Posts by Cassius

I went back and reviewed the Scientism article. Here's my problem with it -- I think I agree with the direction he is going, but THIS is his conclusion?

Quote

Distinguishing Science from Scientism

So if science is distinct from scientism, what is it? Science is an activity that seeks to explore the natural world using well-established, clearly-delineated methods. Given the complexity of the universe, from the very big to very small, from inorganic to organic, there is a vast array of scientific disciplines, each with its own specific techniques. The number of different specializations is constantly increasing, leading to more questions and areas of exploration than ever before. Science expands our understanding, rather than limiting it.

Scientism, on the other hand, is a speculative worldview about the ultimate reality of the universe and its meaning. Despite the fact that there are millions of species on our planet, scientism focuses an inordinate amount of its attention on human behavior and beliefs. Rather than working within carefully constructed boundaries and methodologies established by researchers, it broadly generalizes entire fields of academic expertise and dismisses many of them as inferior. With scientism, you will regularly hear explanations that rely on words like “merely”, “only”, “simply”, or “nothing more than”. Scientism restricts human inquiry.

It is one thing to celebrate science for its achievements and remarkable ability to explain a wide variety of phenomena in the natural world. But to claim there is nothing knowable outside the scope of science would be similar to a successful fisherman saying that whatever he can’t catch in his nets does not exist (15). Once you accept that science is the only source of human knowledge, you have adopted a philosophical position (scientism) that cannot be verified, or falsified, by science itself. It is, in a word, unscientific.

Isn't this just an assertion that scientism is wrong, without any explanation of what he believes the correct position to be?

I agree that there are severe criticisms to be leveled at people who think too narrowly that what they believe has been established by "the experts" is worthy of deference simply because "they are the experts." I believe that "the experts" can have just as many prejudices and predispositions and political positions as anyone else, and that every claim has to consider the possibility of corruption, with the most sweeping claims given the most scrutiny.

But this article really isn't saying that, is it? This seems to be saying simply that "nothing is knowable outside the scope of science" and that ends up being circular, because he's never defined what "science" really is. If he is wanting to say that "the five senses are not all there are" or something else specific, then he should say so, but I don't see that he has been clear as to what he is criticizing, with the result being that he opens the barn door wide to all sorts of claims that have no verifiability whatsoever. Am I reading that wrong?

I personally am probably open to a lot more possibilities than the average traditional "empiricist" might be willing to admit, but even so I would demand repeatability and verifiability in some way, or else the claim would have to remain entirely personal and of very limited relevance to anyone else. Correct?

Like Don I want to think and then comment further. There is much in what you have written Susan that I think I can agree with, but I am not yet comfortable that the issues are clear enough. That's much what I would say about the Scientism article-- I read it and I THINK I know where he might be going, but I am not yet clear what lines he is willing to draw.

So of course what comes to my mind immediately is the letter to Menoeceus:

First of all believe that god is a being immortal and blessed, even as the common idea of a god is engraved on men’s minds, and do not assign to him anything alien to his immortality or ill-suited to his blessedness: but believe about him everything that can uphold his blessedness and immortality. For gods there are, since the knowledge of them is by clear vision. But they are not such as the many believe them to be: for indeed they do not consistently represent them as they believe them to be. And the impious man is not he who popularly denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to the gods the beliefs of the many. For the statements of the many about the gods are not conceptions derived from sensation, but false suppositions, according to which the greatest misfortunes befall the wicked and the greatest blessings (the good) by the gift of the gods. For men being accustomed always to their own virtues welcome those like themselves, but regard all that is not of their nature as alien.

It seems to me that the field of what most people seem to be talking about when they discuss religious experiences is very clearly over the line in what would be "false suppositions," according to the test of what I think are many Epicurean texts that the nature of a true god is entirely blissful and undependent on others, which excludes them from liking or disliking any particular humans. It would be on that basis that I would exclude the great majority of what most people in my experience have called "religious experiences" - because those in my experience have always been shorthand ways of saying that these people have direct communications and special revelations resulting from them.

Just on general experience I would suspect that the author of the Scientism article is probably going in that way too, which I say just on the statistical basis that I have never seen someone in public argue from an Epicurean views of divinity such as is expressed in the Epicurean texts.

But I don't yet want to lump you in with that, Susan, because I simply don't know specifically what you are talking about as "spiritual experiences." I think it is perfectly possible that experiences of awe such as I think Don and Joshua have referenced could be experienced in many different ways, with many different levels of intensity, prompted by many different phenomena. But I don't expect that Don or Joshua are implying "communication" in a sense that would amount to a special revelation about some special truth.

And again, I am at this point just coming at this from the point of view of applying the Epicurean texts as I understand them, not from the point of view of wanting to make sweeping statements of what is and what is not possible.

So for now my comments are I think pretty much what I have said before: the texts are what they are, and they are pretty clear about the benefits of experiencing "images" of divinity. The remaining texts are ambiguous, however, and it's easier to say what they "must not" mean, when reading them in context of other core principles, than it is to say what the "do mean."

