Posts by Cassius

Oh. my. gosh. If you come across anything further on that, now we have a thread for it!

I envision one of many desirable options would be to commission something in a format roughly like this,which has fewer but bolder lines:

That seems to me to be much easier to duplicate in small size or different formats that trying to digitally convert the 3d picture of the seated figure. I think the seated figure could also be done in this format if the artist stylizes the design and finds a way to emphasize the face/head features.

That example comes from here:

https://www.fiverr.com/komangj/create…ler_online=true

But to truly pursue this intelligently I am thinking that it is desirable to take the time to read through many profiles of many artists and hopefully find someone whose thinking and disposition might be at least somewhat consistent with Epicurus (for example I doubt it would make sense to commission someone whose specialty is islamic art, or fundamentalist christian). And of course in checking the existing samples we can more easily find someone who has done something in the past like we are thinking about.

I will get started looking through the options but surely if anyone else has thoughts or time to invest looking for options, please post.

Others that strike me as talented:

https://www.fiverr.com/monocrom_id/dr…ler_online=true

https://www.fiverr.com/saifullahali99…ckg_id=1&pos=10

https://www.fiverr.com/thinmandsg/dra…pckg_id=1&pos=5

https://www.fiverr.com/jpbravomalo/dr…ckg_id=1&pos=12

https://www.fiverr.com/rezaramadhan98…pckg_id=1&pos=7

https://www.fiverr.com/masrxyan/draw-…ckg_id=1&pos=40

I have split off my posts on Commissioning Original Epicurean Artwork because I think that's actually a different subject than the laser / engraving issue.

The laser engraving / wallhanging format probably deserves its own thread. The subject of finding or creating artwork that might be used as the basis for such a project is separate, since that artwork can be used in many different formats.

Ok there are a huge variety of options at that link, and no doubt it just takes research (time) to go through the list and find artists who seem to be targeting the type of "look" that would be desirable to have. I am going to split this into a new thread.

Also I would think an important part of any such commissioning project would be to be sure that "we" (or whoever commissions) gets the legal right to duplicate / distribute.

Certainly it would be desirable to get core artwork that can be released under some kind of GPL license that is free to everyone to use. However I would not want to foreclose or discourage the idea of an individual undertaking a project method to recover costs, or even (gasp) make a profit of some kind. If that's what it takes to bring good results into fruition, then whatever method works best.

It's been a constant frustration to me over the years that I don't personally have even the most basic artistic talent to produce sketches of any of the major art subjects. I think that that's in part why I have always gravitated toward these sketches made early on from the Herculaneum discoveries -- I particularly like this "look" in the face/eyes of Epicurus, and the format lends itself to easier reproduction - but it's still not a "line sketch" we would be more easily translatable digitally.

I download every version of Epicurus I ever come across, but not many seem to have a lot of "sketch" potential. Perhaps the "stamp" version might convert well, and it's a pretty good likeness.

This color version might also have some potential, but I expect one of the first two would do best.

However I would love to get a good sketch version of the full statue that Elli is talking about, but i have a feeling that it would almost require reworking it from scratch to get something that really works as "art."

I know there must be artists who are good at quick sketches who we might even be able to "commission" to do the job, but I've never made any progress.

I am going to check here: https://www.fiverr.com/categories/gra…oons-and-comics

Quote from camotero

P4 "The universe consists of atoms and void" so the soul is composed of atoms. Is somebody willing to ellaborate on this point?

I think Don hit that one well. The issue is that everything that exists either does, or does not, have the ability to be "touched" and occupy space, or else is the space that is being occupied. And when we say everything, "everything" includes whatever it is that you'd like to call the soul (if it exists) because if something cannot occupy space then it does not by definition exist. It's important to observe that of course we can't sense things as small as atoms, so this argument is ultimately a logical one, but one that comports with the evidence that we ARE able to detect with our senses. This is the point DeWitt emphasizes when he says that Epicurean philosophy is not strictly "empiricism" in the sense that it demands everything to be directly observable by the senses. Atoms aren't directly observable, and neither did Epicurus argue (like some modern empiricists) that everything must come to us from the five senses.

Quote from camotero

P5 "Faith was recognized for the first time as a factor in happiness". I guess this will be expanded upon later in the book, but... why does faith play such an important role in Epicurean Philosophy? How is this not contradictory to its materialistic ontology and its empiricist epistemology?

You will see that this kind of "faith" is probably better thought of as "confidence in our conclusions about things which cannot be seen, which we have because the things which CAN be "seen" support our observations, as does our system of thought. We have "faith" that atoms exist even though we have never and will never see them ourselves. As in many cases the subtlety of the word definition is very important and Epicurus uses words sometimes in a different sense than we use them today, plus of course there are issues of translation.

Quote from camotero

P5 The nature of gods, which is presumed to be the topic of the book missing from Lucretiu's poem. What is Epicurean Philosophy's stance on this topic since there is no extant text about it? Or there is?

