Posts by Cassius

Quote from Godfrey

I would begin with natural or unnatural, and eliminate the unnatural desires.

Quote from Kalosyni

I'm not sure if the labels of "natural, necessary, unnecessary, unnatural" are workable for me. I like to use more words to explore things, and here is an example:

Comparing what Godfrey wrote with what Kalosyni wrote, I expect most of us are going to agree on the benefits of both methods of analysis.

The differences appear to me to come out with Godfrey's "I would begin...." because the point of division seems to be mostly the question of where to start.

Do you start with hedonic calculus analysis, or do you start with natural and necessary analysis?

No doubt some will want to say that it doesn't matter but for someone who is new to the philosophy or who just wants to be intellectually rigorous, it will matter.

In fact, a major difference came out last night, in that one view is that if we can determine that a desire is neither natural nor necessary, then there is no reason to consider evaluating that action according to the hedonic calculus. That's because it is the point of view of some that we would NEVER under any circumstances pursue a desire that is neither natural nor necessary. In our meeting last night we had specific disagreement on that.

Thank you Cleveland Oakie for taking the time to write up that review and adding it here!

In researching other issues I came across this article by David Sedley: Inferential Foundations of Epicurean Ethics

While I have some issues with the first section, but that's only a brief summary of Epicurean ethics and not essential to the main point of the article. The main part thrust of the article is to examine how Epicurus constructed his argument that in ethics good and bad divides into pleasure and pain in much the same way that in physics everything int he universe divides into bodies and space.

Sedley agrees with DeWitt in pointing out that we need to be careful in interpreting Cicero as to "the highest good." Sedley writes: "The phrase summum bonum occurs literally hundreds of times in Cicero’s philosophical writings, yet it is by no means clear to me what Greek term it could represent. "

Here's the full section:

Quote

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Now as far as the actual expression summum bonum is concerned, there is nothing new or surprising about finding it here. Pleasure was introduced at the outset, back in the Cradle Argument, as the summum bonum, and pain as the summum malum. The phrase summum bonum occurs literally hundreds of times in Cicero’s philosophical writings, yet it is by no means clear to me what Greek term it could represent. Expressions like ‘the ultimate good’ (to eschaton tōn agathōn) and ‘the primary good’ (to prōton agathon) are far too rare in Hellenistic philosophy to account for such frequent occurrence. My own guess is that summum bonum is in most cases simply Cicero’s rendition of ‘the good’ (to agathon). When one looks through the contexts in which it occurs, the overwhelming majority are ones in which the mere word bonum would, in the absence of a Latin definite article, have been ambiguous between ‘the good’ and ‘a good’. For instance in the Cradle Argument, where all animals rejoice in pleasure ‘as in the highest good’ (ut summo bono), a mere ‘as in the good’ (ut bono) would have been indistinguishable from ‘as in a good’.²⁸ The addition of summum before bonum neatly removes the ambiguity.

Let us take it, then, that summum bonum in Fin. 1.40–1 just represents ‘the good’. For an Epicurean, to call pleasure ‘the good’ is to label it, if not strictly as the only good thing, at least as the only underivatively good thing, that by courtesy of which other things are good—in other words, the ethical end (telos). But the present passage goes further than that. The thing labelled the summum bonum (and also, more elaborately, the highest (summum) or ultimate (ultimum) or extreme (extremum) of goods, which the Greeks call telos) is not pleasure tout court, but the pleasant life (iucunde vivere, or cum voluptate vivere), the very life amply filled out with a portrayal of the ideal Epicurean. To see what has happened, we need here a distinction between a primitive and a substantive account of the good or the telos. In Aristotle, for instance, the primitive account is simply eudaimonia, or perhaps ‘activity of the soul in accordance with virtue’, while the substantive account would be a detailed analysis of this as acted out in the civic life, the contemplative life, or both. What has happened in the course of Torquatus’ speech is not a shift in the meaning of summum bonum, but a shift from the primitive to the substantive specification of what it consists in. Is this legitimate? How can Torquatus assert that the Epicurean life is the best possible life, when he has not yet even dealt with the question whether virtue has a place in it; or with the relation of mental to bodily pleasure; or with the lessons of physics for dealing with fear of death and god; or with the function of friendship?

