Posts by Cassius

I am going to agree with Elayne even after I said I agree with what Don quoted, and this is an interesting application of the recent back and forth Elayne and I have been having. I think the statement is correct, as far as it goes, when limited to "in one's life" as if we are talking about one of us. That's a concrete application in which I think it is correct.

But Elayne is also extending the statement to its logical conclusions, and in doing so she is showing that a flat logical reading of it WOULD go to far.

This is back to our discussion of the interplay of logic and feeling/observation. Elayne is pointing out the issue from the position of making sure that the statement is logically consistent with the whole. She is correct in how the issue should be explained in the widest context. If we limit the discussion and state our limitations, then Don's view is acceptable.

We're making progress I think in seeing that we've got to articulate things in a "logically consistent" fashion while paying attention to both the "reasonable person" standard to come up with a "rule" or a "systematic explanation" and also the particular perspective of an individual focusing on what seems real to them locally.

I do not believe that Epicurus would say that his philosophy was anything less than rigorously logical and reasonable. We can achieve that aim, i think, and we HAVE to if we're going to be able to explain these issues to wider groups of people.

Quote from Godfrey

This quote of Don's seems like a good summary to me. It addresses hypotheticals and also provides grounds for evaluating a life of "sex, drugs and rock 'n' roll."

I completely agree with what Don stated and what Godfrey quoted too, but I do not believe it addresses, at least fully, the proper use of hypotheticals - if there is one - in philosophy. But I'll have to come back to this later....

Hello and welcome to the forum Dab !

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
2. "A Few Days In Athens" by Frances Wright
3. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
4. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
5. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
6. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
7. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
8. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
9. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
10. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
11. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
12. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

Quote from Don

"There's no way to adequately answer this hypothetical given the possible parameters we can realistically assign to it."

Ok that's very close to the same question. Must a hypothetical be "realistic" to be worth entertaining. That could be very close to the issue of "conceivability" apparently discussed by Epicurus. Is there, or should we consider there to be, a bright line against hypotheticals which are "inconceivable?" I think there are at least a couple of examples of "inconceivability" as a criterion in Lucretius but I would have to check.

Before we go too down that road we'd want to consider whether Epicurean gods are conceivable or inconceivable (presumably the former) and also whether it is conceivable to talk about a human being as a god (also presumably yes, per Epicurus' letter to menoeceus and also the reference in Lucretius to Epicurus being godlike).

Well we will soon be able to answer the question:

"Is the process of going through the details of a hypothetical of sufficient educational value to make the process worthwhile?

I would say that's probably he question. I am thinking the answer is "yes."

Yes this is the key "if it was a true bliss pill as advertised, then it would provide reliable pleasure." I understand you (Don) are unwilling to entertain that as a hypothetical so really the issue becomes are you suggesting we draw a bright line against all hypotheticals for which we have never seen an actual instance? I can see that being a reasonable position to entertain but I would think that would have far reaching implications that would require scrutiny.

Quote from Cassius

My own conclusion is that the wider interpretation DOES provide real benefits to SOME real people, but for other real people it does not.

And one of the keys to this is going to be the definition we use for "logic" and "reason" which is addressed near the end of the podcast. I am particularly interested in as much feedback as possible from people on this point, as you will understand when you listen.

Quote from Don

In the end, the argument doesn't provide benefits to real people.

Don this comment is very close to the issue that I think a number of us to have been circling around for a while on these issues. My own conclusion is that the wider interpretation DOES provide real benefits to SOME real people, but for other real people it does not.

I think you'll be really interested in the discussion we had today, so I took the time to edit it immediately so we can keep the conversation moving forward. When you find time to listen to it, be sure to listen all the way to the end, where I think some of the most important discussion takes place.

RE: Episode Fifty-Four: Reason Is Dependent On The Senses

Episode Fifty-Four of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In today's podcast we will discuss how mistaken judgments caused by illusions should not be considered to be the fault of the senses, but of the mind. Our text will be from Latin Lines: 324- 468. Thanks to Charles for reading today's text.

