Posts by Cassius

How's that literally and in Roman word order?

"to the senses - these - are known ? Or

"the senses - these [things] - are known?

or "the senses - these [things] - know?

I'm not sure if putat is present indicative or a passive, or whether sentiri is a plural of senses or some kind of participle or dative or other construct. There's no "ad" there for "to the senses" but those Romans seemed to drop things a lot!

Might be a good day to review what's left of "Philodemus On Piety!"

I apologize for not having taken the time for a much more elaborate declaration, but I thought if you are personally in a situation were your livelihood or your life was requiring you to affirm that you are entitled to some relief due to your claim of freedom of religion, this might be of some use for you in documenting that you are entitled to those rights as least as much as those younger and therefore less-well-established religious traditions as Christianity or Islam.

If I recall correct Plato himself categorized Philebus' "patron goddess" as Aphrodite / Venus, correct?

And there is ample reason from the Epicurean texts to consider the primary Epicurean divinity of note to be Venus, correct?

Are there any other contenders for the role of primary divinity in Epicurean religion?

WHEREAS August 20, 2021, is as good a day as any other to make this declaration; and

WHEREAS it is a better day than most others of any month, because the Twentieth was designated by Epicurus himself as a special day of commemoration; and

WHEREAS it is in the world today a valuable right of the citizens of many nations to claim protected freedoms of conscience and action and other civic rights associated with the right to "freedom of religion" that many today find essential to the protection of their livelihoods and even their lives;

BE IT THEREFORE KNOWN THAT:

(1) Epicurus was the founder of one of the oldest and most respected systems of religious viewpoint as to the nature and existence of Divinity in the history of Western Civilization; and

(2) That those who follow the teachings of Epicurus hold, as much or more than those members of any group recognized as a religion, a distinct and sincerely-held religious viewpoint;

THEREFORE BE IT PROCLAIMED THAT:

Those who call themselves "Epicurean" are members of a religious tradition that deserves to hold and does hold the same legal rights and privileges as those of any religion recognized by the Constitution of the United States, by the Constitution of any State of the United States, or by the governing documents of any nation or organization of any nation or civilization on Planet Earth or on any other Planet or location elsewhere in the universe.

Cassius Amicus

August 20, 2021

I've noted at least two translations of "On Ends" is out there, with the excerpt that I've usually used on the form being from Epicurus.net, but that doesn't exactly match the full book version which I have elsewhere (and at the moment can't find the name of the translator!)

Quote

IX. First of all then, said he, I will proceed in the manner which is sanctioned by the founder of this school: I will lay down what that is which is the subject of our inquiry, and what its character is: not that I imagine that you do not know, but in order that my discourse may proceed in a systematic and orderly manner. We are inquiring, then, what is the end,—what is the extreme point of good, which, in the opinion of all philosophers, ought to be such that everything can be referred to it, but that it itself can be referred to nothing. This Epicurus places in pleasure, which he argues is the chief good, and that pain is the chief evil; and he proceeds to prove his assertion thus. He says that every animal the moment that it is born seeks for pleasure, and rejoices in it as the chief good; and rejects pain as the chief evil, and wards it off from itself as far as it can; and that it acts in this manner, without having been corrupted by anything, under the promptings of nature herself, who forms this uncorrupt and upright judgment. Therefore, he affirms that there is no need of argument or of discussion as to why pleasure is to be sought for, and pain to be avoided. This he thinks a matter of sense, just as much as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet; none of which propositions he thinks require to be confirmed by laboriously sought reasons, but that it is sufficient merely to state them. For that there is a difference between arguments and conclusions arrived at by ratiocination, and ordinary observations and statements:—by the first, secret and obscure principles are explained; by the second, matters which are plain and easy are brought to decision. For since, if you take away sense from a man, there is nothing left to him, it follows of necessity that what is contrary to nature, or what agrees with it, must be left to nature herself to decide. Now what does she perceive, or what does she determine on as her guide to seek or to avoid anything, except pleasure and pain? But there are some of our school who seek to carry out this doctrine with more acuteness, and who will not allow that it is sufficient that it should be decided by sense what is good and what is bad, but who assert that these points can be ascertained by intellect and reason also, and that pleasure is to be sought for on its own account, and that pain also is to be avoided for the same reason.

