Posts by Cassius

Quote

Above all, she advances no dogmas, — is slow to assert what is, — and calls nothing impossible.

It would be interesting to discuss whether this statement can be squared with Epicurus' views on "dogmatism" and such Lucretian terminology as Epicurus coming back from his survey of the universe to tell us "what can be, and what cannot," and "the borderline, the benchmark, set forever" in the opening of Book One, not to mention the reference in Book 4 to the man who says he knows nothing as being perverse or a trifler.

This is admittedly not a perfect analogy, but I continue to see parallels between Elayne's point of view and Frances Wright -- and I just realized another - A Few Days In Athens is, if I recall correctly, almost totally devoid of argumentation based on physics.

Compare also from Chapter 14:

"In the schools you have hitherto frequented,” she continued, addressing the youth, “certain images of virtue, vice, truth, knowledge, are presented to the imagination, and these abstract qualities, or we may call them, figurative beings, are made at once the objects of speculation and adoration. A law is laid down, and the feelings and opinions of men are predicated upon it; a theory is built, and all animate and inanimate nature is made to speak in its support; an hypothesis is advanced, and all the mysteries of nature are treated as explained. You have heard of, and studied various systems of philosophy; but real philosophy is opposed to all systems. Her whole business is observation; and the results of that observation constitute all her knowledge. She receives no truths, until she has tested them by experience; she advances no opinions, unsupported by the testimony of facts; she acknowledges no virtue, but that involved in beneficial actions; no vice, but that involved in actions hurtful to ourselves or to others. Above all, she advances no dogmas, — is slow to assert what is, — and calls nothing impossible. The science of philosophy is simply a science of observation, both as regards the world without us, and the world within; and, to advance in it, are requisite only sound senses, well developed and exercised faculties, and a mind free of prejudice. The objects she has in view, as regards the external world, are, first, to see things as they are, and secondly, to examine their structure, to ascertain their properties, and to observe their relations one to the other. — As respects the world within, or the philosophy of mind, she has in view, first, to examine our sensations, or the impressions of external things on our senses; which operation involves, and is involved in, the examination of those external things themselves: secondly, to trace back to our sensations, the first development of all our faculties; and again, from these sensations, and the exercise of our different faculties as developed by them, to trace the gradual formation of our moral feelings, and of all our other emotions: thirdly, to analyze all these our sensations, thoughts, and emotions, — that is, to examine the qualities of our own internal, sentient matter, with the same, and yet more, closeness of scrutiny, than we have applied to the examination of the matter that is without us finally, to investigate the justness of our moral feelings, and to weigh the merit and demerit of human actions; which is, in other words, to judge of their tendency to produce good or evil, — to excite pleasurable or painful feelings in ourselves or others. You will observe, therefore, that, both as regards the philosophy of physics, and the philosophy of mind, all is simply a process of investigation. It is a journey of discovery, in which, in the one case, we commission our senses to examine the qualities of that matter, which is around us, and, in the other, endeavor, by attention to the varieties of our consciousness, to gain a knowledge of those qualities of matter which constitute our susceptibilities of thought and feeling.”

Quote from Elayne

I think it's inaccurate to stretch what Epicurus said to include energy.

I would say that just as the essence of atoms is that they are uncuttable, the essence of "matter" is that it can be measured through the senses, in this case through the use of technology that extends the senses to areas that the unaided senses are not able to go on their own. I don't think that Epicurus would rule that the hearing of someone who requires a hearing aid is not hearing, or that vision through an electron microscope or other detector devise is not he equivalent of seeing.

Those extensions of the senses allow us to better describe the phenomena but would be fully compatible with Epicurus' first principles of nothing from nothing and nothing to nothing and the like.

If not for having confidence in some specific set of conclusions about the universe - and claiming that these are knowledge, then where IS one's starting point other than "this is what I feel pleasure and pain about?" Would we suggest that pleasure and pain are the foundation for the position that there is no supernatural god or life after death?

Quote from Elayne

Yes, a first principle is an axiom. It's something you start with that you can't prove, nor is it logic based. An assumption that other parts of your model use but can't prove. It's not the same as a fact, because by its nature it actually can't be shown to be accurate. If it ever IS shown to be accurate by some kind of evidence, then it is no longer a first principle.

If your first principles are wrong, then anything derived from them is wrong.

However, a first principle that there exists an observable reality can't lead to other reliable conclusions without evidence... because choosing that as a first principle means observations are required for other conclusions.

When I made my posts above I had not really focused on this one from Elayne. I do not read DeWitt as following this "unprovable" perspective on "First Principles." I think both DeWitt and Epicurus were explicitly considering their principles to be proven by observation, from which point they THEN were treated as the confirmed foundation on which the rest were based.

This may be another situation where a word ("first principle" or even "axiom") is being used more loosely than it might be in formal logic, but it does seem to me that the "proven" version of a first principle is the way that DeWitt and Epicurus were looking at things, and that's the way that makes the most sense to me too. To say that your first principle is unprovable (let's assume an imaginary line with only length but no width) immediately rules if out of my mind as a candidate for being a first principle.

