Posts by Cassius

Yes I think you are documenting how Gosling & Taylor are ultimately not with Epicurus themselves, but insist on following the party line. I think you are exactly right as to where it would lead.

My main thought I guess is that G&T had enough intellectual honesty / perception to publish what ought to be obvious to most anyone - that the mainstream view of Epicurus is nonsense. But they don't have enough "courage" (or something, I don't want to paint with too broad a brush) to adopt Epicurus' views themselves. The pull of the consensus Academy / Reason / Humanist position (and who knows what else) is too strong for them to break free entirely. Quite possibly they realized that even writing what they did would set them back in their profession -- I see this book cited or mentioned VERY infrequently, even though it seems to be head and shoulders the most thorough and best-researched on the topic.

I think what I am reading there is their attempt to square Epicurus with Aristotle and I agree that it fails. But if what is disturbing to you is 18.3.19 then I think I might have a different take. I have never considered ataraxia and aponia to be statements of the ultimate end, but simply adverbs that go along with successfully have overcome disturbances and pain while in the process of pursuing the pleasures that make like worth living. So if your concern is that he is demeaning aponia and ataraxia then I think that doesn't bother me as much, for that reason. If "pleasure" is the goal then a series of particular pleasures from day to day is what is being pursued, with ataraxia and aponia being derivative descriptions that are really only useful from the point of view of semantics and debating with Platonists when that is necessary (which hopefully isn't often).

Is that the part that you find disturbing? I am afraid I got distracted this afternoon so I may have lost the train of thought.

At danger of making a point that is too minute to be of general interest, I want to point something out that I think should be incorporated. We rarely spend much time discussing "images" and their impact. The topic of images seems very strange, and as we haven't reached it in the Lucretius podcast yet I haven't re-read Lucretius on it lately. But in re-reading the Nikolsky article I see how he emphasizes how pleasures of all kinds seem to involve an impact on the living thing (impact from outside) so we should probably keep the involvement of images in mind when we do deep thinking about this topic. I remember the joking between Cicero and Cassius to the effect that some Epicureans seemed to think that "spectres" were factors that influenced us to all sorts of things.

At the very least, all this confirms in my mind that pleasure involves the motion of atoms, which should never really be questionable, and thus there is nothing really "static" about it

I forgot one unfortunate aspect of the Nikolsky article - in general, he does not translate his Latin and Greek. At some point I'd like to compile the translations and attach them to our copy to make it easier for people to read.

This is PART, but not all, of what I am remembering. I am remembering that G&T document somewhere how a mental process such as "gladness of mind" is a kinetic pleasure. If "Gladness of mind" is not a static pleasure, then I once again emphatically hold that I hardly can imagine what IS a static pleasure, and I can't imagine how I would have a use for them - much less that they are the "highest good."

It has been too long since I read this article. Very well written, very persuasively argued, in my humble opinion. If I were looking for a pantheon of modern commentators who I would rank near to DeWitt in terms of their contributions to "rediscovering" Epicurus, Nikolsky would be on the short list.

Ok great comments and witticisms!

Thanks for the Lucian link. A full mediawiki-based page - very good!

I was hoping you would include the precise sentence about "experiencing everything" as i have not yet had time to look at it. Thinking only about your formulation, and of course purely speculating, I would wonder whether the "experience everything" part might be a reference to what the same idea that Epicurus expressed (through DL) about the wise man FEELING HIS EMOTIONS MORE DEEPLY than others, and this being no hindrance to his wisdom. Surely DL would not have conflated a similar thought into something antagonistic, but at this point I am pretty much committed to the view that most (if not all) of these guys possessed at least normal intelligence, and even if they were disposed to be witty and thus subjecting themselves to the possibility of being misunderstood, if they took a position on something surely it had at least a colorable position in what normal people think of as fact. To totally eliminate mental / emotional enjoyment from pleasure would seem to be so counter intuitive that I question whether that could be true.

Seems to me we have to constantly deal with the ambiguities in words like "bodily" and "mental" given that if we take the Epicurean view that there is no "spiritual" or "divine" realm, then ultimate all the workings of our minds are also "bodily" as well (unless he makes the specific opposite point, which I don't see). Then there's the question of "atoms" or "elements" vs "bodies," and of course Epicurus didn't use the term "emergent property" as best I can tell, so it's hazardous to take a position on these distinctions without a lot of clear evidence. And in the absence of clear evidence indicating a counterintuitive position, I am thinking that it makes sense to interpret everything in a way that a "normal person" would think it would be meant, unless there's clear evidence otherwise. And is there really clear evidence that Aristippus emphatically held that good memories, or planning for the future, is not pleasurable? (asking that rhetorically, not at you Don).

