to something.

A) I can only take responsibility for my own happiness. This is in fact a Stoic doctrine, other people’s happiness is outside your control and you should not be suckered into trying to deliver it.

I can work towards the happiness of those around me. I think we can all agree that this is a wise course of action as this happiness is reflected back. I think you agree on this.

C) I respect the equal right of other people to pursue their own happiness. (As you can see ‘equal’ means in society at large, not in my own personal priorities: there’s a difference). In fact, your message above also agrees with this: when you say ‘some will be counter-protesting for their own pleasure’, and you don’t condemn this action, you are in fact recognizing that equal right.

So given this a/b/c set of values, there is no conflict at all between Epicurus and Bentham: one is simply a rational extension of the other.

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End of excerpt

This is the kind of issue we come back to again and again and again, and need to think clearly about so we understand the implications.

Of course I wake up this morning thinking about this thread and have another comment: I am very much in the camp that is sort of captured by "you only live once" - but that doesn't really capture the issue. Given our Epicurean understanding that life is so short in comparison with the infinity of time when we will not exist, how can we possibly NOT want to use our lives as productively as possible? Of course the initial question has to be asked as to what "as productively as possible means" but that is where Epicurus points us to the answer in a way that virtually no one else does. Do we really want to get to the end of our lives and think that we spent our brief lives "avoiding pain"? That the best use of our time was to be bunkered down in our cave, even with a few friends, with bread and water?

I will repeat again there is NO WAY I can imagine Epicurus advocating such a position. That is pure Stoicism!

Epicurean philosophy is the creed of a fighter, not a coward.

Vatican Saying 47. I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and I have closed off every one of your devious entrances. And we will not give ourselves up as captives, to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who cling to it maundering, we will leave from life singing aloud a glorious triumph-song on how nicely we lived.

Note 47. Translation by C.Yapijakis, Epicurean Garden of Athens, Greece .Bailey: “I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and entrenched myself against all thy secret attacks. And I will not give myself up as captive to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for me to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who vainly cling to it, I will leave life crying aloud a glorious triumph-song that I have lived well.”

Quote from Don

This opportunity to talk through these issues is truly one of the values in finding this forum.

Definitely!

Quote from Don

. I consider something like equality for all genders and races to be universal.

Ok here is my interpretation, I think "slavery" as you mentioned is probably the ultimate emotional test, but these are good too.

I think where Epicurus was going is to recognize BOTH that:

(1) Our feeling is the ultimate guide for life, and that means that we will die for things that we feel to be important enough to us like friends, or whatever we happen to feel at that level of intensity, which would include our political values of equality or whatever we feel intensely about. The "friends" example is the one I use here because Epicurus explicitly is recorded to have said that we will on appropriate occasions die for our friends.

(2) That despite the intensity of our feelings and our personal willingness on appropriate occasions to fight and die for our feelings, we still have to admit that these are OUR feelings, and that they aren't sanctioned by "God" or even by some cosmic "Nature." The ultimately is no prime mover / supernatural / teleological "right" and "wrong" in the universe, and we justify our actions based on the only guide we have - our individual senses of pleasure and pain, just like all other animals do.

This is ultimately why I react so strongly against the "passivist" or the "tranquility above all" view of Epicurus, because that conflicts totally with the view that we stake all our actions to the flag of feeling. There is no way that I could accept that Epicurus (or we) would turn our backs on our friends, or on the basic values that motivate us, just so we could eke out a few extra moments of "tranquility" in our cave with our bread and water and cheese. There is NO WAY that Epicurus advocated such a position. We could go on and on listing and arguing the reasons for that conclusion, and that is in fact why I spend so much time on it and think it is so essential, but ultimately I think Epicurus would tell us that we grasp this not really intellectually, but through feeling.

I know that it is shocking to a lot of people to give up the argument that there is some "higher sanction" for their personal views of right and wrong, but I can't think of anything in the Epicurean physics (the nature of the universe) that would allow such a position. In fact everything in it goes in the opposite direction - that the universe is truly ultimately reducible to combinations of matter and void that are constantly changing, and in such a system there is no room for Platonic ideals or any other kind of "universal" or "absolute" rules of right and wrong.