Well this thread was extremely helpful in our recording of Episode 54 of the Lucretius Today podcast. I will get that edited and posted as soon as possible and hopefully we will get some comments that can be used in next week's episode too.

Yep, your reaction is consistent, to say the least! This is why I recommend that everyone at least read DeWitt before making up their minds, because most people aren't going to find DeWitt's perspective anywhere else but in "Epicurus and His Philosophy." Everyone should read and come to their own conclusions.

Quote from Don

I think once one starts to say "what he's actually saying is..." that's "like butter scraped over too much bread."

I see your perspective there and think it is a good place to start. However I would not recommend stopping there, because unless you develop more of the context of the discussion it's easy to miss many implications of what is being presented. In this context I don't think Epicurus can be fully appreciated without realizing how much he amounts to a rejection of Platonic viewpoints, and that remains very important today since Platonic viewpoints are embedded in so much of modern thinking. Plato is never mentioned by name in the principle doctrines, yet it seems that Epicurus was probably thinking explicitly about the need to refute his viewpoints when he compiled his list of important doctrines. A list of principles presented as "this is important to understand" isn't fully understood until the reader understands "why this is important."

Norman Dewitt Epicurus and His Philosophy Page 12

He also exhibits great familiarity with the writings of Plato and he distributed among members of his school the work of refuting or ridiculing his various dialogues. His own classification of the desires is developed from a Platonic hint and he begins to erect his structure of hedonism from the point where this topic was left by Plato. A paragraph is extant in which he warns his disciples against the Platonic view of the universe as described in the Timaeus, and elsewhere he pokes a little satirical fun at that famous opus. More than half of his forty Authorized Doctrines are direct contradictions of Platonic teachings.

In connection with this episode we should keep in mind this paragraph from Chapter X of Diogenes Laertius:

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31. They reject dialectic as superfluous; holding that in their inquiries the physicists should be content to employ the ordinary terms for things.^[43] Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our sensations and preconceptions and our feelings are the standards of truth; the Epicureans generally make perceptions of mental presentations^[44] to be also standards. His own statements are also to be found in the Summary addressed to Herodotus and in the Sovran Maxims. Every sensation, he says, is devoid of reason and incapable of memory; for neither is it self-caused nor, regarded as having an external cause, can it add anything thereto or take anything therefrom. 32. Nor is there anything which can refute sensations or convict them of error: one sensation cannot convict another and kindred sensation, for they are equally valid; nor can one sensation refute another which is not kindred but heterogeneous, for the objects which the two senses judge are not the same;^[45] nor again can reason refute them, for reason is wholly dependent on sensation; nor can one sense refute another, since we pay equal heed to all. And the reality of separate perceptions guarantees^[46] the truth of our senses. But seeing and hearing are just as real as feeling pain. Hence it is from plain facts that we must start when we draw inferences about the unknown.^[47] For all our notions are derived from perceptions, either by actual contact or by analogy, or resemblance, or composition, with some slight aid from reasoning. And the objects presented to mad-men^[48] and to people in dreams are true, for they produce effects – i.e. movements in the mind – which that which is unreal never does.

For the definition of "Dialectic" here is the 1911 Encyclopaedia Brittannica:

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DIALECTIC, or Dialectics (from Gr. διάλεκτος, discourse, debate; ἡ διαλεκτική, sc. τέχνη, the art of debate), a logical term, generally used in common parlance in a contemptuous sense for verbal or purely abstract disputation devoid of practical value. According to Aristotle, Zeno of Elea "invented" dialectic, the art of disputation by question and answer, while Plato developed it metaphysically in connexion with his doctrine of "Ideas" as the art of analysing ideas in themselves and in relation to the ultimate idea of the Good (Repub. vii.). The special function of the so-called "Socratic dialectic" was to show the inadequacy of popular beliefs. Aristotle himself used "dialectic," as opposed to "science," for that department of mental activity which examines the presuppositions lying at the back of all the particular sciences. Each particular science has its own subject matter and special principles (ἴδιαι ἀρχαί) on which the superstructure of its special discoveries is based. The Aristotelian dialectic, however, deals with the universal laws (κοιναὶ ἀρχαί) of reasoning, which can be applied to the particular arguments of all the sciences. The sciences, for example, all seek to define their own species; dialectic, on the other hand, sets forth the conditions which all definitions must satisfy whatever their subject matter. Again, the sciences all seek to educe general laws; dialectic investigates the nature of such laws, and the kind and degree of necessity to which they can attain. To this general subject matter Aristotle gives the name "Topics" (τόποι, loci, communes loci). "Dialectic" in this sense is the equivalent of "logic." Aristotle also uses the term for the science of probable reasoning as opposed to demonstrative reasoning (ἀποδεικτική). The Stoics divided λογική (logic) into rhetoric and dialectic, and from their time till the end of the middle ages dialectic was either synonymous with, or a part of, logic.

In modern philosophy the word has received certain special meanings. In Kantian terminology Dialektik is the name of that portion of the Kritik d. reinen Vernunft in which Kant discusses the impossibility of applying to "things-in-themselves" the principles which are found to govern phenomena. In the system of Hegel the word resumes its original Socratic sense, as the name of that intellectual process whereby the inadequacy of popular conceptions is exposed. Throughout its history, therefore, "dialectic" has been connected with that which is remote from, or alien to, unsystematic thought, with the a priori, or transcendental, rather than with the facts of common experience and material things.

Here is the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica on "Logic" (a very long article)

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LOGIC (λογική, sc. τέχνη, the art of reasoning), the name given to one of the four main departments of philosophy, though its sphere is very variously delimited. The present article is divided into I. The Problems of Logic, II. History.

I. The Problems of Logic.

Introduction.—Logic is the science of the processes of inference. What, then, is inference? It is that mental operation which proceeds by combining two premises so as to cause a consequent conclusion. Some suppose that we may infer from one premise by a so-called “immediate inference.” But one premise can only reproduce itself in another form, e.g. all men are some animals; therefore some animals are men. It requires the combination of at least two premises to infer a conclusion different from both. There are as many kinds of inference as there are different ways of combining premises, and in the main three types:—

1. Analogical Inference, from particular to particular: e.g. border-war between Thebes and Phocis is evil; border-war between Thebes and Athens is similar to that between Thebes and Phocis; therefore, border-war between Thebes and Athens is evil.

2. Inductive Inference, from particular to universal: e.g. border-war between Thebes and Phocis is evil; all border-war is like that between Thebes and Phocis; therefore, all border-war is evil.

3. Deductive or Syllogistic Inference, from universal to particular, e.g. all border-war is evil; border-war between Thebes and Athens is border-war; therefore border-war between Thebes and Athens is evil.

In each of these kinds of inference there are three mental judgments capable of being expressed as above in three linguistic propositions; and the two first are the premises which are combined, while the third is the conclusion which is consequent on their combination. Each proposition consists of two terms, the subject and its predicate, united by the copula. Each inference contains three terms. In syllogistic inference the subject of the conclusion is the minor term, and its predicate the major term, while between these two extremes the term common to the two premises is the middle term, and the premise containing the middle and major terms is the major premise, the premise containing the middle and minor terms the minor premise. Thus in the example of syllogism given above, “border-war between Thebes and Athens” is the minor term, “evil” the major term, and “border-war” the middle term. Using S for minor, P for major and M for middle, and preserving these signs for corresponding terms in analogical and inductive inferences, we obtain the following formula of the three inferences:—

Analogical.	Inductive.	Deductive or Syllogistic.
S1 is P	S is P	Every	M is P
S2 is similar to S1	Every M is similar to S		S is M
∴⁠S2 is P.	∴⁠Every M is P.	∴	S is P.

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Here is the 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica on "Reason."