So much in there:

1. Yes the duration issue is of great significance since I think it is natural for us to presume that length is the key or supreme element and it is pretty clear that Epicurus did not hold that. So much implied there that it definitely deserves detailed treatment.

2. "18.1.5 Per Epicurus, kinetic pleasures are those which accompany a change from pain to its removal. Static pleasures are those of conditions where pain is absent, and with it any cause of change. Quite generally, pleasures cannot increase in degree beyond the point of removal of pain, only in type."

This may be a quote and may or may not be true as to Epicurus (I tend to doubt it) but I recall reading somewhere in G &T that the wider view was that any pleasure involving ANY kind of change (not just replenishment) was considered to be kinetic. Perhaps that was from an earlier section but I tend to think that the Epicurean nature of atoms constantly moving means that nothing is essentially static and so I question whether Epicurus would even have considered "static" to be a legitimate category. I am pretty sure the book contains good material somewhere supporting the view that kinetic implies ANY KIND of change, even moving the focus of the mind from one thought to another, so if someone comes across that reference and can pull it out and highlight it so we can find in the future I would appreciate it.

Perhaps that is in Nikolsky but I think it is somewhere in G&T.

" As far as I can see, Aristippus advocated for his followers to experience *every* pleasure"

Do you think so? I have not read the material closely enough to agree or disagree. But on its face that position would seem to be difficult to reconcile with real life, so I wonder if that allegation (that *every* pleasure should be experienced) was true or a slander.

Welcome to Episode Twenty-Five of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

Before we start, here are three ground rules.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, which may or may not agree with what you here about Epicurus at other places today.

Second: We aren't talking about Lucretius with the goal of promoting any modern political perspective. Epicurus must be understood on his own, and not in terms of competitive schools which may seem similar to Epicurus, but are fundamentally different and incompatible, such as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, and Marxism.

Third: The essential base of Epicurean philosophy is a fundamental view of the nature of the universe. When you read the words of Lucretius you will find that Epicurus did not teach the pursuit of virtue or of luxury or of simple living as ends in themselves, but rather the pursuit of pleasure. From this perspective it is feeling which is the guide to life, and not supernatural gods, idealism, or virtue ethics. And as important as anything else, Epicurus taught that there is no life after death, and that any happiness we will ever have must come in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Now let's join the discussion with today's text, beginning at approximate line 250 of the Latin edition:

(For an Outline of where we have been so far in past discussions, click here.)


Daniel Browne:

Besides, were all motion of the seeds uniform, and in a straight line, did one succeed another in an exact and regular order, did not the seeds, by their declining, occasion certain motions, as a sort of principle, to break the bonds of fate, and prevent a necessity of acting, and exclude a fixed an eternal succession of causes, which destroy all liberty, whence comes that free will, whence comes it, I say, so sensibly observed in all creatures of the world who act as they please, wholly rescued from the power of fate and necessity? That will by which we are moved which way soever our inclination leads us? We likewise forbear to move, not at any particular time, nor at any certain place, but when and where our mind pleases; and without doubt, the will is the principle that determines these motions, and from whence all motion is conveyed to the limbs. Don't you observe, when the barriers of the lists are thrown open of a sudden, the eager desire of the horses cannot start to the race with that celerity as their mind requires? Because the spirits, or particles of matter that maintain the course, must be got together from all parts of the body, and stirred through every limb, and fitly united, that they may readily follow the eager desire of the mind. You see then the beginning of motion rises in the heart, proceeds then by means of the will, and is thence diffused through every limb over the whole body.

But the case is otherwise, when we act as we are compelled by force by the prevailing power and the great violence of another, for then we feel plainly that the whole weight of our body moves, and is urged on against our consent, ‘til our will restrains the motion through all our limbs. Don't you see now that though an outward force drives us on, and often compels us to proceed against our will, and hurries us headlong, yet there is something in the heart that resists and strives against that compulsion, at whose command the spirits or particles of matter are forced through the nerves into the several limbs and members, and are curbed likewise by the same nerves, and obliged to retire backwards.

