Posts by Cassius

I think that's probably fair, Don, but I personally side more with:

Quote from Cassius

However, according to Sbordone, the only dissenting voice, it is on the contrary an oversimplification operated by little seasoned Epicureans,

And I would really like to read the full argument here, if I could eventually find it and get a translation: Francesco Sbordone. Philodemi Adversus [Sophistas] e Papyro Herculanensi 1005 (Naples: L. Loffredo, 1947)

I woke up today too thinking of this one additional point, that in addition to thinking each aspect is an oversimplification, I would vigorously object to the "don't fear "GOD"" if indeed the original is singular rather than plural. The implicit approval of monotheism is a direct conflict with Epicurean doctrine of the nature of "gods" and I would consider that a huge breach in a core element of the philosophy. I suppose it is possible in some contexts (dealing with Jews perhaps?) but I can't imagine that the original founders talked that way in most contexts, and if this version is singular.

I note Don that you translated it both ways in one of your earlier posts here. What is your view on which is most likely?

Yes it does look promising - it at least seems to entertain that the formulation is "simplistic" -- I too will see what I can do with Google Translate:

1245 / 5000

Translation results

The hypothesis of the orthodoxy of the tetrapharmakos, which is based on the proximity of these four elements to the content of Men. 133 and MC I-IV, is almost universally accepted today; most editors, translators and commentators on Epicurus spontaneously reconcile these different testimonies and assume that the tetrapharmakos is well understood directly, as well in Men. 133 than in MC I-IV18. Comparetti19, Usener20, Crönert21 and Bignone22 are probably at the origin of this reading, because, from the appearance of the first critical ecdotic works on Epicureanism, they defended not only the hypothesis of an orthodoxy of the tetrapharmakos , but that of an invention of the formula by Epicurus himself. However, according to Sbordone, the only dissenting voice, it is on the contrary an oversimplification operated by little seasoned Epicureans, who are in the text of the PHERC. 1005 the adversaries of Philodemus 23. This uncertainty is linked to the very poor condition of the papyrus concerned, and in particular to the enormous gap in the title; from this gap, a Sbordone will thus have postulated a Against the Sophists, where Marcello Gigante and his suite Anna Angeli rather suppose an Aux Amis de l'Ecole24.

The consensual reading of the text, since the edition of Anna Angeli25, is based on two elements: on the one hand, the fact that Philodemus himself does not attribute the tetrapharmakos to Epicurus; on the other hand, and contrary to what Sbordone supposed, the hypothesis which he defends in the Πρὸς τοὺς [... the thesis according to which it remains a correct and exact formula, in accordance with the spirit of the ethics of 'Epicurus. The claim made by Philodemus, to which he does not seem absolutely hostile, is a claim of orthodoxy; In any case, this is strongly suggested by the legible elements in the whole of the preserved part of the treaty26. It is then necessary to understand with a little more subtlety what makes Philodemus cautious with regard to this statement. The question, as we will see, is not so much content as it is method; and it will shed suggestive light on the very teaching of ethics within the Garden, and on the question of the relationship between short speeches and long speeches.

The Πρὸς τοὺς [... is probably addressed or alluded to Epicureans who do not commit errors, strictly speaking, but who do not have a very clear conception of the relation which unites the abstracts of the doctrine to its full developments. It is therefore a question of inviting them to make fair use of each of these media, that is to say to start not being satisfied with the abstracts; but it also means knowing how to use them without fear when the opportunity arises, and not to doubt them. Epicureanism is working and deepening; a true epicurean cannot therefore be satisfied with the tetrapharmakos or any other epitome and must only resort to it when the case presents itself without risk of caricature or confusion. Philodemus thus allusively reports controversies created by ignorance of the details of the Epicurean doctrine; to be able on the one hand not to be intimidated by incomplete refutations, on the other hand to respond effectively, research in books is essential.