That's a long and detailed subject which DeWitt will answer best for you. I've done a FAQ here but I suggest you suspend judgment til you read DeWitt's full explanation. https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/index.php?faq/#entry-18

Quote from camotero

P5 The synoptic view of Epicurus and his philosophy are "presented in the form of dogmatic general statements". From my first reading, I remembered some reference about the value of dogma, but I don't know if its this one or another one later on. Dogma doesn't strike me as a constructive thing, let alone in philosophy; is this something that is just asked of the reader at the beginning because of the synoptic view, or is dogma a particularly important part of the philosophy?

By "dogma" here is meant simply that SOME things are knowable in a way that we can be confident or essentially certain about them, following the principles of Epicurean epistemology. Epicurus was not a radical skeptic and did not join them in holding that nothing is knowable. Of course the issue of what IS knowable is tricky, but since he claimed that some things are knowable that makes him a "dogmatist" in the strict definition of the term. I predict that ultimately when you read into this you will not have an issue with it, but you do need to be aware that people who ARE radical skeptics, and who hold that "nothing" should be considered to be "known" are definitely going to find themselves at odds with Epicurus.

Quote from camotero

P7 "He was the first to promulgate a dogmatic philosophy" ... "The distinction of being a dogmatist was naturally not denied him, because it was deemed a demerit, the renunciation of inquiry". This is the part I was referring to (in my comment lines above); I too think that dogmatism is a reunciation of inquiry; how is this not in agreement with Dewitt? Am I understanding something wrong? Why does he propose dogmatism as an argument in favor of the philosophy.

The answer to this is the same as what I typed above. This is another of many important examples where if you project modern terminology on Epicurus you will be very dangerously misled. DeWitt is introducing the topic and will answer it in detail later.

Quote from camotero

P7 Epicurs epistemology is not empiricist in the modern sense, since "he never declared sensation to be the source of knowledge; much less did he declare all sensations to be trustworthy". What is Dewitt refering to when he says "empiricism in the modern sense"?

He is referring (accurately or not, I don't know) to the contention of some philosophers (apparently) that nothing exists which does not enter the human mind through the five senses. DeWitt says that Locke and others took this view, and it is sort of related to the "blank slate" argument too. DeWitt contends (and I think correctly) that Epicurus was a very strong proponent of the use of "reason" to reach conclusions that cannot strictly be validated by direct observation through the senses. (You'll never see an atom, but you should be confident that they exist.)

Quote from camotero

P8 "The mistake is to look upon Epicurus as an effeminate and a mora invalid". My doubt here is not specifically about the philosophy but rather how in this instance and in some other texts stoic texts I've read they refer to femininity (which I take as having a behavior that likens that of women) as a very bad thing. This hasn't aged well. My surprise here is that the one who uses this adjective is Dewitt, as he's not quoting a text of that old period. This doesn't seem to me to be very Epicurean, from what I've understood so far of Epicurus.

There Camotero I think you are again following modern terminology, and this is an area almost like the use of masculine pronouns to denote both male and female. It is no longer considered good form to use the word "effeminate" and you are right that it originated as a slam on women that we would not use today, but the meaning of it was of course things like "cowardly" or "overly emotional" or "unreasonable" so the intent of the word is clear. DeWitt was writing in the early part of the 20th Century so that's a word choice that would not be used today, but it's something we have to deal with. Maybe an even more direct and emotional example would be that Epicurus held slaves, and yet we don't (or I don't anyway) reject his philosophy due to that fact. We can get a lot out of DeWitt without accepting Dewitt's personal choices.

Quote from camotero

P8 Epicureanism "shunted the emphasis from the political to the social virtues and offered what may be called a religion of humanity". "The mistake is to" ... "think of its founder [of the philosophy, Epicurus] as an enemy of religion". Again, religion (for me) is the epitome of dogma; how important is religion to Epicurean philosophy? Does religion here have a different connotation than what it usually means? How is somebody going to be able to learn something different (and change his/her mind to something better) if we argue in favor of dogma and religion?

OK this relates again to the nature of the gods argument. I urge you just to hold that off and suspend judgment until you see how strongly Epicurus held that any "god" is first and foremost NOT supernatural, and that he had a very specific definition of them that I doubt very much you will ultimately have much objection to.

Quote from camotero

P13 "Many anticipations of his teachings may there be identified: for example, the possibility of man's attainment to a life that in respect of quality may be called immortal or divine". Did Epicurus actually used inmortality or divinity as qualities to describe a good life? Isn't this a bit contradictory?

OK this is another question that will be answered as you read the chapter on the true piety. For now I would say that for Epicurus these words are what we would call poetic analogies that are not meant to imply supernatural beings or attributes. However I should note that your reaction to them is part of the reason that Epicurus was concerned about promoting a "true" and alternate version of religion. We do have in our minds ideas that we attach to words like "divinity" and Epicurus wanted those concepts to be useful to us, and not harmful. it is useful to have descriptions such as "worthy of the gods" to describe things of great beauty and pleasure and even awe to us, without polluting those feelings with supernatural nonsense.

Quote from camotero

P13 "Aristotle's study of the embrio seems to have given rise to the doctrine of innate ideas or Anticipations...". It just seems kind of incongruent that they would derive conclusions from things they were unable to sense in any way, and criticize others for doing the same in a different domain. But here I have doubts I may be misunderstanding something.

