Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

In light of that, I would say laying out agreed upon definitions would have to be allowable.

I would think DeWitt would say "yes of course" to that. I think he's saying that Epicurus was totally practical, accepting the good that comes through definition, while strenuously guarding against the bad that come can from it if not kept in check.

So many times this rings in my ears:

"And so it was that the lively force of his mind won its way, and he passed on far beyond the fiery walls of the world, and in mind and spirit traversed the boundless whole; whence in victory he brings us tidings what can come to be and what cannot, yea and in what way each thing has its power limited, and its deepset boundary-stone. And so religion in revenge is cast beneath men’s feet and trampled, and victory raises us to heaven."

Sorry Don I see while I was posting you made your most recent point and I do think we are largely in agreement.

Upon rereading this it seems to me that this from DeWitt dramatizes best what I agree with him is the issue here "the quest of definitions is useless":

In that I presume he is evoking something similar to the Quest for the Holy Grail, and illustrating that with the absurdities Plato comes up with in Timaeus.

Obviously definitions do have some uses, and some definitions are highly useful.

But that's the issue, unless the limitations of "reason" or "logic"- in this case the use of words, in other cases the use of math and geometry - are kept firmly in mind, your subject to the worst kind of error from failing to keep the canonical faculties supreme.

I consider this next passage to be also among DeWitt's best interpretations:

So this is where I got my reference to the "mere words" passage -- I had forgotten DeWitt said this:

Don here DeWitt begins discussion of your point:

This is one of several references in DeWitt to this issue, and it seems to me that DeWitt's reasoning is highly persuasive:

Don absolutely I am with you on stressing of clarity as critical to Epicurus, I am just saying that no amount of clarity can convert words into something they are not - into real things which can reach the same status of reality as the canonical faculties.

But that is just what advocates of a fourth leg of the canon concluded, as per Diogenes Laertius. Dewitt writes, and I agree, that this was a mistake - I think a huge one.

"We have to use language, and Epicurus is advocating using the most simple, direct language to accomplish this to cut down the possibility of misunderstanding."

That is certainly true, and so therefore Epicurus must have agreed with it.

But that does not mean that words, no matter how precisely defined, can ever be the equivalent of the thing itself, or reveal it in all its dimensions. That limitation also seems true from a non-supernatural atomist perspective, but the rationalism of Plato and others seems to elevate words into something more - like the Logos of Christianity. (In the beginning was the word.....)

As per the implication of the Wikipedia excerpt, it would appear that Epicurus held that such a view of the nature of words and concepts is incorrect and that words are purely matters of convention.

I think there is a close parallel Herr between words and math and geometry, both of which too Epicurus would have used while also remembering their limitations.

Quote from Don

The only inquiries about words would be to establish the clear meaning of words so works could be easily understood and not "run on ... ad infinitum."

I do think that is a significant part of the issue, especially as to poetry and other flowery and overly-complicated language. But I also am concerned about taking that too far as the full point. I think in that direction lies issues involved with the "present impressions of the mind," and concepts vs preconcepts, and whether there are four legs of the canon rather than just three.

Best way I can think to state my concern at the moment is that I think Epicurus was thinking that all communication through words is inherently limited and fall short of reality, just like math and geometry are inherently limited in what they can do. I believe that this position is one of the most important in the philosophy as providing the antidote to rationalism. No matter how clear we try to make our words or our theorems they will always fall short of reality.

Edit: For what it's worth I decided to see what wikipedia says about "rationalism":

In philosophy, rationalism is the epistemological view that "regards reason as the chief source and test of knowledge"^[1] or "any view appealing to reason as a source of knowledge or justification".^[2] More formally, rationalism is defined as a methodology or a theory "in which the criterion of the truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive".^[3]

In an old controversy, rationalism was opposed to empiricism, where the rationalists believed that reality has an intrinsically logical structure. Because of this, the rationalists argued that certain truths exist and that the intellect can directly grasp these truths. That is to say, rationalists asserted that certain rational principles exist in logic, mathematics, ethics, and metaphysics that are so fundamentally true that denying them causes one to fall into contradiction. The rationalists had such a high confidence in reason that empirical proof and physical evidence were regarded as unnecessary to ascertain certain truths – in other words, "there are significant ways in which our concepts and knowledge are gained independently of sense experience".^[4]

Different degrees of emphasis on this method or theory lead to a range of rationalist standpoints, from the moderate position "that reason has precedence over other ways of acquiring knowledge" to the more extreme position that reason is "the unique path to knowledge".^[5]

I think that's a very useful dive into the meaning of that section, but I do think there will remain an important distinction between the realities of things, which we detect through the senses, and our opinions about them, which can only be expressed through words, and which will always include the possibility of error mixed in to those opinions. Otherwise there would be little need to have made the point, since he had already in section 37 made the point about the importance of clarity.