This kind of controversy seems to have blossomed during an important part of the Garden’s life, as an echo of this disputed practice of abstracts is found in another scroll in Herculanum’s library, the PHerc. 1044, which alludes to the activity of a certain Philonides who is said to have produced a large quantity of these summaries. To take up the completely suggestive but perhaps somewhat forced translation of Koch Piettre27, these books are supposed to have been composed "to serve lazy young people" (νέοις ἀργοῖς ὠφελίμους).

Mais, dans le Πρὸς τοὺς [... de Philodème, on lit également ceci:
(col. XVI) [- - -] δ [ύ] ναν̣ [ται] μ [ὲν] τοῖς [β] υ̣βλίοις̣ παρακολουθεῖν οἳ καὶ τετυ [χ] ό̣τες ἀγωγῆς Ἕλλησι καὶ̣ [ο] ὐ̣ [Πέρσαις] πρεπούσης καὶ παι [δευθέ] ν̣τες ἐν μ [α] θημασι, δι̣ [δά] σκουσι καὶ [τ] ὰ τ̣ῶν ἐπιτετηδευκότων ἀσάφειαν ἐξευρίσκειν καὶ ὁμοειδῆ γ ', εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, ἐκ παιδίου μέχρι γήρως φ [ι] λοσοφήσαντες καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ταῖς ἀκριβείαις συντεθεικότες · ο [ἱ] δὲ δουλεύσαντες ἐργατικῶς ἢ ἀνάγ [ω] γοι καὶ γράμματα μὴ μ̣ [α] θόντες [---
28 Πρὸς τοὺς [... col. XVI, trad. Delattre & Monet 2010, p. 739.
Women are more likely to pay attention to books, as they are, because they have the opportunity to attend a school that is owned by the Greeks, not by […], and are formed in school disciplines, explicitly just for men who are occupied by the elixir which is obscure. It has been studied by philosophers - from infancy to life - from similar observations of the moon, to the choice of others, or to the composition of very numerous and very interesting scripts by their precision. In revenge, those who are enslaved and accomplished through work, or who are deprived of education, and who are not free to write and write, [...] 28.

This passage may be the start of a well-reasoned defense of the use of abstracts for a certain type of audience. Philodemus distinguishes here, not two categories of philosophical texts, but two categories of people: the scholars, who having studied "as philosophers" - and it will be noted that here the philosophical activity is defined as a school activity - are in able to make useful use of the vast developments which elucidate what is obscure in a detailed fashion, and laymen who, due to their condition of laborious existence, cannot have any bookish approach. Such a distinction can open the way to two kinds of argument: an apologetic argument, which will take the defense of the type of philosophical support adapted to this second uneducated public - the summary or the memorizable and simple formula being all indicated for the slave who does not know how to read but who nevertheless has the right to access a happy life; or else an aristocratic argument intended to limit philosophy to this first cultivated public, the only one capable of understanding it - and which in the context of Πρὸς τοὺς ... leads to ridicule those who, although having by education and social status the possibility to read and study philosophy at school, refuse to do so - to be honest, the young idle smokers denounced according to Koch Piettre in the PHERC. 1044. This second argument is possible - and it is the one retained by the most recent French translators of this text, Daniel Delattre and Annick Monet; it nevertheless seems a bit problematic to us if we take into account the general posture of Epicureanism, a philosophy that aims to be popular and which is being built in the mouth of Epicurus against the training program of classical paideia29. We should therefore see perhaps a little irony in this passage from Philodemus, and in the description of these apprentice philosophers bent over their grimoires and strictly occupied in understanding the letter of an obscure text. In reality, the full argument of Philodemus's text is very subtle, since what we can read about it indicates at least three demonstrative tracks:
the need for a real deepening of the doctrine (not to be satisfied with anthologies or summaries);
the defense of the texts of the first Epicureans, even though their detail would contradict recent philosophical developments, and the need not to question the entire corpus because some books appear doubtful; 30 Cf. the different occurrences of συμμετρία, Πρὸς τοὺς [... col. XVIII, 3 and XX, 4.
taking into account the different social and intellectual situations, which gives its proper place to each type of writing, summary or detailed. From this perspective, the abstracts are valid "to a fair extent30" as long as they are used wisely and without claiming to replace the developed texts.