The issue of anticipations is very complex and you will need to read the detail. But for now this is an example of how Epicurus was not a strict empiricist and did not insist that the five senses are the source of all knowledge. Whether you want to consider this as something like animal instinct (birds migrating) or something else, Epicurus held that living beings are not totally "blank slates" at birth.

Quote from camotero

P15 "he arrogated the title of Sage or Wise Man" and he was capable "of claiming perfection of knowledge, because he had approximated to the life of the gods". What do you think this means?

I think this is Dewitt being a little too poetic. There is a lot of debate about to what extent Epicureanism was a "cult of personality." Epicurus' critics try to make it look like Epicurean philosophy was a "cult." A much more reasonable interpretation is that Epicurus was in fact revered as a father figure, to whom personal appreciation was owed for his accomplishments, and that Epicurus considered that it is good for us to have such "role models" as practical influences in life.

Quote from camotero

P15 He held a presumptuous attitude "virtually imperative for him as thte founder and head of a sect". The term sect to me holds a negative connotation; would you agree to call Epicurus's movement a sect?

Again this is Dewittian language that I would prefer he not have used. DeWitt dearly loves to compare the Epicurean movement to early Christianity, and indeed there is probably "some" justification for that. These kind of references are useful if your audience is going to be composed primarily of Christians, as DeWitt probably expected his book to be. These kind of references are not so useful or helpful to "us" in 2020.

Quote from camotero

P16 Geometry inspired a movement that was romantic; Plato seemed to see in it "absolute reason contemplating absolute truth, perfect precission of concept joined with finality of demonstration". "He began to transfer the precise concepts of geometry to ethics and politics". "Especially enticing was the concept which we know as definition. This was a creation of the geometricians; they created it by defining straight lines, equilateral triangles, and other regular figures. If these can be defined, Plato tacitly reasoned, why not also justice, piety, temperance, and other virtues? This is reasoning by analogy, one of the trickiest of logical procedures. It only holds good only between sets of true similars. Virtues and triangles are not true similars. It does not follow, therefore, because equilatereal traingles can be precisely defined, that justice can be defined in the same way." This makes sense, at least at a glance. But perhaps it could be argued that it still lacks more arguments for proof. I think if this can be further developed by way of examples it could be validated, without the need for mor argumentation. Can you think of any?

I am not sure you bolded anything here but I do have a comment, because this is a subject still going around in my mind and I see it implicit in lots of our conversations. Epicurus was promoting a "philosophy" which includes epistemology and a LOT of his writing is direct sparring with the arguments of Plato/Aristotle and as continued with the Stoics. Epicurus was not anti-science at all, but I think he accepted also that all of us face limits on the direct knowledge that is open to us, and so each of us also have to take a position on questions where we don't have, and never will have, all the direct evidence we would like to have. What do we do in those cases? We develop rules for evaluating the evidence that IS available to us, and we do our best to then apply those rules and have "confidence" in the result, knowing that that's the best we can do.

Quote from camotero

P17 "The quest of a definition, of justice, for example, presumes the existence of the thing to be defined". What would be your answer to the argument that, from this sentence, follows that justice doesn't exist?

Well that is in fact Epicurus' conclusion, in my view. Justice does NOT have a separate existence outside our own personal perspectives of it. Very deep subject but you'll see how it is compelled by the rest of the philosophy.

Quote from camotero

P17 "Hence arose Plato's theory of ideas. The word idea means shape or form and he thought of abstract notions as having an independent existence just as geometrical figures exist, a false analogy". This was rejected as absurd by Epicurus. So... geometrical figures are things that exist, that can be abstractly defined, in terms of its relations with physical things. But the ideas of virtues, don't exist in the physical world. Then, a definition of them, eludes us, because we cannot derive it from observation of their existence in the physical world of atoms and void. Or, so we can try to define them, albeit poorly or in a very limited fashion, in abstract terms, when we observe something in the physical world that we would call is a physical manifestation of said idea, but accepting that the definition can only comprise the observed phenomenon, and hence it cannot be absolute or universal and only related to that one observation?

I am not sure I grasp your question exactly but yes the point is that absolute ideal forms do not exist. PARTICULAR things which we for example label "square" do exist, but the "concept" of a square is an assertion of the human mind, something that we define, not something that Nature itself has established. Virtue is an extreme example of that because at least squares have a relatively simple definition, while "courage" i or "honor" or "wisdom" are very difficult to define and impossible to evaluate outside a particular fact pattern.

That's my first attempt to get started with your questions. Is see in retrospect that I am using DeWitt's / Epicurus' own pattern, I am hitting the high points and leaving the rest to be filled in later, and to the extent you're interested in pursuing particular ones in detail.

Camotero thanks for your work in making that post! I agree with Don's start but you're asking a classic series of questions that will take time to go through and deal with individually, but that's definitely what we will do!

First, as Don says, your questions are a natural result of the "outline" method that Dewitt is using, on the Epicurean model. You are being given big-picture conclusions early on, and in order to be satisfied with them you are going to need to know the details of the argument, but by knowing the outline at first you are better able to see where it goes. Or at least that's the theory anyway -- I do think it is a good one. In the next post I'll respond to the particular points at least in brief.