But at the same time, we do and should fight to the death, just like all other animals do, for our ultimate feelings about what is important to us in life.

That's why the tranquilist view is to me not just intellectually and factually "incorrect" based on the record, but totally unacceptable and irreconcilable at a basic feeling / emotional level with the thrust of Epicurean philosophy.

Ok this moves us as expected into the area of interpreting "natural justice."

Do we all here agree that there is no absolute standard of natural justice? And that the "harmed or be harmed" reference is simply something similar to a statement of virtue, which much be translated into the "pleasure" of the people involved? And that when the individuals no longer agree on their pleasures, there is no longer any natural justice involved in the issue of "harmed or be harmed"?

I suspect that in this discussion so far everyone will largely agree that the answer to that question is "yes, there is no absolute justice" - but probably not without hesitation. I think in most all discussions of this we find that this is one of the least discussed areas of the PDs because many people do not want to see the clear statement here that Epicurus is saying that no individual's version of "justice" is applicable to all times and all people and all places. And of course since most people are dedicated to their pre-existing absolute standards of "virtue" they find these impossible to accept as written. The temptation is therefore to think that there is an absolute standard of "harm or be harmed" but that is not likely at all to be the case given the nature of the Epicurean universe, where there are no absolute standards other than the pleasure and pain of the people involved, correct?

33. Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.

34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions.

35. It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if, at present, he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.

36. In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.

37. Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.

38. Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage.

In the spirit of keeping it coming, I think:

(1) the view that it is important to "pursue" pleasure is pretty clear, we all agree on it, and stating it is not particularly controversial, at least in our circles.

(2) What is HUGELY controversial, has profound implications, and is probably NOT a consensus view, expect maybe in our smallest circle here, is the part where we say something like:

"The only proper way of comparing pleasures is from the perspective. "I feel this pleasure is more pleasing to me than that pleasure."

Huge numbers of people (almost Everyone outside our inner circle of people who are trying to interpret Epicurus rigorously) default to interpeting "virtue" as having objective content, and the worst offense in the world in their eyes is to suggest that the individual has any type of sanction from Nature to pursue "his/her own" pleasure apart from social/universal norms.

So therefore when we discuss issues like ".... maximizing pleasure in our lives over time in the present and the future and talking about maximum pleasure of any one pleasurable event. The latter can't be measured by definition because we're talking about subjective phenomena."

Then we have at least a couple of levels of analysis ---

(1) The issue of being clear in our technical discussions about "ranking" and "divisions" and "types" of pleasure. Here we have a fascinating and important discussion that can be pursued with a wide variety of types of people (both inside and outside the Epicurean framework) without too much pressure from emotional issues.

But we also have :

(2) The issue of the apparent subjective/relativistic nature of pleasure, the acceptance of which is explosively rejected outside the Epicurean framework of Nature. In fact it is hard to even discuss personal attitudes toward pleasure without first coming to terms with the practical implications of concluding that people will disagree on how to pursue pleasure. That probably takes us off into the infrequently discussed issues such as the last ten PDs, and this issue (which might be the most important of which) has to be kept tightly tied to the Epicurean framework for us to make progress on dissecting it. Talking about this issue with people outside the basic Epicurean framework is hardly even possible because you run into immediate and emotional issues about what "should" be the best pleasures, and if you can't agree that that "objective" framework makes no sense then you can hardly even get off the ground.

Here is a link to the "geocentric model" (which Epicurus rejected) that we discuss during this episode:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geocentric_model

In astronomy, the geocentric model (also known as geocentrism, often exemplified specifically by the Ptolemaic system) is a superseded description of the Universe with Earth at the center. Under the geocentric model, the Sun, Moon, stars, and planets all orbited Earth.^[1] The geocentric model was the predominant description of the cosmos in many ancient civilizations, such as those of Aristotle in Classical Greece and Ptolemy in Roman Egypt.

This is one of the few texts I can think of that refers to a superlative experience of pleasure ("jubilation unsurpassed"):

Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 7, p. 1091A: Not only is the basis that they assume for the pleasurable life untrustworthy and insecure, it is quite trivial and paltry as well, inasmuch as their “thing delighted” – their good – is an escape from ills, and they say that they can conceive of no other, and indeed that our nature has no place at all in which to put its good except the place left when its evil is expelled. … Epicurus too makes a similar statement to the effect that the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: “That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about {a jibe at the Peripatetics}, prating meaninglessly about the good.”