So I need to make some notes as to where these translations come from and get some links to the various versions on this text too.

I believe now that is YONGE - https://www.gutenberg.org/files/29247/29247-h/29247-h.html

The Academic Questions,

Treatise De Finibus.

and

Tusculan Disputations

Of

M. T. Cicero

With

A Sketch of the Greek Philosophers Mentioned by Cicero.

Literally Translated by

C. D. Yonge, B.A.

London: George Bell and Sons

York Street

Covent Garden

Printed by William Clowes and Sons,

Stamford Street and Charing Cross.

1875

Yes I agree that seems to have been Epicurus' position, although even there we have to dig down into the words.

When it says that Epicurus refused to admit any NECESSITY to argue or discuss it, does that mean that he refused to do so in all contexts, or simply said that it's not *necessary* to do that, but on occasion I will anyway when dealing with particular people? I suspect that's just what it means - that he emphasized that it's not necessary, but not that it's not always unwise.

For the time being I am still considering how to analyze Torquatus and whether that section is Cicero slanting the argument or is in fact an accurate summary of the Epicurean material that Cicero was supposedly copying from for his own book.

I tend to think "both" -- I tend to think that this was the way that Cicero thought, but I also think it's the way that the later Epicureans were drifting in response to Stoicism. Something similar is cited in Laertius about the other Epicureans having a "fourth" leg of the canon, so it appears to me that by the time of Cicero there were in fact important divisions within the Epicureans.

Quote from Don

4) Cassius , you're bringing in the words "rigorously logical" and Epicurus's argument for pleasure as that to which everything else points is the exact opposite of that, especially in the Cicero section you quote. "Torquatus" is specifically saying Epicurus didn't need "elaborate argument"; he simply needed to point out that pleasure was the thing every living thing strives for. That is the definition of a Chief Good.

Yes I realize that what you are saying is inherent in this discussion. Torquatus is saying that Epicurus didn't need that but Torquatus is specifically saying also that he (Torquatus) disagreed and thought the elaborate argument was a good idea. That contradiction seems to be what we are talking about and deciding how to wrestle with. My way of resolving it (at least for the moment) is to take the problem as contextual and saying "sometimes you do argue that way, and sometimes you don't." My preference is not to argue that way, and I think that's the best approach and the ultimate way to resolve the issue, but I can't deny that lots of very educated Epicureans seemed to think that there was a time and a place for everything -- if only to illustrate that logic can't ultimately resolve the issue.

In other words there may be better ways to say it but "it's rigorously logical to emphasize that logic cannot resolve the question." -- because we have previously defined the limits of logic and that it is insufficient.

I trust my initial response efforts will meet at least mostly Don 's approval but I'll tag him to be sure and to get his current take, since this is somewhat related to the "greatest good" question we've been discussing recently.

Preliminary comments:

1) I would argue that it is not possible to draw up a specific table of natural and necessary items that would apply to all people at all times except for the most basic of things such as air, food, and water, and I would argue that is why we do not have anything like such a list from Epicurus.

2) I would argue that rather than being a list of target items, the issue involved in this is as stated by Torquatus in "On Ends" - " Nothing could be more useful or more conducive to well-being than Epicurus's doctrine as to the different classes of the desires. One kind he classified as both natural and necessary, a second as natural without being necessary, and a third as neither natural nor necessary; the principle of classification being that the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural desires also require but little, since nature's own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount; but for the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered." The point of this being that thinking about the consequences and the costs of any action is the way to select among them, since there is in fact no absolute rule of conduct that will tell you what to do in any situation other than to consider the resulting pain and pleasure. Thus it might be helpful for us to think about lists in a general way, but it would be a big mistake to think that any single list can be an ultimate guide of conduct.