Thanks for your work Godfrey. I am thinking that the Asklepios is looking pretty good, but that the artist is going to need to do more with Epicurus' face. The hair on Asklepios frames the face well, but the same is harder to say for Epicurus. Currently he looks like he has something stamped on his forehead, and it almost looks like he has three feet, with the whole drawing perhaps looking a little stretched in width so that it would probably look better "narrowed." I know in some of my Epicurus graphics they sometimes get the dimensions off and Epicurus' head can look too wide. Working with the gold original image of Epicurus may be harder than working with a version that has already been somewhat "stylized"

I would expect that Joshua is going to run into similar issues with his ring. I wish we already had some well drawn "sketches" of Epicurus as those probably are easier to work with.

Quote from camotero

This makes me feel uncomfortable on a very deep level. Perhaps it is because I have accepted for a long time as true the concept that universal well-being is achievable.

Camotero:

In making today's recording of the Lucretius today podcast we came across something that I think is similar to this. Here is a passage from where we currently are in Book 2:

Quote from Cassius

Besides, consider well mankind, the scaly fry of silent fish that swim the flood, the verdant trees, wild beasts, the various kinds of birds, such as flock about the banks of pleasant streams, the fountains and the lakes and those who frequent the thick covers of the woods; consider all these in their several kinds, and you will find them all consist of forms different among themselves. 'Tis by nothing else the tender young knows its own Dam, and thus the Dam distinguishes her young, thus we see each creature knows its own kind, no less than men, and so unite together. For often before the gilded temples of the gods a young heifer falls a slain victim beside the alter flaming with incense, and breathes from her heart a reeking stream of blood. The Dam, robbed of her young, beats over the fields and leaves the marks of her divided hoofs upon the pressed grass, and searches every place with careful eyes to find her the young she lost; then stops and fills the branched woods with her complaints, and often returns back to her stall, distracted with the love of her dear young - no more the tender willows, or the herbs freshened with dew, nor can the running streams within the full banks divert her mind, or turn away her care, nor can a thousand other heifers, as they play wantonly over the grass, take off her eye, or ease the pain she feels - so plain it is that she searches for her own, for what she knows full well. And thus the tender kids find by their bleat their horned Dams, and so the sporting lambs know their own flocks, and, as by Nature taught, each hastest to the full dug of its own Dam.

In our discussion of this heart-string-tugging passage, I brought up the issue of ethical treatment of animals / animal welfare or whatever you'd like to call it that motivates some people toward vegetarianism.

In my own mind, I find it hard to separate the thought of animals confined in factory farming, or animals confined in "shelters" waiting to be euthanized, from the plight of humans or society in general, as you're talking about. If I allowed myself to think constantly about factory farming of animals, or animals "shelters" with their euthanasia chambers, or elderly people "warehoused" in nursing homes in various forms of stupor, I simply would not be able to function at all.

Now some people might object that these are different categories of problems, but I don't see them at all differently from the same kind of socially desirable results that you're talking about. And the examples I have mentioned are just the living - what about the uncounted millions of people who have died under terrible circumstances in the past? Do they deserve less thought because they died yesterday or an hour ago, versus those who died a year or a decade or a century ago?

And some are going to say something like "Well, we only do WHAT WE CAN...." as if that provides a bright-line philosophical answer to where to stop worrying or being concerned. I don't agree that "what we can" answers anything whatsoever.

So somewhere we have to come to terms with where to draw the lines with our concerns, or else give up the idea that we ourselves "should" live our own lives in any way whatsoever.

I think that's what Epicurus is forcing us to confront, and I think it's right that we confront the issue, or else we dealing as you say with a dream-like situation that has no connection with reality. So we have to get to the bottom of the question of where and when we draw the line as to where to be concerned, and where to stop being concerned, with other living things.

I think you've correctly focused on the problem as "idealism" but we've all got a lot of work to do about how to understand where the lines should be drawn, and why.

Maybe this section from Lucretius, which we also touched on today, gives a hint, and the hint has something to do with the limits of those things that "touch" us:

Quote from Cassius

For Touch, the Touch (blessed be the Gods above!) is a Sense of the Body, either when something from without enters through the pores, or something from within hurts us, as it forces its way out, or pleases, as the effect of venery tickles as it passes through, or when the seeds, by striking against each other, raise a tumult in the body, and in that agitation confound the Sense; and this you may soon experience, if you strike yourself in any part with a blow of your hand. It is necessary, therefore, that the Principles of Things should consist of figures very different in themselves, since they affect the Senses in so different a manner.

Of course that's a super-broad comment and as we also discussed, "touch" probably here does not really mean "touch" as in the sense "I touch this with my fingers" but something much more broad, as Munro thinks in his notes on this section:

This is to start a thread to encourage those of us who have developed Epicurean-themed wallpapers for desktop of mobile devices to post them here. I personally have not worked on this for quite some time and only made a few very basic ones such as below. These are almost embarrassingly too simple, but I didn't want to start the thread without something. Many of our graphics in the gallery could be used for this purpose, but for general use as a "wallpaper" we're probably talking more about a basic background with some kind of a simple photo or logo. Please post yours in the thread if you have any to share:

Quote from Don

. The US Declaration of Independence states that there are "inalienable" rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

Yes I agree, that formulation is certainly a problem. I don't think enough is known about the development of Jefferson's thought to know how much he was into Epicurus at the time he was involved in the Declaration, but I haven't tried to figure it out. The only way I could consider that reconcilable with Epicurus would be if he were referring to "inalienable" in the sense of the Epicurean/Lucretius doctrine of properties and qualities of bodies, as in the part of Book 1 of Lucretius where several examples are given of things like water being wet, or so forth, and it being impossible to remove the quality without destroying the nature of the thing.