But regardless of that, the more pressing point is that we may well have been locked by the term "highest good" into thinking that Epicurus advocated for some particular pleasure as the goal and that there are a larger number of "inferior" pleasures that should be flatly avoided.

To me the more likely alternative is that Epicurus was, as Sedley states, looking first to establish what is good vs what is bad in blanket terms, in the same way he offset bodies vs space in blanket terms, and only thereafter is it significant to look at the implication of further details.

I unfortunately have to point out that Sedley disagrees with Gosling & Taylor's "Greeks on Pleasure" as to the katastematic/kinetic issue, and that means he would also disagree with Emily Austin's position in "Living for Pleasure" (Chapter 4 Note eight) where she wrote:

This is a non-specialist text, so I have chosen not to wade into the dispute about katastematic and kinetic pleasures in the body of the text. A specialist will recognize that I am adopting a view roughly in line with Gosling and Taylor (1982) and Arenson (2019). On my reading, katastematic pleasures are sensory pleasures that issue from confidence in one’s ability to satisfy one’s necessary desires and an awareness of one’s healthy psychological functioning; choice-worthy kinetic pleasures are the various pleasures consistent with maintaining healthy functioning, and those pleasures vary, but do not increase healthy psychological functioning. (emphasis added)

In fact in this section Sedley says flatly that "Katastematic pleasure is the absence of pain." I very much disagree with that and think it is far too overbroad, because it explicitly states that they are the same thing. Following the argument in the rest of Sedley's article, I would argue that Epicurus' analysis follows the pattern of contrasting bodies against space, and that he then sets off pleasure against pain. I would say that if Sedley wanted to discuss kinetic and katastematic pleasure within this article at all, he should have said:

"Pleasure is the absence of pain. Of the pleasures, Epicurus mentions two categories, kinetic and katestematic, the first of which requires stimulation, the other of which does not require stimulation..... He could then have proceeded to further discussion from there. That would have preserved the main point of the article, which is that just as in physics Epicurus establishes first and foremost that everything divides into bodies and space, in ethics Epicurus establishes first and foremost that everything divides into pleasure and pain.

We've discussed this article many times in the past, with mixed reviews, but we don't have a separate thread devoted to it. This will serve that purpose. The article itself can be found in our filebase here. The occasion for posting this thread today is in regard to one of the major premises of the work, that the "lack of a definite article" in Latin, and/or other factors, led Cicero to use "summum bonum" in ways that have proved to be misleading.

DeWitt starts off his article "The aim of this writing is to show how the lack of a definite article in Latin obliterated the doctrine of Epicurus that life itself and not pleasure is the greatest good. It will also be shown how the recovered doctrine serves to explain certain verses of Maecenas."

DeWitt packs a lot into that first sentence, and the question of whether we should conclude "life itself and not pleasure is the greatest good" is one that would have to examine what exactly is meant by "life itself" and "pleasure" and "greatest" and "good." No doubt anyone who examines each of those words closely will profit from the exercise. But that's not the point I'm going to examine in this post.

What I want to add into our discussion mix on this topic is that DeWitt is not alone in pointing out the difficulties in translating Greek to Latin and how to express "the" - implying highest or greatest or preeminent" vs. "a" - implying "one among many."