21The tetrapharmakos, despite its extreme concentration, then remains a valid statement if and only if it can be linked at one time or another in philosophical practice, or to the already somewhat more consistent form it takes in the Maxims, or, even better, to a complete and reasoned ethical presentation. But, for want of anything better, it remains a solid basis for Epicureans who are temporarily in situations that are not very appropriate for a school philosophical practice.

---

I am going to tag Charles here to be sure he catches this part of the article.

OK that page seems to be the best source.

Is this it?

Don can you make any context out of that?

Again many thanks Don. Do you get an impression of where the Tetrapharmakon fits among the parts that are translated above?

(This does seem to confirm my memory that the full context of the book seems to be a discussion of controversies within or among the Epicurean community, so I continue to think that context is important to consider.)

That (quote from Hiram) 's a good example of the concerns I have about going further than the text probably justifies. Everything Hiram wrote there in that first sentence is probably correct as isolated statements (Epicurus advised making outlines; Philodemus was aware of that advice). But does that really mean anything in regard to whether this particular text was an example of one of the good outlines? I think I recall reading that in fact surviving parts of this scroll of Philodemus was substantially devoted to his disputes with other Epicureans as to proper doctrine? (Again, keep me honest, Don, but I think I remember reading that about this scroll/book.)

Perhaps indeed this text is part of just the sort of conversation we have had here at the forum about personal outlines. Our context is to take the examples that people post and then "pick them apart" showing how they might be improved, while still noting the usefulness of the process of drafting the outline.. Without more context it's just not clear to me that we can be sure that this was an "approved" outline, or even possibly an example of an outline that is more harmful than helpful. It's possible that Philodemus would have been making much the same comment about this formulation as Charles himself has here -- illustrating both its merits and deficiencies. Without more context in the text it's just not possible to know with confidence.

1 - Godfrey you are on a roll with good papers recently - thank you!

Quote from Charles

If indeed Philodemus or Zeno (of Sidon) were pro-tetrapharmakon, perhaps the saying only circulated among the inner circles of students within various gardens, as opposed to being a means of teaching others who were unfamiliar.

2 - Don you are deeper into this now than I am so please keep me honest. It seems to me I am remembering that there are "zero" references to this precise formulation **except for** the passage in the Herculaneum scroll that was reconstructed after their discovery in the 1700's. Am I correct about that? Do we have any examples of any ancient Epicurean using this formulation other than that scroll?

3 - And I usually combine that caveat with the statement that there is also "zero" context in terms of surrounding material on that "page" of the scroll that would tell us how it is being used. Am I also correct about that? I don't even know if "page" is the right measure - I am not aware of anyone stating the content of the last remaining text before this occurs, of the first remaining text after it occurs. Don have you picked up anything on that? I think that would be very valuable information to know, but I have not seen it addressed anywhere.

4 - I make that last observation also in context of how Philodemus is regularly writing in opposition to non-Epicureans and/or some other Epicureans, so that I think we always have to keep in mind the peril of putting too much emphasis on an isolated passage that may not even be something that Philodemus was writing approvingly, since he regularly summarized opposing or incorrect doctrine so he could attack it.. On this point I don't think there's much doubt (of course correct me there too if I am wrong), but on points 2 and 3 I know that's an issue of fact that may actually change over time with new discoveries.

Quote

I also don't see it as an evangelizing tool but rather as a succinct "creed" encapsulating key points of Epicurus's philosophy

I've said much the same as Charles has, but the key to me is what you say here. In the hands of someone who understands that it is clipped it can be very useful. But in the hands of much of today's internet it is treated as a complete synopsis of what Epicurus taught, and if someone stops there it can be very misleading. I think we touch on more of this in today's episode, with Elayne back, so I will try to get that posted asap.

Episode Forty-Seven of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. As always we invite your comments and suggestions.

