Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

I'm also reading Philodemus' "On Methods of Inference" and the commentary that you recommended. This does seem to bear directly on the issue at hand, so thanks for that suggestion.

Don it's going to take you a while to get through that material so we are going to have to give your some time, but I do think you will continue to agree that it is extremely relevant material. It's possibly some of the most helpful material I've come across, especially in how it provides background in comparing Epicurus to Plato and especially Aristotle. Aristotle is often considered much appreciative of the senses than was Plato, and that's probably true, but DeLacey helps show I think that Epicurus went much further in rejecting rationalism and that is point that deserves tremendous emphasis (to the everlasting pain and embarrassment of the Randians/Objectivists!).

As we discuss that remember that i have the full book online so we can post links to this location: https://archive.org/stream/philode…age/n5/mode/2up

Wow my compliments and thanks to both Godfrey and Don for these last posts. Godfrey that quote from Frances Wright is directly on point, and Don thanks for that link to the article on Prolepsis which I have not seen. I have not yet started to read it but the abstract sounds very promising to me. Sounds like most all of us are going to agree with his direction as the prolepsis being pre-rational and not at all the same thing as "concept formation" (which would involve reasoning/opinion.

If I understand the direction Don is going (and I think i do) he will not be surprised that I agree with him and the direction. At this point in the conversation I am prepared to commit that I believe that Epicurus held that prolepsis/anticipation/preconception is a faculty that provides a COMPONENT of "truth," just as do the five senses and the feelings of pain and pleasure, but I would not say that in general we can say that 'truth' IS a preconception.

I am pretty convinced along with Frances Wright and Don that truth is a purely contextual proposition. I think the word "objective" when evaluating the "truth" of a situation means something like "repeated observations from the same perspective under the same conditions will produce the same result" which I gather to be something like the "correspondence theory" of truth in that the opinion corresponds reliability with the situation about which the opinion is given. I think that in order to evaluate the "truth" of any proposition you have to have an opinion about the nature of the observer, and an opinion about the nature of what is being observed, and an opinion about the conditions under which the observation is being made. I think that that is why we're going to find Lucretius devoting so much attention to "images" in De Rerum Natura, in that he is stressing that our opinion as to truth (which he is convinced we can obtain in at least some instances) has to be tested by whether repeated observations produce the same result. That would constitute "our truth" but even then, as Frances Wright says, that truth ceases to exist when the facts change and the repeated observations stop yielding the same result. (And yes I am kind of mirroring the statements about "justice" in the PDs to the effect that justice changes when the facts change.

This is all hugely deep and I reserve the right to amend and change my comments, but the general direction that I am going is that I am agreeing with Don's observations. I think that Elayne is raising a valid point too, but I think that point is eventually going to resolve itself in the direction of clarifying that "we know truth instinctively by prolepsis" more to something like "'truth' is an important and valid human experience in which input from the faculty of preconception is an important point, but one of the most important things to recognize about truth is that what we consider to be true changes with contextual facts." I suspect that's the direction that Frances Wright was going in and her version is probably much more clear than mine.

Don -- Elayne got called away today and wasn't able to participate in this episode, so we'll bring up these comments next week and now you have a full week to consider whether there's any other aspect for us to cover

Thank you Don. As you think about it more, also please comment on what got you on this train of thought in the first place. I know in this instance I started the thread myself, but this comes up regularly so it would be interesting to know what passage or text or whatever led you to have a concern about the issue.

Welcome to Episode Thirty of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

Before we start, here are three ground rules.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, which may or may not agree with what you here about Epicurus at other places today.

Second: We aren't talking about Lucretius with the goal of promoting any modern political perspective. Epicurus must be understood on his own, and not in terms of competitive schools which may seem similar to Epicurus, but are fundamentally different and incompatible, such as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, and Marxism.

Third: The essential base of Epicurean philosophy is a fundamental view of the nature of the universe. When you read the words of Lucretius you will find that Epicurus did not teach the pursuit of virtue or of luxury or of simple living. or science, as ends in themselves, but rather the pursuit of pleasure. From this perspective it is feeling which is the guide to life, and not supernatural gods, idealism, or virtue ethics. And as important as anything else, Epicurus taught that there is no life after death, and that any happiness we will ever have must come in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Now let's join the discussion with today's text:

Latin text location: Approximately lines 661 - 729

Munro Summary: Notes on the text

Daniel Browne:

But to return, we see the wooly sheep, the warlike breed of horses, and horned bulls, living under the same covert of the sky, grazing together in the same field, and quenching their thirst in the same stream of water; yet they are each of a different species, and retain the nature of their sires, and every kind imitates the dispositions of the race from which they came, so different is the nature of the seeds in every herb, so various are the principles of the water in every stream. Now though blood, bones, veins, heat, moisture, bowels, nerves, go to the formation of every animal, yet of what variety of figures, widely different in themselves, do their seeds consist?