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REASON (Lat. ratio, through French raison), in philosophy, the faculty or process of drawing logical inferences. Thus we speak of man as essentially a rational animal, it being implied that man differs from all other animals in that he can consciously draw inferences from premises. It is, however, exceedingly difficult in this respect to draw an absolute distinction between men and animals, observation of which undoubtedly suggests that the latter have a certain power of making inferences. Between the higher animals and the lower types of mankind the distinction is so hard to draw that many psychologists argue that the difference is one of degree rather than of kind (see also Instinct). There can be little doubt, however, that inference by man differs from that of the brute creation in respect of self-consciousness, and, though there can be no doubt that some animals dream, it is difficult to find evidence for the presence of ideal images in the minds of any but the highest animals. In the nature of the case satisfactory conclusions as to the rationality which may be predicated of animals are impossible.

The term "reason" is also used in several narrower senses. Thus reason is opposed to sensation, perception, feeling, desire, as the faculty (the existence of which is denied by empiricists) by which fundamental truths are intuitively apprehended. These fundamental truths are the causes or "reasons" (ἁρχαί) of all derivative facts. With Kant, reason (Vernunft) is the power of synthesizing into unity, by means of comprehensive principles, the concepts provided by the intellect (Verstand). The reason which gives a priori principles Kant calls "Pure Reason" (cf. the Kritik der reinen Vernunft), as distinguished from the "Practical Reason" (praktische Vernunft) which is specially concerned with the performance of particular actions. In formal logic the drawing of inferences (frequently called "ratiocination," from Lat. ratiocinari, to use the reasoning faculty) is classified from Aristotle downwards as deductive (from generals to particulars) and inductive (from particulars to generals); see Logic, Induction, Syllogism. In theology, reason, as distinguished from faith, is the human intelligence exercised upon religious truth whether by way of discovery or by way of explanation. The limits within which the reason may be used have been laid down differently in different churches and periods of thought: on the whole, modern Christianity, especially in the Protestant churches, tends to allow to reason a wide field, reserving, however, as the sphere of faith the ultimate (supernatural) truths of theology.

The Greek words for reason are νοῦς and λόγος, both vaguely used. In Aristotle the λόγος of a thing is its definition, including its formal cause, while the ultimate principles of a science are ἁρχαί, the "reasons" (in a common modern sense) which explain all its particular facts.^[1] Nois in Plato and Aristotle is used both widely for all the meanings which "reason" can have, and strictly for the faculty which apprehends intuitively. Thus, in the Republic, van is the faculty which apprehends necessary truth, while δόξα (opinion) is concerned with phenomena.

For the Stoic and Neoplatonic uses of Aόγος, as also for those of Philo Judaeus and the Fathers, see Logos.

I certainly think that we are together on the practical result of the doctrine. I think we are just still apart on the type of argument being employed and therefore the implications involved in presenting the position as a system of thought.

Thanks Don -

I think we end up in the same place because of the practicalities of human life.

However I would say that the practical approach alone would undercut the meaning of these two:

PD8: " No pleasure is a bad thing in itself; but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures."

and from the letter to Menoeceus:

"Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided."

It seems to me that Epicurus is clearly wishing to establish as a flat principle that "pleasure" is an unalloyed good and is to be accepted as such in the philosophic scheme as an absolute premise of all other conclusions that might follow from that premise.

If we look at PD10 solely from the "practical" point of view alone, it seems to me that we imply, or at least open up the logical possibility, that pleasure can lose its nature as good in certain contexts -- namely the context in which the cost of such pleasure is large in terms of the pain required in order to achieve it. I would submit that labeling pleasure "good" or "not good" is not at all the same as saying pleasure is to be "chosen" or not chosen," so I am suggesting that Epicurus is telling us to keep these two aspects in mind as distinctly separate.