Welcome to Episode Forty-Eight of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

For anyone who is not familiar with our podcast, please check back to Episode One for a discussion of our goals and our ground rules. If you have any question about that, please be sure to contact us at Epicureanfriends.com for more information.

In today's episode, we will cover roughly lines 931-1023 from Book 3 of the Latin Text. In this episode we will hear Nature speak to us about death, and Lucretius will compare the myths of Tityus, Sisyphus, and Tantalus to the tortures that actually exist for some people on Earth.

Munro Notes

931-977: if nature were to say to you or me 'why lament your death? if your life has been a pleasant one, why not go to rest satisfied with the feast? if the contrary, why not end your troubles? for I have nothing new to give you, if you were to live for ever': we must allow her words to be true: if an old man were to bemoan himself, would she not with justice thus chicle? 'a truce with tears; the fault is your own, if you have not had enjoyment': make way for others: they too will follow you, as you now follow those before you; life is but a limited tenure: what took place before our birth is nothing to us; judge from this of what the future will be after our death.

978-1023 : the stories told of hell are really true of this life: Tantalus, Tityos, Sisyphus, the daughters of Danaus, are but types of people tormented here by various lusts and passions: Tartarus too, Cerberus and the furies have no existence; but are pictures of the various punishments of crime in this world; and even if these are escaped, the tortures of conscience make a hell of earth.

Browne 1743

But if the Nature of Things should offer to speak of a sudden, and upbraid the folly of any one of us in a manner like this: Prithee, Man, Why is it that thou indulgest thyself in such sharp sorrow and complaints? Why dost thou groan and weep because thou shalt die? If your life past has been agreeable to you, and all the abundant delights of it did not pass your mind as through a sieve, and perished without pleasure to you, why do not you, as a guest plentifully regaled with life, take your leave - and, fond Fool, enjoy your sweet repose with a cheerful mind? But if the good things thou has received have been idly squandered and are gone, and life is grown a burden to you, why do you covet more, that may come to the same unhappy end, and vainly die away like those that were before, and not rather put a period to thy life and all thy cares? For there is nothing further I can contrive or invent that can please thee more. Things always continue the same; if thy body was not to decay by years, nor thy limbs grow feeble by age, things will ever remain the same, tho' thou were to go on and live forever, and much more so if thou wert never to die. What could we say but that Nature gave a very just reproof, and set the case in a very proper light?

But the wretch that deplores his death beyond all bounds, may not she deservedly cry out the louder upon such a one, and chide him in sharper note: Get thee gone with thy tears, thou booby, and leave sobbing. If he be an old fellow, and far advanced, that complains: Dost thou fret thyself that hast run through all the delights of life? Because thou are reaching after absent pleasures, thou despisest the present, and so thy life passes away imperfect, and without relish, and death stares thee in the face before thou art aware, before thou has enough, and canst go off the stage satisfied and full of joy. It is high time to take thy leave of everything that does not agree with thy age; come, make way cheerfully for others, there is no help for it.

I think Nature, upon such occasions, would act justly, and, by such a rebuke, use him as he deserves, for old things must be thrust off, and give way as new come, and one thing must needs be repaired by another; but nothing sinks into Hell, or descends into the dark shades. There must still be a stock of matter to produce future generations, all which likewise, when their race is run, shall follow thee, nor did things less pass away in the ages before than they do now, and so shall they do for the ages to come, for beings never cease to rise from the ruins of one another, and life was given to none for a property, but to all for use. Look back, then, how that infinite tract of time that vanished before we were in being, how it has no relation to us; and the nature of all time to come will be of the same concern to us after we are dead. And now does anything show dreadful in death? Has it anything melancholy in its appearance? Is it not more serene than the softest sleep?