And then all bodies that are combustible, and burnt by fire, if they agree on nothing else, yet discharge from themselves such parts, by which they spread about their flame and light; from whence they raise sparkles, and scatter their embers all abroad. So if you examine other things by the same rule, you will find seeds of different kind lie concealed in all bodies within, and show themselves of a different figure.

Lastly, you observe many things that emit both smell and taste, especially those victims you offer when your mind is religiously moved for something you have unjustly acquired. These sensations, therefore, must be raised by seeds of different figure; for smell pierces through pores where taste can find no passage. The juice likewise, and the taste of things, affect the sense by proper organs, to convince that their seeds vary in their figure. Principles therefore of various shape make up every particular mass, and things in general are composed of mingled seeds; for, in these verses of mine, you may all along observe that many letters are common to many words, and yet you must confess, that some verses and some words consist of very different letters, not because the number of letters are few, or no two words are formed of the same letters, but because every verse and every word is composed of letters altogether different. So, though the same principles are common to many things, yet the things may remain very different among themselves; and it may properly enough be said that men, and fruits, and pleasant trees are made up of different seeds.

Yet we are not to suppose that all seeds of whatever figure do mutually unite to the production of beings, for then you would observe monsters springing up every day, creatures half man, half horse, the lofty boughs of trees growing out of a living body, and the limbs of land animals joined to the bodies of fish, and nature forming every where out of the earth (the mother of all things) Chimaeras from their dreadful mouths breathing out flames; but ‘tis plain, nothing of this happens, since we see all things are formed from certain seeds, and regular principles, and preserve their kind as they grow up and increase.

Nor indeed can it, by the fixed rules of reason, be otherwise; for, out of the several sorts of food, the particles of that which is proper to every animal descend into the limbs, and there united, produce the motions suitable to that animal; but, on the contrary, those particles of food that are destructive, some of them, we find, nature throws off through open passages, others are, insensibly to us, forced out of the body through the pores, such as would admit of no Union with others, nor agree to promote the vital motions and purposes of life.

But lest you should think that living creatures only are bound by these laws, the same reason holds with regard to all other beings; for as all bodies are in their nature different in themselves, so it is necessary that each should consist of principles of a different figure, not but that many seeds are the same in shape, but they do not all agree in form perfectly alike. Since then the seeds differ, it is necessary that their intervals, their courses, connections, weights, strokes, concussions, and motions, should differ likewise; Properties, that not only make a distinction between animals, but divide the Earth and the Sea, and preserve the heavens separate from the earth, and secure all things from being confusedly mingled together.

Munro:

And so the woolly flocks and the martial breed of horses and homed herds, though often cropping the grass from one field beneath the same canopy of heaven and slaking their thirst from one stream of water, yet have all their life a dissimilar appearance and retain the nature of their parents and severally imitate their ways each after its kind: so great is the diversity of matter in any kind of herbage, so great in every river. And hence, too, any one you please out of the whole number of living creatures is made up of bones, blood, vein, heat, moisture, flesh, sinews; and these things again differ widely from one another and are composed of first-beginnings of unlike shape.

Furthermore whatever things are set on fire and burned, store up in their body, if nothing else, at least those particles, out of which they may radiate fire and send out light and make sparks fly and scatter embers all about.

If you will go over all other things by a like process of reasoning, you will thus find that they conceal in their body the seeds of many things and contain elements of various shapes. Again you see many things to which are given at once both color and taste together with smell; especially those many offerings [which are burned on the altars].

These must therefore be made up of elements of different shapes; for smell enters in where color passes not into the frame, color too in one way, taste in another makes its entrance into the senses; so that you know they differ in the shapes of their first elements. Therefore unlike forms unite into one mass and things are made up of a mixture of seed. Throughout moreover these very verses of ours you see many elements common to many words, though yet you must admit that the verses and words one with another are different and composed of different elements; not that but few letters which are in common run through them or that no two words or verses one with another are made up entirely of the same, but because as a rule they do not all resemble one the other. Thus also though in other things there are many first-beginnings common to many things, yet they can make up one with the other a quite dissimilar whole; so that men and corn and joyous trees may fairly be said to consist of different elements.