This seems to me to present a significant problem in analyzing the original question as set by Torquatus, (who cites it as something on which all philosophers, presumably even Epicurus, agree) which is that of specifying the highest good toward which all else aims, and which is itself not the means to something else. If you are suggesting that pleasure may at times not be a good at all, then you are pretty clearly opening up the field to say that if pleasure cannot be relied on to always be good, then you have to value something else (presumably wisdom or prudence) as higher than pleasure, since you need wisdom / prudence to know when to choose pleasure. Plato will back you into a corner and you will end up admitting, as did Philebus, that there is something more important for you to have than pleasure.

On the other hand, the more absolute position suggested by Elayne and me would (I submit) have it both ways. You would be affirming the practical conclusion (that it is necessary to watch choices carefully) both experimentally and reasonably according to your definitions.

I seem to remember that there is at least one reference but possibly more than one in Lucretius to a position being doubly potent, or perhaps it is "cutting off all retreat." I can't say I am 100% sure that Lucretius was thinking of that in this context, but this discussion is causing me to be more convinced than ever that Epicurus should be read as linking the experiential with the logical and fighting on both fronts. I suppose it's not "necessary" to fight on the logical level if someone is the type of supremely practical person who isn't bothered by logical problems, but I personally am convinced that the Epicurus was committed not to abandoning logical arguments, but to showing how they can be used properly in conjunction with experience.

Probably someone arguing this position would also cite PD16 as evidence of Epicurus not abandoning reason, but pointing to its proper use:

PD16. In but few things chance hinders a wise man, but the greatest and most important matters, reason has ordained, and throughout the whole period of life does and will ordain.

Presuming that you or Elayne may assert it, I will continue to agree with you that it is legitimate to find it unnecessary to engage in logical debates at all. Some people can successfully go through life not worrying about certain issues, effectively saying "to heck with Plato and his arguments." But I think the evidence is overwhelming that Epicurus didn't just teach his students to ignore Plato and tell them that the Platonists that totally wrong to think about logical reasoning. I would say instead that he showed his students a logical way to reach his conclusions based on the combined use of reason and evidence.

Note: Looks like i am thinking of a passage in Book 3 (perhaps in the mid-400's) which Munro translates as:

"So invariably is truth found to make head against false reason and to cut off all retreat from the assailant, and by a two-fold refutation to put falsehood to rout."

Bailey: "So surely is true fact seen to run counter to false reasoning, and to shut off retreat from him who flees, and with double-edged refutation to prove the falsehood."

Browne: "So evidently does the true matter of fact overthrow all false reasoning, that there is no possibility to escape its force; and the contrary opinion is either way fully refuted."

More context for that passage is here: Episode Forty-Three - The Mind is Born, Grows Old, and Dies With the Body

Episode Fifty-Three of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In today's podcast we will discuss how mistaken judgments caused by illusions should not be considered to be the fault of the senses, but of the mind. Our text will be from Latin Lines: 324- 468. Thanks to Martin for reading today's text.

Maybe the question is the extent we are converting experience to concepts and back again. Is all manipulation of concepts something that comes under the category of "reason" or "logic?" Certainly we thing there is accurate and inaccurate manipulation of concepts, but don't we call that accurate or inaccurate logic or reasoning?

Ha let me quote myself:

Quote from Cassius

Epicurus was saying that just as we don't choose the longest life, but the most pleasant, we don't choose the most pain-free life, but the most pleasant.

Is it not interesting how this statement has to be viewed carefully too. Because from the point of view of PD3 (the limit of quantity....) the most pain-free life IS the most pleasant life, by definition, at least in PD3 when considering the issue from the point of quantity alone. But if you consider that pleasure can't be reduced to a single aspect of measurement that trumps all others (certainly not quantity of time), then every time you put a caveat and say "pleasure in terms of ......." you're going to end up with a problem in measurement that isn't resolvable by any other standard of measure than going back to "pleasure" itself - which presumably is an individual standard, since only individuals can feel pleasure.