I would definitely think that the common view that he means a set of rights installed and protected by a god or supernatural force is not something that can be squared with Epicurus.

Quote from camotero

So one thing I would add, although, like I said, perhaps is already there, is a conscious and disciplined effort to "catch" these concepts that we normally accept automatically, because of their ubiquitous nature, and the lack of awareness of almost everybody about them.

i very much agree that such an attitude of active thinking and active effort to root out false ideas seems definitely to have been a significant part of the ancient Epicurean attitude. I think that is what people think about in relating Epicurus to the skeptics, in that it is good to have a skeptical attitude toward claims which do not seem to be supported by evidence, but then people get carried away and need to remember that Epicurus does not allege that all knowledge is impossible, just that our conclusions need to be carefully checked and supported.

Quote from Don

People are neither good nor bad. Their actions are neither intrinsically good or bad. Have they harmed someone and gone against the social contract? If so, they deserve punishment. Have they done something "bad" but no one's come to harm. Then it doesn't matter. I can say I think their actions are ill-advised and won't lead to lasting pleasure for them. But, I don't think, I can call them "bad."

I agree with this, but I also know that some people think it is a "word game" to seem to be throwing out the words "good" and "bad" entirely, so I suppose the real point is that those words can be very useful IF they are properly understood to have a subjective basis rather than some kind of mystical supernatural objective nature.

One more thing, as to the wiki --

Like so many other things here I took the bull by the horns and got things started on the wiki, with the idea and hope of collaboration in the future, but not much available help at the time. Anytime anyone would like to engage further and collaborate on any aspect of the wiki or most anything else please let me know and I would be happy to extend those privileges (to people like those in the thread so far, or who come later, who've shown their good faith and interest.)

1- One would think I could spell Epicurean by now -- apparently not!

2 - Camotero I may be missing some of the subtlety of your question and maybe Don or Godfrey or others will answer better, but my first response is that you have to be clear what it means to label someone "bad" (or "good"). I think you're on the right track to see how relative and contextual everything is, and terms like "good" and "bad" as ordinarily viewed are often thought of as absolute, so they are outside the contextual / relative framework, and therefore I think Epicurus would say (and did say) that such absolute standards do not exist. That's pretty much the explicit message of the final ten PDs on "justice." Of course from our individual perspectives it certainly means something to us to consider someone a "Good person" or a "bad person," but if we're being rigorous we have to remember that out judgment comes from assessing that person as "good for us" or "bad for us" (or maybe for particular third persons we're concerned about) rather than "good" or "bad" in general. And then another implication of your question is that we need to realize that since there is no god enforcing any kind of divine or absolute law, judging someone to be "good" or "bad" is going to raise the question "So what?" With an important part of the answer being that since there is no god or absolute standard of right and wrong, it's up to living human beings to be the "enforcers" and to bring about whatever consequences for "bad conduct" are actually going to happen.

Elli has let me know that she is exploring wall decorations for a professional office setting, and she is investigating laser-etched wall hangings such as shown in the photos in this thread.

Elli is looking primarily to produce an etching based on this statue of Epicurus:

With the goal of producing something that looks like this:

Two initial options came out like this:

Elli has found this information about the process: https://www.foteinon.gr/wp-content/upl…PANTOGRAFOS.pdf

A video about the process: https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%…Q6gPcQFOzmQuLfQ

And she has learned that the machine is called pantograph plasma laser and cuts metals. She is asking me if we have any ability to see what something like this would cost in the USA with dimensions of 19 inches X 35 inches.

For anyone who can view it, here are apparently the STL files she is working with:

EpicurusAndAsclepiosSTLfiles.zip

Any thoughts about this will be appreciated!

I found this book because I was reading an introductory section of the Munro translation, and found this praised highly on page 20 of his notes:

It can be downloaded for free here: https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?…LSOQ0t8ELT-tHIA

or

https://www.google.com/books/edition/…tsec=frontcover

Contents include:

I am going to try to improve the links in each episode so it is easier to cross-check the various sources. For example I have included above the link to these notes on today's text from Munro:

For comparison, Bailey's notes in this edition essentially skip over this section:

Episode 25 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available:

Welcome to Episode Twenty-Six of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

Before we start, here are three ground rules.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, which may or may not agree with what you here about Epicurus at other places today.

Second: We aren't talking about Lucretius with the goal of promoting any modern political perspective. Epicurus must be understood on his own, and not in terms of competitive schools which may seem similar to Epicurus, but are fundamentally different and incompatible, such as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, and Marxism.