And yet we are not to suppose that all things can be joined together in all ways; for then you would see prodigies produced on all hands, forms springing up half man half beast and sometimes tall boughs sprouting from the living body, and many limbs of land-creatures joined with those of sea-animals, nature too throughout the all-bearing lands feeding chimeras which breathed flames from noisome mouth. It is plain however that nothing of the sort is done, since we see that all things produced from fixed seeds and a fixed mother can in growing preserve the marks of their kind. This you are to know must take place after a fixed law.

For the particles suitable for each thing from all kinds of food when inside the body pass into the frame and joining on produce the appropriate motions; but on the other hand we see nature throw out on the earth those that are alien, and many things with their unseen bodies fly out of the body impelled by blows: those I mean which have not been able to join on to any part nor when inside to feel in unison with and adopt the vital motions.

But lest you haply suppose that living things alone are bound by these conditions, such a law keeps all things within their limits. For even as things begotten are in their whole nature all unlike one the other, thus each must consist of first-beginnings of unlike shape; not that a scanty number are possessed of a like form, but because as a rule they do not all resemble one the other. Again since the seeds differ, there must be a difference in the spaces between, the passages, the connections, the weights, the blows, the clashings, the motions; all which not only disjoin living bodies, but hold apart the lands and the whole sea, and keep all heaven away from the earth.

BAILEY:

And so often fleecy flocks and he warrior brood of horses and horned herds, cropping the grass from one field beneath the same canopy of heaven, and slaking their thirst from one stream of water, yet live their life with different aspect, and keep the nature of their parents and imitate their ways each after his own kind. So great is the difference of matter in any kind of grass you will, so great in every stream. Moreover, any one living creature of them all is made of bones, blood, veins, heat, moisture, flesh and sinews: and they as well are far different, formed as they are with first-beginnings of unlike shape.

Then once again, all things that are set ablaze and burnt up by fire, store in their body, if nothing else, yet at least those particles, from which they may be able to toss fire abroad and shoot out light, and make sparks fly, and scatter cinders far and wide. Traversing all other things with the like reasoning of your mind, you will find then that they hide in their body the seeds of many things and contain diverse shapes. Again, you see many things to which both colour and taste are given together with smell.

First of all, most of the offerings [burnt on the altars of the gods]: these then must needs be made of diverse shapes; for the burning smell pierces, where the hue passes not into the limbs, even so the hue in one way, the taste in another, finds its way into our senses; so that you may know that they differ in the shapes of their first-bodies. So different forms come together into one mass and things are made with mingled seeds. Nay, more, everywhere in these very verses of mine you see many letters common to many words, and yet you must needs grant that verses and words are formed of different letters, one from another; not that but a few letters run through them in common, or that no two of them are made of letters all the same, but that they are not all alike the same one with another. So in other things likewise since there are first-beginnings common to many things, yet they can exist with sums different from one another: so that the human race and corn and glad trees are rightly said to be created of different particles.

And yet we must not think that all particles can be linked together in all ways, for you would see monsters created everywhere, forms coming to being half man, half beast, and sometimes tall branches growing out from a living body, and many limbs of land-beasts linked with beasts of the sea, and nature too throughout the lands, that are the parents of all things, feeding Chimaeras breathing flame from their noisome mouths. But it is clear to see that none of these things comes to be, since we see that all things are born of fixed seeds and a fixed parent, and can, as they grow, preserve their kind. You may be sure that that must needs come to pass by a fixed law.

For its own proper particles separate from every kind of food and pass within into the limbs of everything, and are there linked on and bring about the suitable movements. But, on the other hand, we see nature cast out alien matter on to the ground, and many things with bodies unseen flee from the body, driven by blows, which could not be linked to any part nor within feel the lively motions in harmony with the body and imitate them. But lest by chance you should think that living things alone are bound by these laws, the same condition sets a limit to all things. For even as all things begotten are in their whole nature unlike one to the other, so it must needs be that each is made of first-beginnings of a different shape; not that but a few are endowed with a like form, but that they are not all alike the same one with another. Moreover, since the seeds are different, there must needs be a difference in their spaces, passages, fastenings, weights, blows, meetings, movements, which not only sunder living things, but part earth and the whole sea, and hold all the sky away from the earth.