This is why I look at the "pleasure is absence of pain" as not only experientially true, as Elayne will be quick to say, but also as "logically" true. Maybe the correct word is not "logically" because what we're NOT saying is that this can be proven by abstract logic disconnected from experience. I suppose the best words I have for this at the moment are "true reason" (doesn't Lucrestius refer to "vera ratio"?) because it is reason based tightly and closely and validated by experience. Maybe it's also "true logic," or at least "practical logic." But to return to the point, it's both logically and experientially sound.

Ha - I started to list you along with Elayne and me in the "ya'll" camp but I pulled back and erased that. Probably my doing so and your post are absolute scientific proof of the existence of telepathy in humans.

As as for the intermundia we have lots of odd place names in the Southeast but I am not sure I have ever seen "Intermundia 10 miles" on any of the road signs!

Quote from Don

As Epicurus says in his philosophy as a whole, nothing stands above pleasure. As far as the "profligate" of PD 10 are experiencing pleasure, there can be no argument or censure against whatever activities they choose to engage in. PD 10 is only saying that the "profligate" can be censured in so far as they aren't experiencing the fullness of pleasure because they still have the "mind’s fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering." If they would resolve these pains and fears and come to a correct understanding of these, they could engage in any of the activities which bring them pleasure without anxiety

I would rewrite that as follows:

As Epicurus says in his philosophy as a whole, nothing stands above pleasure as the ultimate good, which means the ultimate good or goal for which we do everything else to achieve, and which is not in terms an intermediate step toward any higher goal. As far as the "profligate" of PD 10 are experiencing pleasure, there can be no argument or censure against whatever activities they choose to engage in if in fact those activities succeed in bringing them pleasure which they feel to outweigh the pain which may be required to achieve that pleasure. This is because any legitimate censure would have to be based on them failing to achieve the ultimate goal of nature, and if they do in fact achieve that goal, there is no natural grounds for censuring them. PD 10 is only saying that the "profligate" can be censured to the extent that they fail to achieve their goal, which in practical human experience is likely to happen if their profligate ways do not banish the "mind’s fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering." If their profligate ways included a means of resolving these and all other pains and fears, there would be no proper /natural grounds for censuring them because they were in fact successful in achieving a pleasurable life.

Now a couple of comments:

(1) I think it's clear that what I am doing is taking "pleasure is the goal" to its logical extreme and presuming that this is a hypothetical profligate man who is hypothesized (against the odds of general experience) to in fact be successful in achieving a pleasurable life. Anyone who looks at PD10 and insists on saying that the profligate man "cannot" be successful, and analyzing it that way, is in my view not accepting this as the hypothetical it seems clearly intended to be. Taking such a position, such a person won't ever accept the conclusion I think PD10 was aimed at communicating, so I think anyone analyzing this has to deal with whether and how to treat this as a hypothetical. So my position is that PD10 is taking the same logical/hypothetical approach entailed in the Torquatus section of On Ends:

"I will start then in the manner approved by the author of the system himself, by settling what are the essence and qualities of the thing that is the object of our inquiry; not that I suppose you to be ignorant of it, but because this is the logical method of procedure. We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil."

(2) Clarity also requires that we make clear that there is the time issue. Epicurus said in the letter to Menoeceus that the wise man isn't going to choose the longest life, but the most pleasant, so it needs to be clear that the profligate man isn't necessarily wrong because he experiences pains "longer" than he experiences pleasure. If the letter to Menoeceus is correct, then we have to let the individual involved judge whether the pleasure achieved is worth the cost in pain / effort of achieving it.

(3) Just as with point two we have to take a position on whether Epicurus was saying that it is more important to eliminate pain than it is to achieve pleasure. If you take the position that Epicurus was advising real people to place first priority on eliminating pain, in order to have the best life possible to a human, then you're going to slide to asceticism and minimalism. I would even argue that you're impelled toward eventual suicide at a relatively young age, before the inevitable pains of middle and older age set in. Of course I take the opposite position, and think Epicurus was saying that just as we don't choose the longest life, but the most pleasant, we don't choose the most pain-free life, but the most pleasant.