Posts by Cassius

Cassius · PD09 - Alternate Renderings Cassius July 5, 2025 at 6:53 PM

"If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another." Epicurus PD9 (Bailey)

EΙ ΚATEΠΥΚΝΟΥTΟ ΠAΣA ΗΔΟΝΗ ΚAΙ ΧΡΟΝῼ ΚAΙ ΠEΡΙ ΟΛΟΝ TΟ AΘΡΟΙΣΜA ΥΠΗΡΧEΝ Η TA ΚΥΡΙΩTATA ΜEΡΗ TΗΣ ΦΥΣEΩΣ ΟΥΚ AΝ ΠΟTE ΔΙEΦEΡΟΝ AΛΛΗΛΩΝ AΙ ΗΔΟΝAΙ.

“If every pleasure were condensed, if one may so say, and if each lasted long, and affected the whole body, or the essential parts of it, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another.” Yonge (1853)

“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation, if this had gone on not only in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, the principal parts of man's nature, there would not have been any difference between one pleasure and another as, in fact, there now is.” Hicks (1910)

“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation,—if this had gone on not only by recurrence in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, over the principal parts of man's nature, there would never have been any difference between one pleasure and another, as in fact there is.” Hicks (1925)

“If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Bailey (1926)

“If every pleasure were alike condensed in duration and associated with the whole organism or the dominant parts of it, pleasures would never differ from one another." De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 235 (1954)

“If every pleasure were cumulative, and if this were the case both in time and in regard to the whole or the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would not differ from each other.” Geer (1964)

“If every pleasure were condensed in <location> and duration and distributed all over the structure or the dominant parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“If every pleasure were condensed and existed for a long time throughout the entire organism or its most important parts, pleasures would never differ from one another.” O'Connor (1993)

“If every pleasure were condensed and were present, both in time and in the whole compound [body and soul] or in the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would never differ from one another.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“If every pleasure could be prolonged to endure in both body or mind, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Anderson (2004)

“If all pleasures could be added together consecutively with respect to space and duration, and across the entire span over which they had all existed, or at least across the principal parts of human nature <which are naturally susceptible to pleasures:> then, pleasures would not be different from each other in any respect.” Makridis (2005)

“If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“If all pleasures could be compressed in time and intensity, and were characteristic of the whole man or his more important aspects, the various pleasures would not differ from each other.” Strodach (2012)

“If all pleasure were condensed in space and time, and pervaded the whole aggregate, or the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ, one from another.” Mensch (2018)

“If every pleasure were concentrated in place and time and affected our whole aggregate or the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” White (2021)

Cassius

The Principal Doctrines forum reorganization is mostly complete. One thing remaining is that the "Alternate Translations" posts are in the wiki, rather than the forum, so they are not showing up automatically, and it will likely be necessary to re-create those within the forum section so that they work properly.

Cassius · PD08 - Alternate Renderings Cassius July 5, 2025 at 6:14 PM

"No pleasure is a bad thing in itself; but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures." Epicurus PD8 (Bailey)

Οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν κακόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν ποιητικὰ πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς ὀχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν.

“No pleasure is intrinsically bad: but the effective causes of some pleasures bring with them a great many perturbations of pleasure.” Yonge (1853)

“No pleasure is evil in itself, but the objects productive of certain pleasures may lead to annoyances many times greater than the pleasure.” Wallace,

Epicureanism 150 (1880)

“No pleasure is in itself evil, but the things which produce certain pleasures entail annoyances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.” Hicks (1910)

“No pleasure is in itself evil, but the things which produce certain pleasures entail annoyances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.” Hicks (1925)

“No pleasure is a bad thing in itself: but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures.” Bailey (1926)

”No pleasure is evil in itself but the practices productive of certain pleasures bring troubles in their train that by many times outweigh the pleasures themselves.” De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 235 (1954)

“No pleasure is evil it itself; but the means by which certain pleasures are gained bring pains many times greater than the pleasures.” Geer (1964)

“No pleasure is something bad per se: but the causes of some pleasures produce stresses many times greater than the pleasures” Long,

The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“No pleasure is evil in itself; but the means of obtaining some pleasures bring in their wake troubles many times greater than the pleasures.” O'Connor (1993)