Now would it be desirable to live every moment of life experiencing "jubilation unsurpassed"? I think so, and I think this example does stand for the ability to rank some pleasures as more pleasing than others. And it may be there there is no "legitimate" "absolute" standard by which you can say that one pleasure is more pleasing than another other than saying. "I feel this pleasure is more pleasing to me than that one, or those."

But there's a lot to consider about these points.

It "might" be true, but would also be very important to flesh out and explain, that it is a core Epicurean principle that:

There there is no standard by which you can say that one pleasure is "objectively" more pleasing than another, for all people at all times, and from any "absolute" perspective. The only proper way of comparing pleasures is from the perspective. "I feel this pleasure is more pleasing to me than that pleasure."

Would that be correct?

Quote from Godfrey

For a different perspective, hopefully not too different, there is the idea of the best life being the pleasantest life.

A large part of the question seems to be "How do we measure, or define, 'most pleasantest'?"

Episode 20 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available.

Probably need a post in this thread devoted to Aristotle's views, which would likely definitely have been rejected by Epicurus:

Unchanging forms

Main articles: Hylomorphism and Great chain of being

Aristotle did not embrace either divine creation or evolution, instead arguing in his biology that each species (eidos) was immutable, breeding true to its ideal eternal form (not the same as Plato's theory of Forms).^[4][5] Aristotle's suggestion in De Generatione Animalium of a fixed hierarchy in nature - a scala naturae ("ladder of nature") provided an early explanation of the continuity of living things.^[6][7][8] Aristotle saw that animals were teleological (functionally end-directed), and had parts that were homologous with those of other animals, but he did not connect these ideas into a concept of evolutionary progress.^[9]

In the Middle Ages, Scholasticism developed Aristotle's view into the idea of a great chain of being.^[1] The image of a ladder inherently suggests the possibility of climbing, but both the ancient Greeks and mediaeval scholastics such as Ramon Lull^[1] maintained that each species remained fixed from the moment of its creation.^[10][9]

^{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism}

^{Hylomorphism From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigation Jump to search This article is about the concept of hylomorphism in Aristotelian philosophy. For the concept in computer science, see Hylomorphism (computer science). Hylomorphism (or hylemorphism) is a philosophical theory developed by Aristotle, which conceives being (ousia) as a compound of matter and form. The word is a 19th-century term formed from the Greek words ὕλη hyle, "wood, matter", and μορφή, morphē, "form".}

The "Lack of Pattern" argument is in Book Five, here is Bailey:

Quote

For it is clear that he must take joy in new things, to whom the old are painful; but for him, whom no sorrow has befallen in the time gone by, when he led a life of happiness, for such an one what could have kindled a passion for new things? Or what ill had it been to us never to have been made? Did our life, forsooth, lie wallowing in darkness and grief, until the first creation of things dawned upon us? For whosoever has been born must needs wish to abide in life, so long as enticing pleasure shall hold him. But for him, who has never tasted the love of life, and was never in the ranks of the living, what harm is it never to have been made? Further, how was there first implanted in the gods a pattern for the begetting of things, yea, and the concept of man, so that they might know and see in their mind what they wished to do, or in what way was the power of the first-beginnings ever learnt, or what they could do when they shifted their order one with the other, if nature did not herself give a model of creation? For so many first-beginnings of things in many ways, driven on by blows from time everlasting until now, and moved by their own weight, have been wont to be borne on, and to unite in every way, and essay everything that they might create, meeting one with another, that it is no wonder if they have fallen also into such arrangements, and have passed into such movements, as those whereby this present sum of things is carried on, ever and again replenished.

The purpose of this post is to set up a thread to discuss how our understanding of an "evolution" section from Book Four of Lucretius (Bailey) might by improved by considering some of the non-religious based arguments that were current among people who apparently were also reading Lucretius in the 1700's. First, the relevant section from Lucretius. (Note: the "lack of pattern" argument, that the universe could not have been created by supernatural gods, is probably relevant to this too.)

