Posts by Cassius

Godfrey's response is in my view 100% correct, but in addition:

Quote from Don

So, Epicurus says it's alright to use reason, right? We shouldn't rely on it to rationalize and come up with "ideal" absolutes, but we can use it to assimilate the information from our canonical senses.

Oh My Gosh Yes!!!!! What other reading can be given to sayings like these which stress reason and science:

Quote

12. A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe, but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that, without natural science, it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed.

13. There is no profit in securing protection in relation to men, if things above, and things beneath the earth, and indeed all in the boundless universe, remain matters of suspicion.

16. In but few things chance hinders a wise man, but the greatest and most important matters, reason has ordained, and throughout the whole period of life does and will ordain.

It would probably be helpful to think about what it is that might ever cause you to question that!

What I am beginning to suspect to be the case (and I am not just talking about you) is that people today are so conditioned to treat "science" and "reason" as "absolute" that they get uncomfortable with any suggestion that they themselves (science and reason) have limits which much be accounted for.

I am currently trying to finish editing the most recent podcast and we talk about the issue that some people are just never going to accept their lack of "certainty" and this bothers some people more than it does others. For some number or people no amount of data is ever going to be sufficient , while some others seem to be more willing to accept "probabilities" without being anxious about the lack of "certainty."

Sometimes that difference between people may relate to something clinical in them that amounts to a pathology of some kind, but I don't think that everyone who is bothered by lack of certainty is by any means subject to pathology. I think that there are very real and reasonable questions that have to be answered here, and as usual they come back to "limits and boundaries" that we have to wrestle with in our own minds.

"Science" and "reason" do not exist in the air - they are creations of human beings and they have natural limits and boundaries that exist due to our human nature as finite beings. We're NEVER going to know all we would like to know, and that means that "science" and "reason" are always going to have limits which is unfair to ask them to try to handle. You haven't ever died before, and so there is no way you can have the assurance of saying "i've been there so i KNOW that there is no life after death." You haven't been to every corner of the universe, and you never will, so you'll never be able to say that you "know from experience" what lurks there. "Science" and "reason" are creations of humanity and have the same limits we have.

We can choose to say that "I am a pragmatist and I accept that statistics-based evidence of all past experience pointing in one direction is satisfactory to me, and I don't worry about it any further than that." But even that statement is based (at best) on "consensus" after experience (testing) in which you choose for yourself whose test results to trust and whose not to trust. Decisions on what is reliable to trust and what is not reliable to trust in the big questions of life cannot ever reasonably be based 100% on "I observed it for myself," because no one here has been alive except for a short period of time. The question of what evidence to accept can only be answered by philosophy, and that is where Epicurus points for the answer to the question. An absolute attitude of faithin human "Reason" or "Logic" or "Science," which simply cannot bear the burden which we are trying to place on them if we look to them as the equivalent of a supernatural god.

Supernatural gods don't exist, and neither does deified "Reason" or "Science." All we can do is be "prudence" in evaluating the evidence that we can gather. And that means subjecting EVERY input from ALL of the legs of the canon to the same scrutiny before we reach final opinions as to what is true. We may think we see a purple elephant in front of us, but we train ourselves to look again and again, from different perspectives, until we are sure, and the same goes for feelings of pleasure and pain, and the same goes for any data we receive through "anticipations." We accept for the moment that the data is honestly reported, but we never accept that what we experience at one moment is expected to be experienced in any future moment until we have tested each experience over time and found it to be repeatedly reliable. I choose to call that the foundation of all "reason" and "science" even though I am also accepting the fact that that data I am receiving through these three legs of my canonical faculties is subject to distortion and is necessarily far more limited than I would prefer it to be. It's ALL I have on which I can prudently decide what to be confident in and what not to be confident in.

Quote from Godfrey

The senses, prolepses and feelings, and after these, reason, cover all the bases as to how we determine truth. They are all "corrective" of each other as in the bent oar problem. EP isn't a touchy-feely philosophy but one that uses all of the tools available to us to determine truth and how to live our lives.