“No pleasure is a bad thing in itself. But the things which produce certain pleasures bring troubles many times greater than the pleasures.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“No pleasure is a bad thing in itself, but some pleasures are only obtainable at the cost of excessive troubles.” Anderson (2004)

“No pleasure is a morally bad thing in itself. But the agents that produce certain pleasures bring about vexations that outnumber the pleasures themselves.” Makridis (2005)

“No pleasure is bad in itself; but the means of paying for some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“No pleasure is bad in itself. But the things that make for pleasure in certain cases entail disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.” Strodach (2012)

“No pleasure is intrinsically bad; but the means of producing certain pleasures may entail annoyances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.” Mensch (2018)

“No pleasure is in itself anything bad; but some pleasures are produced by things that bring along troubles many times greater than those pleasures.” White (2021)

Cassius · PD07 - Alternate Renderings Cassius July 5, 2025 at 6:14 PM

"Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous, thinking that they would thus win for themselves safety from other men. Wherefore if the life of such men is safe, they have obtained the good which nature craves; but if it is not safe, they do not possess that for which they strove at first by the instinct of nature." Epicurus PD7 (Bailey)

**EΝΔΟΞΟΙ ****ΚAΙ ΠEΡΙΒΛEΠTΟΙ ****TΙΝEΣ EΒΟΥΛΗΘΗΣAΝ**

**ΓEΝEΣΘAΙ ****TΗΝ EΞ AΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ AΣΦAΛEΙAΝ ****ΟΥTΩ**

**ΝΟΜΙΖΟΝTEΣ ΠEΡΙΠΟΙΗΣEΣΘAΙ ****ΩΣTE EΙ ΜEΝ AΣΦAΛΗΣ ****Ο**

**TΩΝ TΟΙΟΥTΩΝ ΒΙΟΣ AΠEΛAΒΟΝ ****TΟ TΗΣ ΦΥΣEΩΣ AΓAΘΟΝ·**

**EΙ ΔE ΜΗ AΣΦAΛΗΣ ****ΟΥΚ EΧΟΥΣΙΝ ****ΟΥ EΝEΚA EΞ AΡΧΗΣ**

**ΚATA TΟ TΗΣ ΦΥΣEΩΣ ΟΙΚEΙΟΝ ΩΡEΧΘΗΣAΝ. **

“Some men have wished to be eminent and powerful, thinking that so they would secure safety as far as men are concerned. So that if the life of such men is safe, they have attained to the nature of good; but if it is not safe, then they have failed in obtaining that for the sake of which they originally desired power according to the order of nature.” Yonge (1853)

“Some men sought to become famous and renowned, thinking that thus they would make themselves secure against their fellow-men. If, then, the life of such persons really was secure, they attained natural good; if, however, it was insecure, they have not attained the end which by nature's own promptings they originally sought.” Hicks (1910)

“Some men have sought to become famous and renowned, thinking that thus they would make themselves secure against their fellow-men. If, then, the life of such persons really was secure, they attained natural good ; if, however, it was insecure, they have not attained the end which by nature's own prompting they originally sought.” Hicks (1925)

“Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous thinking that they would thus win for themselves safety from other men. Wherefore if the life of such men is safe, they have obtained the good which nature craves; but if it is not safe, they do not possess that for which they strove at the frst by the instinct of nature.” Bailey (1926)

“Some men have chosen to become celebrities and to be in the public eye, thinking thus to achieve security from the attacks of men. Consequently, if the lives of such men are safe, they have reaped the end of Nature, but if their lives are not safe, they lack that for the sake of which at the outset they reached out by the instinct of Nature. ” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 189 (1954)

“Some men wish to gain reputation and to be in the public eye, thinking by this means to win security from the attacks of men. Consequently, if the lives of these men are safe they have achieved the end ordained by Nature; if, on the contrary, their lives are not safe they lack that for which at the outset they reached out in obedience to an instinct of Nature." DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus 187 (1954)

“Some, thinking thus to make themselves safe from men, wished to become famous and renowned. They won a natural good if they made their lives secure; but if their lives were not secure, they did not have that for which, following the rule of nature, they first sought.” Geer (1964)