Quote

Herein you must eagerly desire to shun this fault, and with foresighted fear to avoid this error; do not think that the bright light of the eyes was created in order that we may be able to look before us, or that, in order that we may have power to plant long paces, therefore the tops of shanks and thighs, based upon the feet, are able to bend; or again, that the forearms are jointed to the strong upper arms and hands given us to serve us on either side, in order that we might be able to do what was needful for life. All other ideas of this sort, which men proclaim, by distorted reasoning set effect for cause, since nothing at all was born in the body that we might be able to use it, but what is born creates its own use. Nor did sight exist before the light of the eyes was born, nor pleading in words before the tongue was created, but rather the birth of the tongue came long before discourse, and the ears were created much before sound was heard, and in short all the limbs, I trow, existed before their use came about: they cannot then have grown for the purpose of using them.

But, on the other side, to join hands in the strife of battle, to mangle limbs and befoul the body with gore; these things were known long before gleaming darts flew abroad, and nature constrained men to avoid a wounding blow, before the left arm, trained by art, held up the defence of a shield. And of a surety to trust the tired body to rest was a habit far older than the soft-spread bed, and the slaking of the thirst was born before cups. These things, then, which are invented to suit the needs of life, might well be thought to have been discovered for the purpose of using them. But all those other things lie apart, which were first born themselves, and thereafter revealed the concept of their usefulness. In this class first of all we see the senses and the limbs; wherefore, again and again, it cannot be that you should believe that they could have been created for the purpose of useful service.

This, likewise, is no cause for wonder, that the nature of the body of every living thing of itself seeks food. For verily I have shown that many bodies ebb and pass away from things in many ways, but most are bound to pass from living creatures. For because they are sorely tried by motion and many bodies by sweating are squeezed and pass out from deep beneath, many are breathed out through their mouths, when they pant in weariness; by these means then the body grows rare, and all the nature is undermined; and on this follows pain. Therefore food is taken to support the limbs and renew strength when it passes within, and to muzzle the gaping desire for eating through all the limbs and veins. Likewise, moisture spreads into all the spots which demand moisture; and the many gathered bodies of heat, which furnish the fires to our stomach, are scattered by the incoming moisture, and quenched like a flame, that the dry heat may no longer be able to burn our body. Thus then the panting thirst is washed away from our body, thus the hungry yearning is satisfied.

Next, how it comes to pass that we are able to plant our steps forward, when we wish, how it is granted us to move our limbs in diverse ways, and what force is wont to thrust forward this great bulk of our body, I will tell: do you hearken to my words. I say that first of all idols of walking fall upon our mind, and strike the mind, as we have said before. Then comes the will; for indeed no one begins to do anything, ere the mind has seen beforehand what it will do, and inasmuch as it sees this beforehand, an image of the thing is formed. And so, when the mind stirs itself so that it wishes to start and step forward, it straightway strikes the force of soul which is spread abroad in the whole body throughout limbs and frame. And that is easy to do, since it is held in union with it. Then the soul goes on and strikes the body, and so little by little the whole mass is thrust forward and set in movement. Moreover, at such times the body too becomes rarefied, and air (as indeed it needs must do, since it is always quick to move), comes through the opened spaces, and pierces through the passages in abundance, and so it is scattered to all the tiny parts of the body. Here then it is brought about by two causes acting severally, that the body, like a ship, is borne on by sails and wind. Nor yet herein is this cause for wonder, that such tiny bodies can twist about a body so great, and turn round the whole mass of us. For in very truth the wind that is finely wrought of a subtle body drives and pushes on a great ship of great bulk, and a single hand steers it, with whatever speed it be moving, and twists a single helm whithersoever it will; and by means of pulleys and tread-wheels a crane can move many things of great weight, and lift them up with light poise.

I start this note because of references to Thomas Browne of Edinborough in Frances Wright's "A Few Days In Athens" where she generally praises Browne but criticizes his denunciation of Epicurus (but apparently denunciation of Epicurean ethics rather than physics). This is interesting to me because Browne was apparently against some elements of Erasmus Darwin. I've collected some references below.