The same point was raised and discussed by David Sedley in his article "Inferential Foundations of Epicurean Ethics." In a sentence that will shock some:

"The phrase summum bonum occurs literally hundreds of times in Cicero’s philosophical writings, yet it is by no means clear to me what Greek term it could represent. "

Here's the full section from Sedley:

Quote

Now as far as the actual expression summum bonum is concerned, there is nothing new or surprising about finding it here. Pleasure was introduced at the outset, back in the Cradle Argument, as the summum bonum, and pain as the summum malum. The phrase summum bonum occurs literally hundreds of times in Cicero’s philosophical writings, yet it is by no means clear to me what Greek term it could represent. Expressions like ‘the ultimate good’ (to eschaton tōn agathōn) and ‘the primary good’ (to prōton agathon) are far too rare in Hellenistic philosophy to account for such frequent occurrence. My own guess is that summum bonum is in most cases simply Cicero’s rendition of ‘the good’ (to agathon). When one looks through the contexts in which it occurs, the overwhelming majority are ones in which the mere word bonum would, in the absence of a Latin definite article, have been ambiguous between ‘the good’ and ‘a good’. For instance in the Cradle Argument, where all animals rejoice in pleasure ‘as in the highest good’ (ut summo bono), a mere ‘as in the good’ (ut bono) would have been indistinguishable from ‘as in a good’.²⁸ The addition of summum before bonum neatly removes the ambiguity.

Let us take it, then, that summum bonum in Fin. 1.40–1 just represents ‘the good’. For an Epicurean, to call pleasure ‘the good’ is to label it, if not strictly as the only good thing, at least as the only underivatively good thing, that by courtesy of which other things are good—in other words, the ethical end (telos). But the present passage goes further than that. The thing labelled the summum bonum (and also, more elaborately, the highest (summum) or ultimate (ultimum) or extreme (extremum) of goods, which the Greeks call telos) is not pleasure tout court, but the pleasant life (iucunde vivere, or cum voluptate vivere), the very life amply filled out with a portrayal of the ideal Epicurean. To see what has happened, we need here a distinction between a primitive and a substantive account of the good or the telos. In Aristotle, for instance, the primitive account is simply eudaimonia, or perhaps ‘activity of the soul in accordance with virtue’, while the substantive account would be a detailed analysis of this as acted out in the civic life, the contemplative life, or both. What has happened in the course of Torquatus’ speech is not a shift in the meaning of summum bonum, but a shift from the primitive to the substantive specification of what it consists in. Is this legitimate? How can Torquatus assert that the Epicurean life is the best possible life, when he has not yet even dealt with the question whether virtue has a place in it; or with the relation of mental to bodily pleasure; or with the lessons of physics for dealing with fear of death and god; or with the function of friendship?

So to close this post I'm not sure that in "The Summum Bonum Fallacy" DeWitt adequately makes his case that we should consider "life" to be "the higest good." To me it's clear that DeWitt is right that Epicurus has vastly expanded the field of what the word "pleasure" covers, but the objection most of us have made in the past is that you need to say something like "all parts of life that are not painful" to adequately specify "the good." Maybe it's possible to collapse that into the dual choice of "life" vs "death," and line that up just like Epicurus lines up atoms vs void and pleasure vs pain.

But regardless of that, the more pressing point is that Sedley and DeWitt agree that there is a major issue involved when we interpret Epicurus through Cicero and potentially other Latin writers. We may well have been locked by the term "highest good" into thinking that Epicurus advocated for some particular pleasure as the goal and that there are a larger number of "inferior" pleasures that should be flatly avoided.

To me the more likely alternative is that Epicurus was, as Sedley states, looking first to establish what is good vs what is bad in blanket terms, in the same way he offset bodies vs space in blanket terms, and only thereafter is it significant to look at the implication of further details.