Third: The essential base of Epicurean philosophy is a fundamental view of the nature of the universe. When you read the words of Lucretius you will find that Epicurus did not teach the pursuit of virtue or of luxury or of simple living as ends in themselves, but rather the pursuit of pleasure. From this perspective it is feeling which is the guide to life, and not supernatural gods, idealism, or virtue ethics. And as important as anything else, Epicurus taught that there is no life after death, and that any happiness we will ever have must come in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Now let's join the discussion with today's text:

Latin text location: Approximately line 333

Notes on the Text: Munro Notes

(For an Outline of where we have been so far in past discussions, click here.)


Daniel Browne:

Now learn at length the form of these first seeds, these principles of things, how widely different is their shape, of what variety of figure their frame consists. For though many are endowed with a form not much alike, yet all are far from being of the same figure. And no wonder, for since (as I have said) their number is so great that no end, no bound is to be set to them; they ought, for the same reason, to be all of a different contexture, and not fashioned alike of the same form.

Besides, consider well mankind, the scaly fry of silent fish that swim the flood, the verdant trees, wild beasts, the various kinds of birds, such as flock about the banks of pleasant streams, the fountains and the lakes and those who frequent the thick covers of the woods; consider all these in their several kinds, and you will find them all consist of forms different among themselves. 'Tis by nothing else the tender young knows its own Dam, and thus the Dam distinguishes her young, thus we see each creature knows its own kind, no less than men, and so unite together. For often before the gilded temples of the gods a young heifer falls a slain victim beside the alter flaming with incense, and breathes from her heart a reeking stream of blood. The Dam, robbed of her young, beats over the fields and leaves the marks of her divided hoofs upon the pressed grass, and searches every place with careful eyes to find her the young she lost; then stops and fills the branched woods with her complaints, and often returns back to her stall, distracted with the love of her dear young - no more the tender willows, or the herbs freshened with dew, nor can the running streams within the full banks divert her mind, or turn away her care, nor can a thousand other heifers, as they play wantonly over the grass, take off her eye, or ease the pain she feels - so plain it is that she searches for her own, for what she knows full well. And thus the tender kids find by their bleat their horned Dams, and so the sporting lambs know their own flocks, and, as by Nature taught, each hastest to the full dug of its own Dam.

Observe again the various sorts of corn, you'll find each grain, though in kind of the same, not so much alike; but there will be a difference in their figure; and so a great variety of shells, we see, paints the Earth's lap, where the Seas gentle waves feed the most sand along the winding Shore. And thus, by parity of reason, it must follow that the first seeds of things, as they are formed by Nature, not made by Art in any certain figure, must fly about in shapes various and different among themselves.

It is easy for us now to unfold the difficulty why the flame of lightning is much more penetrating than our common fire race from fuel here below. You may give this reason, that the subtle Celestial fire of lightning consist of particles much smaller, and so passes through pores, which are fire, made from toe or wood, cannot.

Besides, Light, we perceive, finds a way through horn, but water does not; because the principles of light are smaller than those of which water is composed. So we see wine passes swiftly through a strainer; on the contrary, heavy oil moves slowly through, either because it is made up of larger seeds, or its principles are more hooked and entangled among themselves. And thus it happens that the several particles cannot be so soon separated from one another so as to flow through the little holes with the same ease. Thus it is that honey and milk pass in the mouth with a pleasing sensation over the tongue; on the contrary, the bitter juice of wormwood and sharp Centaury torment the palate with a loathsome taste. From whence you collect easily that those things which agreeably affect the sense are composed of particles smooth and round; and such again that seem rough and bitter are bound together by parts more hooked, and closer twined; and therefore they tear the way to our senses, and wound the body as they enter through the skin. In short, such things as are agreeable to our senses, and those that are rough and unpleasant to the touch, are opposite, and formed of a figure very different from one another; lest you should think perhaps that the grating sound of the whetting of a saw was made of parts equally smooth, without the soft notes of a lute, which the musician forms upon the strings, awaked, as it were, by the gentle strokes of his fingers.

Nor are you to suppose that the seeds are of the same form which strike upon our nerves of smell, when a filthy carcass is burning, or when the stage is fresh sprinkled with Cilician saffron, or the altar sweetens the air with the odor of Arabian incense.

And so in colors you must not imagine such as are agreeable and delight our eyes are composed of the same fashioned seeds with those which prick our sense, and force us to weep, or seem dark or ugly, and shocking in appearance to us; for whatever pleases and delights our senses cannot be composed but of smooth particles; and, on the contrary, things that are hurtful and harsh cannot be formed without seeds that are filthy and disagreeable.

There are other seeds, likewise, which you cannot properly call smooth, nor are altogether hooked, with their points bent, but are rather shaped with small ankles, a little jutting out, and may be sad rather to tickle than to hurt the senses; such as the acid taste of the sweet sauce made of the Lees of wine, or the sweet sauce made of the sweetish-bitter root of Elecampane. Lastly, that burning heat, or freezing cold, being formed of seeds of different figures, do affect the body with different sensation our touch is evidence sufficient to evince.

For Touch, the Touch (blessed be the Gods above!) is a Sense of the Body, either when something from without enters through the pores, or something from within hurts us, as it forces its way out, or pleases, as the effect of venery tickles as it passes through, or when the seeds, by striking against each other, raise a tumult in the body, and in that agitation confound the Sense; and this you may soon experience, if you strike yourself in any part with a blow of your hand. It is necessary, therefore, that the Principles of Things should consist of figures very different in themselves, since they affect the Senses in so different a manner.