3) I would argue that Epicurus would have said, and in fact did say, that it is a terrible mistake to target the "bare minimum needed for happiness" as anyone's goal. As is recorded in Vatican Saying 63: "Frugality too has a limit, and the man who disregards it is like him who errs through excess." "Frugality" and "simplicity" are in a sense like the virtues - the virtues can be useful as tools in pursuing pleasure, but they are not ends in themselves, and if set up as ends in themselves you make a terrible mistake about the purpose of life, thus leading Diogenes of Oinoanda to shout at you, as well as to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that *pleasure* is the highest end of life."

4) And to summarize these points the main issue is this: The generic and ultimate point of Epicurus is that the guide of life is "pleasure" and Epicurus is rigorously logical and practical in his approach. The goal of life is not "simple pleasure" or "worthy pleasure" or even "lasting pleasure" or "intense pleasure" -- and not "natural pleasure" or "necessary pleasure" either. Anytime you place modifiers along with "pleasure" you are limiting the goal and you are trying to force everyone into a single pattern which is not compatible with the Epicurean view of the universe, in which there is no god or absolute arbiter of conduct. Again as recorded by Torquatus in one of the most clear statements left to us: "What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?" (And the answer to that question is clear - "nothing")

[The full quote is: "I will start then in the manner approved by the author of the system himself, by settling what are the essence and qualities of the thing that is the object of our inquiry; not that I suppose you to be ignorant of it, but because this is the logical method of procedure. We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil. This he sets out to prove as follows: Every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the Chief Good, while it recoils from pain as the Chief Evil, and so far as possible avoids it. This it does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of Nature's own unbiased and honest verdict. Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, be thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature. What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?"]

The Natural and Necessary List Question appears today again at Facebook in a question from DG - might be good to record it again here:

Ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ
κεναί, καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον·
τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν.
τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανά-
γειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀτα-
ραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος.

And one must calculate, so far as desire is concerned, that some are natural and some are empty, and among the natural desires, some are necessary, and some are only natural; and among the necessary desires some are necessary for happiness, and some for the freedom of disturbance of the body, and some for life itself. For, a fixed contemplation [observation] of these desires understands every choice and avoidance to lead to the health of the body and to the tranquility of the mind, since this is the final end of the blessed life.

-Has anyone worked out a table differentiating the natural and necessary desires as they relate to happiness, freedom from physical disturbance, and the basic needs of survival? I’m curious how others here may carve out these distinctions among the field of natural and necessary desires. What is the bare minimum one needs for survival, freedom from physical disturbance, and for happiness?

Quote from camotero

is not bad in an of itself as long as its authority is justified by the benefits it provides to the ones it's leading.

Camotero, I am not familiar with this point of view - that an anarchist would not consider an authority (which I interpret to mean central authority) bad in itself. I interpret opposition to authority to be rhe essence of anarchism. Can you give me something to explain that?

In regard to your comment before that I thought you were analogizing free will to be something that we experience as a given , like pleasure and pain. As for the reference to an anticipation I am equating all three of the canonical faculties as things we experience as "givens" (which we then have to process in our minds)

Quote from Don

a little more trusting of Seneca

At least Seneca was not a lawyer -- you never can trust those lawyers you know!

Quote from Don

On sources: I'm generally distrustful of Cicero,

I think that distrust will serve you well, and he's the one who most clearly wrapped Epicurus's view of pleasure into the formal "greatest good" formula, pretty much admitting even as he was doing it that such an approach was not sanctioned by Epicurus himself.

This is a pretty damning statement from my point of view, in its lack of confidence and his affirmative reliance on "elaborate and reasoned argument" and especially "abstruse theoretical discussion." (Of course as always I wish we had time to parse the Latin!)

Quote

Others again, with whom I agree, observing that a great many philosophers do advance a vast array of reasons to prove why pleasure should not be counted as a good nor pain as an evil, consider that we had better not be too confident of our case; in their view it requires elaborate and reasoned argument, and abstruse theoretical discussion of the nature of pleasure and pain.

I think @EricR may have some thoughts on this thread so I will tag him to be sure he sees it.

As to looking for a "first" or primitive form of life millions or billions of years ago I am always going to think that is the wrong approach from an Epicurean perspective. I think Epicurus would insist that there is life throughout the universe, and that the universe had no beginning date. So whatever he would point to as producing this mechanism, or to be it's key characteristics, I do not think he would think that to be time-dependent. I think the appropriate analogy would be that no matter how many monkeys and how many typewriters and how many years those monkeys would never produce the works of Shakespeare. I am thinking it's likely the discussion would be more on the lines of something swerve-like in the sense of "it must be there and be natural even though we don't yet understand the mechanism."

Of course I am very open to alternate possibilities including being completely wrong on my view there.

But I think any theory that posits a "first" is going to be incompatible, as would any theory that violates what we can glean from the views of "isonomia" and "nature never produces only a single thing of a kind."

That's why I think If we want to talk "soups" that is one thing, but simply assigning something to millions of years ago is not helpful. Where we are today is going to be "millions of years ago" when a couple more millions of years pass by.

1. I think you are on the right track comparing this with something derived from an anticipation. It is something we experience as true even almost like pleasure and pain. It is part of our natural experience of life and therefore it's a given that we take it and use it regardless of how it works.

2. I did not completely follow your final comment about anarchism. Perhaps you meant authoritarianism in the last sentence? The next to last paragraph about the problems with "losing the self" I think is very good. I do think it is permissible under our forum rules (and even necessary) to talk about systems in general, so as to discuss the last ten or so PDs. One point I would make among systems however is that I think just like we sometimes choose pain in the short term, and just as there is no absolute justice, it is probably the case that depending on circumstance it can be necessary to move from system to system as required by "temporary" facts. Even the Romans of the republican period apparently recognized that despite their traditional laws it might be necessary on occasion to have a dictator if survival of the community required it. So in my view the fundamental premise would be that there is no "one size fits all" system endorsed by nature. I say that of course as being someone who is personally in favor of the maximum personal freedom possible. Bit who acknowledges that there are times when survival demands otherwise.

For example, we are living through such a period today. In my view it is a fact question in which I don't think we should take a side here on the forum lest we get too political on exactly what response to Covid-19 is appropriate. But surely if we considered a hypothetical example like some kind of science fiction Andromeda Strain movie, or discovery of a huge meteor about to impact and destroy the earth, it is easier to make a case for extreme central authority to deal with that absolutely clear contingency..

I think discussions of hypotheticals like that are valuable and are fair game here, but I do think that it would be dangerous for everyone to start stating personal positions on (for example) Covid-19 responses. We all can and should have those positions. But here it is very likely best to use either a science fiction example or something from long ago history as the best way to discuss those issues unemotionally.

Yes I think "capacity" is another good word. It isn't fully developed at birth but improves with use and experience. And nobody forces us to use it - we can choose to ignore it. And it isn't some sort of infallible guide - we can still make mistakes in using it. All those things apply I think to what we're talking about.

And the reference to pleasure is a part I find fascinating too. Pleasure is where I think the deepest questions arise as to how that faculty came to be - because the others all seem to be channeling data to it, where alone the "stop" and "go" signals arise.

We know that all animate living things have these signals, and by recognizing them as canonical I think that means Epicurus recognized them as things which are inherent in us and simply have to be accepted as our stop and go signal from nature.

But it does strike me as a fascinating issue to consider the nature of pleasure and how it fits in with eternal / infinite universe and whether it therefore qualifies as the kind of "given" that arises just like life itself, etc.

But then overanalyzing it seems to be much of what Epicurus seemed to be warning against. Ultimately - whether we like it or not or analyze it or not - it's "the way things are."

I agree that that formulation is correct and useful in some contexts I think in other contexts the point would have to be stated more explicitly in order to communicate with the audience and especially to affirm that what is included in "pleasure" is extremely broad.