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Note: I unfortunately have to say that Sedley's article referenced above has seven sections. I think the last six sections are generally excellent. However the first section is intented to provide just a brief summary of Epicurean ethics and I find that part very unsatisfying. Sedley states in the first section that he disagrees (or at least he did disagree at the time he wrote this many years ago) with Gosling & Taylor's analysis of kinetic and katestematic pleasure. That means he would also disagree with Emily Austin position in "Living for Pleasure" (Chapter 4 Note where she wrote:

This is a non-specialist text, so I have chosen not to wade into the dispute about katastematic and kinetic pleasures in the body of the text. A specialist will recognize that I am adopting a view roughly in line with Gosling and Taylor (1982) and Arenson (2019). On my reading, katastematic pleasures are sensory pleasures that issue from confidence in one’s ability to satisfy one’s necessary desires and an awareness of one’s healthy psychological functioning; choice-worthy kinetic pleasures are the various pleasures consistent with maintaining healthy functioning, and those pleasures vary, but do not increase healthy psychological functioning. (emphasis added)

In fact in this section Sedley says flatly that "Katastematic pleasure is the absence of pain." I very much disagree with that and think it is far too overbroad, because it explicitly states that they are the same thing. Following the argument in the rest of Sedley's article, I would argue that Epicurus' analysis follows the pattern of contrasting bodies against space, and that he then sets off pleasure against pain. I would say that if Sedley wanted to discuss kinetic and katastematic pleasure within this article at all, he should have said:

"Pleasure is the absence of pain. Of the pleasures, Epicurus mentions two categories, kinetic and katestematic, the first of which requires stimulation, the other of which does not require stimulation..... He could then have proceeded to further discussion from there. That would have preserved the main point of the article, which is that just as in physics Epicurus establishes first and foremost that everything divides into bodies and space, in ethics Epicurus establishes first and foremost that everything divides into pleasure and pain.

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But the point of THIS thread is to set up discussion of the DeWitt article. I'll set up a separate thread for the Sedley article.

In tonight's Zoom we went at length into the question posed in the title to this thread, but I need to explain the background. First, it appears that there is a division of opinion about whether "Hedonic Calculus" analysis is more fundamental and primary, or whether "Natural and Necessary Desire" analysis is more fundamental and primary. In other words,

1. Does one analysis come before, or override, or overrule the other?
2. Do you start with one analysis and then bring the other into play only if a possible activity "passes the test" of the other one first?

One reason this question arose is that in section 33 of Part V of Tusculan Disputations, Cicero discusses Epicurus' position on several ethical questions. Some of this review is plainly sarcasm, but much of it seems to be accurate. (And for purposes of this analysis let's refer to the LOEB/KING translation, which Bryan tells us is more accurate than the Yonge translation, as discused in another recent thread.)

Here's the section. I think most of us will agree that except for the snide remarks implying inconsistency by Epicurus, what's stated here is actually a pretty good summary of the Epicurean position. The point of this thread is not to attack Cicero's analysis but to raise another question.

Cicero goes first to the Natural and Necessary analysis and indicates its usefulness.

Then, in the sentence that begins "The whole teaching of Epicurus about pleasure is that pleasure is, he thinks, always to be wished....."

The reason for this post is in part because this section section is almost a stand-alone / restart-from-the-beginning statement of Epicurean ethics, and Cicero doesn't really explain the linkage between what he has just given in the "natural and necessary analysis" to this new "hedonic calculus" analysis.

It was suggested at the meeting that the reason for Cicero placing natural and necessary first here is that Cicero is wanting to emphasize a more "moral" view of Epicurean pleasure as part of Cicero's own plan of arguing in favor virtue. That may or may not be the reason, or may be a part of the reason, but the way Cicero presents the order of the argument here helps highlight a question that we've talked about many times before, and takes us back to the questions posed above:

1. Does one analysis come before, or override, or overrule the other? Does Epicurus mean for our analysis to be: "Start by asking whether desires are natural, necessary, or neither. If you can determine that a desire is neither natural nor necessary, STOP -- there is no need to ask whethe it might lead to more pleasure or less pain by pursuing it."
2. If so, then the conclusion is that Epicurus teaches us to always apply first the natural/necessary test, and only consider the hedonic calculus if the proposed activity "passes the test" of the natural/necessary filter.

There was significant dissent to that position in our meeting, with some observing that if that perspective were correct, then one is not really following Epicurus if they don't understand and apply the natural / necessary filter BEFORE worrying about hedonic calculus.