Wherefore you must needs confess there is something else beside stroke and weight which is the cause of those motions from whence this innate power of our will proceeds. We see nothing can arise from nothing, for weight, which is natural to bodies, hinders us to conclude that all things are moved by stroke or outward force, and lest the mind should seem to act by some necessary impulse within itself (this is, by motion that proceeds from weight) and overpowered, be compelled, as it were, to bear and suffer, this is occasioned by ever so little a declination of the seeds, which however is done at no certain or determinate time or place.

Nor was the mass of matter ever more close or more loose, nor did the number of seeds ever increase or diminish, and therefore the same course in which the seeds move now, the same motion they had for the time past, and they will be carried on hereafter in the very same manner, and the things that have been hitherto produced shall be formed again in the same way; they shall come into being, grow, and arrive at perfection, as far as the laws of their respective natures will admit. For this universe of things no force can change, neither is there any place into which the least particle of matter may fly off from the whole mass, nor is there a place from whence any new seeds may break in upon this All, and so change the nature of things and disorder their motions.

There is nothing wonderful in this, that when all the principles of things are in continual motion the whole should at the same time seem to be at perfect rest, though every particular body has a sort of motion peculiar to itself, for the nature of first seeds is so subtle that they lie far beyond the reach of our sense. And therefore, since you cannot perceive them by the eye, their motions are much less to be discerned, especially, as we observe many things are discovered to us by our sight whose motions we cannot perceive, by being placed at a remote distance from us. For often the wooly flock upon a hill wander about, and crop the tender grass, wherever the sweet herbs crowned with pearly dew invite. The lambs, their bellies full, wantonly play and try their tender horns. All this to us standing far off appears confused, and like a steady white spread over the green. And this a mighty army fills the plain, and moves about, and acts a real fight - the horse scour over the field and wheel at once, and in the center charge, and shake the ground with mighty force. The blaze of arms darts up to heaven, all the earth around glitters with brazen shields, and groans beneath the feet of men engaged. The neighboring hills, struck with the noise, rebound it to the skies. Yet place yourself upon a mountain-top to view this wild confusion, and you'd think it was a fixed and steady light that filled the plain.

Munro:

Again if all motion is ever linked together and a new motion ever springs from another in a fixed order and first-beginnings do not by swerving make some commencement of motion to break through the decrees of fate, that cause follow not cause from everlasting, whence have all living creatures here on earth, whence, I ask, has been wrested from the fates the power by which we go forward whither the will leads each, by which likewise we change the direction of our motions neither at a fixed time nor fixed place, but when and where the mind itself has prompted? For beyond a doubt, in these things his own will makes for each a beginning and from this beginning motions are welled through the limbs. See you not too, when the barriers are thrown open at a given moment, that yet the eager powers of the horses cannot start forward so instantaneously as the mind itself desires? The whole store of matter through the whole body must be sought out, in order that stirred up through all the frame it may follow with undivided effort the bent of the mind; so that you see the beginning of motion is born from the heart, and the action first commences in the will of the mind and next is transmitted through the whole body and frame.

Quite different is the case when we move on propelled by a stroke inflicted by the strong might and strong compulsion of another; for then it is quite clear that all the matter of the whole body moves and is hurried on against our inclination, until the will has reined it in throughout the limbs. Do you see then in this case that, though an outward force often pushes men on and compels them frequently to advance against their will and to be hurried headlong on, there yet is something in our breast sufficient to struggle against and resist it? And when ,too, this something chooses, the store of matter is compelled sometimes to change its course through the limbs and frame, and after it has been forced forward, is reined in and settles back into its place.

Wherefore in seeds too you must admit the same, admit that besides blows and weights there is a cause of motions, from which this power of free action has been begotten in us, since we see that nothing can come from nothing. For weight forbids that all things be done by blows through as it were an outward force; but that the mind itself does not feel an internal necessity in all its actions and is not as it were overmastered and compelled to bear and put up with this, is caused by a minute swerving of first beginnings at no fixed part of space and no fixed time.

Nor was the store of matter ever more closely massed nor held apart by larger spaces between; for nothing is either added to its bulk or lost to it. Wherefore the bodies of the first-beginnings in time gone by moved in the same way in which now they move, and will ever hereafter be borne along in like manner, and the things which have been wont to be begotten will be begotten after the same law and will be and will grow and will wax in strength so far as is given to each by the decrees of nature. And no force can change the sum of things; for there is nothing outside, either into which any kind of matter can escape out of the universe or out of which a new supply can arise and burst into the universe and change all the nature of things and alter their motions.