“Certain people wanted to become famous and admired, thinking that they would thus acquire security from other men. Consequently, if such people's life was secure, they did obtain nature's good; but if it was not secure, they are not in possession of the objective which they originally sought after on the basis of nature's affinity.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 126 (1987)

“Some men wished to become esteemed and admired by everyone, thinking that in this way they would procure for themselves safety from others. Therefore, if the life of such men is safe, they have received the good that comes from nature. If it is not safe, they do not have that for which they struggled at first by natural instinct.” O'Connor (1993)

“Some men want to become famous and respected, believing that this is the way to acquire security against [other] men. Thus if the life of such men is secure, they acquire the natural good; but if it is not secure, they do not have that for the sake of which they strove from the beginning according to what is naturally congenial.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Some seek fame and status, thinking that they could thereby protect themselves against other men. If their lives really are secure, then they have attained a natural good; if, however, they're insecure, they still lack what they originally sought by natural instinct.” Anderson (2004)

“Some have wished to become famous and enviable, thinking that they would in this way procure for themselves security from other human beings. In that case: if their life is secure, they have indeed enjoyed what is the good by nature; if, however, they are not safe, they still lack that naturally familiar good for the sake of which our appetites have striven from the very first stirrings of human nature and in accordance with natural principles.” Makridis (2005)

“Some people want to be well esteemed and widely admired, believing that in this way they will be safe from others; if the life of such people is secure then they have gained its natural benefit, but if not then they have not gained what they sought from the beginning in accordance with what is naturally appropriate.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Some men have desired to gain reputation and to be well regarded, thinking in this way to gain protection from other people. If the lives of such men are secure, they have acquired a natural blessing; but if they are not, they do not possess what they originally reached for by natural instinct.” Strodach (2012)

“Some have longed to become famous and celebrated, thinking that they would thereby obtain security against other men. If the lives of such persons were secure, they attained what is naturally good; but if insecure, they did not attain the object that they were originally prompted by nature to seek.” Mensch (2018)

“Some people wanted to become famous and admired, supposing they would in this way achieve security from other people. Hence, if the life of such people is secure, they obtained their nature’s good; but if it is not secure, they do not have the goal they initially desired in the way congenial to their nature.” White (2021)

Discussion Forum - Doctrine 7 - Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous...

Cassius · PD06 - Alternate Renderings Cassius July 5, 2025 at 6:13 PM

"Whatever you can provide yourself with to secure protection from men is a natural good." Epicurus PD6 (Essential Epicurus - Eugene O'Connor)

**EΝEΚA TΟΥ ΘAΡΡEΙΝ ****EΞ AΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ ****ΗΝ ΚATA ΦΥΣΙΝ**

**[AΡΧΗΣ ****ΚAΙ ΒAΣΙΛEΙAΣ]***** AΓAΘΟΝ ****EΞ ΩΝ AΝ ΠΟTE TΟΥTΟ**

**ΟΙΟΣ T' ῌ ΠAΡAΣΚEΥAΖEΣΘAΙ. **

***Arrighetti**

“For the sake of feeling confidence and security with regard to men, anything in nature is good, if it provides the means to achieve this.” Yonge (1853)

“As far as concerns protection from other men, any means of procuring this was a natural good.” Hicks (1910)

“In order to obtain security from other men any means whatsoever of procuring this was a natural good.” Hicks (1925)

“To secure protection from men anything is a natural good, by which you may be able to attain this end.” Bailey (1926)

“As for the assurance of safety from the attacks of men, by virtue of the nature of political dominion and kingly power this is a good thing, no matter by whose aid one is able to procure it." DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 79 (1954)

“Political rule and kingly power being what they are, it is a good thing to feel secure in human relations no matter through whose agency one is able to attain this." DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus 187 (1954)

“Any device whatever by which one frees himself from the fear of others is a natural good.” Geer (1964)

“Whatever you can provide yourself with to secure protection from men is a natural good.” O'Connor (1993)

“The natural good of public office and kingship is for the sake of getting confidence from [other] men, [at least] from those from whom one is able to provide this.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“That natural benefit of kingship and high office is (and only is) the degree to which they provide security from other men.” Anderson (2004)

