Posts by Cassius

For future reference, when we (primarily Don ) have time, i would like to mark this Latin text as one which has always seemed to me to be ripe for misunderstanding and yet highly useful if we could get a grip on its full meaning.

I have sometimes thought that this might be as straightforward as referring to, for example, the type of person who prefers to speculate with his mind about whether a building is square or round, rather than simply walking over to that building to see for himself up close. Munro, as usual, is relentlessly literal, and Bailey largely follows Munro. I think that the 1743 edition probably is expanding the text in a correct direction, but it may convey a generally right result with a less-than-optimum illustration.

At any rate, this "idiom" comes in the middle of a text that is so important that it seems a shame not to get every last bit of meaning out of the illustration that we possibly can.

So the question is, presuming the Latin is unadulterated, "What does it mean to place one's head where one's feet should be?"

Here's the Latin, from Munro:

1743: Lastly, if anyone thinks that he knows nothing, he cannot be sure that he knows this, when he confesses that he knows nothing at all. I shall avoid disputing with such a trifler, who perverts all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards. And yet allow that he knows this, I would ask (since he had nothing before, to lead him into such a knowledge) from whence he had the notion what it was to know, or not to know; what was it that gave him an idea of Truth or Falsehood, and what taught him to distinguish between doubt and certainty? You will find that knowledge of truth is originally derived from the senses, nor can the senses be contradicted, for whatever is able by the evidence of an opposite truth to convince the senses of falsehood, must be something of greater certainty than they. But what can deserve greater credit than the senses require from us? Will reason, derived from erring sense, claim the privilege to contradict it? Reason – that depends wholly upon the senses,which unless you allow to be true, all reason must be false.

Munro: Again if a man believe that nothing is known, he knows not whether this even can be known, since he admits he knows nothing. I will therefore decline to argue the case against him who places himself with head where his feet should be. And yet granting that he knows this, I would still put this question, since he has never yet seen any truth in things, whence he knows what knowing and not knowing severally are, and what it is that has produced the knowledge of the true and the false and what has proved the doubtful to differ from the certain. You will find that from the senses first has proceeded the knowledge of the true and the false and that the senses cannot be refuted. For that which is of itself to be able to refute things false by true things must from the nature of the case be proved to have the higher certainty. Well then, what must fairly be accounted of higher certainty than sense? Shall reason founded on false sense be able to contradict them, wholly founded as it is on the senses? And if they are not true, then all reason as well is rendered false.

Bailey: Again, if any one thinks that nothing is known, he knows not whether that can be known either, since he admits that he knows nothing. Against him then I will refrain from joining issue, who plants himself with his head in the place of his feet. And yet were I to grant that he knows this too, yet I would ask this one question; since he has never before seen any truth in things, whence does he know what is knowing, and not knowing each in turn, what thing has begotten the concept of the true and the false, what thing has proved that the doubtful differs from the certain? You will find that the concept of the true is begotten first from the senses, and that the senses cannot be gainsaid. For something must be found with a greater surety, which can of its own authority refute the false by the true. Next then, what must be held to be of greater surety than sense? Will reason, sprung from false sensation, avail to speak against the senses, when it is wholly sprung from the senses? For unless they are true, all reason too becomes false.

I agree with what you are saying, Susan, but there's a part of this that I think is dangerous to let go, echoing from Lucian. I think I quoted this recently in a similar context but no one ever accused me of not being repetitive

Quote

And at this point, my dear Celsus, we may, if we will be candid, make some allowance for these Paphlagonians and Pontics; the poor uneducated ‘fat-heads’ might well be taken in when they handled the serpent—a privilege conceded to all who choose—and saw in that dim light its head with the mouth that opened and shut. It was an occasion for a Democritus, nay, for an Epicurus or a Metrodorus, perhaps, a man whose intelligence was steeled against such assaults by skepticism and insight, one who, if he could not detect the precise imposture, would at any rate have been perfectly certain that, though this escaped him, the whole thing was a lie and an impossibility.

The point being that I think it's a pretty fundamental part of a basic Epicurean education to have near the top of one's mind at least an outline-level understanding of a "rule" that starts flashing red whenever we confront something that seems "over-the-line" as a lie and an impossibility.

Getting back to the title of the topic, I think it's dangerous to ever consider that any area of knowledge is off limits or to be avoided per se, even though for all the reasons Epicurus is stating, a prudent person does not waste more time on them than might be absolutely necessary.

Probably the category of quantum woo is right up there nowadays, at least in some circles, with the claims of traditional religion. I am not young anymore, but I suspect especially with young people going through establishment education, it's possible even that quantum woo might be even more present than straight religious arguments. So that's the reason the topic interests me - we ought to be able to articulate, even if the precise imposture of quantum woo escapes us, why it is we are confident that the whole thing is a lie and an impossibility.

I am thinking that the general description of the answer is going to involve affirming how the senses (the three legs of the canon, actually) are really what the meaning of "truth" and "reality" is all about to us, and that any impactful claims which cannot be validated using that method is in fact, for us, a "lie and an impossibility" and to be treated as such. I think also that this is closely related to the direct argument in Lucretius that he who asserts that knowledge is impossible is in a way "upside down" and has to be rejected out of hand.

That's where I think we can improve - I do not think we are there yet in expanding the meaning of that material in Lucretius, which is hinted at in other aspects of the texts, in way that is clear and meaningful.

For example, it's taking me far too long to state the issue in this post -- it ought to be reducible to something very simple and memorable, along the lines of this excerpt from Lucretius book four. Probably if I had to rank everything I have read in the Epicurean texts, this is one of the most important to me:

1743: Lastly, if anyone thinks that he knows nothing, he cannot be sure that he knows this, when he confesses that he knows nothing at all. I shall avoid disputing with such a trifler, who perverts all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards. And yet allow that he knows this, I would ask (since he had nothing before, to lead him into such a knowledge) from whence he had the notion what it was to know, or not to know; what was it that gave him an idea of Truth or Falsehood, and what taught him to distinguish between doubt and certainty? You will find that knowledge of truth is originally derived from the senses, nor can the senses be contradicted, for whatever is able by the evidence of an opposite truth to convince the senses of falsehood, must be something of greater certainty than they. But what can deserve greater credit than the senses require from us? Will reason, derived from erring sense, claim the privilege to contradict it? Reason – that depends wholly upon the senses,which unless you allow to be true, all reason must be false.

Munro: Again if a man believe that nothing is known, he knows not whether this even can be known, since he admits he knows nothing. I will therefore decline to argue the case against him who places himself with head where his feet should be. And yet granting that he knows this, I would still put this question, since he has never yet seen any truth in things, whence he knows what knowing and not knowing severally are, and what it is that has produced the knowledge of the true and the false and what has proved the doubtful to differ from the certain. You will find that from the senses first has proceeded the knowledge of the true and the false and that the senses cannot be refuted. For that which is of itself to be able to refute things false by true things must from the nature of the case be proved to have the higher certainty. Well then, what must fairly be accounted of higher certainty than sense? Shall reason founded on false sense be able to contradict them, wholly founded as it is on the senses? And if they are not true, then all reason as well is rendered false.

Bailey: Again, if any one thinks that nothing is known, he knows not whether that can be known either, since he admits that he knows nothing. Against him then I will refrain from joining issue, who plants himself with his head in the place of his feet. And yet were I to grant that he knows this too, yet I would ask this one question; since he has never before seen any truth in things, whence does he know what is knowing, and not knowing each in turn, what thing has begotten the concept of the true and the false, what thing has proved that the doubtful differs from the certain? You will find that the concept of the true is begotten first from the senses, and that the senses cannot be gainsaid. For something must be found with a greater surety, which can of its own authority refute the false by the true. Next then, what must be held to be of greater surety than sense? Will reason, sprung from false sensation, avail to speak against the senses, when it is wholly sprung from the senses? For unless they are true, all reason too becomes false.

I think as I post this that the back and forth with Alan is still going on, but I posted this as my summary of my perspective:

My general comment on this topic: While I do not have the same personal feelings about Jefferson that Elayne has, I think she does a great job of separating Epicurean philosophy from her own personal perspective, and in that respect her essay is one of the most valuable we have had in a long time. Ironically enough, I think that in most respects Jefferson would agree with her commentary and her responses to Alan.

It is very hard to do given the modern worldviews that prevail, but if we can't see that our own personal feelings - on any topic - cannot be justified by appeals to absolute universal standards, then we don't understand much of anything about Epicurean philosophy. In my view that is the point Elayne is driving home in this commentary.

No matter how we might try to dress our personal preferences up as "virtue" and say that Epicurus endorsed virtue, we're spinning in circles if we don't see that the "virtue" that Epicurus recommended is not the virtue of Plato and Aristotle and the Stoics or the religionists. Epicurean "virtue" is in no sense universal, but rather it is a purely pragmatic weighing of alternatives toward the goal of pleasurable living for ourselves and our friends. The line as to what affects us and what doesn't is not easy for us to draw, but there's no god or realm of universals that hands that answer to us.

We can "shout" along with Diogenes of Oinoanda that "pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end..." but shouting doesn't always help.

Unfortunately, some people are just not going to let go to their attachment to universal values. This is the same issue, dressed up in another name, as all the variants of "humanism," and it is why we moderate the group closely to be sure that we who really want to pursue Epicurean philosophy to its conclusions are not drowned out and driven away by those who want to use Epicurus for their own current political positions. That does not mean that we should not have political positions, and in fact I think the opposite is true -- we *must* engage with the world if we want to live safely and happily. But if we confuse our own preferences for those which we think are ordained by gods or universal in any way, then we're only fooling ourselves.

People who don't let go of their attachment to universalism and humanism generally end up being short-time Epicureans. That's because their attachment to universalism/humanism is what drives them, rather than getting all the way to the bottom of Epicurus' philosophy and understanding how the physics, epistemology, and ethics all work together to form a coherent whole. This is one of the biggest challenges we all face in studying Epicurus.

Elayne has undertaken an Augean Stables (not sure that is the correct analogy) of reviewing Alan Reyes' article on Thomas Jefferson. I don't personally share Elayne's feelings about Jefferson, but I think her thoughtful discussion of all the issues is well worth reading and does a great job of unwinding much confusion about Epicurus' views on virtue and justice.

I presume that at some point we will get a version of it here at Epicureanfriends.com, but I also see that it is unique exchange with Alan that probably would lose a lot by not following the details of the back and forth between Elayne and Alan.

So for now here's a link to the thread at Facebook and perhaps we can exchange commentary here without getting into the immediate fray with Alan, which probably is best handled at Facebook where the full context is available.

Just as at Facebook it would be best if this did not devolve into an "I like Jefferson" vs "I dislike Jefferson" thread, because Elayne's points are much deeper than that.

Martin is it useful to generalize that at least one differentiator is that some theories/calculations are based *entirely* on their consistency with other theories/calculations, without *any* of those theories/calculations in the chain being verified by real-world experiment?

Or is that so general a statement as to be useless? I would think conceptually there is a dividing line between theories/calculations that have *some* verification through experiential observation vs those that do not?

Hello and welcome to the forum GeorgeS

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.
2. "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt
3. "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius
4. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
5. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
6. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
7. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
8. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
9. Plato's Philebus
10. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
11. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

Link from Charles: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/21_grams_experiment

Important points from Phaedo - How Plato "Proved" the Immortality of the Soul

The following comes from the latter part of Plato's argument, after Plato has backed away from his initial more superficial arguments in favor of immortality, and he has begun to respond to the objections raised against his initial statement. Those objections included the "harmony" argument (in which it is argued that the harmony cannot exist when its parts are destroyed) and the "newer cloak" argument (in which the soul, though durable enough to outlast many worn-out cloaks in life, does not outlast the cloak that the man obtains shortly before his death). Plato proceeds with these as part of his concluding arguments:

1. Harmony admits of degrees, but in the soul there are no degrees;
   1. I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a harmony, and more completely a harmony, when more truly and fully harmonized, to any extent which is possible; and less of a harmony, and less completely a harmony, when less truly and fully harmonized.
   2. True.
   3. But does the soul admit of degrees? or is one soul in the very least degree more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another?
   4. Not in the least.
   5. Yet surely of two souls, one is said to have intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and the other to have folly and vice, and to be an evil soul: and this is said truly?
   6. Yes, truly.
2. If the ideas have an absolute existence the soul is immortal.
   1. There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you; but only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous discussion and on other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that cause which has occupied my thoughts. I shall have to go back to those familiar words which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and the like; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of the cause, and to prove the immortality of the soul.
   2. Cebes said: You may proceed at once with the proof, for I grant you this.
   3. Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree with me in the next step; for I cannot help thinking, if there be anything beautiful other than absolute beauty should there be such, that it can be beautiful only in so far as it partakes of absolute beauty—and I should say the same of everything. Do you agree in this notion of the cause?
   4. Yes, he said, I agree.
3. All things exist by participation in general ideas.
   1. He proceeded: I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of those wise causes which are alleged; and if a person says to me that the bloom of colour, or form, or any such thing is a source of beauty, I leave all that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in whatever way or manner obtained; for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful. This appears to me to be the safest answer which I can give, either to myself or to another, and to this I cling, in the persuasion that this principle will never be overthrown, and that to myself or to any one who asks the question, I may safely reply, That by beauty beautiful things become beautiful. Do you not agree with me?
   2. I do.
   3. And that by greatness only great things become great and greater greater, and by smallness the less become less?
   4. True.
4. The merely verbal truth may be replaced by a higher one.
   1. And now, he said, let us begin again; and do not you answer my question in the words in which I ask it: let me have not the old safe answer of which I spoke at first, but another equally safe, of which the truth will be inferred by you from what has been just said. I mean that if any one asks you ‘what that is, of which the inherence makes the body hot,’ you will reply not heat (this is what I call the safe and stupid answer), but fire, a far superior answer, which we are now in a condition to give. Or if any one asks you ‘why a body is diseased,’ you will not say from disease, but from fever; and instead of saying that oddness is the cause of odd numbers, you will say that the monad is the cause of them: and so of things in general, as I dare say that you will understand sufficiently without my adducing any further examples.
   2. Yes, he said, I quite understand you.
   3. Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will render the body alive?
5. We may now say, not life makes alive, but the soul makes alive; and the soul has a life-giving power which does not admit of death and is therefore immortal.
   1. The soul, he replied.
   2. And is this always the case?
   3. Yes, he said, of course.
   4. Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life?
   5. Yes, certainly.
   6. And is there any opposite to life?
   7. There is, he said.
   8. And what is that?
   9. Death.
   10. Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite of what she brings.
   11. Impossible, replied Cebes.
   12. And now, he said, what did we just now call that principle which repels the even?
   13. The odd.
   14. And that principle which repels the musical or the just?
   15. The unmusical, he said, and the unjust.
   16. And what do we call that principle which does not admit of death?
   17. The immortal, he said.
   18. And does the soul admit of death?
   19. No.
   20. Then the soul is immortal?
   21. Yes, he said.
   22. And may we say that this has been proven?
   23. Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied.

Hello and welcome to the forum @Konstantin !

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.
2. "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt
3. "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius
4. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
5. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
6. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
7. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
8. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
9. Plato's Philebus
10. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
11. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

Much of the Lucian Material is extremely enjoyable, "A True Story" being one of them.

If I recall correctly, the ones with the most Epicurean aspects/interest are:

It's not on this list but also notable is the one with the unflattering reference to the early Christians - the Passing of Perigrinus. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passing_of_Peregrinus

It applies to a wide range, bit it does have a special bite for the Stoics!

Quote from Susan Hill

It seems to me that the two main problematical findings of quantum theory are the Schrodinger equation and quantum entanglement. Are they as "nonsensical" as they are generally presented?

That's a good way of asking the question Martin -- where do you identify the line where "Quantum woo" starts?

Quote from Susan Hill

Lucian's Hermotimus is pretty devastating. I have been much chastened.

I read it for entertainment as regularly as I can - I think I will try again today. It is very witty!

No doubt it is true that not all of us have to study Plato, and it is even more certain that in fact most of us will not do so. The trick is going to be finding "trusted Epicurean Friends who know Phaedo" and at the moment I am aware only of Norman DeWitt who even attempts to draw attention to these issues by explaining how Epicurus' arguments fit together as responses to Plato.

There is a lot to think about here. For me personally it is one thing to use the word "idealism" to describe Plato's position, but when I actually read the translation and come face to face as it were with his argument I am being shocked at what "idealism" actually means. Calling it a "word game" does not seem to me to begin to evoke the full significance of the manipulation that is going on. Plato is literally basing everything in his worldview on defining words in a certain way, and then interpolating conclusions based solely on his definitions, explicitly throwing out the senses as any check or restraint on his procedure, and using his dialogue format as a form of cheerleading to imply that his conclusions are obvious and the only conclusions possible. "Yes Plato you're absolutely right! Nothing could be more clear!"

Geesh - give me a break!

But the bottom line is that most of us are not going to read Phaedo and Philebus and other key works of Plato. So we have to figure out how to substitute for that.

In many respects it seems clear that Epicurus was writing to Platonists or at least to people who were familiar with Platonism. We who are neither are at great risk of not being able to understand what is being argued for that reason.

Tonight I read Phaedo for the first time and posted some reaction here.

It seems to me that the relation between Phaedo and the thread here is that the existence of these Platonic/Socratic arguments is a large part of the reason why some issues that are otherwise a total waste of time, and unproductive to pursue, must be pursued. If you are unlucky enough to get taught these Platonic arguments in school, or run into them in some other form in another part of life, you have to be able to respond to them, otherwise they will immobilize you (or at least, many people) with fear and uncertainty and doubt. And I just don't think it's effective in many cases to simply take the position of saying "don't worry about it" and use arguments like "the burden of proof is on the proponent" or "speculation is not a valid form of reasoning" such as someone like Frances Wright might argue. Some people in some situations might be able to get away with that, and if so then the result is the proof of their success, but in my experience personally, these arguments are everywhere, and unless they are met they lead to skepticism, nihilism, and even anti-intellectualism. They are just so corrosive that ignoring them is unlikely to work in most cases. (And Socrates even includes in Phaedo just such a warning, but he includes it presumably so that his listeners won't seek refuge in them, but will simply give in to his conclusions based on his dialectical logic!)

One more question we will need to address as we deal with Epicurus/Lucretius on the soul:

In Phaedo, Socrates' ultimate argument on which immortality of the soul is based comes down to his "recollection" theory, which is hard to summarize but seems to be something similar to "concepts" at least of a certain type are clear to us from birth, and they must have come from somewhere, therefore we must have had them from a prior existence.

That's a woefully inadequate summary and perhaps not even correct at all, but the argument does seem to me to be related to Plato/Socrates reverence for "ideas."

Presumably, therefore, Epicurus' arguments against immortality of the soul must address this argument. Do we think Epicurus/Lucretius has already made this impossible by the "nothing exists eternally except matter an void" argument? Or are there other aspects of Epicurus/Lucretius which attack this argument. No doubt there are huge numbers of commentaries on Plato/Socrates' recollection argument, so maybe we can find something concise that states the issue clearly.

From Wikipedia,

the four arguments are these, but the common element to me is that they all appear to be word games: which rely on the listener accepting the asserted definitions, rather than questioning them with observations from the senses and pointing out the limitations of the definitions.

The Cyclical Argument

Cebes voices his fear of death to Socrates: "... they fear that when she [the soul] has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the very day of death she may perish and come to an end immediately on her release from the body ... dispersing and vanishing away into nothingness in her flight."^[10]

In order to alleviate Cebes' worry that the soul might perish at death, Socrates introduces his first argument for the immortality of the soul. This argument is often called the Cyclical Argument. It supposes that the soul must be immortal since the living come from the dead. Socrates says: "Now if it be true that the living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, for if not, how could they have been born again?". He goes on to show, using examples of relationships, such as asleep-awake and hot-cold, that things that have opposites come to be from their opposite. One falls asleep after having been awake. And after being asleep, he awakens. Things that are hot came from being cold and vice versa. Socrates then gets Cebes to conclude that the dead are generated from the living, through death, and that the living are generated from the dead, through birth. The souls of the dead must exist in some place for them to be able to return to life.^[11]

The Theory of Recollection Argument

Cebes realizes the relationship between the Cyclical Argument and Socrates' Theory of Recollection. He interrupts Socrates to point this out, saying:

Quote

... your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that our learning is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we have learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible unless our soul had been somewhere before existing in this form of man; here then is another proof of the soul's immortality.^[12]

Socrates' second argument, the Theory of Recollection, shows that it is possible to draw information out of a person who seems not to have any knowledge of a subject prior to his being questioned about it (a priori knowledge). This person must have gained this knowledge in a prior life, and is now merely recalling it from memory. Since the person in Socrates' story is able to provide correct answers to his interrogator, it must be the case that his answers arose from recollections of knowledge gained during a previous life.^[13]

The Affinity Argument

Socrates presents his third argument for the immortality of the soul, the so-called Affinity Argument, where he shows that the soul most resembles that which is invisible and divine, and the body resembles that which is visible and mortal. From this, it is concluded that while the body may be seen to exist after death in the form of a corpse, as the body is mortal and the soul is divine, the soul must outlast the body.^[14]

As to be truly virtuous during life is the quality of a great man who will perpetually dwell as a soul in the underworld. However, regarding those who were not virtuous during life, and so favored the body and pleasures pertaining exclusively to it, Socrates also speaks. He says that such a soul as this is:

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... polluted, is impure at the time of her departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always and is in love with and bewitched by the body and by the desires and pleasures of the body, until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a man may touch and see, and drink and eat, and use for the purposes of his lusts, the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and avoid that which to the bodily eye is dark and invisible, but is the object of mind and can be attained by philosophy; do you suppose that such a soul will depart pure and unalloyed?^[15]

Persons of such a constitution will be dragged back into corporeal life, according to Socrates. These persons will even be punished while in Hades. Their punishment will be of their own doing, as they will be unable to enjoy the singular existence of the soul in death because of their constant craving for the body. These souls are finally "imprisoned in another body". Socrates concludes that the soul of the virtuous man is immortal, and the course of its passing into the underworld is determined by the way he lived his life. The philosopher, and indeed any man similarly virtuous, in neither fearing death, nor cherishing corporeal life as something idyllic, but by loving truth and wisdom, his soul will be eternally unperturbed after the death of the body, and the afterlife will be full of goodness.^[16]

Simmias confesses that he does not wish to disturb Socrates during his final hours by unsettling his belief in the immortality of the soul, and those present are reluctant to voice their skepticism. Socrates grows aware of their doubt and assures his interlocutors that he does indeed believe in the soul's immortality, regardless of whether or not he has succeeded in showing it as yet. For this reason, he is not upset facing death and assures them that they ought to express their concerns regarding the arguments. Simmias then presents his case that the soul resembles the harmony of the lyre. It may be, then, that as the soul resembles the harmony in its being invisible and divine, once the lyre has been destroyed, the harmony too vanishes, therefore when the body dies, the soul too vanishes. Once the harmony is dissipated, we may infer that so too will the soul dissipate once the body has been broken, through death.^[17]

Socrates pauses, and asks Cebes to voice his objection as well. He says, "I am ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the bodily form has been ... proven; but the existence of the soul after death is in my judgment unproven." While admitting that the soul is the better part of a man, and the body the weaker, Cebes is not ready to infer that because the body may be perceived as existing after death, the soul must therefore continue to exist as well. Cebes gives the example of a weaver. When the weaver's cloak wears out, he makes a new one. However, when he dies, his more freshly woven cloaks continue to exist. Cebes continues that though the soul may outlast certain bodies, and so continue to exist after certain deaths, it may eventually grow so weak as to dissolve entirely at some point. He then concludes that the soul's immortality has yet to be shown and that we may still doubt the soul's existence after death. For, it may be that the next death is the one under which the soul ultimately collapses and exists no more. Cebes would then, "... rather not rely on the argument from superior strength to prove the continued existence of the soul after death."^[18]

Seeing that the Affinity Argument has possibly failed to show the immortality of the soul, Phaedo pauses his narration. Phaedo remarks to Echecrates that, because of this objection, those present had their "faith shaken," and that there was introduced "a confusion and uncertainty". Socrates too pauses following this objection and then warns against misology, the hatred of argument.^[19]

The Argument from Form of Life

Socrates then proceeds to give his final proof of the immortality of the soul by showing that the soul is immortal as it is the cause of life. He begins by showing that "if there is anything beautiful other than absolute beauty it is beautiful only insofar as it partakes of absolute beauty".

Consequently, as absolute beauty is a Form, and so is Life, then anything which has the property of being animated with Life, participates in the Form of Life. As an example he says, "will not the number three endure annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into an even number, while remaining three?". Forms, then, will never become their opposite. As the soul is that which renders the body living, and that the opposite of life is death, it so follows that, "... the soul will never admit the opposite of what she always brings." That which does not admit death is said to be immortal.^[20]

Socrates thus concludes, "Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will truly exist in another world. "Once dead, man's soul will go to Hades and be in the company of," as Socrates says, "... men departed, better than those whom I leave behind." For he will dwell amongst those who were true philosophers, like himself.^[21]

More post-Phaedo reaction:

OK so in Phaedo Plato/Socrates delivered to the Greeks an argument for immortality of the soul and punishment/reward after death that is MUCH more persuasive than anything the stupid Christians and Jews ever came up with. And all of it based on essentially "dialectical logic" and denigration of the senses.

So of course Epicurus rejected dialectical logic.

Of course Epicurus defended the senses against ideal forms.

Of course Epicurus argued that the soul cannot be immortal since everything is made of atoms and void.

and of course Epicurus came up with an answer to the logical argument that pleasure cannot be the highest good because pleasure is supposedly something that partakes of the essence of lesser or greater, rather than partakes of the essence of something absolute.

It's really almost a sick joke to try to jerk Epicurus' views on happiness/pleasure out of this context, and consider them separately. The whole philosophy is an integrated reject of Platonism at its deepest level - the elevation of "logic" as the only truth, and none of the separate aspects of Epicurus make any sense outside that context.

These Platonic dialogues take time to read, but they are really indispensable. However maybe there is a way to identify several of the most important, possibly including Phaedo and Philebus and maybe Timeaus - and develop a short introductory guide to the key concepts? It makes sense that so much would be packed into Phaedo since this is Socrates' final speech before his death, so maybe it's possible to identify only a couple as the real keys.

Oh my, oh my, oh my. I have just finished reading PHAEDO at Charles link, which carries you to wikisource.

How can we begin to analyze this material in Lucretius, or many other aspects of Epicurus, without reading Phaedo!?!? And how many other aspects of Epicurus are unfathomable without at least some amount of exposure to these Platonic arguments?

We mentioned in the episode that the discussion of harmony in Phaedo was relevant, but in reading the full dialogue I am struck that one of the less important aspects.

That's because the Phaedo's argument for an eternal soul is really built not on anything that has any relation to harmony, but on Plato's main fundamental that there is nothing truly real but the ideal, and that the senses are unreliable things that chain us to the least things and always separate us from the best things.

And that there is no way to know anything about the lesser or the better but to understand that they can be understood only as partaking in the essences to which those words refer.

Words, words, and more words -- all reflections of "ideas" -- everything boils down to that for Plato!

Not only is this dialog essential for the discussion of harmony in this podcast, but it's really a high-level summary of the essential differences between Plato and Epicurus.

We're going to have to give a lot of thought as we proceed to how it is even possible to begin to understand Epicurus without constantly referring back to the Platonic positions against which he was rebelling.

Episode 39 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today's episode is from Book Three, and focuses on the "mind" and "spirit" as parts of the body just like the hand or feet. This text includes discussion of the Greek theory of "harmony" and contains some difficult material that will take several episodes to sort through. As always we invite your comments and suggestions.

LOL ---

I don't recommend Seneca, but if you do read him, read this part, all of which, I think, was "in the guise of an Epicurean":

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(Seneca’s Letters – Book II Letter XLVIII)

In answer to the letter which you wrote me while traveling, – a letter as long as the journey itself, – I shall reply later. I ought to go into retirement, and consider what sort of advice I should give you. For you yourself, who consult me, also reflected for a long time whether to do so; how much more, then, should I myself reflect, since more deliberation is necessary in settling than in propounding a problem! And this is particularly true when one thing is advantageous to you and another to me. Am I speaking again in the guise of an Epicurean? But the fact is, the same thing is advantageous to me which is advantageous to you; for I am not your friend unless whatever is at issue concerning you is my concern also. Friendship produces between us a partnership in all our interests. There is no such thing as good or bad fortune for the individual; we live in common. And no one can live happily who has regard to himself alone and transforms everything into a question of his own utility; you must live for your neighbor, if you would live for yourself. This fellowship, maintained with scrupulous care, which makes us mingle as men with our fellow-men and holds that the human race have certain rights in common, is also of great help in cherishing the more intimate fellowship which is based on friendship, concerning which I began to speak above. For he that has much in common with a fellow-man will have all things in common with a friend.

And on this point, my excellent Lucilius, I should like to have those subtle dialecticians of yours advise me how I ought to help a friend, or how a fellowman, rather than tell me in how many ways the word “friend” is used, and how many meanings the word “man” possesses. Lo, Wisdom and Folly are taking opposite sides. Which shall I join? Which party would you have me follow? On that side, “man” is the equivalent of “friend”; on the other side, “friend” is not the equivalent of “man.” The one wants a friend for his own advantage; the other wants to make himself an advantage to his friend. What you have to offer me is nothing but distortion of words and splitting of syllables. It is clear that unless I can devise some very tricky premises and by false deductions tack on to them a fallacy which springs from the truth, I shall not be able to distinguish between what is desirable and what is to be avoided! I am ashamed! Old men as we are, dealing with a problem so serious, we make play of it! ‘Mouse’ is a syllable. Now a mouse eats its cheese; therefore, a syllable eats cheese.”

Suppose now that I cannot solve this problem; see what peril hangs over my head as a result of such ignorance! What a scrape I shall be in! Without doubt I must beware, or some day I shall be catching syllables in a mousetrap, or, if I grow careless, a book may devour my cheese! Unless, perhaps, the following syllogism is shrewder still: “‘Mouse’ is a syllable. Now a syllable does not eat cheese. Therefore a mouse does not eat cheese.” What childish nonsense! Do we knit our brows over this sort of problem? Do we let our beards grow long for this reason? Is this the matter which we teach with sour and pale faces?

Would you really know what philosophy offers to humanity? Philosophy offers counsel. Death calls away one man, and poverty chafes another; a third is worried either by his neighbor’s wealth or by his own. So-and-so is afraid of bad luck; another desires to get away from his own good fortune. Some are ill-treated by men, others by the gods. Why, then, do you frame for me such games as these? It is no occasion for jest; you are retained as counsel for unhappy men, sick and the needy, and those whose heads are under the poised axe. Whither are you straying? What are you doing? This friend, in whose company you are jesting, is in fear. Help him, and take the noose from about his neck. Men are stretching out imploring hands to you on all sides; lives ruined and in danger of ruin are begging for some assistance; men’s hopes, men’s resources, depend upon you. They ask that you deliver them from all their restlessness, that you reveal to them, scattered and wandering as they are, the clear light of truth. Tell them what nature has made necessary, and what superfluous; tell them how simple are the laws that she has laid down, how pleasant and unimpeded life is for those who follow these laws, but how bitter and perplexed it is for those who have put their trust in opinion rather than in nature.

I should deem your games of logic to be of some avail in relieving men’s burdens, if you could first show me what part of these burdens they will relieve. What among these games of yours banishes lust? Or controls it? Would that I could say that they were merely of no profit! They are positively harmful. I can make it perfectly clear to you whenever you wish, that a noble spirit when involved in such subtleties is impaired and weakened. I am ashamed to say what weapons they supply to men who are destined to go to war with fortune, and how poorly they equip them! Is this the path to the greatest good? Is philosophy to proceed by such claptrap and by quibbles which would be a disgrace and a reproach even for expounders of the law? For what else is it that you men are doing, when you deliberately ensnare the person to whom you are putting questions, than making it appear that the man has lost his case on a technical error? But just as the judge can reinstate those who have lost a suit in this way, so philosophy has reinstated these victims of quibbling to their former condition. Why do you men abandon your mighty promises, and, after having assured me in high-sounding language that you will permit the glitter of gold to dazzle my eyesight no more than the gleam of the sword, and that I shall, with mighty steadfastness, spurn both that which all men crave and that which all men fear, why do you descend to the ABC’s of scholastic pedants? What is your answer? Is this the path to heaven? For that is exactly what philosophy promises to me, that I shall be made equal to God. For this I have been summoned, for this purpose have I come.

Philosophy, keep your promise! Therefore, my dear Lucilius, withdraw yourself as far as possible from these exceptions and objections of so-called philosophers. Frankness, and simplicity beseem true goodness. Even if there were many years left to you, you would have had to spend them frugally in order to have enough for the necessary thing; but as it is, when your time is so scant, what madness it is to learn superfluous things! Farewell

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Quote from Susan Hill

In this way, one may spend an entire lifetime in devoted study and contemplation of a theology or metaphysics that may have a mountain of books written about it by very intelligent people, yet have no practical value or means of personal verification in this lifetime.

On this point, for a long form answer which hits this home very hard, I recommend Lucian's "HERMOTIMUS" -- https://newepicurean.com/suggested-read…ian-hermotimus/

I consider Lucian to be thoroughly Epicurean, and this dialog is both fun to read and I think does a very good job of explaining a part of the answer the Epicurus would give to Susan's comment here.

In the dialog, Lycinus (who I think speaks for the Epicurean position) confronts Hermotimus (a student of Stoicism) about the pursuit of his studies. The dialog explores the dangers of and issues in "spending an entire lifetime in devoted study and contemplation ... yet find ... no practical value or means of personal verification.... of the result.