And truly, all those dreadful things that are said to be in the shades below are all felt by us whilst we are in this life; nor is there, as they tell us, such a miserable wretch, so stupified with idle fear, as Tantalus, who dreads the fall of the huge impending stone upon him from above; but rather, a vain fear of the gods torments men in this life, and terrifies them with all the ills that Fortune thinks fit to lay upon them. Nor do the vultures dig into the bowels of Tityus, as he lies in Hell, nor can they find in that large breast of his a liver they shall be forever tearing out, tho' his body were ever so big, tho' he not only covered nine acres with his expanded limbs, but could spread them over all the Earth; yet he would not be able to bear eternal pains, nor could he furnish an everlasting meal out of his body. But that man is Tityus, whom by love oppressed the birds of prey devour, and piercing sorrow eats through, or any other impetuous passion tears in pieces. Sisyphys walks visibly before us in this life - it is he who sets his heart to court the people for honors, for the rods and cruel axes, and is ever repulsed, and retires sad and disappointed; for in vain to hunt after empty power which is never obtained, and to suffer the hardest labor in the pursuit of it. This is to thrust with all one's might the stone up the hill, which again tumbles down upon us from the top, and rolls swiftly into the plain below.

Munro

Once more, if the nature of things could suddenly utter a voice and in person could rally any of us in such words as these: “What hast thou: o mortal, so much at heart, that thou goest such lengths in sickly sorrows? Why bemoan and bewail death? For say thy life past and gone has been welcome to thee and thy blessings have not all, as if they were poured into a perforated vessel, run through and been lost without avail? Why not then take thy departure like a guest filled with life, and with resignation, thou fool, enter upon untroubled rest? But if all that thou hast enjoyed has been squandered and lost, and life is a grievance, why seek to make any addition, to be wasted perversely in its turn and lost utterly without avail? Why not rather make an end of life and travail? For there is nothing more which I can contrive and discover for thee to give pleasure: all things are ever the same. Though thy body is not yet decayed with years nor thy frame worn out and exhausted, yet all things remain the same, ay though in length of life thou shouldst outlast all races of things now living, nay even more if thou shouldst never die.” What answer have we to make save this, that nature sets up against us a well-founded claim and puts forth in her pleading a true indictment?

If however one of greater age and more advanced in years should complain and lament, poor wretch, his death more than is right, would she not with greater cause raise her voice and rally him in sharp accents, “Away from this time forth with thy tears, rascal; a truce to thy complaining: thou decayest after full enjoyment of all the prizes of life. But because thou ever yearnest for what is not present, and despisest what is, life has slipped from thy grasp unfinished and unsatisfying, and or ever thou thoughtest, death has taken his stand at thy pillow, before thou canst take thy departure sated and filled with good things. Now however resign all things unsuited to thy age, and with a good grace up and greatly go: thou must.”

With good reason methinks she would bring her charge, with reason rally and reproach; for old things give way and are supplanted by new without fail, and one thing must ever be replenished out of other things; and no one is delivered over to the pit and black Tartarus. Matter is needed for after generations to grow; all of which though will follow thee when they have finished their term of life; and thus it is that all these no less than thou have before this come to an end and hereafter will come to an end. Thus one thing will never cease to rise out of another, life is granted to none in fee-simple, to all in usufruct. Think, too, how the bygone antiquity of everlasting time before our birth was nothing to us. Nature therefore holds this up to us as a mirror of the time yet to come after our death. Is there aught in this that looks appalling, aught that wears an aspect of gloom? Is it not more untroubled than any sleep?

And those things sure enough, which are fabled to be in the deep of Acheron, do all exist for us in this life. No Tantalus, numbed by groundless terror, as the story is, fears, poor wretch, a huge stone hanging in air; but in life rather a baseless dread of the gods vexes mortals: the fall they fear is such fall of luck as chance brings to each. Nor do birds eat away into Tityos laid in Acheron, nor can they, sooth to say, find during eternity food to peck under his large breast. However huge the bulk of body he extends, though such as to take up with outspread limbs not nine acres merely, but the whole earth, yet will he not be able to endure everlasting pain and supply food from his own body for ever. But he is for us a Tityos whom, as he grovels in love, vultures rend and bitter bitter anguish eats up or troubled thoughts from any other passion do rive. In life, too, we have a Sisyphus before our eyes who is bent on asking from the people the rods and cruel axes, and always retires defeated and disappointed. For to ask for power, which empty as it is, is never given, and always in the chase of it to undergo severe toil, this is forcing uphill with much effort a stone which after all rolls back again from the summit and seeks in headlong haste the levels of the plain.