“This [human ability to lead a good life] originally became possible by nature and for the sake of imparting courage in human beings [who were then living in a pre-social condition.] And this is the natural origin and principle on which all authority—be it even kingship—is based. And it is from the same [natural propensities] that a human being is able also to arrange a good and pleasant life.” Makridis (2005)

“It is a natural benefit of leadership and kingship to take courage from other men (or at least from the sort of men who can give one courage).” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Any means by which it is possible to procure freedom from fearing other men is a natural good.” Strodach (2012)

“In order that men might not fear one another, there was a natural benefit to be had from government and kingship, provided that they are able to bring about this result.” Mensch (2018)

“There was some natural good in leadership and kingship for the purpose of establishing mutual confidence among people, any time someone is thereby able to do so.” White (2021)

New Greek Version: “In order to obtain security from other people, there was (always) the natural good of sovereignty and kingship, through which (someone) once could have accomplished this.”

Discussion Forum: Doctrine 6 - To secure protection from men anything ...

Cassius · PD05 - Alternate Renderings Cassius July 5, 2025 at 6:11 PM

**ΟΥΚ EΣTΙΝ ΗΔEΩΣ ΖΗΝ ****AΝEΥ TΟΥ ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ ****ΚAΙ ΚAΛΩΣ**

**ΚAΙ ΔΙΚAΙΩΣ ****[ΟΥΔE ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ ****ΚAΙ ΚAΛΩΣ ****ΚAΙ ΔΙΚAΙΩΣ] **

**AΝEΥ TΟΥ ΗΔEΩΣ·**** ΟTῼ Δ' EN TΟΥTΩN ΜΗ ΥΠAΡΧEΙ ****ΟION**

**ΖΗΝ ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ ****KAI ΚAΛΩΣ ****KAI ΔΙΚAΙΩΣ ΥΠAΡΧEΙ ****OΥΧ**

**EΣTΙ TΟΥTΟΝ ΗΔEΩΣ ΖΗΝ. **

"It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honorably, and justly, [nor again to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice] without living pleasantly. And the man who does not possess the pleasant life is not living prudently, honorably, and justly, [and the man who does not possess the virtuous life] cannot possibly live pleasantly." Epicurus PD5 (Bailey)

“It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, and honourably, and justly; nor to live prudently, and honourably, and justly, without living pleasantly. But to whom it does not happen to live prudently, honourably, and justly cannot possibly live pleasantly.” Yonge (1853)

“It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man does not live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.” Hicks (1910)

“It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.” Hicks (1925)

“It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honourably and justly, [nor again to live a life of prudence, honour, and justice] without living pleasantly. And the man who does not possess the pleasant life, is not living prudently and honourably and justly, [and the man who does not possess the virtuous life], cannot possibly live pleasantly.” Bailey (1926)

“It is impossible to live pleasurably without living according to reason, honor and justice, nor to live according to reason, honor, and justice without living pleasurably….” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 184, 246 (1954)

“It is impossible to live pleasantly without living prudently, well, and justly, (and to live prudently, well, and justly) without living pleasantly. Even though a man live well and justly, it is not possible for him to live pleasantly if he lacks that from which stems the prudent life.” Geer (1964)

“It is impossible to live a pleasantly without living prudently, well, and justly, nor is it possible to live prudently, well, and justly without living pleasantly. The man for whom this latter condition is impossible cannot live prudently, well, or justly; he for whom the former is impossible, cannot live pleasantly.” O'Connor (1993)

“It is impossible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honourably, and justly and impossible to live prudently, honourably, and justly without living pleasantly. And whoever lacks this cannot live pleasantly.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“It is impossible to live pleasantly without living wisely and honorably and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and honorably and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking (when, for instance, one is not able to live wisely, though he lives honorably and justly) it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.” Anderson (2004)

“It is impossible to lead a pleasant life without leading a life that is prudent, proper, and just. Nor is it possible to live a life that is prudent, proper, and just without living a life that is pleasant. Whoever lacks [any one of] the above [elements of a good and pleasant life] cannot have a good life.” Makridis (2005)