I think this is what Don is getting at, because people aren't being clear about what is meant by "truth." The debate goes along the lines too of "my truth" vs. "your truth" as if everyone has exactly the same definition of truth, but the reality is that "truth" is a word that has many levels of meaning, and unless you specify what you're talking about it's easy to get tripped up. Same with the "my facts" vs "your facts" debate. The religionists/ Platonists want to imply that all truth and all facts are the same for everyone. The nihilists/radical skeptics want to say that NO ONE has any claim to any truth or facts whatsoever. Epicurus points the way to a reasonable evaluation of what is contextual and what is not contextual, and gives you the tools to deal with the problem of "ought" by referring to the only realistic standard of preference -- the pleasure and pain of the person/people involved in the analysis.

Those distinctions have been wiped away in modern terminology so we're regularly at each others' throats about issues where we not communicating on a basic level.

Just like there is both atoms AND void, there is both contextual truth (some prefer vanilla) and "absolute truth" (all men die).

But if we get caught up on "well there is really no such thing as void because modern science says that there is energy and fields and so talking about void is obsolete" then we are always going to be stuck in the level of the trees and never see the forest.

Quote from Don

Epicurus wasn't saying our feelings determine facts, right? We still gather objective facts about reality through our senses and mental capacity and judge our reaction to it by pleasure and pain. Is that it? Because if it's "going with your gut" and "truthiness", Aristotle is winking at me over here.

Of course he wasn't saying that your feelings about the bullet coming at your head will determine how it impacts you. And he wasn't saying that you can force yourself to be "indifferent" about it and thereby escape the effects of it.

The first comment that comes to mind is that you wouldn't be concerned about the argument that the nose determines how something smells and not the eyes or the ears. It seems pretty obvious to accept that these faculties have domains of their own in which they are supreme, and cannot be overridden by the other faculties. In general, how something smells to you can't be changed by showing you pictures of different things or telling you that you should smell it differently.

It seems to me that the point that Epicurus was making was that pleasure and pain are entitled to the same respect as the nose or the eyes. What they tell you is a primary connection between you and reality and there's no second-guessing it. You can tell yourself that you don't find the pin sticking in your finger painful, but if it feels painful it feels painful.

And a second point that he was making is that since there is no god and no absolute reference point to tell you what is worthwhile and what isn't, then pleasure and pain are in fact the only criteria given by Nature to determine what to pursue and what to avoid. But just like the eyes and ears, the sense of pleasure and pain only gives you input about the "now," and it's up to you to use all your faculties plus your intelligence to make a decision on how you want to proceed over time. In fact you might choose to decide that the particular pleasure and pain is so great that you want to make a decision that will permanently alter or even end your life in exchange for a short-term pleasure or avoidance of pain, but in the end the pleasure and pain should remain primary, because in nature those other standards that Aristotle pushes (god, virtue based on what others do,...) are arbitrary assertions with no evidence to establish that they have any reality outside his assertion that they exist.

I can't recall if we've discussed that "facts don't care about your feelings" statement but I have seen it too and I think it does require analysis.

In one sense it is true - the fact of the bullet striking your head will kill you regardless of how you "feel" about it emotionally."

But in another sense it is very wrong, in that your feelings of pleasure and pain are of primary importance to you, and what other people are asserting as "facts" may truly not be of significance to you at all. Where I see that phrase used most often is in political debates where in truth the "fact" being asserted may not be "true" at all, but rather an assertion of a generalization which may not apply directly to the people involved at all.

It looks to me like once again we have another issue of ambiguity of words. What we're really talking about in the canonical analysis is the "feeling of pleasure and pain" which seems to have been reduced to "pleasure" and "pain" in the texts. It seems to me that "feelings" in this context most properly refers to "reactions" as I have seen you discuss yourself. (The word is a variation of "pathe," right?) What Epicurus was really doing was looking for a general word that describes the combination of all types of pleasure and pain in a way that describes "how it moves us" rather than simply subjectively how we might choose to view something at a particular moment.

So here again part of my comment is that what we need to be doing in philosophy is realizing that we aren't talking biology or physiology. We aren't looking for (because it's not possible) a precise medical terminology description of a bodily phenomena. We're looking instead for a series of words that provide an outline description of the general issues involved by which we can organize our thoughts. And we're not doing that in a vacuum, but in a context in which there are competing philosophies and religions that tell us to organize our thoughts in totally different ways -- ways that it appears to Epicurus are disastrously inconsistent with the true nature of things and the true goal for life set by nature.