Bailey

Again, suppose that the nature of things should of a sudden lift up her voice, and thus in these words herself rebuke some one of us: ‘Why is death so great a thing to thee, mortal, that thou dost give way overmuch to sickly lamentation? why groan and weep at death? For if the life that is past and gone has been pleasant to thee, nor have all its blessings, as though heaped in a vessel full of holes, run through and perished unenjoyed, why dost thou not retire like a guest sated with the banquet of life, and with calm mind embrace, thou fool, a rest that knows no care? But if all thou hast reaped hath been wasted and lost, and life is a stumbling-block, why seek to add more, all to be lost again foolishly and pass away unenjoyed; why not rather make an end of life and trouble? For there is naught more, which I can devise or discover to please thee: all things are ever as they were. If thy body is not yet wasted with years, nor thy limbs worn and decayed, yet all things remain as they were, even if thou shouldst live on to overpass all generations, nay rather, if thou shouldst never die.’ What answer can we make, but that nature brings a just charge against us, and sets out in her pleading a true plaint?

But if now some older man, smitten in years, should make lament, and pitifully bewail his decease more than is just, would she not rightly raise her voice and chide him in sharp tones? ‘Away with tears henceforth, thou rogue, set a bridle on thy laments. Thou hast enjoyed all the prizes of life and now dost waste away. But because thou yearnest ever for what is not with thee, and despisest the gifts at hand, uncompleted and unenjoyed thy life has slipped from thee, and, ere thou didst think it, death is standing by thy head, before thou hast the heart to depart filled and sated with good things. Yet now give up all these things so ill-fitted for thy years, and with calm mind, come, yield them to thy sons: for so thou must.’

She would be right, I trow, in her plea, right in her charge and chiding. For the old ever gives place thrust out by new things, and one thing must be restored at the expense of others: nor is any one sent down to the pit and to black Tartarus. There must needs be substance that the generations to come may grow; yet all of them too will follow thee, when they have had their fill of life; yea, just as thyself, these generations have passed away before, and will pass away again. So one thing shall never cease to rise up out of another, and life is granted to none for freehold, to all on lease. Look back again to see how the past ages of everlasting time, before we are born, have been as naught to us. These then nature holds up to us as a mirror of the time that is to come, when we are dead and gone. Is there aught that looks terrible in this, aught that seems gloomy? Is it not a calmer rest than any sleep?

Yea, we may be sure, all those things, of which stories tell us in the depths of Acheron, are in our life. Neither does wretched Tantalus fear the great rock that hangs over him in the air, as the tale tells, numbed with idle terror; but rather ’tis in life that the vain fear of the gods threatens mortals; they fear the fall of the blow which chance may deal to each. Nor do birds make their way into Tityos, as he lies in Acheron, nor can they verily in all the length of time find food to grope for deep in his huge breast. However vast the mass of his outstretched limbs, though he cover not only nine acres with his sprawling limbs, but the whole circle of earth, yet he will not be able to endure everlasting pain, nor for ever to supply food from his own body. But this is our Tityos, whom as he lies smitten with love the birds mangle, yea, aching anguish devours him, or care cuts him deep through some other passion. The Sisyphus in our life too is clear to see, he who open-mouthed seeks from the people the rods and cruel axes, and evermore comes back conquered and dispirited. For to seek for a power, which is but in name, and is never truly given, and for that to endure for ever grinding toil, this is to thrust uphill with great effort a stone, which after all rolls back from the topmost peak, and headlong makes for the levels of the plain beneath.

Thanks for pointing that out! And a relatively young one too, which is good to see that younger people are still interested in Epicurus.

Looks like she wrote at least one more article on the topic that we ought to look at:

so it appears she is in Croatia - a very interesting area

Quote from Godfrey

Perceptions are true and not describable by propositions, while beliefs are testable propositions and therefore not a criterion of truth.