And herein you need not wonder at this, that though the first-beginnings of things are all in motion, yet the sum is seen to rest in supreme repose, unless where a thing exhibits motions with its individual body. For all the nature of first things lies far away from our senses beneath their ken; and therefore since they are themselves beyond what you can see, they must withdraw from sight their motion as well; and the more so that the things which we can see, do yet often conceal their motions when a great distance off. Thus often the woolly flocks as they crop the glad pastures on a hill, creep on whither the grass jeweled with fresh dew summons and invites each, and the lambs fed to the full gambol and playfully butt; all which objects appear to us from a distance to be blended together and to rest like a white spot on a green hill. Again when mighty legions fill with their movements all parts of the plains waging the mimicry of war, the glitter then lifts itself up to the sky, and the whole earth round gleams with brass and beneath a noise is raised by the mighty trampling of men and the mountains stricken by the shouting reecho the voices to the stars of heaven, and horsemen fly about and suddenly wheeling scour across the middle of the plains, shaking them with the vehemence of their charge. And yet there is some spot on the high hills, seen from which they appear to stand still and to rest on the plains as a bright spot.

Bailey:

Once again, if every motion is always linked on, and the new always arises from the old in order determined, nor by swerving do the first-beginnings make a certain start of movement to break through the decrees of fate, so that cause may not follow cause from infinite time; whence comes this free will for living things all over the earth, whence, I ask, is it wrested from fate, this will whereby we move forward, where pleasure leads each one of us, and swerve likewise in our motions neither at determined times nor in a determined direction of place, but just where our mind has carried us? For without doubt it is his own will which gives to each one a start for this movement, and from the will the motions pass flooding through the limbs. Do you not see too how, when the barriers are flung open, yet for an instant of time the eager might of the horses cannot burst out so suddenly as their mind itself desires? For the whole store of matter throughout the whole body must be roused to movement, that then aroused through every limb it may strain and follow the eager longing of the mind; so that you see a start of movement is brought to pass from the heart, and comes forth first of all from the will of the mind, and then afterwards is spread through all the body and limbs.

Nor is it the same as when we move forward impelled by a blow from the strong might and strong constraint of another. For then it is clear to see that all the matter of the body moves and is hurried on against our will, until the will has reined it back throughout the limbs. Do you not then now see that, albeit a force outside pushes many men and constrains them often to go forward against their will and to be hurried away headlong, yet there is something in our breast, which can fight against it and withstand it? And at its bidding too the store of matter is constrained now and then to turn throughout the limbs and members, and, when pushed forward, is reined back and comes to rest again. Wherefore in the seeds too you must needs allow likewise that there is another cause of motion besides blows and weights, whence comes this power born in us, since we see that nothing can come to pass from nothing. For weight prevents all things coming to pass by blows, as by some force without. But that the very mind feels not some necessity within in doing all things, and is not constrained like a conquered thing to bear and suffer, this is brought about by the tiny swerve of the first-beginnings in no determined direction of place and at no determined time.

Nor was the store of matter ever more closely packed nor again set at larger distances apart. For neither does anything come to increase it nor pass away from it. Wherefore the bodies of the first-beginnings in the ages past moved with the same motion as now, and hereafter will be borne on for ever in the same way; such things as have been wont to come to being will be brought to birth under the same law, will exist and grow and be strong and lusty, inasmuch as is granted to each by the ordinances of nature. Nor can any force change the sum of things; for neither is there anything outside, into which any kind of matter may escape from the universe, nor whence new forces can arise and burst into the universe and change the whole nature of things and alter its motions.