So in the end maybe the bottom line is that when considering that maybe Aristotle or Plato or some other philosophy or modern scientific viewpoint is better, it's important to make sure you're not comparing apples to oranges. If you have Covid19 then you need a medical doctor who is familiar with the latest science on what works and what doesn't, and you need a set of medications - not a high-level philosophy of life.

But if you're at one of those many points in life where you can go in different directions and you're wondering what paths to choose and how to avoid errors of all sorts, then you don't need a medical doctor to prescribe you Xanax or tell you that you need glasses or a hearing aid. You need a high-level philosophy of life that is going to address what options you have and give you way to analyze what choices you should conclude to be best for you to take.

It's awfully easy for people who have already committed to another direction to play word games with people who aren't experienced in these issues, and convince people that they (these competing philosophers) have a better idea about which path to take. Words can be very seductive and it's important to be grounded in the nature of reality, but at the same time neither Xanax nor Remdesivir are going to tell you how to live your life. "Feelings" and "divinity" and "truth" and "reality' all have levels of meaning that apply differently in different contexts, and there's no avoiding that. if they DIDN'T have those contextual differences, then Plato and Aristotle would be right -- there would absolute truth that applies the same to everyone everywhere and in the same way. But an absolute reality that applies to everyone at all times and all places is exactly what they are trying to persuade you of with their ideal forms and essences.

But in contrast to that evidence shows us that the events of life are contextual. "Feelings" are part of that context, but in the end there are also realities that don't depend on how we feel about them, so there's no way around dealing with and understanding the nature of things.

At least that's my first stab at approaching your comments.

This is what I had added earlier to the "Announcements" thread:

On days when the everyday pressures of life seem extreme, it's a particularly good time to remember Vatican Saying 78: "The noble soul occupies itself with wisdom and friendship; of these, the one is a mortal good, the other immortal."

This could be a good be a really good thread to keep on hand. I am going to take the liberty to rename it for easier finding in the future. Thanks to Godfrey for starting it!

More!

Here's a passage that's always been one of my favorites, from the opening of Book 3, this time from the Rolfe Humphries translation, which I will always hear in my mind in the voice of Charlton Griffin, from the Audible.com reading of the poem:

If you would like to know

What a man really is, the time to learn

Comes when he stands in danger or in doubt.

That's when the words of truth come from his heart,

The mask is torn aside, reality

Remains for all to see. But avarice

And blind desire for honors urge men on

To trespass on the areas which the law

Forbids them, and they struggle night and day

As criminal accomplices to win

Toward heights of wealth - such vital wounds as these

Are aggravated by the fear of death.

Men seem to think that bitter poverty

And the contempt a low position brings

Are far from sweet and reassuring life,

Are hangers-on around the doors of death.

So a false panic harries them; they long

Too late for flight, for far-off distances;

Seek, through the blood of fellow-citizens,

A way to prosper; they amass estates

In avarice, pile one murder on another,

Rejoice when a brother dies, and hate and fear

The table of a kindly relative.

In the same way compulsive envy, born

Of the same fear, can make them waste away

Seeing a man blest with renown or power

Before their very eyes, while they are held,

Or so they mutter, in darkness and in muck.

Some die for lack of statues or a name;

It goes so far, sometimes, that fear of death

Induces hate of life and light, and men

Are so depressed that they destroy themselves

Having forgotten that this very fear

Was the first source and cause of all their woe.

As children tremble and fear everything

In the dark shadows, we, in the full light,

Fear things that really are not one bit more awful

That what poor babies shudder at in darkness,

The horrors they imagine to be coming.

Our terrors and our darknesses of mind

Must be dispelled then, not by sunshine's rays, -

Not by those shining arrows of the light,

But by insight into nature, and a scheme

of systematic contemplation.

The Mellow Californian to the rescue! Thanks - I needed that!