Don if you get a chance could you let us know if we've addressed your thoughts in the podcast? I am sure there is a lot more on this to discuss, and I am not even sure that we hit your exact question.

Quote from Don

There's a LOT to digest here and I greatly appreciate everyone's thoughts on this topic. I plan to respond in more detail, but I had to say that this line from Elayne 's post made me smile and nod my head in agreement!

Well said!

Hello and welcome to the forum @toink !

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.
2. "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt
3. "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius
4. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
5. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
6. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
7. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
8. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
9. Plato's Philebus
10. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
11. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

Yes, Godfrey I agree. I can understand the technical issues being discussed by those who challenge "free will" - at least I think I can - but I also observe that those who really get into arguing against "free will" seem to have an agenda with implications that go far more deep than just a desire to be technically correct. Some version of "free will" is something that seems to be just as real to us as pleasure and pain, and from a practical point of view that pretty much ends the discussion of whether it is "real" or not.

I was going to ask if this was an original video to you Eoghan, but all I had to do was hear that accent in the first words -- listening now! Looks great so far!

Outstanding video! I hope we will get lots of comments at the various places this gets posted, and I encourage everyone to watch and consider "sharing."

Don your comment on feet is interesting too, since it has always struck me how odd Lucretius' formulation is in the discussion of those who deny the existence of any kind of knowledge, which also contains a "foot" analogy -

I see Munro uses "where his feet should be" to pursue the analogy, but I was expecting to see some variation of "pedes" here and see "vestgia" instead so I am not sure how firmly the foot analogy holds. (However since I think Munro tried very much to be literal, I bet it does.)

Yes Don - I hate to be so dependent on the commentators, but this is one of those areas that has sunk into my mind I think from a variety of sources - and not just DeWitt - that the "cosmos/world" reference in Herodotus is intended not just to refer to the Earth, but (I presume) pretty much everything we see in the sky as well. And yes that would certainly lend itself to interpretation that Epicurus was distinguishing "our visible universes" from "all other infinitely numbered other universes that are out there beyond those that we can see ourselves. "

However all along the way I drag my feet about using the word "universe" in this phrasing, since I grew up on the definition that "universe" means "everything" and "everything" in fact means "every thing" !

But times change and if people want to use "universe" to mean some segment of the whole then that is OK with me, just like I acknowledge that there are all sorts of languages other than English, and in the end the terms are matters of convention.

From that article I just cited, here is the part that seems to me to be the centerof the criticism against "A Universe From Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing," both the book and the terminology. I think the questions I underlined here are things we have to wrestle with in thinking about "Infinity and the Expanding Universe":

Quote

That brings me to South African physicist George Ellis. When I interviewed Ellis last year, I asked him if Krauss’s book answers the question posed by its subtitle. Ellis responded:

Certainly not. He is presenting untested speculative theories of how things came into existence out of a pre-existing complex of entities, including variational principles, quantum field theory, specific symmetry groups, a bubbling vacuum, all the components of the standard model of particle physics, and so on. He does not explain in what way these entities could have pre-existed the coming into being of the universe, why they should have existed at all, or why they should have had the form they did. And he gives no experimental or observational process whereby we could test these vivid speculations of the supposed universe-generation mechanism. How indeed can you test what existed before the universe existed? You can’t.

Thus what he is presenting is not tested science. It’s a philosophical speculation, which he apparently believes is so compelling he does not have to give any specification of evidence that would confirm it is true. Well, you can’t get any evidence about what existed before space and time came into being. Above all he believes that these mathematically based speculations solve thousand year old philosophical conundrums, without seriously engaging those philosophical issues. The belief that all of reality can be fully comprehended in terms of physics and the equations of physics is a fantasy. As pointed out so well by Eddington in his Gifford lectures, they are partial and incomplete representations of physical, biological, psychological, and social reality.

And above all Krauss does not address why the laws of physics exist, why they have the form they have, or in what kind of manifestation they existed before the universe existed (which he must believe if he believes they brought the universe into existence). Who or what dreamt up symmetry principles, Lagrangians, specific symmetry groups, gauge theories, and so on? He does not begin to answer these questions. It’s very ironic when he says philosophy is bunk and then himself engages in this kind of attempt at philosophy.