Because in the end what is the implication of the distinction? I'm not sure what the answer to that question would be, but maybe the most obvious possibility is that inquiries about things can be settled through reference to the things themselves, but that inquiries about words are always ultimately matters of convention and opinion, wherein again error can take place. (it occurs to me to ask, "There are errors other than lack of clarity, correct?")

Camotero:

First I want to totally agree with you that these issues are contextual, and that each person can only pursue the pleasure that is available to them under their particular circumstances, which includes all sorts of things including health, age, and all the issues of what is going on in surrounding society. So I do not in any way intend to be disapproving of someone who lives a quiet and selfcontained life, even subsistence farming as an example, if in fact that is their personal choice and that is all that is open to them.

The main concern that I have which you are seeing is that I think that for most people in most places, a life of subsistence farming is NOT all that is open to most people, nor would most people voluntarily choose to limit themselves to a life of subsistence farming when other options are available. Again, if any individual truly does wish to live that way then I would say more power to them for it, but in my experience that is not the way most people are wired by nature. In my experience most people agree with the formulation from Torquatus as to the best life:

"The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement."

Of course in this context I also always cite Vatican Saying 63: "Frugality too has a limit, and the man who disregards it is like him who errs through excess."

To me, the clear implication of knowing that life is short and then for an eternity we no longer exist is that we should use the time we have to achieve the "most pleasure possible." Now of course that needs all kinds of scare quotes and qualifications, because we are also looking to experience as little pain as we can as the price of that pleasure, but all of us as humans are going to experience pain, and we all have to make our own calculation as to what price we are willing to pay to achieve the pleasures we would like to achieve.

There are definitely some people who are so averse to pain of any kind that they are willing to live a life of subsistence farming, valuing tranquility and stillness etc, and if they truly wish to do that then that is the life they "should" pursue so far as I can see under Epicurean philosophy.

But by no means is that life just described the only kind of life that is valid under Epicurean philosophy, because in my experience most people are willing to put up with significant pain in order to achieve significant pleasures. That's the way I see life - when you only go around once, you should enjoy life to the best extent you can. That means doing far more than subsistence farming (my catchall term for the most tranquil life in this discussion) and being willing to accept the effort and pain that such a life requires.

And that leads me to the concern that I observe frequently -- that while it is very easy for me to accept and say that the tranquil subsistence life is fine for those who wish to pursue it, those who think that Epicurus elevated "tranquility" as the highest good are very very disapproving (an understatement) of the idea that pursuing pleasure in the manner described by Torquatus is acceptable under Epicurean philosophy.

And that is my diagnosis of why there is so much reluctance to accept "Pleasure" as the goal set by Epicurus in the normal meaning of that word. And thus one result is that even those who admit that "pleasure" is a term that Epicurus used then resort to redefining "pleasure" so that it means something that is not recognizable to an ordinary person -- they turn it into a variant of stoicism.

So let me comment on "things under our control." Certainly Epicurus held that it is smart not to concern ourselves too much with things that are not under our control. The fact that we are going to die is probably an example, but even there Epicurus didn't advise that we block death from our mind - on the contrary he emphasized that it is important to remember that life is short. Why? For many reasons, but I think that one of the reasons is to remind us to "make hay while the sun shines" -- to pursue pleasure while life is available to us to pursue it.

As to this question:

Quote from camotero

This confuses me a bit. Why would an Epicurean would think of trying to erect something to replace religion which is, almost by definition, aimed at the masses and with the greatest scope possible, hence making it analogous to “public” work, and something we should refrain of engaging in.

I think that this is the reason that the last ten PD's are devoted to "justice" and to comments on preferred living situations. And it's why Cassius Longinus participated in the Roman Civil War. And it's why Epicurus and the school devoted so much time to pamphleteering and working to expand their circle of friends. It's because humans are social beings, and we get our greatest pleasures, and greatest safety, through associating with like-minded people.

There's nothing intrinsically "wrong" with being like the Turk and essentially sticking his head in the sand in many ways - the problem with his lifestyle in many situations is that the world doesn't leave us alone, and we have to organize our friends to maintain our safety. If we fail to do that, then we are essentially choosing to make no effort whatsoever to effect what IS often at least somewhat within our control. And of course the perils of doing that are clear - we will frequently fall prey to robbers and wars and enemies of all kinds which we might well avoid if we take precautionary action to monitor what is going on around us and - for example - get out of the way of oncoming armies before they strike.