Now I do think that is a very clear and useful statement.

Quote from Godfrey

An example he uses, with reservations, is that of a photograph

And that's an interesting example and gives something concrete to talk about. The photograph becomes something to which we can compare future observations ,but in and of itself the photograph is a limited representation and doesn't really contain any opinion about what is on the film. Sounds like a good article.

Looks like a good find and important read. I had time to skim the first page or two but I was immediately struck that DeWitt's way of explaining the truth issue (honestly reported, like a witness in court who is honestly reporting but might be mistaken) doesn't seem to be Milos' approach. If you have read the full article, Godfrey, is my impression correct?

I see this is the conclusion. "Factive"?????? That doesn't sound very helpful to me.

Then there is the sentence that I underlined. If I read this correctly then he is basically taken the Bailey approach: we see things, we form concepts (pictures) of what we have seen, and those concepts/pictures become standards of truth for future analysis. That's not the view I tend to agree with, but I want to read and think about this in more detail. My problem has always been, and remains, that I think Epicurus held a standard of truth to be something that is perceptual and not challengeable in and of itself, in that we need to take every perception (taste, touch, sight, etc) as a given for what is being honestly reported by the faculty at that moment. A "belief" or a "concept," on the other hand, is by definition full of opinion, and can't be considered unchallengeable, can it? Or can it? I think another way of stating my concern relates to his last sentence. To me, the process of seeing things and forming pictures is obviously very important, but I don't consider it to be an "epistemological" tool as much as an "analytic" tool (or thinking tool or some other word that preserves the distinction that this tool contains opinion, while the other tools -the five senses - do not).

I haven't made it to episode yet, but the framing of the post led me to search dictionary.com on "emotion." How in the world did we get to the point where "emotions" have a negative connotation, whereas the original Latin seems broad enough to encompass everything that "sets us in motion"? I smell a religious or a Stoic rat at work, because who else would want to turn a word that expresses a totally basic and benign understanding of what moves us as humans into a word to treat with suspicion at first mention of it?

The best source for the text of this work is the De Lacy translation available here. The appendix is excellent and should be read, if possible, before the work itself.

BW --

Thanks for engaging on this. You're coming at the issue from the normal perspective, so I understand why you reached the conclusions about Epicurus that you did. If you have the time and inclination to get started on the DeWitt book, you will see there is a different perspective on "pleasure" which involves the observation that what might be called "the faculty of pleasure," being Nature's ultimate stop and go signal, is not properly divided in to "good pleasures" vs "bad pleasures" or any other categories. There is only "pleasure" which covers a vast spectrum of pleasurable experiences, and there is only "pain" which also covers a vast spectrum.

In Epicurean philosophy it is fundamental that all pleasures are desirable, and all pains are undesirable, but it is also fundamental that there is no absolute standard as to how you as an individual (or humans as a group, for that matter) must always choose from among the available pleasures and pains. The "natural" and "necessary" divisions are totally pragmatically based -- there is no "list" by which nature approves or disapproves of any set category.

I don't want you to take what I am saying on my or DeWitt's authority - unfortunately there is no way for someone like you to be sure who is right without reading both sides of the argument and the texts for yourself. I cite DeWitt so strongly because his summary is the most concise and persuasive of which i am aware, but the articles I cited also provide much additional documentation for the same conclusions.

Also I have to note that I think that you are off on a significant detour by talking in terms of "vainglories" -- which is not an Epicurean term in any way, and rather conveys the implication that there is a set category of prohibited pleasures, which I am contending, and think you will eventually find - there is not.

For example, this from Epicurus' letter to Menoeceus:

Quote

"Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good."

Today we had a short forum outage, and that's a reminder that we need a contingency plan in case something happens to this forum for a longer period.

Probably the easiest temporary solution is to have an easy-to-remember domain name on a totally different server with instructions on where to continue communications in the event of an emergency.

For the present let's use this as a location name you might be able to remember: CASSIUSAMICUS.COM.