Again, the main point of this post is to collect some references that help explain "logic-based" and "non-religious" theories of mechanisms of cause and effect involved in questions of origin and development of life. It seems to me that the translations of Lucretius on the sections devoted to this issue are murky, and an understanding of the logical issues will help in understanding these sections. I don't have time to start here an analysis of these issues but I think if there were / are non-religious based arguments about cause and effect and development of life then those are probably helpful to interpreting passages like:

"All other ideas of this sort, which men proclaim, by distorted reasoning set effect for cause, since nothing at all was born in the body that we might be able to use it, but what is born creates its own use. Nor did sight exist before the light of the eyes was born, nor pleading in words before the tongue was created, but rather the birth of the tongue came long before discourse, and the ears were created much before sound was heard, and in short all the limbs, I trow, existed before their use came about: they cannot then have grown for the purpose of using them."

In the Epicurean context everyone is going to agree that these changes over time did not come about at the direction of supernatural gods, and we can put that contention aside. The issue is, among other things, "What logical and understandable suggestions were the Epicureans making to explain the non-supernatural development of faculties like eyesight?"

This is related to the theory of "Saltation." Does the Lucretian/Epicurean material imply a position on these issues?

Wikipedia:

In biology, saltation (from Latin, saltus, "leap") is a sudden and large mutational change from one generation to the next, potentially causing single-step speciation. This was historically offered as an alternative to Darwinism. Some forms of mutationism were effectively saltationist, implying large discontinuous jumps.

Prior to Charles Darwin most evolutionary scientists had been saltationists.^[1] Jean-Baptiste Lamarck was a gradualist but similar to other scientists of the period had written that saltational evolution was possible. Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire endorsed a theory of saltational evolution that "monstrosities could become the founding fathers (or mothers) of new species by instantaneous transition from one form to the next."^[2] Geoffroy wrote that environmental pressures could produce sudden transformations to establish new species instantaneously.^[3] In 1864 Albert von Kölliker revived Geoffroy's theory that evolution proceeds by large steps, under the name of heterogenesis.^[4]

With the publication of On the Origin of Species in 1859 Charles Darwin had denied saltational evolution by writing that evolutionary transformation always proceeds gradually and never in jumps. Darwin insisted on slow accumulation of small steps in evolution and wrote "natural selection acts solely by accumulating slight successive favourable variations, it can produce no great or sudden modification; it can act only by very short steps". Darwin continued in this belief throughout his life.^[5]

Back to Browne of Edinborough:

Criticism of Erasmus Darwin

One of Brown's notable works included a critique of Erasmus Darwin's theory of transmutation. The philosopher published it in the form of a detailed study Observations on the zoonomia of Erasmus Darwin (1798), which was recognized as a mature work of criticism.^[5]

There, Brown wrote:

Quote

As the earth, to a considerable depth, abounds with the recrements of organic life, Dr. Darwin adopts the opinion, that it has been generated, rather than created; the original quantity of matter having been continually increased, by the processes of animalization, and vegetation. This production of the causes of effects he considers, as affording a more magnificent idea of the infinite power of the Creator, than if he had simply caused the effects themselves; and, if the inconceivable be the source of the magnificent, the opinion is just. It is contrary, however, to all the observations, which prove the processes of animal, and vegetable growth, to be the result of new combinations of matter, previously existing; and it is also in direct opposition to the opinions, which Dr. Darwin has himself advanced.
A body can increase in bulk, only by the farther separation of its parts, in expansion, or by the accretion of new parts. In the former case, no addition is made to the original quantity of matter; and it will surely be admitted, that nothing can accresce, which does not exist. The parts accreted, existing before their junction with the animal, must have formed a portion of the original matter of the world, or been called into being, in a new creation, not by the animal, to which they accresce, but by the great fource of animal existence.
The immense beds of limestone, chalk, and marble, may have been, at one time, the shells of fish, and may thus have received a difference of form; but, unless the calcareous earth, of which they are composed, if that earth be a simple body, or its ingredients, if it be compound, had previously existed, all the powers of animation which the ocean contains would have been insufficient to create a single shell...

