Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

nothing inherently inconsistent with Epicurus's philosophy to wanting to have a calm mind and a pain free body.

Absolutely agreed that there is nothing inconsistent about that, the issue would be that of being strictly rigorous in identifying the goal - the "end of nature," rather than getting sidetracked on lesser issues that are only part of the goal, like some people tend to do when they focus on the means rather than the end.

As for the distinction between "living pleasurably" and "pleasure" I think that the issue revolves around the context in which you're discussing the issue. If you're in a strictly philosophic debate you reduce things down to as essential and clear a concept as possible, so you end up expressing it like Torquatus did with his formulation:

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I will start then in the manner approved by the author of the system himself, by settling what are the essence and qualities of the thing that is the object of our inquiry; not that I suppose you to be ignorant of it, but because this is the logical method of procedure. We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil.

When we start talking about "living pleasurably" we're getting in the details of exactly what pleasures we're pursuing in a particular moment. When we talk about "pleasure" it sounds like we're at that higher level of identifying our ultimate goal (such as "virtue" vs "piety" vs "reason" vs "wisdom" vs "pleasure")

Both perspectives are valid and should not be seen to be at war with each other, or that one needs to replace the other.

The EpicSwerve website is here, and discussion with its author is here.

EpicureanFriends account at Matrix.org

Update 2-6-22: This account is still there, but I am not signing in very often. I have cooled off toward Matrix for a variety of reasons, mainly that they too seem to be getting a lot of mysterious funding that no doubt has strings attached. They are open source and the security may be there if you run your own server, but at this point they don't make it easy to do that and so using the matrix.org main server probably subjects you to unwanted vulnerabilities.

Cassius Amicus account at Pixelfed.

The Odysee (formerly Lbry.tv) account for Cassius Amicus is here.

Cassius Amicus / NewEpicurean account at Youtube

Cassius Amicus at Instragram

The Cassius Amicus page at Gab.com (established long ago but not regularly used) is here.

The Cassius Amicus page at Minds.com (established long ago but not regularly used) is here.

The NewEpicurean twitter feed is here.

The Society of Epicurus twitter feed is here.

The primary Reddit thread on Epicurean philosophy is here.

The primary Epicurean Philosophy Facebook group is here.

The largest Epicurus "page" is here.

This morning I was thinking about the passages excerpted below from Philebus, especially the last one I have underlined. In these passages, Plato has Socrates talking as if the battle of identifying the greatest good was between specific patron gods and goddesses. In these passages the patron god(dess) of pleasure is clearly Aprhrodite / Venus, and we can see that identification carried on by the Epicureans at least through Lucretius.

However I am unclear as to who stands as the patron god for Socrates' position, especially if we conclude that Socrates' position comes down to "reason" or "rationality" or "wisdom" or "logic."

Was there a particular Greek god who symbolized those characteristics distinctly more than any other? If not, does the absence of such a distinctive figure play into why Socrates talked about being influenced by his "daemon" rather than being talked to by a particular god?

I ask this question in the context of triangulating on the Epicureans' use of the very broad term "Pleasure" as the goal of life without spending a lot of time identifying the particular pleasures being referenced. It seems to me that part of this terminology is that Epicurus was responding to the ongoing philosophic debates that distilled the ultimate goals down into high-level concepts such as "virtue" or "the good" or "reason" or "wisdom." Given a culture in which people were being asked to choose their allegiance among and between such high-level words, then "pleasure" seems to correspond nicely to that level of discussion. So therefore in that context, I am wondering if in identifying pleasure with Venus/Aphrodite that the Epicureans were facing one or more corresponding patron god(s) from the Academy / Pertipatetics / or later, the Stoics.

So at this time the specific question is: Was there a patron god or goddess identifed with Socrates' position, from which we can infer the same as to Plato? If that answer is somewhere else in Philebus I seem to be overlooking it.

Here are the excerpts from Philebus:

Quote

SOCRATES: Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure.

PROTARCHUS: Very good.

SOCRATES: The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the gods is more than human—it exceeds all other fears. And now I would not sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; let her be called what she pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was just now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is. She has one name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and yet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance,—that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike!

......