“It is not possible to live joyously without also living wisely and beautifully and rightly, nor to live wisely and beautifully and rightly without living joyously; and whoever lacks this cannot live joyously.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“It is impossible to live the pleasant life without also living sensibly, nobly, and justly, and conversely it is impossible to live sensibly, nobly, and justly without living pleasantly. A person who does not have a pleasant life is not living sensibly, nobly, and justly, and conversely the person who does not have these virtues cannot live pleasantly.” Strodach (2012)

“It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honorably, and justly; nor can one live prudently, honorably, and justly without living pleasantly. Nor is it possible for the man who does not live prudently, though he may live honorably and justly, to live pleasantly.” Mensch (2018)

“It is not possible to live pleasantly without living wisely, honorably, and justly, [nor wisely, honorably, and justly] without living pleasantly; and for anyone who does not have that, {does not live wisely, honorably, and justly, does not have,} it is not possible for him to live pleasantly.” White (2021)

For Discussion in the Forum See: Doctrine 5 - It is not possible to live pleasantly without living...

Cassius · PD04 - Alternate Renderings Cassius July 5, 2025 at 6:09 PM

“Pain does not abide continuously in the flesh, but in its extremity it is present only a very short time. That pain which only just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh, does not last many days. But long diseases have in them more that is pleasant than painful to the flesh.” Yonge (1853)

“Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh, and pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not occur for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh.” Hicks (1910)

“Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh ; on the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not last for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh.” Hicks (1925) “Pain does not last continuously in the flesh, but the acutest pain is there for a very short time, and even that which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not continue for many days at once. But chronic illnesses permit a predominance of pleasure over pain in the flesh.” Bailey (1926)

“Pain does not prevail continuously in the flesh but the peak of it is present for the briefest interval, and the pain that barely exceeds the pleasure in the flesh is not with us many days, while protracted illnesses have an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh." De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 244 (1954)

“Continuous bodily suffering does not last long. Intense pain is very brief, and even pain that barely outweighs physical pleasure does not last many days. Long illnesses permit physical pleasures that are greater than the pain.” Geer (1964)

“Pain does not last continuously in the flesh: when acute it is there for a very short time, while the pain which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not persist for many days; and chronic illnesses contain an excess of pleasure in the flesh over pain.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“Pain does not dwell continuously in the flesh. Extreme pain is present but a very brief time, and that which barely exceeds bodily pleasure continues no more than a few days. But chronic illness allows greater pleasure than pain in the flesh. ” O'Connor (1993)

“The feeling of pain does not linger continuously in the flesh; rather, the sharpest is present for the shortest time, while what merely exceeds the feeling of pleasure in the flesh lasts only a few days. And diseases which last a long time involve feelings of pleasure which exceed feelings of pain.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Continuous physical pain does not last long. Instead, extreme pain lasts only a very short time, and even less-extreme pain does not last for many days at once. Even protracted diseases allow periods of physical comfort that exceed feelings of pain.” Anderson (2004)

“What produces pain does not remain constantly in the body over a long period of time; it is rather that the maximal pain persists for the least span of time, and even that bodily pain which barely exceeds pleasure does not continue to happen for many days <in a row.> And, indeed, chronic illnesses themselves have an excess of what produces bodily pleasure over what is productive of pain.” Makridis (2005)

“Pain does not last continuously in the flesh; instead, the sharpest pain lasts the shortest time, a pain that exceeds bodily pleasure lasts only a few days, and diseases that last a long time involve delights that exceed their pains.” Saint-Andre (2008) “Bodily pain does not last continuously. The peak is present for a very brief period, and pains that barely exceed the state of bodily pleasure do not continue for many days. On the other hand, protracted illnesses show a balance of bodily pleasure over pain.” Strodach (2012)

“Pain does not last long in the flesh; in fact, extreme pain is present for the briefest time, while that which hardly outweighs pleasure does not last for many days. And illnesses that are prolonged may even afford the flesh more pleasure than pain.” Mensch (2018)

“Pain does not continue for long in the flesh. Rather, the most intense pain lasts the shortest time; any pain that exceeds pleasant feeling in the flesh does not last many days; and lengthy infrmities have more pleasant feeling in the flesh than pain.” White (2021)