The process of generation is said to consist in the secretion by the male of a living filament, and by the female of a nutritive fluid, which stimulates the filament, to absorb particles, and thus to add to its bulk: At the earliest period of its existence the embryon, as secreted from the blood of the male, would seem to consist of a living filament, with certain capabilities of irritation, sensation, volition and association," p. 484. To say, that the filament is living, and that it possesses these powers, is to say, that it possess sensorial power, which is considered by Dr. Darwin, as the source of animation...

Dr. Darwin seems to consider the animals of former times, as possessing powers, much superior to those of their posterity. They reasoned on their wants: they wished: and it was done. The boar, which originally differed little from the other beasts of the forest, first obtained tusks, because he conceived them to be useful weapons, and then, by another process of reasoning, a thick shield-like shoulder, to defend himself from the tusks of his fellows. The stag, in like manner, formed to himself horns, at once sharp, and branched, for the different purposes of offence, and defence. Some animals obtained wings, others fins, and others swiftness of foot; while the vegetables exerted themselves, in inventing various modes of concealing, and defending their feeds, and honey. These are a few of many instances, adduced by Dr. Darwin, which are all objectionable, on his own principles; as they require us to believe the various propensities, to have been the cause, rather than the effect, of the difference of configuration...

If we admit the supposed capacity of producing organs, by the mere feeling of a want, man must have been greatly degenerated, or been originally inferior, in power. He may wish for wings, as the other bipeds are supposed to have done with success; but a century of wishes will not render him abler to take flight. It is not, however, to man that the observation must be confined. No improvements of form have been observed, in the other animals, since the first dawnings of zoology; and we must, therefore, believe them, to have lost the power of production, rather than to have attained all the objects of their desire.

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Noteworthy, Brown's criticism of the Darwinian thesis, like that of Rudolf Virchow, did not come from any religious feeling.

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That in turn leads to RUDOLF VIRCHOW:

Anti-Darwinism

Virchow was an opponent of Darwin's theory of evolution,^[81][82] and particularly skeptical of the emergent thesis of human evolution.^[83][84] On 22 September 1877, he delivered a public address entitled "The Freedom of Science in the Modern State" before the Congress of German Naturalist and Physicians in Munich. There he spoke against the teaching of the theory of evolution in schools, arguing that it was as yet an unproven hypothesis that lacked empirical foundations and that, therefore, its teaching would negatively affect scientific studies.^[85][86] Ernst Haeckel, who had been Virchow's student, later reported that his former professor said that "it is quite certain that man did not descend from the apes...not caring in the least that now almost all experts of good judgment hold the opposite conviction."^[87]

Virchow became one of the leading opponents on the debate over the authenticity of Neanderthal, discovered in 1856, as distinct species and ancestral to modern humans. He himself examined the original fossil in 1872, and presented his observations before the Berliner Gesellschaft für Anthropologie, Ethnologie und Urgeschichte.^[7] He stated that the Neanderthal had not been a primitive form of human, but an abnormal human being, who, judging by the shape of his skull, had been injured and deformed, and considering the unusual shape of his bones, had been arthritic, rickety and feeble.^[88][89][90] With such an authority, the fossil was rejected as new species. With this reasoning, Virchow "judged Darwin an ignoramus and Haeckel a fool and was loud and frequent in the publication of these judgments."^[91]

On 22 September 1877, at the Fiftieth Conference of the German Association of Naturalists and Physician held in Munich, Haeckel pleaded for introducing evolution in the public school curricula, and tried to dissociate Darwinism from social Darwinism.^[92] His campaign was because of Herman Müller, a school teacher who was banned because of his teaching a year earlier on the inanimate origin of life from carbon. This resulted in prolonged public debate with Virchow. A few days later Virchow responded that Darwinism was only a hypothesis, and morally dangerous to students. This severe criticism of Darwinism was immediately taken up by the London Times, from which further debates erupted among English scholars. Haeckel wrote his arguments in the October issue of Nature titled "The Present Position of Evolution Theory", to which Virchow responded in the next issue with an article "The Liberty of Science in the Modern State".^[93] The debate led Haeckel to write a full book Freedom in Science and Teaching in 1879. That year the issue was discussed in the Prussian House of Representatives and the verdict was in favour of Virchow. In 1882 the Prussian education policy officially excluded natural history in schools.^[94]