SOCRATES: And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus’ goddess is not to be regarded as identical with the good?

PHILEBUS: Neither is your ‘mind’ the good, Socrates, for that will be open to the same objections.

....

SOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good. But now—admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature of the infinite—in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on this point.

PHILEBUS: You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god.

SOCRATES: And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question.

....

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Quote from Don

Our bodies want to be in equilibrium, to have our budgets in balance.

How does "equilibrium" square with: "For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good."

Is talk about "equilibrium" going to carry one down the road to "tranquility" - or even Buddhism - instead of to "pleasure?"

Quote from Godfrey

The only thing that I would add to this is that if understanding the mechanism in more detail helps us to increase pleasure, then it is worthwhile to do so to the degree that it does so.

Agreed, with the question always being "Does this increase detail in understanding actually produce that result?"

What I am not sure about, since I haven't gone as far into the details of LFB as you guys have, is whether the result increases confidence in resisting rationalism and idealism in thinking, or the reverse. I think there is a constant tension in the pursuit of any "detail" or "tool" that we not get so consumed in the detail that we lose sight of the reason we are pursuing the detail. We are never interested in knowledge for the sake of knowledge; the issue is whether it contributes to living happily. And the obstacle to living happily is only sometimes the lack of knowledge (such as might be the case when we need knowledge to diagnose and cure a disease, for example). Someone who gets a disease profits tremendously from drugs that treat that disease, and if we haven't pursued the knowledge to develop the drug, then we have a problem.

But there's also the constant issue that I think is present in Epicurean teaching that the disease we are treating and inoculating against is not a something that stems purely from lack of knowledge, but from an affirmative warped way of thinking that actually has a constituency behind it pushing its malevolent influence on unsuspecting people.

Skepticism, nihilism, rationalism, idealism, and on and on are the primary philosophical opponents that we are playing against just as much as we're playing against schizophrenia or other "clinical" conditions. We aren't in the game solely to respond to clinical conditions that developed naturally, though we do want to respond to those too.

I think that the ancient Epicureans diagnosed an example of this problem in the Stoic (and earlier) fixation on "virtue." Pursuing virtue became a tool in the minds of some people that transcended its function in happy living, and became an end in itself, with terribly misleading effects.

Sometimes it is in fact true that "the cure can be worse than the disease." If the pursuit of clinical knowledge ends up for any reason taking our eye off the overall goal, and leaves us open to other harms (because we fail to address them) then in philosophical study too the "cure" (pursuit of knowledge for the sake of knowledge) can be worse than the disease, by leaving us open to more powerful enemies which must at the same time be constantly guarded against.

An example of this occurs I think in our reading of Lucretius or many of the details of Epicurean physics. If we get too caught up in the comparison of Lucretian-age "science" against modern-day "science" then we can easily lose focus on the overall message. And that is something that is tempting to do, because all of us can easily get caught up in appreciating how far "ahead of its time" Epicurean physics turned out to be, as if the point of the discussion was to appreciate "the history of science" or something similar. If we see Lucretius as an exercise in the history of science it's very easy to lose sight of the fact of how the conclusions and philosophical benefits from science have in many ways regressed, rather than progressed, from the ancient Epicurean period. The Epicureans looked at their science and saw in it confirmation of the absence of supernatural gods, of the fact that we have but one life to live, of the fact that pleasure is the goal of life, and the fact that there can be no absolute standards of virtue or justice. If our "science" today isn't sustaining those conclusions with even greater clarity than before, then I think we have to seriously question how much "progress" has really been made.

Also on the topic of "take-aways" I think it's useful to review these couple of paragraphs from DeWitt. As I read it, it's possible that he is right or possible he is wrong about the way he is interpreting the functioning of the anticipations. However I think in his diagnosis of what Epicurus was trying to do, he is almost certainly correct.

If we (Epicurus) want to defeat both rationalism and skepticism, we have to be able to articulate a totally natural (non-abstract-logic-based) process which allows us to have confidence in the conclusions we reach based on our observations. This process cannot rely on abstract logic, or else abstract logic takes over like the proverbial camel with nose under the tent, so it has to be ejected entirely except as a supplemental factor. Likewise we can't let observation alone rule the day, without drawing any conclusions, but that would effectively amount to skepticism and establish the rule that we can never have confidence in anything.

So to some extent this is an issue that is probably like the free agency and the swerve. As with the swerve, we may not be able to describe the mechanism of consciousness with certainty, nor should we really think that we need to (since such a task would be as impossible as asking to view the entire universe in order to see if it has an end). All we really need to do is to articulate in broad terms that there are mechanisms by which we can have confidence in living happily if we eject both skepticism and rationalism in favor of reliance on the faculties that Nature gave us.

Quote from Don

Oh, and I should be clear: Much of the time, I'm thinking out loud when I post so I'm not committed to any of my previous assertions.

Just to make things slightly more difficult for everyone

LOL! Probably that should be a caveat to at least 3/4 of what most everyone (including me!) posts here on the forum!

On the "sequence" issue I think this is probably the key section of DeWitt's view on that question:

With the continual caveat that (1) Epicurus' philosophical perspective might not be the same at all as what modern science is looking at, and (2) we need to be constantly on guard as to the implications of any particular approach.

I believe DeWitt to be correct at least insofar as he is stressing that there is a human functioning process that Nature set up for us to use to determine what to consider to be "true," and that this biological process is not "abstract reason" or "abstract logic." That would be the takeaway of most any version of the whole "canon of truth" discussion.

At this point I don't know what LFB's takeways would be. I did finish listen to the podcast today however, and I agree that we would expect her takeaways to be similar.

Quote from Don

-Sensations

-Pain/Pleasure

-Prolepses

My understanding is that this order is meaningful and now even more so in light of LFB's research (and, I should include, from others):

- the sensations include all of our sensory input

- This input then impacts our "feeling" of pain or pleasure, or as LFB states, pleasure/displeasure.

-and our minds use this to compare our past experience to our current situation.

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This is a point that I think deserves discussion over time. Have you seen a commentator assert that the "order is meaningful," or do you have other reasons for making that deduction? I believe if I recall correctly that DeWitt asserts that they basically go hand in hand, rather than sequentially. I see why it would be tempting to order them in the way that you have, as that would coincide with an order of processing if "prolepses" are equated with "concepts," but again that is probably the ultimate question.

At this point in my thinking I would interpret this aspect differently, and suggest that the three legs of the canon are not in fact the steps by which concepts are formed, but are the "checks" against which concepts are judged for accuracy. Probably as an example I would suggest that "concepts" can be made up out of whole cloth, with no input whatsoever from the legs of the canon, such as "let A=B" then "let B=D" therefore "A+B = A+D" or whatever you'd want to construct from pure words. Those would be (I think) conceptual constructs formed separately and apart from experience of any kind.

So in fact i would think that considering prolepses to be the equivalent of concepts and considering them to be the result of sensations and feelings, rather than a separate category of experience, would produce a dramatically different result than considering prolepses to be an experience or measurer of its own.

Quote from Don

But it seems to me that there is probably a faculty we're born with but individual prolepses have to come from experience in utero, early in life, or even later. To say we're born with prolepses seems to me to fall into the realm of Plato

In regard to that, I would say that is where it is essential to distguish the faculty from the perceptions it generates.

We are born with eyes, yet not with visions of trees. The mechanism of eyesight, however, is innate.

Presumably if prolepses are an equal leg of the canon, rather than concepts formed after experience, then the "faculty of prolepses" would be innate.

Yes and I want to repeat that I do not mean my comments to derail discussion of details of the LFB book. My main point is that to the extent we devote time to analyzing it under the category of anticipations it would be best if we make clear what view of anticipations we're talking about as we discuss her observations.

I'm not sure how to categorize the two competing alternatives, but they generally fall under something like (1) "anticipations as product of an innate faculty predating experience" vs (2) "anticipations as product of conceptual reasoning based on experience."

With one part of the issue being that those who advocate (2) either ignore (1) or contend that (1) does not exist.

I have no clue yet as to where to fit LBF into that paradigm. Presumably the answer to that comes from determining whether LBF believes that there are innate dispositions predating experience, or whether all mental processing occurs after, and based exclusively on, experience. Also, I really don't know if LBF has a position on what "truth" means.