How about too:

"For Thou alone mankind with quiet peace canst bless; because ‘tis Mars Armipotent that rules the bloody tumults of the war, and He by everlasting pains of love bound fast, tastes in Thy lap most sweet repose, turns back his smooth long neck, and views thy charms, and greedily sucks love at both his eyes. Supinely as he rests his very soul hangs on thy lips; this God dissolv’d in ease, in the soft moments when thy heavenly limbs cling round him, melting with eloquence caress, great Goddess, and implore a peace for Rome. For neither can I write with cheerful strains, in times so sad, nor can the noble House of Memmius desert the common good in such distress of things."

Quote from Don

This could be evidence of Cassius 's conviction that Epicureans weren't wallflowers and that some took part civic and political life.

Oh yes, that's a conviction of mine that's at least as strong as that Epicurus was serious about what he was saying about divinity. Give me liberty, or give me death, but at the end of my life above all don't make me have to admit to myself that I spent my life entirely in a cave on bread and water and running from the world!

In regard to the planets / stars actually being gods, somewhere along the lines I got the impression from a commentator somewhere that this probably factored in to Epicurus' position on the size of the sun - that he was likely reluctant to embrace the idea (without further proof) that the sun was immense in size because of a concern that that would play into those who suggested the sun was a god. That's likely to be just more speculation, but I do think that arguing against the stars/planets as gods was probably a theme of the texts, and that's probably also something that factored into his commentary on life on other worlds, etc, as that also de-mystifies the nature of the stars/planets and would help people realize that they are actually something graspable as potentially familiar, like the moon.

I am pretty sure both of these articles are totally new to me so it is going to take me some time to comment. But in the same department, it was sort of my understanding that the Epicurean who was an "advisor" (my word because I can't remember more detail to Antiochus Epiphanes and his dealings with Jerusalem was an Epicurean.

Hmm I am thinking sort of about this article, but it was my recollection that the references were to an Epicurean in his government, not to Antiochus himself: https://web.archive.org/web/2018032911…/history.html#C

I would add to this part of the exchange that it is my understanding that Epicurus was indeed specifically fighting against the idea that the stars and planets are themselves gods. Might be in Timeaeus but I am not sure.

Quote from Don

You're not discounting the idea that humans have experiences for which they feel they can only describe using culturally-derived religious or spiritual language.

Well that reminds me of Lucretius talking about the poor depth of Latin in comparison with Greek! I am not sure I would agree with that, though, I think we re talking about experiences which can or should be able to be put into words. You way be correct that people who are interested in religious and spiritual matters have refined the terminology in ways that isn't common, but I would still expect to be able to communicate in normal words about the experience.

As for this:

Quote from Don

Can Epicurus's teachings provide an alternate framework within which to interpret these real experiences without denigrating or belittling the person who experiences them?

Yes, that's what I think we are talking about. We have some pretty interesting Epicurean texts on the subject, but they are not clear on the details of the experiences they are talking about, and for all we know the experiences that today fit under the term "spiritual experience" might or might not be totally foreign to what they were referring to.

I think my best comment is to continue to say that we're flying blind unless we discuss particulars.

Here are a couple of other related thoughts in the form of questions:

1) In this discussion are we suggesting that there are characteristics or hypothetical interactions with us which are in any way excluded from "scientific" examination? Is anyone suggesting that this area is prima facie off limits to "science?" If so, how can we even engage in conversation about them, so I presume the answer to this is no?

2) If we agree that what we are talking about can be systematically studied, would there be a way to eliminate the possibility that the experiences we are talking about are coming from within the brain rather than from outside?

3) I personally hold open the possibility that there are all sorts of "natural" phenomena that are not yet recognized, just like radio and X-rays were at one time not recognized, and (to my understanding "gravity waves" are accepted to exist but are still not understood.) However if we accept for the sake of argument that such a phenomena might be involved here, should we not presume that such phenomena will at some point be just as capable of being studied, an analyzed as accurate or distorted, as the other phenomena we are currently familiar with? No one is suggesting that there is completed information/opinion being deposited directly in the brain in fully-formed completion, correct?