Please give us your thoughts!

On of the most on-point quotes on Eplcurean confidence. Cicero is intending it to be a slam, but coming from an Academic Skeptic like Cicero, anyone who takes a position on anything of sustance is a raving madman!

Quote

Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus! “I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato's Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortuneteller the Pronoia (which, we may render ‘Providence’) of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fire; these are the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream.

Velleius From On The Nature Of The Gods - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

Episode 317 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week our episode is entitled: "The Epicurean System of Counterbalancing In the Pursuit of Pleasure"

[media]https://www.spreaker.com/episode/69538630/media

I'm taking the title of today's episode from the fact that both Yonge and King translate "system of counterbalancing" as the best English version of the Latin in section 33:

Totumque hoc de voluptate sic ille praecipit, ut voluptatem ipsam per se, quia voluptas sit, semper optandam expetendamque putet, eademque ratione dolorem ob id ipsum, quia dolor sit, semper esse fugiendum ; itaque hac usurum compensatione sapientem, ut et voluptatem fugiat, si ea maiorem dolorem effectura sit, et dolorem suscipiat maiorem efficientem voluptatem, omniaque iucunda, quamquam sensu corporis iudicentur, ad animum referri tam en;

Thank you Bryan! King's version makes much more sense to me.

In this week's episode, part of what we discuss is the following section from XXXIII which was new to Joshua and me when we came across it. In tonight's 20th Zoom there was a general idea that this is likely referring to sex / romantic relations, but all ideas will be appreciated.

There are two things going on here: (1) is that there's a significant difference between the Yonge and Loeb translations of the sentence before the one we're referring to ("and seem rather for lessening the number of them" vs. "yet all the same look out for a plentiful supply of them," where Yonge and Loeb seem to be at odds, and

(2) the sentence that contrasts "birth position and rank" to beauty, age, and shape." (the Loeb version) on which point Yonge largely agrees, but the question is "what exactly are they talking about?

Here's a video suggested to me by a forum participant. It's not Epicurean specifically or philosophy-oriented in general. However think the attitudes and issues discussed here would be very good to think about for anyone considering how Epicurean philosophy can lead to greater confidence in everday life:

A Special Birthday Greeting To James!

Today is not only the Twentieth of January, and a time of the year close to Epicurus' birthday, but it is the birthday of a 14-year-old who I don't know personally but am told (by his father) was introduced to Epicurus by my "Catius' Cat" poem some years ago.

I understand he is very much into Science, which is great, and also Math, which can also be good when kept on a tight leash! No doubt the story of Polyoenus is relevant here, and I think Frances Wright was likely correct when she wrote in "A Few Days In Athens" that Epicurus did not tell him to give up his studies so much as to be sure they were kept in proper proportion:

Quote from Frances Wright - A Few Days In Athens - Chapter 9

“With regard to the sciences, if it be said, that they are neglected among us, I do not say that our master, though himself versed in them, as in all other branches of knowledge, greatly recommends them to our study but that they are not unknown, let Polyoenus be evidence.

“He, one of the most amiable men of our school, and one most highly favored by our master, you must have heard mentioned throughout Greece as a profound geometrician.”

“Yes,” replied Theon, “but I have also heard, that since entering the garden, he has ceased to respect his science.”

“I am not aware of that,” said Leontium, “though I believe he no longer devotes to it all his time, and all his faculties. Epicurus called him from his diagrams, to open to him the secrets of physics, and the beauties of ethics; to show him the springs of human action, and lead him to the study of the human mind. He taught him, that any single study, however useful and noble in itself, was yet unworthy the entire employ of a curious and powerful intellect; that the man who pursued one line of knowledge, to the exclusion of others, though he should follow it up to its very head, would never be either learned or wise; that he who pursues knowledge, should think no branch of it unworthy attention; least of all, should he confine it to those which are unconnected with the business, and add nothing to the pleasures of life; that further not our acquaintance with ourselves, nor our fellows; that tend not to enlarge the sphere of our affections, to multiply our ideas and sensations, nor extend the scope of our inquiries. On this ground, he blamed the devotion of Polyoenus to a science that leads to other truths than those of virtue, to other study than that of man.”