Munro:

Now mark and next in order apprehend of what kind and how widely differing in their forms are the beginnings of all things, how varied by manifold diversities of shape; not that a scanty number are possessed of a like form, but because as a rule they do not all resemble one the other. And no wonder; for since there is so great a store of them that, as I have shown, there is no end or sum, they must sure enough not one and all be marked by an equal bulk and like shape, one with another.

Let the race of man pass before you in review, and the mute swimming shoals of the scaly tribes and the blithe herds and wild beasts and the different birds which haunt the gladdening watering spots about river-banks and springs and pools, and those which flit about and throng the pathless woods: then go and take any, one you like in any one kind, and you will yet find that they differ in their shapes, every one from every other. And in no other way could child recognize mother or mother child; and this we see that they all can do, and that they are just as well known to one another as human beings are.

Thus often in front of the beauteous shrines of the gods a calf falls sacrificed beside the incense-burning altars, and spurts from its breast a warm stream of blood; but the bereaved mother as she ranges over the green lawns knows the footprints stamped on the ground by the cloven hoofs, scanning with her eyes every spot to see if she can anywhere behold her lost youngling: then she fills with her moanings the leafy wood each time she desists from her search and again and again goes back to the stall pierced to the heart by the loss of her calf; nor can the soft willows and grass quickened with dew and yon rivers gliding level with their banks comfort her mind and put away the care that has entered into her, nor can other forms of calves throughout the glad pastures divert her mind and ease it of its care: so persistently she seeks something special and known. Again the tender kids with their shaking voices know their horned dams and the butting lambs the flocks of bleating sheep; thus they run, as nature craves, each without fail to its own udder of milk.

Lastly in the case of any kind of corn you like you will yet find that any one grain is not so similar to any other in the same kind, but that there runs through them some difference to distinguish the forms. On a like principle of difference we see the class of shells paint the lap of earth, when the sea with gentle waves beats on the thirsty sand of the winding shore. Therefore again and again I say it is necessary for like reasons that first-beginnings of things, since they exist by nature and are not made by hand after the exact model of one, should fly about with shapes in some cases differing one from the other.

It is right easy for us on such a principle to explain why the fire of lightning has much more power to pierce than ours which is born of earthly pinewood: you may say that the heavenly fire of lightning subtle as it is, is formed of smaller shapes and therefore passes through openings which this our fire cannot pass, born, as it is of woods and sprung from pine. Again light passes through horn, but rain is thrown off. Why?

But that those first bodies of light are smaller than those of which the nurturing liquid of water is made. And quickly as we see wines flow through a strainer, sluggish oil on the other hand is slow to do so, because sure enough it consists of elements either larger in size or more hooked and tangled in one another, and therefore it is that the first-beginnings of things cannot so readily be separated from each other and severally stream through the several openings of any thing.

Moreover the liquids honey and milk excite a pleasant sensation of tongue when held in the mouth; but on the other hand the nauseous nature of wormwood and of harsh centaury writhes the mouth with a noisome flavor; so that you may easily see that the things which are able to affect the senses pleasantly consist of smooth and round elements; while all those on the other hand which are found to be bitter and harsh, are held in connection by particles that are more hooked and for this reason are wont to tear open passages into our senses and in entering in to break through the body.

All things in short, which are agreeable to the senses and all which are unpleasant to the feeling are mutually repugnant, formed as they are out of an unlike first shape; lest haply you suppose that the harsh grating of the creaking saw consists of the elements as smooth as those of tuneful melodies which musicians wake into life with nimble fingers and give shape to on strings; or suppose that the first-beginnings are of like shape which pass into the nostrils of men, when noisome carcases are burning, and when the stage is fresh sprinkled with Cilician saffron, while the altar close by exhales Panchaean odors; or decide that the pleasant colors of things which are able to feast the eyes are formed of a seedlike to the seed of those which make the pupil smart and force it to shed tears or from their disgusting aspect look hideous and foul. For every shape which gratifies the senses has been formed not without a smoothness in its elements; but on the other hand whatever is painful and harsh has been produced not without some roughness of matter.

There are too some elements which are with justice thought to be neither smooth nor altogether hooked with barbed points, but rather to have minute angles slightly projecting, so that they can tickle rather than hurt the senses; of which class tartar of wine is formed and the flavors of elecampane. Again that hot fires and cold frost have fangs of a dissimilar kind wherewith to pierce the senses, is proved to us by the touch of each.

For touch, touch, ye holy divinities of the gods, the body’s feeling is, either when an extraneous thing makes its way in, or when a thing which is born in the body hurts it, or gives pleasure as it issues forth by the birth-bestowing ways of Venus, or when from some collision the seeds are disordered within the body and distract the feeling by their mutual disturbance; as if haply you were yourself to strike with the hand any part of the body you please and so make trial. Wherefore the shapes of the first-beginnings must differ widely, since they are able to give birth to different feelings.