If you click there now you'll see that I have that page set up as a tree of links at which you ought to be able to find the other regulars of the forum if we are down for an extended period.

I have recently been testing out the SESSION instant messenger, which isn't as fancy as Telegram or some of the others, but which has the redeeming virtue of not requiring a telephone number or user name to be associated with the account. I've been using that for several weeks now, so if you would like to communicate on Session, set up an account at getsession.org and look up the EpicureanFriends Session group (or look me up there and send me a direct message).

Also Bartleby, in regard to this, did you find us by Googling or some other method? It's always good to know how people find us - thanks.

Quote from Bartleby

I found this site while trying to answer a specific question, but I have long meant to deepen my knowledge of Epicurus.

Good to hear from you Bartleby. If you read through the site at all you will see that head and shoulders above all others I recommend the DeWitt book. There are many disputes as to how to interpret Epicurus, and I won't suggest to you that there is any way you can know that you should accept the viewpoints you'll read here on this forum over those you will read most other places - the only judge of that can be your yourself. But many of us have found that the DeWitt approach summarizes in one place a clear alternative to the conventional analysis of Epicurus, and it is the best place to begin to check out that viewpoint.

I summarize these recommendations in the sidebar on the front page which I will paste here in case you're on a smartphone and don't see the sidebar. In this comment i suggest starting with a couple of articles, but in any order these sources will present you the alternative analysis:

Quote

Don't Be A "Stoic In Disguise!"

Many people who come here have been influenced by the alleged importance of a distinction between "kinetic" and "katastematic" pleasure. This argument is unsound, probably not of Epicurean origin at all, and can be very damaging to a proper understanding of Epicurus. To research this issue, start with Boris Nikolsky's "Epicurus on Pleasure," which argues that the katastematic issue was not introduced by Epicurus and reflects a later Stoic-influenced viewpoint. Next, read the chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks on Pleasure," from which Nikolsky got the inspiration for his article. The whole section on Epicurus is good, but be sure to read their Chapter 19 "Katastematic and Kinetic Pleasure." Add to that the Wentham article "Cicero's Interpretation of Katastematic Pleasure," which highlights how emphasis on katastematic pleasure contradicts other core aspects of Epicurean philosophy.

Those shorter articles should then take you back to the best general book on Epicurus, Norman DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy."  DeWitt provides a sweeping overview of Epicurus which hardly mentions the katastematic - kinetic distinction except to point out how - even if one considers the categories relevant - Epicurean philosophy embraces both types. If you don't read anything else at this website, check out the articles listed above, and you'll see how important this issue is to a proper understanding of Epicurean philosophy. And if you are brand new to the study of Epicurus, be sure to start your study with DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philsosophy."

Don as for an example of the drift toward asceticism which is so widespread, check out this post: Is Romantic Love a Vainglory

Bartleby I have not yet had a chance to absorb your full article, but this catches my eye:

I would disagree that Epicurus took the position which I underlined in red. As per my earlier post, the "principle of classification being that the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural desires also require but little, since nature's own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount; but for the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered." This is no doubt an accurate generalization of what most people find to be the case in life, so as a general rule it makes very good sense to think about these observations before deciding what to choose and what to avoid.

But that does not mean that you should "never" pursue a pleasure which is difficult to obtain without pain. The logical conclusion of taking your position to an extreme would be to put avoidance of pain as your most important goal, and would in many cases lead to living in a cave on bread and water -- and the weight of Epicurean philosophy does not at all support such a conclusion. One of the most important reasons for that, i think, is that there is no absolute rule of what pleasures are most to be chosen, because even those pleasures that last the longest are not always to be chosen (as per the letter to Menoeceus). Epicurus does not give a list because it is the individual's faculty of pleasure which is the test for that individual - there is no platonic ideal list of pleasures which are "best" for all people at all times and all places to pursue. In the absence of such a list, it is the faculty of pleasure alone which a person can look to for the answer on what to pursue and what to avoid, and so use of the word "never" in this context is something I think which would violate basic premises of Epicurean philosophy.