Herein we need not wonder why it is that, when all the first-beginnings of things are in motion, yet the whole seems to stand wholly at rest, except when anything starts moving with its entire body. For all the nature of the first-bodies lies far away from our senses, below their purview; wherefore, since you cannot reach to look upon them, they must needs steal away their motions from you too; above all, since such things as we can look upon, yet often hide their motions, when withdrawn from us on some distant spot. For often the fleecy flocks cropping the glad pasture on a hill creep on whither each is called and tempted by the grass bejewelled with fresh dew, and the lambs fed full gambol and butt playfully; yet all this seems blurred to us from afar, and to lie like a white mass on a green hill. Moreover, when mighty legions fill the spaces of the plains with their chargings, awaking a mimic warfare, a sheen rises there to heaven and all the earth around gleams with bronze, and beneath a noise is roused by the mighty mass of men as they march, and the hills smitten by their shouts turn back the cries to the stars of the firmament, and the cavalry wheel round and suddenly shake the middle of the plains with their forceful onset, as they scour across them. And yet there is a certain spot on the high hills, whence all seems to be at rest and to lie like a glimmering mass upon the plains.

For anyone reading this thread, this is the heart of the Nikoslky argument, which is something he says that he researched after reading through the arguments of Gosling and Taylor. Full article is here.

Also as to method I think we have to acknowledge that not every person in every situation is a good prospect for becoming an Epicurean. They could be and should be, if started early enough, but at some point the thought patterns become so entrenched that there's just no going back and rebuilding at the appropriate ground level.

So that means that I think we spin our wheels uselessly when we focus all our time on "Academic" types who have already spend much of their lives pursuing other paths. No doubt some of them are open to rethinking things, but the issues we address are so emotional that of the academic class, if they haven't already gotten to the point where there realize the value of the Epicurean perspective (even if they don't realize that it is Epicurean) then they probably are not going to be able to do anything other than resist it since it conflicts so strongly with their core beliefs.

I know that's a broad brush and there will be many individual exceptions, but I'm saying this from a general "strategy" perspective of how it makes sense for most of us to spend our time.

I know I get a lot more "satisfaction" and "pleasure" in talking to people who are intelligent but new to Epicurus, and who want to take it seriously in their own lives, rather than debating committed Stoics or those of other philosophies who simply want to compare relatively obscure details without ever being open on the basic issues. That's a significant part of what is frustrating in talking to confirmed Stoics, although NEW stoics, who don't yet realize where Stoicism really leads, are often receptive.

Quote from Don

And I think I see your perspective on those last points. So then which comes first: The realization that pleasure is worthy of pursuit? Or the realization that there's no afterlife and it's acceptable to then pursue pleasure in the here and now? Or do they arise together? Or do we build each up as on the "Canon, Physics, Ethics" tripod? If this, then that. This isn't a criticism of your points. I'm just working through how we arrive at answers to those questions you posed. This is why I think it's important to see Epicurus's context and thought process in opposing the Cyrenaics and what they disagreed with in his philosophy. How did we get where we are?

To address this specifically I would say this:

I don't think that we can understand the nature of pleasure without first having a basic understanding that the universe is natural and not supernatural, and I don't think we can understand that without a basic framework of knowledge in which we accept that it is correct to have confidence in certain conclusions, even though we will never have all of the detailed evidence we would like to have. Both of those concerns can be addressed with some basic Epicurean arguments as to the physics and to the senses and the role of reason. Once you are then clear that there is no possibility of a supernatural god or an absolute virtue, then it becomes clear that feeling (pleasure) is the appropriate guide of life. I think they all go hand in hand, with the best approach being what I gather Epicurus held about being clear and being quick to make the important points at first (rather than hiding the point like Socrates). Then the details are expanded in outline form to the extent that the individual person has time and inclination to pursue them.

Those are great points and questions Don.

You know what explains and motivates some of my most recent thinking, and these comments?

I always seem to come back in my mind to the concern that I think Epicurus intended his philosophy for pretty much EVERYONE who has any brainpower whatsoever. I think it's inherent in the "outline" model that he referred to explicitly that we ought to concentrate most of our time and effort on the "big picture" items that are the most significant to us as real people living real lives, and that we aren't just "academics" pursuing knowledge for the sake of knowledge.

That means that I think it's kind of a trap - a type that Cicero and other anti-Epicurean philosophers intentionally laid and set - for us to be so fascinated by the details that we fail to accept and apply the immediate issues of most profound significance. I enjoy it is as much as anybody else, but so long as we act like we are college students in an advanced philosophy class, the human world spins by outside the windows in total unawareness or even hostility toward what we are discussing inside. And we miss the experiences and the accomplishments that we ought to achieve were we fully engaged in the world.