The issue of proportion is similar to the issue of timing, and that occurs to me as something to stress to a young person. While the goal of happiness through "pleasure" applies at any age, there are things that you can do only when you are young. I understand Martin has gone Zip-lining recently so's he's helping push the boundaries there, but certainly there are things like "having children" that can only be done before a certain age.

Diogenes of Oinoanda dedicated his inscription in part to future generations, and Epicurus provided for the children of Metrodorus and for the continuance of his school far into the future. In case that needs to be made plain, he didn't just say: "Ok guys and gals when this current generation is gone the school can go ahead and shut down because we will have accomplished all that needs to be done!"

So I want to say how much I appreciate hearing that someone as young as James has taken an interest in Epicurus, and I hope that will continue. I'm also aware that the daughter of Amrinder Singh (a member of the group who lost his life while properly pursuing a happy life that included ultralight aircraft), and I hope there are others. We need more children introduced to Epicurus both in our own families and beyond.

As a practical matter it's my goal in 2026 and beyond to make sure we at Epicureanfriends are focusing on introducing younger people to Epicurus. That would be right in line with Epicurus himself and Diogenes Laertius and I feel sure every other true Epicurean in the ancient world.

Torquatus: "Epicurus, then, was not destitute of learning; but those persons are ignorant who think that those studies which it is discreditable for boys not to have learnt are to be continued till old age."

One more thought / question on this point:

If we were to add a separate subforum on "Rhetoric" at some point (and not just under Philodemus) would that be clearly more appropriate for the "Ethics" section, or is it possible that it should be considered under "Canonics?"

That in itself is possibly an interesting discussion. Is part of the problem with "rhetoric" that it is being asserted to be a standard of truth? Or is it clearly and distinctly an issue of Ethics/Politics?

For the time being we'll move this to "On Rhetoric" because on first read that seems to me to be the focus of much/most of it.

Thanks again Eikadistes for writing so much about this. Maybe this will help in the "jelling" of exactly what it is that Philodemus' "On Rhetoric" is all about.

I think we have more of a fix on "Dialectic" being damaging because of it being an effort to allege that truth can be determined separately from the senses, just by playing word games and bouncing words off each other.

I don't think I can summarize what is meant by "Rhetoric" (or even whether "all rhetoric is bad(?)" nearly so easily. On that latter point, it seems Epicurus is pretty negative toward "dialectic" across the board (correct? maybe not?).

Is Epicurus also so negative about most/all aspects of "rhetoric?" Or is there "good/useful rhetoric" and "bad/destructive rhetoric?"

Oh this is excellent Ekiadistes thank you!

As to these first comments let me say:

1 - It's a long article.

2 - It's a difficult subject.

3 - It examines Philodemus' "On Rhetoric" which I find very difficult to process despite it existing in fairly well preserved form.

4 - Since I haven't really digested Philodemus on this topic I can't say that I've processed very well what Eikiadistes says here either.

However I will say that I don't think at least on first glance that it gets anywhere near violating our "No Politics" rule.

Seems to me this is a topic that deserves much more attention over time so I'll probably more it to some subforum of "Ethics" where we can eventually begin to deal with whatever implications the ancients found to be so interesting in this topic of "Rhetoric."

OK I read it. I won't echo "fascinating" but I'll certainly give it credit for "well-written" and "holds interest."

That said, I don't see why the whole issue isn't pretty much the same question as something like "what is the physical nature of thought or dreams?" or "does the brain work electrically, and if so, how long can the electrical function continue after the heart stops pumping?"

The article stays largely neutral, but even entertaining certain questions about the supernatural gives some of the positions a credence I don't think they deserve.