Years later, the noted German physician Carl Ludwig Schleich, would recall a conversation he held with Virchow, who was a close friend of his: "...On to the subject of Darwinism. 'I don't believe in all this,' Virchow told me. 'if I lie on my sofa and blow the possibilities away from me, as another man may blow the smoke of his cigar, I can, of course, sympathize with such dreams. But they don't stand the test of knowledge. Haeckel is a fool. That will be apparent one day. As far as that goes, if anything like transmutation did occur it could only happen in the course of pathological degeneration!'".^[95]

Virchow's ultimate opinion about evolution was reported a year before he died; in his own words:

Quote

The intermediate form is unimaginable save in a dream... We cannot teach or consent that it is an achievement that man descended from the ape or other animal.

— Homiletic Review, January, (1901)^[96][97]

Virchow's antievolutionism, like that of Albert von Kölliker and Thomas Brown, did not come from religion, since he was not a believer.^[14]

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Abert von Koliker:

Heterogenesis

Further information: Saltationism

In 1864 Kölliker revived Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire's theory that evolution proceeds by large steps (saltationism), under the name of heterogenesis.^[7] Kölliker was a critic of Darwinism and rejected a universal common ancestor, instead he supported a theory of common descent along separate lines.^[8] According to Alexander Vucinich the non-Darwinian evolution theory of Kölliker tied "organic transformism to three general ideas, all contrary to Darwin's view: the multiple origin of living forms, the internal causes of variation, and "sudden leaps" (heterogenesis) in the evolutionary process."^[9] Kölliker claimed that heterogenesis functioned according to a general law of evolutionary progress, orthogenesis.^[10]

Other Notes:

Probably should consider here too Nietzsche's "anti-Darwinism" (Atterton article, etc)

I add this here as a note for anyone interested in the origin of A Few Days In Athens. This footnote appears on page 189 of the 1850 edition. It seems to me that it is significant that the book singles out "the late amiable and enlightened teacher, Thomas Browne of Edinborough," as "chargeable with the weakness" of censuring the Epicurean school "whose doctrines he has borrowed and taught." I haven't had time to look up Thomas Browne to see what can still be learned about him, but whoever was the driving force behind AFDIA seems to have felt a personal connection to him.

Here is a drawing of him:

And Wikipedia entry.

Brown set an answer to the objections raised against the appointment of Sir John Leslie to the mathematical professorship (1805). Leslie, a follower of David Hume, was attacked by the clerical party as a sceptic and an infidel, and Brown took the opportunity to defend Hume's doctrine of causality as in no way inimical to religion.^[1] His defence, at first only a pamphlet, became in its third edition a lengthy treatise entitled Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect, and is a fine specimen of Brown's analytical faculty.^[2]

In 1806, Brown became a medical practitioner in partnership with James Gregory (1753–1821), but, though successful, preferred literature and philosophy. After twice failing to gain a professorship in the university, he was invited, during an illness of Dugald Stewart in the session of 1808–1809, to act as his substitute, and during the following session he undertook much of Stewart's work. The students received him with enthusiasm, due partly to his splendid rhetoric and partly to the novelty and ingenuity of his views. In 1810 he was appointed as colleague to Stewart, a position which he held for the rest of his life. Brown was elected a member of the American Antiquarian Society in 1815.^[3] He wrote his lectures at high pressure, and devoted much time to the editing and publication of the numerous poems which he had written at various times during his life. He was also preparing an abstract of his lectures as a handbook for his class. His health, never strong, gave way under the strain of his work.