So right now I'll close with repeating your quote from Joshua, which I think sums up where I understand us to be:

Quote from Susan Hill

As Joshua recently and astutely pointed out: “A large measure of our project then, must be to mark that boundary. If the study of the divine starts to lead where the philosophy cannot and should not go, we have to say as much.”

Each of these entries that are currently in this "Glossary" section of the FAQ I will move over into the Lexicon:

https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/index.php?faq/#category-208

It is necessary for me or another administrator to add "Categories" and "Subcategories" to the master index of the Lexicon, but if you want another category just let me know.

There is also a feature I have not implemented called "Custom Fields" and "Field Categories" which I have not read into the documentation far enough to understand yet. If you see a use for them before I do, let me know.

Until such time as we figure a better approach, let's use a format similar to this for posting citations:

Citations Relevant to the Multivalent Approach / Multiple Possibilities / Waiting

Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles, line 94 (translation by XXXX, add link or cite)

The wanings of the moon and its subsequent waxings ..... may be explained in all the ways in which phenomena on earth invite us to such explanations of these phases, if only one does not fall in love with the method of a single explanation (μοναχῇ τρόπος ) and groundlessly

disapproves of others, without having considered what it is possible for a human being to observe and what it is not and, for this reason, desirous of observing things that cannot be observed’.

Epicurus, On Nature XI Ia11-19 (text and translation by Sedley, add link or cite)

The sun, if we walk towards the place from which it appeared to us] to rise, directing ourselves up into the mainland zone, appears to us to set where we previously passed by, sometimes even when we have moved in all only a short distance. And this time we cannot blame it on the latitudinal movements. Why after all should you declare the measurement from here, or the one from here, or the one from here, or this one a more reliable guide of the risings and settings (of the sun)?’

T3 Epicurus, On Nature XI IIa1 - 21 (text and translation by Sedley, add link or cite)

They cannot hope] to form a [mental] model ([ὁ]μοίωμα) and to reason out (συλλογίζεσθαι) anything about these matters. For it seems to me that when they spend their time contriving some of them (I means their [ὄρ]γανα, instruments) and fooling around with others, it is no wonder, in view not only of the enslavements brought upon them by their doctrines but also (as far as concerns the appearances of the sun) of the indeterminacies (ἀοριστείας) of risings and settings, that they cannot form an adequate mental model by means of their instruments which

produce no regularity. But their instruments are ...

Today we have added the forum software's "Lexicon" feature as a means of addressing the ability to collaborate on pages which contain, for example, lists of the important passages on canonics, or ethics, or divinity, or the like.

Rather than create a full wiki in separate software, choice of this option, at least in the beginning, allows us to leverage the existing user and permission system of the forum software so that those of us who are regular uses of the forum have seamless access to creating and editing pages.

For those of you interested in helping with this organization, the software coders explain the capabilities of their software here. As of the writing of this post I have only begun to understand these capabilities, so if you see a feature in that article that does not appear to be implemented, please let me know. At this moment all I have set up are basic categories for Physics, Canonics, and Ethics, and under each of those categories I have added an article entitled, for example, "Canonics - List of Major Citations in Canonics." This would be the place where I would like us to collaborate to add the most important cites - we can paste the full cites into a list (with a citation to a source like Bailey, Exant Remains, Page XX) and add to it over time.

The two examples of uses that prompted me to set this up are our recent discussions on "Canonics" and "Divinity." There are not a tremendous number of text references on these two topics, but we are constantly going hunting over again to find the main ones. This Lexicon feature should provide a good place where we can collaborate on adding to a single list, and creating a good reference list once and for all.

Aside from the use to create "lists of citations" the feature is also intended to be used to create Wikipedia-like articles with hyperlinks that can be jointly edited by those with permission to do so.

[Note 1: And that reminds me - everyone here at the forum with user level 3 or above should have editing privileges in the Lexicon. If you are a regular and/or wish to add to the wiki and don't have editing privileges, please let me know.]

I will add to this opening post in the future.

Thank you Don. I think I have seen this bit it is challenging to remember... I guess what we're really missing is an update to Baileys Extant Remains or Useners collection or at least some kind of "glossary" or topical list of references so that newer material can be accessed in the same way.

That really needs to be on the list of future topics and maybe that is something that working together some of us can collaborate on.

We probably have enough people to give that a try. Anyone want to suggest a format that is group-workable? Probably a wiki is near the top of logical things to use, and designed for group access, but there may be other better suited tools?

In addition to what you're saying, Don, I personally considered that part of the discussion to fall under the "multiple possibilities" part of the canon, with them taking the position that these were plausible possibilities, but there might be others that could be suggested that would also be consistent with observations.

Quote from Elayne

In medicine, situations of incomplete or indirect evidence can be acted on but not placed in a category of definite conclusions. They would be in the suspense account pending direct evidence,

And thus we are reminded of one of the key Epicurean canonical concepts about which we do have reliable text evidence -- "WAITING"

Just as a note I'll drop this here that a great deal of discussion on this topic is closely analogous to discussion of it in the legal field. For example here is the observation that sometimes "circumstantial evidence" can be more compelling than direct evidence of the senses (i.e, when the direct evidence is limited and distorted):

That comes from this article.