So as to: "The belief that all of reality can be fully comprehended in terms of physics and the equations of physics is a fantasy. " I think Epicurus would say that statement is exactly correct. Our human reality cannot be fully understood as "physics." Our human reality is real to us through the canonical faculties, including not just the bodily senses, which are "more" understandable in terms of physics, but also the feeling of pleasure and pain and anticipations, which arise from physical processes but in effect constitute a separate playing field of understanding. On that playing feel we are competing with supernatural religion and philosophical questions to which our nature impels us toward finding answers, and I think Epicurus would say that the best (most pleasurable) life requires that we address these issues as best we can.

Quote from Martin

Heat "death" is somewhat misleading. While we are no more after death, the universe exists without being alive and will still exist when it reaches heat death. ..... conditions will become too adverse for any lifeform to survive.

Martin, I think you mentioned this aspect briefly in the podcast, that the "death" part in "heat death" does not refer to the universe ceasing to exist, but to conditions for life (at least as we know it) not being possible.

I meant to backtrack and bring that out but I think I failed to get back to it. My concern with the subject was that we were planting the notion in less-read peoples' minds that we were entertaining a view in which the universe ceased to exist entirely. But I definitely remember your saying that so it's in the podcast episode and can always be referred to if anyone got really confused and thought we were totally off base from Epicurus.

In general that's really my main concern with most of the terminology like Krauss' "A Universe From Nothing." (Is Lawrence Krauss a Physicist, Or Just a Bad Philosopher?) I just came across that article and have only read it once, but I think the writer pretty much has the attitude I have. I am not sure if this attitude I am describing is that of a philosopher, or a "theologian" as the article mentions, but I think that whatever the issue really boils down to, Epicurus himself would be accused by Krauss of being a philosopher rather than a physicist in taking a position on the eternality of the elemental particles, and that there is no reason from a philosophical perspective to ascribe their existence to a supernatural god.

So I get the impression Krauss and people like him would not be on the side of Epicurus, and would actually be significantly opposed to many of his conclusions, or at least his procedures for reaching his conclusions, and that makes me concerned about seeming to cite their arguments without clarification.

The modern use of words like "nothing" (and maybe I should add "heat death") appear to the untrained to be making claims about ultimate traditional logical issues that are counterintuitive from/against the traditional Epicurean perspective, and should not be accepted on that level.

Plus, I have always been concerned, and continue to be concerned, that people like Krauss did not pick up their terminology because it was really compelled by the science, but exactly because it "tweaked" those who held to the older views, and that's an attitude I personally associate with radical skepticism and nihilism. That's just my personal viewpoint, of course, and it isn't necessarily implied or true in the case of any particular individual or theory, just something that seems to me to be worth considering in writing/talking about these issues to wider audiences.

(Sorry that this post is disjointed - i came across the article in mid-post and added it in. I need to pick up some of those points from that article in a separate post.)

Quote from Don

it can incorporate an idea like the multiverse or evolution or the possibility of alien life or other science with barely a shrug

As to the alien life, of course we know that Epicurus specifically predicted that to occur, which I think is an example of how he did take the position that we could use logic based on observation to produce rules in which we can have confidence ("nature never makes only a single thing of a kind") to extrapolate what we see here to other places which we have not seen. (Pretty much the same goes with a theory of evolution, at least of a kind, and also "other worlds" if you consider "worlds" to be analogous to a universe.)

I do think it is important to consider what seem to be the rules of extrapolating. Seems to me that epicurus is saying that those rules include preference (or at least, accepting it as more substantial evidence) that if we see a thing here, then we know it CAN exist. That gives the thing a head up over pure speculation of something that has never been observed, such as the kind of speculating that says that something MAY exist somewhere else just because we haven't been there to eliminate it.

That's probably not well stated on my part, but I think that's what's going on in our current example of where we are in Book 2. Where we are now, Lucretius has been saying that there must be a limit to size of an atom because to not have a limit would be inconceivable. (Presumably because or else we would see them? Or else if there were not a limit, then a single atom would take up the full universe?)

In other words, it seems to be a premise that Epicurus held that it is legitimate to hold that conditions that we observe here (never seeing an atom; no one thing of a single kind) are at least to some extent extrapolatable throughout the infinite universe. ("At least to some extent" meaning that if we observe them here there is a good reason to expect we will observe them elsewhere where conditions are similar.)

Now what I have just said may not be a good summary at all, but these are the issues I think they were getting at, and they deserve a lot of thought:

Are we not justified in having confidence in certain conclusions about the entire universe (that there is no supernatural god) based on extrapolation of what is observed here? And we have confidence of that even in face of the argument that "But you've never been there!" The answer to that question would have to be "yes i can be confident in some things (no supernatural god there either)" or else we'd never have confidence in much of anything. If we admit any possibility just because we've never been there, no confidence would ever be possible, it would be possible for the supernatural god from the next universe over to pop in at any moment. It seems clear to me that Epicurus did (and was justified in) ruling out that sort of argument.

We're dealing in complex logical issues but the only way to get confident in our conclusion is to think about what we're saying and consider the alternatives, just as he said in suggesting we think about infinity. Because infinity can either be our worst enemy ("the anything is possible argument") or our best friend (Godfrey's it eliminates supernatural gods, for one thing) in getting confident about our decisions on how to live.

I'm going to drop this here without elaboration but we also need to keep in mind in thinking about infinity the related issue we've discussed elsewhere about PD3 and the "limit of pleasure" in how Plato , Seneca, and others argued that a thing cannot be "the best" unless it has a limit, and they alleged pleasure to be something that is unlimited and therefore rejected from competition for the role of "best life." I would expect there to be a clear connection between getting comfortable with discussing limit vs infinity in the field of pleasure (ethics) and limit vs infinity in the field of physics.

Is it possible that one of the issues Epicurus saw was that we need to get comfortable with the idea of the unlimited universe being the highest there is so that we can get comfortable with allegedly unlimited pleasure as the highest goal of life?

Stated another way, maybe one way to get comfortable that there is no single goal of life that is the same for everyone is to compare that question to the size of the universe, for which there is also no single set "end" that everyone would reach if they traveled infinitely in the same direction? No single "best life" might be comparable to no single "end" of the universe in any direction. In both cases we are tempted to think that a supernatural god is the answer for both, but in fact there is no supernatural god and the entire question is logically illegitimate (because we have never observed evidence for a supernatural god, but we have observed lots of evidence that things work naturally, and we reject the "it's possible because we haven't been there to eliminate it" argument).

Having confidence in our answer to one of these questions helps (I think) with our confidence in answering the other one.

I've never really had any major issue with the idea of "multiverses" so long as the presumption is still there that everything is natural and there's no supernatural creeping in. In fact it's pretty clear in the letter the Herodotus that Epicurus was describing "worlds" as something like "star systems" and not just "planets,'" and that seems to me to be very compatible with what i understand to be the basic thrust of any "multiverse" theory (though I have certainly not studied them like Don has).

But at the same time I've also sensed that there was never any reason to transmute the word "universe" from meaning "everything" as it traditionally did to something less than everything. I've always sensed that there was an "agenda" of some kind in doing that, and that part of that agenda was to suspend all rules of extrapolating that what we observe here can be of any use in predicting what would be expected to exist elsewhere in the universe. Obviously there are great hazards in extrapolating like that, but there are also great hazards in taking an "anything goes" approach (such as opening the door to the supernatural).

There's not much to do with that concern other than to note it and move on, but I think the implications of accepting in the distant past that "maybe God lives on Mars and it's possible because we've ever been there" are pretty much the same as "maybe god lives in another part of the multiverse." There are always going to be people who use science in support of their agendas, and its probably safer to say that every scientific theory should be presumed to have an agenda and examined for it at the beginning rather than to accept the alleged sincerity of every theory that comes down the road.

Even saying that, however, I am firmly convinced that most if not all people who really get into Epicurean philosophy are going to be keenly interested in "science" and never put aside that interest as long as they live - too much depends upon it to ever do that. I see the issue as kind of like the question of "logic" - we're always going to be "threatened" by people who use science and logic for their own agendas, and therefore a certain amount of training in it is essential for everyone for self-protection.

Right -- so long as the infinite has no boundary, then there's no "other side" for god to live on, and any gods that do exist must live in our own universe. Good point.

Quote from Don

Scientists have "seen" (with extensions of their senses) space expanding and the broad consensus is that it will keep expanding until the last bit of energy is spent.

THIS is the point where I have my issue. I think by definition they need to realize and admit and most of all BE CLEAR that what they have seen, as far as they can see, no matter how good the technology gets, is not "the end" of the universe, It's only "the limit of our ability to observe." It still seems to me very clear that we would expect (based on the reasoning that matter and void must both be infinite) that there is indeed no limit to how much matter is out there. So that in fact what probably should be the presumption is that even though "our" universe appears to expanding as far as we can see, we ought to presume (based on the logical arguments) that there is in fact no end, and outside/past our ability to see is additional infinite space with additional cosmos that may or may not be expanding or contracting or whatever in the same way that ours is.

That is why I see a major distinction between the innumerable grains of sand and the infinity of space. If in fact you had the time and inclination and perseverance to could the "grains of sand" on the beach, or on the whole earth, that would seem to be theoretically possible to count and one day come to an end.

With the number of objects in space, however, it would be theoretically impossible to even come to an end in counting, because the best argument is that the universe is infinite in size, and therefore there will always be more to be counted no matter how long one tried.

And at least for me, still shaking off the hold of my religious background, I see a difference in kind between the two situations, and not just a difference in degree. It's coming to terms with the idea that there is no counting EVER the number of elements in the universe that is hard, not coming to terms with the idea of counting the grains of sand on the beach. And it's therefore the problem of infinite space which I would see as the worse enemy in polluting mens' minds with religion, rather than the problem of counting the sand on the beach. The challenge of counting the grains of sand I think could eventually be explained to most "normal" rational people, but the problem of counting something that in fact has no end is where the mind gets tempted toward the supernatural, and that's the temptation that needs to be addressed.

As you say this is an excellent discussion and I am glad we have an open forum where it can be extended in depth.

Quote from Don

And I also agree that most people don't need to concern themselves.....

Yes setting the context is a continuing issue. Not only are we constantly dealing with background political issues that are distracting (kind of like Lucretrius), it's always going to be necessary to tune the discussion to the listener so that they can understand it and appreciate it.

Most of us here I would expect are pretty far advanced into the technical and philosophical issues, but I know at least in my own case that I want to be sure to try to reach out to people who might be open to the core issues, but who aren't on the same page in terms of attitude or knowledge toward science, etc.

Ultimately I guess that entails the need to have respect for both approaches and means that any team working together on Epicurean philosophy is going to have a division of labor and a division of approach tailored to the target audience. In the end i don't think that the key issues involve major gray areas that would be a bar to that.

Yes I agree, but just as we have to remain flexible toward ultimate particles we ha e to be at least as flexible and skeptical, or more so, about any particular theoretical model, especially if it is used to imply or advocate interpretations that would undermine the conclusion that the senses (thecanonical faculties) are what human life is all about.

"They're made up of sub-atomic particles according to the Standard Model"

That explanation seems to me a good example of how different people are going to be comfortable with different levels of speculation. I presume that if the theory is that there is a "superstructure" and that "popping" doesn't really mean "from nothing" but rather means that it is somehow generated by the superstructure and "incorporated back into the superstructure," then there's really no violation of the "nothing from nothing" rule which is sort of a logical barrier where the issue is really being fought.

My discomfort with this kind of discussion is that in fact to most common people it does in fact sound "spooky and supernatural" even if it is not intended to be so by the specialists who are theorizing it.

I don't think it is ever appropriate to suggest that there are different "truths" for different types of people on something like this, but I would say that we do need to be aware of the different levels of analysis that people are capable of doing, or maybe said another way, the different perspectives that are in play in which people interpret words at different levels of subtlety.

I'm thinking that Epicurus was perfectly happy to discuss any level of scientific detail himself, but that he also thought it appropriate to reduce things down into broader outlines that most anyone is capable of understanding. "Nothing comes or goes to nothing" is probably such a formulation, useful for most people to keep them away from being manipulated by religion or other types of manipulators, and so it's generally useful to talk in those terms, even if at times it is also appropriate, among experts, to adopt highly-technical definitions of each of the words in the formulation for purposes of scientific theorizing.

So again I think part of this discussion is the issue of context and the purpose of the entire discussion. If we are conducting a seminar of astrophysicists then one way of speaking is appropriate, while if we are talking to the remaining 99% of the people in the world another manner is appropriate. And of course in lumping everyone else into the 99% group, there are huge numbers of subdivisions of categories by language, age, etc, which would be relevant to how to explain things to them.

So maybe this is an issue that involves proper communication as much or more than it does precise scientific theory.