Quote from Don

If the religious practitioner is experiencing pleasure and bliss, do we tell them "No, you're not actually experiencing pleasure and bliss. You're doing it wrong!" If they don't have fear of their God, are they doing it wrong?

"Doing it wrong" is difficult to say. However if they are leaving open the possibility that these experiences are based on presumptions that would leave the path open to a supernatural god having created the universe and manipulating human experience and all that follows from that, I think it would be fair to say that these people are creating conditions that in all likelihood would lead them down paths that would cause significant pain to them later on. That is what comes to mind from the caveats in this passage from Torquatus:

"The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement."

There's also that other passage for which I always forget the cite, which is to the effect that those who turn their attention to the stars and start the investigation but do who leave open the possibility of supernatural creation are as bad off or worse as those who never start the investigation. Seems to me that this investigation of divinity has the same pitfall - if it opens doors to possibilities that would undermine the foundations that have been previously established, then it is dangerous for the person who is on that path without keeping the premises in mind.

I just noticed something additional I want to add to the mix.

Our other and similar thread was entitled "Reverence and Awe in Epicurean Philosophy." I think the words "reverence" and "awe" are fairly self-explanatory and not subject to too much likelihood of confusion. They convey "feelings" or "emotions" which do not presume anything about what is causing them.

The title of this thread however is "Scientism, Atheism, And The Admissibility Of Spiritual Experience." To some extent each of those terms is more subject to confusion.

While I think I have a decent idea, the term "scientism" does not have a clear meaning in my mind. I'll exhibit my tendency to hubris by saying that if it isn't clear to me, it is likely not clear to many others and therefore dangerous to use in common conversation without further definition.

"Atheism" is someone more clear for common conversation, but as discussed here before, in Epicurean terms it is a more ambiguous term. However we've covered that a lot recently so I doubt that ambiguity will retard this discussion.

"Spiritual evidence" however is a term, even more so than "scientism," that I don't think has a consensus meaning. I think it is a term that implies something significantly more, to most people, than "reverence" and "awe." I hardly know even where to begin to define it - it could start with something as minimal as "a firm conviction of the existence" but extend all the way up to "God promised to me and my descendants that we are his chosen people and that he will destroy our enemies and make us master of the world."

My reading of the Epicurean texts is that Epicurus held that the evidence, however we break it down, supports "a firm conviction of the existence" but that anything beyond that is speculation which cannot be verified and therefore has to be treated with the greatest care.

I am reading in this thread many things being stated with considerable conviction, but I am presently still of the mindset that there is nothing that we necessarily have to read in Epicurus' position that is necessarily disproven by modern science. The criticisms I am reading are of positions that I do not believe are necessarily entailed in the texts. I understand why they are being suggested, but I think the texts can be read in multiple ways, and I choose to read them in a way that does not require them being labeled "wrong" in this department.

So for that reason I don't see how any contention that "Epicurus was wrong about XXX" or conversely that "Epicurus' position supports YYY" can be held as established without first being more clear both about what we are contending Epicurus' position was, and what we are seeking to prove or disprove. The Epicurean texts are full of general warnings and denunciations of supernatural religion, so I do not believe that any reading of particular passages should be read as contradictory without compelling reasons to do so, which I am personally still not seeing.

So to repeat the main point of this post, I find the term "spiritual experiences" without further definition to be an obstacle to further clarity here.

This is just an interim comment while I am thinking about it. I'd like to comment on this key sentence:

Quote from Martin

Epicurus saw no sensory evidence of gods, attributed the knowledge humans claimed to have of them to inner perceptions and stated that the gods were not supernatural.

In being clear about what Epicurus' position was (rather than my own) I would like to address each clause there:

(1) Epicurus saw no sensory evidence of gods,

(2) (Epicurus) attributed the knowledge humans claimed to have of them to inner perceptions and

(3) (Epicurus) stated that the gods were not supernatural.

Of these, I think (3) is absolutely and emphatically correct and any assertion to the contrary would hardly be worth the time of discussing.