The field of studying the physical nature of thoughts and dreams is certainly valid and fascinating, and could lead to identifying consciousness as something in the brain that could lead to all sorts of "brain transplants to vats" and "vats to robots" and all sorts of possibilities that has in the past been explored in science fiction.

There's a section in the article about brain activity being stimulated by waves or something coming from outside, and I can see that possibility as being involved at least in part analogously to a form of magnetism or other radiation that is being received and processed by the brain:

That is a key tenet of the parapsychologists’ arguments: if there is consciousness without brain activity, then consciousness must dwell somewhere beyond the brain. Some of the parapsychologists speculate that it is a “non-local” force that pervades the universe, like electromagnetism. This force is received by the brain, but is not generated by it, the way a television receives a broadcast.

The brain being stimulated by something outside the brain like the eyes are by light or ears by sound seems to me to reasonable. In fact being influenced from the outside seems not only reasonable but likely, and that seems to me to be pretty much what Epicurus was saying about the brain receiving "images" directly. I gather there is already a lot of reproducible science about the brain being affected by cell phone radiation and other "electrical" influences.

But to take that outside stimulation and jump to the conclusion that "consciousness must dwell somewhere beyond the brain" seems to me to be going way too far and to be a non-starter.

You're definitely right that if we presume death is the shutdown of ALL systems then that answers the question. But the statements of Epicurus do not appear to be so sweeping - they focus on the end of "sensation" as sufficient to answer the question.

I think that the most obvious concern arises from the possibility that if Epicurus is focused only on "sensation" then what does that mean. Is the end of sensation sufficient to establish that absolutely no unpleasantness can occur after death? If consciousness exists totally independently from sensation, and an continue independently without any "new sensation" input, then the possibility would exist that consciousness could continue to rehash old experiences (old pains) from old sensations. If so, then someone might argue that death is not necessarily the complete insulation from all future unpleasantness.

There are various ways to deal with this question, but I do think the question is a valid one to ask. At least it will arise in the minds of some people given the way some people look at consciousness today as inexplicable and mysterious.

Probably related to this as well would be to consider the relationship between "the five senses" and "the feelings" and "the anticipations." Can or do the "feelings of pain and pleasure" and "the anticipations" function without "the five senses"?

In Dewitt's book he talks about them being dependent upon one another while not being identical.

That probably works, but we also don't want to be sure to steer clear of mystical "three in one" allegories.

In our conversation on the zoom there was considerable talk of consciousness being able to reflect upon "past" sensations without needing "new sensations" for added content. From that perspective, consciousness / awareness might be able to continue for some period of time without new inputs from the five senses.

But that doesn't "seem" to be the way that Epicurus was thinking in his statements, does it?

Joshuas list of words relevant to consciousness:

In our Zoom discussion of January 18 2026 we deviated from Lucretius and examined a question that Raphael raised in a video here. The title of the thread seems to be the best way to summarize the issue, but during the course of the discussion several other ways arose:

1. Can consciousness exist without sensation?
2. Does the end of (new) sensation bring the end of consciousness?
3. Does consciousness continue after sensation ends?
4. When Epicurus says that death is the end of sensation, does "end of sensation" in and of itself mean that consciousness ends at death?
5. What does Epicurus say about consciousness?
6. From the Sorites perspective: When you go down the list and subtract each of the five senses, is anything left of consciousness?
7. How does the Epicurean theory of images relate to this question? Can the mind receive images even when all five bodily senses are inactive?
8. Is "consciousness" a modern idea which the ancients would dismiss as a regression in thought?

In the end a lot revolves around "can consciousness exist without sensation?" but asking the question the other ways helps focus on the subtleties.

In the most practical of terms of immediate interest to the "study and promotion of Epicurean philosophy," however, the issue involves how Epicurus meant to be understood in PD2 and the letter to Menoeceus:

PD02. Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us.

Letter to Menoeceus: Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation.