Todd you don't know me as well as Elayne does. Elayne knows I often think out loud and say things in mid-thought without necessarily being committed to the result. I like to think that I am clear when I am doing that but I know I am not always. In this discussion, as in most discussions of anticipations, I always try to restate that all this is pretty speculative.
So you are right in your last point - I am not sure that anything we are discussing is fully formed. I think what we are doing is trying to unwind the train of thought without committing to any conclusion of it.
And I think what I am really doing is trying to view all this from the lens of justice being a "virtue" and given how flexible Epicurus seems to be about the nature of ANY virtue, considering that he is probably very flexible here too -- and tying the result as you are doing to pain and pleasure (when means feeling) with the logic of "rule-based" part of it strictly instrumental.
As to Elayne's comments which add up to:
"If justice were rational it would not be in the prolepses which are part of the Canon. None of the Canon is reason-based. It's how we know reality, not what we decide to do."
.... I think I am viewing that slightly differently. I am viewing "justice" as "virtue" and I view any "virtue" as a "concept," with concepts being rational constructions which may, or may not have the feelings as a component.
So if an anticipation is essentially some kind of "perception" in the sense that the eyes perceive light, then we probably do need to consider that an "anticipation of justice" might be an input to a "conception of justice" or a "definition of justice in a particular situation."
I think I need to go to sleep for the night.