He was advised to take a trip to London, where he died in 1820 aged 42. His body was returned to Kirkmabreck for burial.^[4]

Interesting criticism of Erasmus Darwin:

Dr. Darwin seems to consider the animals of former times, as possessing powers, much superior to those of their posterity. They reasoned on their wants: they wished: and it was done. The boar, which originally differed little from the other beasts of the forest, first obtained tusks, because he conceived them to be useful weapons, and then, by another process of reasoning, a thick shield-like shoulder, to defend himself from the tusks of his fellows. The stag, in like manner, formed to himself horns, at once sharp, and branched, for the different purposes of offence, and defence. Some animals obtained wings, others fins, and others swiftness of foot; while the vegetables exerted themselves, in inventing various modes of concealing, and defending their feeds, and honey. These are a few of many instances, adduced by Dr. Darwin, which are all objectionable, on his own principles; as they require us to believe the various propensities, to have been the cause, rather than the effect, of the difference of configuration...
If we admit the supposed capacity of producing organs, by the mere feeling of a want, man must have been greatly degenerated, or been originally inferior, in power. He may wish for wings, as the other bipeds are supposed to have done with success; but a century of wishes will not render him abler to take flight. It is not, however, to man that the observation must be confined. No improvements of form have been observed, in the other animals, since the first dawnings of zoology; and we must, therefore, believe them, to have lost the power of production, rather than to have attained all the objects of their desire.

Noteworthy, Brown's criticism of the Darwinian thesis, like that of Rudolf Virchow, did not come from any religious feeling.

Well I can certainly see how longest duration can be different from "long term" pleasure using the illustration, but I am thinking that in both examples the issue being discussed is "time," while I think that "time" is probably not the only factor in judging what is the "most pleasurable" -- in that "purity" would also be a consideration, while what I am really thinking is the major issue is "intensity" -- in that one person can judge getting to the top of Mount Rushmore for a moment such an exhilarating experience that it is worth ten years of looking up at it from the foot of the mountain.

Maybe someone else can jump in and give us a different perspective?

And it's particularly easy since virtually EVERY other person in every other tradition takes the position that "wisdom" is the goal, and virtue is its own reward. And I probably am being overly cautious by saying "virtually."

It is the proverbial slippery slope / walking on edge of the canyon for sure!

And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all Certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.

But I do think that we still have a lot to do on the clear meaning of terms like "sage" and "fullness of pleasure." So that when Epicurus uses the term in the letter to menoeceus I would strongly presume that he is using it in a generic way and not as a term of art as in the comic book "Epicurus The Sage" for example.

Yes so in that sense "being a sage" is a parallel term to "living virtuously" and I have no problem with that, but I always get ready to "shout" with Diogenes of Oinoanda whenever I think someone is elevating the means to the end.

Now I know you are far too far along to be doing that yourself, but that's definitely the impression I get from a lot of people who talk about "Epicurus the Sage" and things like that, and I think it's a hazard that's easy to encounter. Since I am sure that you are doing it here maybe I should just say let's carry on forward

OK I tentatively have to register disagreement on where we are on that, as I do not see your distinction between longest period and long-term, and I think we are talking about the difference between things that may be poorly expressed as "quantity" vs "intensity." I see that you might be saying that we add it all up and judge it as the total at the end of one's life but I am not sure that helps us any to get past the point that "duration" is only one aspect of the measure.

I think where I am going on "fullness" (and I am not sure I recall where DeWitt went) is that "fullness of pleasure" implies "fullness of pleasure possible to you under your circumstances" and not a reference to an absolute measure in terms of quantity or intensity or any other factor.

I am thinking that this is an issue that is related to "purity" of pleasure, in which "pure pleasure" is a statement of experience in which all experience is pleasurable with no mixture of painful experience, but that even this term of "pure pleasure" does not create an absolute standard, but again a measurement of what is possible for the particular individual.

I think all this is very complicated and I am definitely open to modification but I do think firmly that comparisons of pleasure and pain are going to be relative, and that terms like quantity and purity and intensity and duration are going to be useful but always short of an "absolute" way in which we can compare various lives and say that one particular version is "best" as a rule.

(As usual I want to note that i see this is a very fun and very useful discussion!)

Another way of stating my concern is to observe that I think it is pretty clear that the goal and the guide in Epicurean terms is "pleasure." That means that the goal of life cannot be "to be a sage" and the guide of life cannot be "a sage" or "to follow a sage," and those terms strike me as particularly hazardous if we consider "sage" to be synonymous with "a wise man" and if we consider how important it is not to embrace "wisdom" as the goal or the guide of life.

Is it possible that all this discussion of "sage" is overlay by Diogenes Laertius using his non-Epicurean philosophical categories?