I'll conclude for now by agreeing again that it is impractical and therefore a bad idea to try to "change the world." But the issue of what part of the world we CAN have influence over is very complex and varies by individual, and it seems to me absolutely wrong to imply (as Debotton does, in my view) that there is a single best life for everyone, and that everyone should essentially look for a cave to dwell in.

Exactly what motivates his perspective would be a very speculative thing to pursue, but for now I'm firm in thinking that regardless of what de Botton's motivation may be, what he is describing is not accurate Epicurean philosophy as we can reconstruct it from the historical record.

Hicks: https://archive.org/stream/livesof…ge/564/mode/2up

And Yonge: https://archive.org/stream/TheLive…e/n447/mode/2up

Inwood and Gerson, Epicurus Reader:

That will be great Don and thank you. It looks like the version I quoted is Bailey from his "Extant Remains":

Another comment on Voltaire -- I have the impression that we might want to start a thread devoted to him - (maybe this one should be it) so we can dive deeper into his views.

I have the impression that the context of religious oppression can be so bad for some people that they focus exclusively on attacking religion and their current societal problems without paying much attention to what they would erect to replace it as a way to organize society. Seems to me that Epicurus didn't do that and was much wider in his scope of attention.

So maybe if someone has a general background in Voltaire that they could start us off in discussing him that would be good too.

This video reminded me why I personally *REALLY* react negatively to Alaine de Botton. (I"ll check the spelling later).

On the other hand, Voltaire has always interested me, but I've not read him closely enough to know whether this take is accurate or not.

There's clearly a part of it that I agree is Epicurean, especially in the high-level perspective that most people have absolutely no control or ability to influence the world in general, so that it makes no sense to spend your life worrying about trying to change "the world," or however you define accurately the sphere that is indeed beyond your ability to influence.

But I think do Botton carries his quietism WAY too far, and from my hearing his voice tends to revel in the advice to "sit down, give up, tune out, give in" --- in tone that makes me think that de Botton is only to happy to "give out" this advice to others while not following it himself.

I don't think Epicurus was guilty of inconsistency on these points, because I don't have the same view of Epicurus that de Botton apparently does. I think Epicurus DID say that we needed to work as hard as we can to live as pleasantly as possible,, which includes not obsessing about things beyond our control, but also means working as hard as we can to control things that ARE within our ability to influence. And that last part is the message that I NEVER hear in this video or in De Botton's other work. It is as if he is a master propagandist for the "power class" of the world, reveling in this philosophy because it creates compliant sheep for De Botton and his intellectual elite to order around like farm animals.

"Tending your own garden" may sound like a reflection of something Epicurus might have said, but I don't recall anything that is actually recorded in the texts as being so specifically "quietist" - so I think messages like this are much more destructive than helpful.

[But I don't aim this at you camotero! I think it's hugely helpful to discuss material like this, which in my view presents the majority / academic viewpoint, so we can each come to terms with what we think is the bad and the good of it. Certainly Epicurus did say some things that can be interpreted in this direction, so we have to each of us have a method of understanding and incorporating *everything* Epicurus said so that we have a firm grasp of the whole philosophy.]

As far as Epicurus going back and forth, sometimes using logical arguments focused primarily on refuting Plato and the logical arguments of others, vs sometimes focused more practical through the use of real-life examples, this passage from the Biography by Diogenes Laertius may be relevant:

Quote

The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined. Of investigations some concern actual things, others mere words. This is a brief summary of the division of their philosophy and their views on the criterion of truth.

I agree with you I think Don, and I do see a distinction between long-term and longest time.

I also think that there is a possibility that this phrasing may be another targeted argument against Plato, and you'll recall that DeWitt discusses this as a point of contention, that Plato had argued that another reason that pleasure could not constitute the goal is that it is not always present (not continuous being the implication):

This first is from page 66

So while I agree with you again that there's a logical distinction between long-term vs longest, and duration of pleasure is certainly a legitimate consideration, I think this one may be parallel in nature to "absence of pain" - it may need to be "compartmentalized" as a logical rejoinder to an anti-Pleasure argument from Plato and the usual suspects, and as a result handled carefully outside that context, so as not to overstretch its application.

I am glad you posted that because otherwise I would not have gone back and looked up these sections in DeWitt, which I remembered only vaguely.