Quote from JJElbert

What Lincoln is proposing here (as memorably acted by Daniel Day-Lewis, and brilliantly scripted by Tony Kushner) is that moral laws of justice and equality can be derived from the logic of geometry. What's so striking about this scene is that it so perfectly mimics Platonism and Pythagoreanism and their geometric foundations. Lincoln is making a worthwhile and commendable moral stand, but his reasoning is faulty. There's nothing in geometry that can actually answer, with any kind of logical finality, these moral questions. In spite of the worthiness of the cause, it amounts to an abuse of reason.

Joshua the way I would say that slightly differently is that Lincoln's argument shows how important it is to trace back one's reasoning to determine what the "first principles" are. Lincoln's first principle here is erroneous - he is explicitly citing Euclidian / Platonic universals. Even though it leads him in this case to a conclusion with which we agree. However because the first principle is wrong, his reasoning on other issues could go into other "absolutist" directions with which we would disagree.

I think this is why Epicurus was so concerned to establish confidence in an explicit and firm set of "first principles" (such as nothing comes or goes to nothing) and that he did in fact consider his principles of physics to be just such starting points for all other reasoning (specifically including ethics), as DeWitt is suggesting.

I remember the different perspectives that some of us had on this surfacing in the discussion of some of the recent "Reverence and Awe" issues. My view is that anyone who suggested that communicating with gods could be a part of Epicurean philosophy would forever be barred from successfully arguing that due to PD1, which serves as such an axiom or first principle. My view is that PD1 should be considered as forever ruling out such an approach in an Epicurean Philosophy context. Not everyone agreed that that line of reasoning would suffice as an absolute bar.

My thinking on that hasn't changed -- Epicurus intended (in my view) that the basic principles such as the 12 Principles of Nature and to a lesser extent (because they are more loose, such as at the end) be considered bedrock principles that serve that purpose of anchoring the philosophy in something firm, and that absent that anchor the philosophy would be just another person's set of assertions and entitled to no more deference. Identifying a set of bedrock principles anchors them in Nature rather than in Epicurus' personal preferences.

This is turning into an interesting thread indeed!

We don't want to turn this into a debate on DeWitt's reliability, because I think that what he's saying here is probably agreed with by the commentators - this isn't (to my understanding) an area of controversy.

So to repeat, we need to figure out if Epicurus did indeed consider these principles of physics to be the equivalent of axioms which are to be considered the ultimate building blocks of the philosophy. I will go ahead and say that that is indeed the way I view the Epicurus' take on this subject. These principles of the nature of things are ultimately something that can be converted into the methods by which the universe is concluded to be natural and not supernatural, so I see room for latitude in updating them. But I think Epicurus considered them to be so well established as to be "certain" and that reasoning based on them would be among the most certain of truths that we can be confident of.

That's the way I treat them and to the extent that we part of what we have to do is to report what it is that Epicurus held, I would think this is a central part of the philosophy.

Quote from Elayne

"Nothing comes from nothing" is not a first principle, or if it was thought to be, that's an error. It's an observation, which may or may not be correct.

This is certainly a key question we need to clarify.

Was DeWitt holding "nothing from nothing" to be a first principle?

Was Epicurus holding something like "nothing from nothing" to be a first principle?

How does this relate to the Twelve Fundamentals of Nature? https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/index.php?…tals-of-nature/

One interesting aspect of this is that if I read DeWitt correctly, he is saying that Epicurus put the strongest indicia of reliability on "deduction from first principles." And he is saying that analogy from the visible (observation?) to the invisible, and ordinary human intelligence, are less reliable.

So is DeWitt not saying that the most reliable kind of reasoning is deduction based on "first principles" which would be from something like "nothing comes from nothing?"

It is very difficult for me not to see that (deduction from a first principle) as not being well described in modern colloquial terminology with words like logic and reason.

That's why I think it's necessary to have a presentation to new students of Epicurus that would help them distinguish between acceptable forms of logic and reason and unacceptable forms.

Quote from Don

But I may be fantasizing.

No I don't think so.

Relevant to this discussion to is this below. I don't know that I agree with this division, but I do think that a division exists that needs to be articulated

This is going to be a hugely useful article -- thanks again! https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/

Quote from Don

colloquial

That's an important word in this discussion too.

Quote from Don

. I think Epicurus would include formal logic within the paideia (enculturation; instruction; indoctrination) he criticised, ex. "Set sail in your own little boat, free from all paideia."

And yes that is also a saying that cries out for explanation. Epicurus was certainly not against ALL culture/instruction, it was only certain kinds to which he objected, because he had a "correct" version of his own.

To allow the suggestion to stand that Epicurus was against ALL such things is to guarantee that there's no way to resurrect the philosophy as an active force today.

Looks like sullogismos and dialekticos (sp?) are going to be two of the primary culprits.

I am beginning to think that those two are best described to "laymen" as "formal logic" and "the Socratic question-answer method."

Such as "Epicurus opposed the use of formal logica and the Socratic question-answer method of teaching."

Here's another past thread that is related to the issues in this one. Some time ago I spent some time drafting a "spreadsheet" to consider whether such a thing would be helpful in decision-making: A Draft Epicurean Pleasure Maximization Worksheet

I recall that there was lots of discussion beyond what is in that thread, and there were objections that the entire project was counterproductive. I certainly don't use such a spreadsheet myself, but I think if I were facing a particularly difficult life decision then such an analysis would be what I would try to do. I think I would try to use such a method to bring out an consider every possible aspect of the decision. I would know going in that the numbers and the totals were close to useless, because pleasure and pain can't be accurately quantified, as the spreadsheet says. But I think even if when I finished the analysis I tore it up and threw it away, having gone through the process would likely have been very beneficial as a way to be sure that I considered the major aspects of the situation.

I suspect that those who reach varying opinions on the place of "logic and reason" are going to match up closely with their opinions on the usefulness of such a "spreadsheet" analysis.

At the very least, I think the exercise of setting up the spreadsheet, and focusing on its limitations, was useful in my own thinking about the probblem.

Before we leave this discussion, I am interested to know how someone could square a total rejection of the words reason and logic with the wording of PD16. The Epicurus wiki says that Epicurus used the Greek word *logismos* for what is translated as *reason* here. How would someone who doesn't want to separate "practical logic/reason" from "formal logic/reason" respond to someone who asked that?

"Chance has little effect upon the wise man, for his greatest and highest interests are directed by *reason* throughout the course of life."

http://wiki.epicurism.info/Principal_Doctrine_16/

Woke up this morning thinking about this:

I believe that for a significant number of people, it is important to be able to explain logically and reasonably why logic and reason are insufficient to answer the ultimate questions of life and "the good" and how to spend our time.

If I were to reduce that as basically as I can, I would say that as Epicurus held, nature gives us only "feeling" - pain and pleasure - by which to decide what to choose and what to avoid.

The issue with formal reason and logic is that pain and pleasure can never be adequately reduced to words or other symbols. While it is possible to use words to describe scientific measurements and to somewhat approximate reality, it is not possible to use words to approximate feeling with a great degree of accurately. Feelings can be estimated but cannot be accurately reduced to words. "Let A=B and B=C therefore A=C" may be accurate in significant ways, but such symbolic formulas can never encompass the many aspects of feeling.

The Dialectical method of teaching was emphasized by the ancient Epicureans to be a particular problem. In pointed question and answer form it is impossible to convey in symbols or words all the aspects of feeling which need to be considered in evaluating issues such as "the good." There is in fact in conversation a tendency to be agreeable and to wish to avoid taking the time that would be required to consider all of the many aspects of feeling. As a result conclusions reached by dialectic are always truncated and inaccurate because they cannot evaluate every aspect of the feelings involved. Further, the more a dialectical discussion is aimed at the discovery of "universals," the more the discussion necessarily departs from accurately reflecting the feelings of pain and pleasure of the individuals who would supposedly be applying those universal rules.

Those are a couple of points I would include in any discussion of the limitations of formal logic and reason. I am sure there are others?

Quote from Godfrey

It seems, though, that there is a way that an individual Epicurean approaches life that would inform or influence how an Epicurean might engage in political thought and discussion and that this would not lead to any particular positions on specific issues.

I agree with most of what you wrote Godfrey, in the sense that different people in different circumstances are going to find that Epicurean viewpoints lead in different directions according to their circumstances. But I do that that application of Epicurean viewpoints to a specific individual does lead that individual to make conclusions about social behavior. And though it may sound like another word-splitting exercise, I don't think there's a bright line between political action and social action. PD39 and PD40 seem to me to have direct social implications that would be pretty much indistinguishable from political implications -- but the point remains that different people will choose to order their affairs toward these goals in different ways.

The rules against political discussion in the forum don't exist because each of us don't have political/social interests, but because we can know going into the discussion that our interests are not the same, and may even be very divergent or even hostile. We're voluntarily putting those aspects of life aside for the sake of the longer-term and greater goal of the benefit we get from pursuing the philosophy with like-minded people. I would say that "like-minded in philosophy" will frequently, but not always, lead to "political" and "social" agreement. For better or worse the more we spread out geographically and culturally and economically and in many different ways the more that our specifically political decisions would likely differ.

I underlined that this would not lead to any particular positions on specific issues. because I would qualify that by saying that this would not lead to any particular positions on specific issues that would apply to everyone.

Good idea - done!

I would say in some cases yes, but generally a prolepsis would need to be accompanied by perceptions from other faculties too.

Quote from Godfrey

I would say to prioritize the Canon and to keep logic/reason subservient.

In saying that, do you think that most of your friends with whom you might be discussing that would know what it means to "keep logic/reason subservient?" If they were to ask "what do you mean?" what would you say?