Item (2) I think is quite likely incomplete. As written, it is likely a reference to "anticipations/preconceptions" despite the choice to use the term "inner perceptions." I am not sure that "inner perception" is an adequate way to refer to the full scope of anticipations, but more so than that, this presumes the answer to the debate and presumes that anticipations are the result of images. It seems to me the texts are pretty clear that there are two separate phenomena to consider (1) the receipt of images by the brain, and (2) a faculty which per the Velleius text is more of an "unfolding" or "etching" present at birth and prior to experience. I am thinking that these are distinct phenomena, and that "anticipations" are not simply something created by experiences after birth, so as written I would say item (2) is accurate so far as it goes, but incomplete.

Item (1) involves for me the definition of the word "sensory." This is pretty much the same issue as just discussed. Did Epicurus consider what we refer to in the word "sensory" to be limited to taste, touch, sight, sound, and smell? Or would the other two legs (anticipations and feeling) constitute something that we should consider under our own contemporary use of the word "sensory"? Since I am not ready to take a position on what we should consider the full meaning of the word "sensory" I am not able to say that I fully agree with item (1).

I went back and reviewed the Scientism article. Here's my problem with it -- I think I agree with the direction he is going, but THIS is his conclusion?

Quote

Distinguishing Science from Scientism

So if science is distinct from scientism, what is it? Science is an activity that seeks to explore the natural world using well-established, clearly-delineated methods. Given the complexity of the universe, from the very big to very small, from inorganic to organic, there is a vast array of scientific disciplines, each with its own specific techniques. The number of different specializations is constantly increasing, leading to more questions and areas of exploration than ever before. Science expands our understanding, rather than limiting it.

Scientism, on the other hand, is a speculative worldview about the ultimate reality of the universe and its meaning. Despite the fact that there are millions of species on our planet, scientism focuses an inordinate amount of its attention on human behavior and beliefs. Rather than working within carefully constructed boundaries and methodologies established by researchers, it broadly generalizes entire fields of academic expertise and dismisses many of them as inferior. With scientism, you will regularly hear explanations that rely on words like “merely”, “only”, “simply”, or “nothing more than”. Scientism restricts human inquiry.

It is one thing to celebrate science for its achievements and remarkable ability to explain a wide variety of phenomena in the natural world. But to claim there is nothing knowable outside the scope of science would be similar to a successful fisherman saying that whatever he can’t catch in his nets does not exist (15). Once you accept that science is the only source of human knowledge, you have adopted a philosophical position (scientism) that cannot be verified, or falsified, by science itself. It is, in a word, unscientific.

Isn't this just an assertion that scientism is wrong, without any explanation of what he believes the correct position to be?

I agree that there are severe criticisms to be leveled at people who think too narrowly that what they believe has been established by "the experts" is worthy of deference simply because "they are the experts." I believe that "the experts" can have just as many prejudices and predispositions and political positions as anyone else, and that every claim has to consider the possibility of corruption, with the most sweeping claims given the most scrutiny.

But this article really isn't saying that, is it? This seems to be saying simply that "nothing is knowable outside the scope of science" and that ends up being circular, because he's never defined what "science" really is. If he is wanting to say that "the five senses are not all there are" or something else specific, then he should say so, but I don't see that he has been clear as to what he is criticizing, with the result being that he opens the barn door wide to all sorts of claims that have no verifiability whatsoever. Am I reading that wrong?

I personally am probably open to a lot more possibilities than the average traditional "empiricist" might be willing to admit, but even so I would demand repeatability and verifiability in some way, or else the claim would have to remain entirely personal and of very limited relevance to anyone else. Correct?

Like Don I want to think and then comment further. There is much in what you have written Susan that I think I can agree with, but I am not yet comfortable that the issues are clear enough. That's much what I would say about the Scientism article-- I read it and I THINK I know where he might be going, but I am not yet clear what lines he is willing to draw.

So of course what comes to my mind immediately is the letter to Menoeceus:

First of all believe that god is a being immortal and blessed, even as the common idea of a god is engraved on men’s minds, and do not assign to him anything alien to his immortality or ill-suited to his blessedness: but believe about him everything that can uphold his blessedness and immortality. For gods there are, since the knowledge of them is by clear vision. But they are not such as the many believe them to be: for indeed they do not consistently represent them as they believe them to be. And the impious man is not he who popularly denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to the gods the beliefs of the many. For the statements of the many about the gods are not conceptions derived from sensation, but false suppositions, according to which the greatest misfortunes befall the wicked and the greatest blessings (the good) by the gift of the gods. For men being accustomed always to their own virtues welcome those like themselves, but regard all that is not of their nature as alien.