I think I am only now after 10+ years realizing the significance of some of these sections from DeWitt, and after our discussions here and in the Lucretius podcast. I read the words here, and I thought I understood them the first time, but it's really beginning to sink in to me how DeWitt is pointing out that Epicurus was both the ultimate pragmatist, and disdainful of dialectical logic, but also at the same time he responded directly to Plato in logical terms, playing Plato's own game. I think this explains some of the difference in interpretation that I still have in discussing these things with some other people. I am going to have to be more careful to both point out the inadequacies of "logic" while at the same time point how how Epicurus uses "logic" himself, as carefully as any of the Stoics or Platonists did -- just like DeWitt observed.

And ultimately that's my best argument against the "absence of pain passages" - that they are logical points being made in the context of refuting the anti-Platonic arguments, but were never intended to represent the full picture of the nature of pleasure any more than geometry or map-making can represent true reality - they are useful for discussing aspects of reality but they aren't reality themselves. So it may be that the "continuity" issue fits in the same category.

Here's a response worth preserving, and my response to that:

AT:

I do hope we can calm down those people who keep telling us that epicureans somehow prioritise short-term pleasure over long-term pleasure. I believe that deeply embedded in Epicurus’ thinking is the assumption that pleasure should be measured over an entire lifetime. Therefore anything that generates pleasure now while building up pain later is not a rational choice.

Cassius:

Andy thanks for the comment. I do think your first sentence is spot on, but I am afraid we can't count on "calming down" many of those outside the group - we seem to live in a sea of people who either (1) see Epicureans as "hedonists" in the common derogatory meaning of that word, or (2) see Epicureans as proto-stoics who prize "tranquility" above pleasure. It's going to be a constant struggle to point back to the texts and point out that Epicurus held clarity to be of prime importance, so that when he used the word "pleasure" he didn't actually mean "comatose." But the "struggle" is definitely worth it as this is the kind of philosophic exchange which can be both enjoyable and productive at the same time.

Interestingly enough on your second and third sentences, I used to say exactly the same thing myself, but I am no longer thinking that "an entire lifetime" is really the precise point, unless you qualify that "entire lifetime" might be very short. It's hard to escape that conclusion due this very clear statement in the letter to Menoeceus: "(But the wise man neither seeks to escape life) nor fears the cessation of life, for neither does life offend him nor does the absence of life seem to be any evil. ***And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.***

I think that second sentence rules out a flat preference for "length of time of pleasure" as overruling all other factors. Epicurus was pretty precise that "the most pleasant" is the way to weigh the question, rather than the longest period of time. And I think we can see the logical basis of the point if we think about it. If we consider anything that is "outside of pleasure itself, such as "noble pleasures" or "virtuous pleasures" or "longest pleasures" then we logically put ourselves in the position of needing to understand the nature of "nobility" or "virtue" or "time" and that is going to require wisdom or knowledge of those other factors in addition to pleasure.

That's the logical trap set by Plato in the Philebus which you can find by reading that dialogue. Once you admit that there is a standard by which to measure pleasure that is different from pleasure itself, you box yourself in (logically, that is) to admitting that this other factor is as important as is pleasure. Once you admit that this other factor is "as important" then Plato will show you, logically again, that what you really need is knowledge of this mystical art of judging, more so than pleasure itself.

So from a practical point of view, definitely all of us judging our own lives are going to consider how long our future pleasures will last, and how long our future pains will last, and consider that in making our judgments. But one of the reasons we are here, and one of the main ways we end up understanding Epicurus and being able to fight off the attacks of those who elevate virtue or something else to the role of "ultimate good," is to study what Epicurus was saying and see that he was both practical and an expert at logical argument.

And what he was saying is clear: the ultimate good cannot be defined "universally" in more detail that "Pleasure." It's up to each of us in our own lives to come to terms with what that means to us, and apply it accordingly. That might mean choosing to live very simply and live so as to savor every last drop of a 100+ year life. Or it might mean, if we are so inclined at age 25, to strap a rocket to our back and fly to Mars so as to experience the delight of that experience, even if we know that the price will be we'll be dead in a year.

There's no way "logically" to make that decision as a universal for everyone. Nature does do it for us; nature leaves it up to us to do it. Everyone has their own personality and their own judgment about these things, and that's why I think Epicurus phrased things the way he did, and that's why this sentence and the others quoted above are very precise and do not provide a qualifier to the word "pleasure":

"We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil. "

Aristotle the Oracle Monger is a good one to read in full - its the source of the "strike a blow for Epicurus" line that I feature on the home page.