Maybe I think that this is one of the real purposes of the academic viewpoint that wisdom or scholarship itself is the highest kind of life. Maybe I think that we're in a matrix of the sort that Marx accused religion of being - the "opiate of the people." Maybe the endless debates over word structures and points that are of less significance, and which are almost impossible to resolve, is the "opiate of the educated" which keeps US in our box and away from full engagement with the world.

So I always come back in the end to the idea that we should be asking "what are the most important points?" and "how do we convey these to other people who should be our friends?" and "how do we therefore begin again what the ancient Epicureans were in the process of doing before their world was overwhelmed with totalitarian monotheist religion?"

I think that discussing and debating the details that we are doing now is a critical part of the process, so we can in fact understand how to describe the major outline. But unless we find the time and the energy and the organization to do both at the same time, we're still trapped in that Platonic cave because we're not translating our findings into action. It's as if we are so mesmerized by "knowledge" or "science" - which are themselves "unlimited" and can never be fully achieved in a human lifetime, that we forget the fundamental point that we have to use our limited lifespans as productively as possible.

I suspect both the ancient Epicureans and the Cyreniacs would agree on that point, and that they would tell us something like:

"Look at the world around you! PUT ASIDE the details such as whether memories are pleasant for the time being. Your life is short, you are surrounded by people who are actively working to suppress you and your friends and your views of the universe and the true end of life. How do you expect to live pleasantly if you don't accept that reality and form a plan to deal with it? Just don't sit around thinking and debating about details - ACT on the main points -- like we did!"

Episode 23 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available:

Quote from Don

which suggests to me that DL was either positively inclined toward Epicurus or was at least not hostile

Right - I agree with that -- but positively inclined in a way that for example James Warren might be -- because he sees Epicurus through a lens of post and non-Epicurean thought, as perhaps the best of the group, but part of the group, and not as a revolutionary against the group.

Quote from Don

My impression had always been that DL is basically a compiler, pulling in anecdotes that interest him from disparate source

Right I agree with that too, but compiling by means of a framework of analysis that is not Epicurean, and therefore tends to distort what he is reporting. Again I point to the Nikolsky analysis of the "Division of Carneades" which appears to influence the active/static analysis. This isn't something that we would be free from ourselves - we have our sensitivities and our training today and we too look for things that we think ourselves to be most important, and tend to analyze that way. It's a natural issue.

I don't really disagree with most of the last paragraph either, except that I think in my own situation the answers to the questions I listed are of the most extreme practical importance to how to apply pleasure. If there is an afterlife, if there is a supernatural god, if there is absolute virtue, etc, then the game of pleasure totally changes. We would then look to those other factors to determine how we should evaluate and pursue pleasure, and probably reach totally different conclusions than we would under and Epicurean framework.

The more I read this Aristippus material, and our discussion of it, the more concerned I am about relying on the face value of Diogenes Laertius' interpretations.

Even if we are not seeing the result of DL forcing things into anachronistic / stoic-influenced boxes, as per the criticism in the Nikolosky article, to which they do not belong, I think there is a worse problem.

The fact that both the Cyreniacs and Epicurus identified pleasure rather than wisdom or virtue or holiness as the goal of life is the real point of overwhelming significance. It is the elephant in the room against which all other details fade almost into insignificance.

While the additional details are interesting for us to know, they should not be allowed to take our eye off the main focus and things that ought to always be the main focus. For example, what did the Cyreniacs hold about:

1 = is there an afterlife?

2 = is there a supernatural creator / ruler?

3 = is there an absolute virtue?

4 = what did they teach about the senses and the nature of "truth" and "knowledge" and platonic forms or essences?

5 = is the universe infinite and eternal, is the earth at the center of it, is there life elsewhere including higher beings?

Yes the goal of pleasure would be right up there near the top of this list, and the answers to some of these may exist still, but the answers to these questions will have at least as much practical impact on general view of life and ways to pursue pleasure as will issues such as whether memories are pleasurable.

Of course this is "the Greeks on Pleasure" so the focus is naturally on pleasure, but its still necessary to keep perspective and realize that anyone who dethrones virtue and reason and religion as the goal of life and replaces them with pleasure is already choosing for themselves probably the most critically important marker.

Quote from Godfrey

that he incorporated pleasure into the Canon and thereby made it a criterion rather than an abstraction.

Not only incorporated it, but by doing so gave it an elevated position that most people think should be occupied to "logic" and that seems to be only slightly less irritating to the academics than dethroning "god" is to the religionists!