Bailey:

Now come, next in order learn of what kind are the beginnings of all things and how far differing in form, and how they are made diverse with many kinds of shapes; not that but a few are endowed with a like form, but that they are not all alike the same one with another. Nor need we wonder; for since there is so great a store of them, that neither have they any limit, as I have shown, nor any sum, it must needs be, we may be sure, that they are not all of equal bulk nor possessed of the same shape. Moreover, the race of men, and the dumb shoals of scaly creatures which swim the seas, and the glad herds and wild beasts, and the diverse birds, which throng the gladdening watering-places all around the riverbanks and springs and pools, and those which flit about and people the distant forests; of these go and take any single one you will from among its kind, yet you will find that they are different in shape one from another. Nor in any other way could the offspring know its mother, or the mother her offspring; yet we see that they can, and that they are clearly not less known to one another than men. For often before the sculptured shrines of the gods a calf has fallen, slaughtered hard by the altars smoking with incense, breathing out from its breast the hot tide of blood.

But the mother bereft wanders over the green glades and seeks on the ground for the footprints marked by those cloven hoofs, scanning every spot with her eyes, if only she might anywhere catch sight of her lost young, and stopping fills the leafy grove with her lament: again and again she comes back to the stall, stabbed to the heart with yearning for her lost calf, nor can the tender willows and the grass refreshed with dew and the loved streams, gliding level with their banks, bring gladness to her mind and turn aside the sudden pang of care, nor yet can the shapes of other calves among the glad pastures turn her mind to new thoughts or ease it of its care: so eagerly does she seek in vain for something she knows as her own. Moreover, the tender kids with their trembling cries know their horned dams and the butting lambs the flocks of bleating sheep: so surely, as their nature needs, do they run back always each to its own udder of milk. Lastly, take any kind of corn, you will not find that every grain is like its fellows, each in its several kind, but that there runs through all some difference between their forms. And in like manner we see the race of shells painting the lap of earth, where with its gentle waves the sea beats on the thirsty sand of the winding shore. Wherefore again and again in the same way it must needs be, since the first-beginnings of things are made by nature and not fashioned by hand to the fixed form of one pattern, that some of them fly about with shapes unlike one another.

It is very easy by reasoning of the mind for us to read the riddle why the fire of lightning is far more piercing than is our fire rising from pine-torches on earth. For you might say that the heavenly fire of lightning is made more subtle and of smaller shapes, and so passes through holes which our fire rising from logs and born of the pine-torch cannot pass. Again light passes through horn-lanterns, but the rain is spewed back. Why? unless it be that those bodies of light are smaller than those of which the quickening liquid of water is made. And we see wine flow through the strainer as swiftly as you will; but, on the other hand, the sluggish olive-oil hangs back, because, we may be sure, it is composed of particles either larger or more hooked and entangled one with the other, and so it comes about that the first-beginnings cannot so quickly be drawn apart, each single one from the rest, and so ooze through the single holes of each thing.

There is this too that the liquids of honey and milk give a pleasant sensation of the tongue, when rolled in the mouth; but on the other hand, the loathsome nature of wormwood and biting centaury set the mouth awry by their noisome taste; so that you may easily know that those things which can touch the senses pleasantly are made of smooth and round bodies, but that on the other hand all things which seem to be bitter and harsh, these are held bound together with particles more hooked, and for this cause are wont to tear a way into our senses, and at their entering in to break through the body.

Lastly, all things good or bad to the senses in their touch fight thus with one another, because they are built up of bodies of different shape; lest by chance you may think that the harsh shuddering sound of the squeaking saw is made of particles as smooth as are the melodies of music which players awake, shaping the notes as their fingers move nimbly over the strings; nor again, must you think that first-beginnings of like shape pierce into men’s nostrils, when noisome carcasses are roasting, and when the stage is freshly sprinkled with Cilician saffron, and the altar hard by is breathing the scent of Arabian incense; nor must you suppose that the pleasant colours of things, which can feed our eyes, are made of seeds like those which prick the pupil and constrain us to tears, or look dreadful and loathly in their hideous aspect. For every shape, which ever charms the senses, has not been brought to being without some smoothness in the first-beginnings; but, on the other hand, every shape which is harsh and offensive has not been formed without some roughness of substance.

New article on the Festival - this one in English:

https://www.senigallia.co.uk/2020/07/02/the…-guests/806212/

As I wake up today on June 30, I am thinking that the word "passion" probably has the best potential as having a combination of these factors:

1 - Derives (probably/possibly) from the original core pathe. Or at least it easily evokes the original word.

2 - Indicates intensity and is incompatible with the common understanding of "absence of pain"

3- Easily understandable and gripping in a way that "pleasure" does not convey today.

4- Although I don't have any cites at the moment, "passion" is used in the way we are using it in some of the english literature.

5 - Is guaranteed to drive the Platonists and Stoics wild, as indicated in this clip from FLOURISHsandiego (I am just attaching the picture rather than the article. The standard Socratics/Platonists/Arisotelians LOVE "flourishing" and HATE "passion."

I need to make some posts on this topic but I know for myself in addition to the deep discussions we are pursuing I need to budget my time to make more graphics with pithy summaries of the core points which we can use to post different places and hopefully drive more traffic to us, which is motivational for the reasons we have been discussing (we're not just disembodied minds - that's the Platonist/Stoics).

We have a stable of them now, but it's always motivational to produce more: https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/gallery/in…t/207-outreach/