It seems to me that the field of what most people seem to be talking about when they discuss religious experiences is very clearly over the line in what would be "false suppositions," according to the test of what I think are many Epicurean texts that the nature of a true god is entirely blissful and undependent on others, which excludes them from liking or disliking any particular humans. It would be on that basis that I would exclude the great majority of what most people in my experience have called "religious experiences" - because those in my experience have always been shorthand ways of saying that these people have direct communications and special revelations resulting from them.

Just on general experience I would suspect that the author of the Scientism article is probably going in that way too, which I say just on the statistical basis that I have never seen someone in public argue from an Epicurean views of divinity such as is expressed in the Epicurean texts.

But I don't yet want to lump you in with that, Susan, because I simply don't know specifically what you are talking about as "spiritual experiences." I think it is perfectly possible that experiences of awe such as I think Don and Joshua have referenced could be experienced in many different ways, with many different levels of intensity, prompted by many different phenomena. But I don't expect that Don or Joshua are implying "communication" in a sense that would amount to a special revelation about some special truth.

And again, I am at this point just coming at this from the point of view of applying the Epicurean texts as I understand them, not from the point of view of wanting to make sweeping statements of what is and what is not possible.

So for now my comments are I think pretty much what I have said before: the texts are what they are, and they are pretty clear about the benefits of experiencing "images" of divinity. The remaining texts are ambiguous, however, and it's easier to say what they "must not" mean, when reading them in context of other core principles, than it is to say what the "do mean."

So right now I'll close with repeating your quote from Joshua, which I think sums up where I understand us to be:

Quote from Susan Hill

As Joshua recently and astutely pointed out: “A large measure of our project then, must be to mark that boundary. If the study of the divine starts to lead where the philosophy cannot and should not go, we have to say as much.”

Each of these entries that are currently in this "Glossary" section of the FAQ I will move over into the Lexicon:

https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/index.php?faq/#category-208

It is necessary for me or another administrator to add "Categories" and "Subcategories" to the master index of the Lexicon, but if you want another category just let me know.

There is also a feature I have not implemented called "Custom Fields" and "Field Categories" which I have not read into the documentation far enough to understand yet. If you see a use for them before I do, let me know.

Until such time as we figure a better approach, let's use a format similar to this for posting citations:

Citations Relevant to the Multivalent Approach / Multiple Possibilities / Waiting

Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles, line 94 (translation by XXXX, add link or cite)

The wanings of the moon and its subsequent waxings ..... may be explained in all the ways in which phenomena on earth invite us to such explanations of these phases, if only one does not fall in love with the method of a single explanation (μοναχῇ τρόπος ) and groundlessly

disapproves of others, without having considered what it is possible for a human being to observe and what it is not and, for this reason, desirous of observing things that cannot be observed’.

Epicurus, On Nature XI Ia11-19 (text and translation by Sedley, add link or cite)

The sun, if we walk towards the place from which it appeared to us] to rise, directing ourselves up into the mainland zone, appears to us to set where we previously passed by, sometimes even when we have moved in all only a short distance. And this time we cannot blame it on the latitudinal movements. Why after all should you declare the measurement from here, or the one from here, or the one from here, or this one a more reliable guide of the risings and settings (of the sun)?’

T3 Epicurus, On Nature XI IIa1 - 21 (text and translation by Sedley, add link or cite)

They cannot hope] to form a [mental] model ([ὁ]μοίωμα) and to reason out (συλλογίζεσθαι) anything about these matters. For it seems to me that when they spend their time contriving some of them (I means their [ὄρ]γανα, instruments) and fooling around with others, it is no wonder, in view not only of the enslavements brought upon them by their doctrines but also (as far as concerns the appearances of the sun) of the indeterminacies (ἀοριστείας) of risings and settings, that they cannot form an adequate mental model by means of their instruments which

produce no regularity. But their instruments are ...