It would be worth thinking about how "liberty" might be evaluated by Epicurus given his views on justice. I don't immediately have an Epicurean text reference but surely the Epicureans would have been aware of one of the most memorable Socratic passages on "liberty":

Nay,” replied Aristippus, “for my part I am no candidate for slavery; but there is, as I hold, a middle path in which I am fain to walk. That way leads neither through rule nor slavery, but through liberty, which is the royal road to happiness.”

which is followed by:

“Ah,” said Socrates, “if only that path can avoid the world as well as rule and slavery, there may be something in what you say. But, since you are in the world, if you intend neither to rule nor to be ruled, and do not choose to truckle to the rulers

— I think you must see that the stronger have a way of making the weaker rue their lot both in public and in private life, and treating them like slaves. You cannot be unaware that where some have sown and planted, others cut their corn and fell their trees, and in all manner of ways harass the weaker if they refuse to bow down, until they are persuaded to accept slavery as an escape from war with the stronger. So, too, in private life do not brave and mighty men enslave and plunder the cowardly and feeble folk?”

“Yes, but my plan for avoiding such treatment is this. I do not shut myself up in the four corners of a community, but am a stranger in every land.”

“A very cunning trick, that!” cried Socrates, “for ever since the death of Sinis and Sceiron and Procrustes¹ no one injures strangers! And yet nowadays those who take a hand in the affairs of their homeland pass laws to protect themselves from injury, get friends to help them over and above those whom nature has given them, encompass their cities with fortresses, get themselves weapons to ward off the workers of mischief; and besides all this seek to make allies in other lands; and in spite of all these precautions, they are still wronged.

But you, with none of these advantages, spend much time on the open road, where so many come to harm; and into whatever city you enter, you rank below all its citizens, and are one of those specially marked down for attack by intending wrongdoers; and yet, because you are a stranger, do you expect to escape injury? What gives you confidence? Is it that the cities by proclamation guarantee your safety in your coming and going? Or is it the thought that no master would find you worth having among his slaves? For who would care to have a man in his house who wants to do no work and has a weakness for high living?

[Note: this would probably be a good thread to let grow long and detailed, rather than splitting out the details such as our discussion on the Cyreniacs. The book is devoted to them all, so we can raise initial discussions about the chapters here, and then branch off to different threads or forums later as needed. This thread / book is probably the most comprehensive treatment of the whole subject of pleasure so this thread can be a long one.]

More comments:

9- "He laid down as the end the smooth motion resulting in sensation."

This is such a brief statement and I have to question whether there are subtleties that don't come through:

1. So "the end" is what is being discussed? Is this the same as the "highest good" or what Torquatus describes in "On Ends" as "We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else."
2. If so, where is the word "pleasure" in this formulation?
3. Why the word "sensation" rather than pleasure?
4. Is this a statement that pleasure IS a sensation, specifically the sensation of smooth motion?
5. Is this a way of getting around the problem of defining what specific pleasure is being discussed, which is a stumbling block in so many ways (ie, when people here "pleasure" they seem to immediately think of particular pleasures rather than the abstraction of "the feeling of pleasure" or "pleasure.")

10 - I come back to this passage as having profound implications: "They alsohold that there is a difference between "end" and"happiness." Our end is particular pleasure, whereas happiness is the sum total of all particular pleasures, in which are included both past and future pleasures."

11 - "Nor again do they admit that pleasure is derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. For they assert that the movement affecting the mind is exhausted in course of time." <<< Seems clear to me that there is more going on here than meets the eye!

12 - "Hence, although pleasure is in itself desirable, yet they hold that the things which are productive of certain

pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness appears to them a most irksome business." << This seems to me like an uncharitable characterization. I also question the "of a painful nature" - A thing having a "nature" of pleasure?

13 -"They affirm that mental affections can be known, but not the objects from which they come; and

they abandoned the study of nature because of its apparent uncertainty, but fastened on logical inquiries because of their utility." <<< What do we know about the Cyreniacs and atomism? Were they essentially Platonists in physics? If so then that has huge implications.

14 -- "Further that the wiseman really exists." << This has got to be an example of something that was referring to an existing argument which makes no sense without the context.

15 - "They also disallow the claims of the senses, because they do not lead to accurate knowledge. Whatever appears rational should be done." << This does not sound promising at all.