Quote from Elayne

So there's my bright line on causal explanations: at least _some_ sense evidence vs zero evidence, and then when I have some evidence, I choose the explanation with the highest available reliability to base my action decisions on, because that is the most secure way to achieve pleasure

OK to extend the discussion I expect at least one question someone would ask would be:

How do you fit the requirement of "some sense evidence" into the framework of "circumstantial evidence" vs. "direct evidence?" It is common in our society to consider that circumstantial evidence can be held to be sufficient when direct evidence is unavailable. Is that appropriate, and if so under what conditions?

For example, do you mean that one or more people must be able to see, touch, hear, smell, or taste the phenomena directly before you would consider the existence of the phenomena to be reliably proven? Or do you allow that it is possible based on things which are seen, touch, heard, smelled, or tasted to infer the existence of other phenomena which cannot be observed directly?

For example, what status would you assign to the theory of atomism prior to the date when atoms could be observed directly by an electron microscope? (I am presuming that's the right terminology and that atoms in fact can today be visualized.) Presumably you will say that once atoms were observed directly then the reliability of the assertion of their existence improved incrementally. But prior to their observation was there not a great deal of reason to be confident in their existence even though they could not be directly observed?

The posts above in this thread are excellent and need to be extended - but they don't really fit under the "Friendly Debate Show" topic where they started. I'll move these either to a totally new thread under the Canon category or somewhere else.

If someone thinks "Making Epicurean Canonics Understandable" could be improved, let me know!

Welcome to Episode Forty-Three of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

For anyone who is not familiar with our podcast, please check back to Episode One for a discussion of our goals and our ground rules. If you have any question about that, please be sure to contact us at Epicureanfriends.com for more information.

In today's episode, we will cover roughly lines 445 - 547 from Book 3 of the Latin Text. The topic will be how the mind is born, grows old, and dies with the body.

Munro Notes:

445-458: again the mind is born with the body, grows with it, decays with it : in the child it is weak, in the man strong, in the aged again childish: it is natural then it should die also with the body.

459— 525: again, as the body is liable to disease, so is the mind to cares and fears ; therefore it should partake with the other of death: again when the body is ill, the mind often wanders and is senseless before death ; it ought then to die, since disease reaches it ; for that which feels disease must die : again in drunkenness the mind shares in the disorder of the body ; but if it can thus be disordered, it may be killed by a more powerful cause : again in a fit of epilepsy, the sinews stiffen, the man foams at the mouth and the like; his mind is at the same time disordered by the attack ; then when the fit is over he rises up reeling and gradually comes to his senses : when the mind then is thus tempest-tost in bodily disease, how could it battle for ever with storms in the open air? again the mind may be healed like the body; it is therefore mortal; for that which is immortal allows not of any changing or shifting of parts: the healing therefore of the mind by medicine and its suffering from disease both alike prove it to be mortal.

526-547: again a man often loses sense and life limb by limb ; the soul then thus severed and lost must be mortal : or if you say it draws itself together from all the limbs, then the spot in which it is thus gathered ought to have a livelier sense; but this is not so; it therefore disperses, that is dies: nay grant that it can contract itself, you must admit it to be mortal, for equally in this case it gradually deadens, and sense and life quit the man.

Browne:

Besides, we perceive the soul is born with the body, grows up with it, and both wax old together. For as children are of a weak and tender body, their mind likewise is of the same frail complexion. As their age improves, and their strength is more confirmed, their judgment ripens more, and the powers of their mind are more enlarged. But when the body is shaking by the irresistible stroke of time, and the limbs fail without strength, the understanding grows lame, the tongue and the mind lose their vigor, all the faculties fail, and go away together. The whole nature of the soul therefore must needs be dissolved, and scattered like smoke into the air, since we see it is born with the body, increases together with it, and with it, as I said before, becomes feeble by age, and decays.

Add to this, that the body is subject to violent diseases and tormenting pains, so the mind is affected by sharp cares, by griefs and fear, and therefore must equally partake of death and dissolution with it. And then, in great disorders of the body, the mind frequently grows mad, raves, and talks wildly; sometimes it is sunk into such a profound and never-ending sleep by a heavy lethargy, the eyes shut, and the head nodding, so that neither hears the words, nor is able to distinguish the face of those who stand about bedewing their cheeks with tears, and striving to recall the departing breath. Wherefore you must needs allow that the mind may be dissolved, since the infection of the disease pierces through it; for grief and diseases are both the causes of death, as we are taught by experience in a thousand instances. And again, why is it, when the quick force of wine strikes through a man, and the insinuating heat works in all his veins, why follows a heaviness of the limbs? The legs no longer support the reeling body, the tongue falters, the mind is drowned, the eyes swim; noise, hiccups, brawlings deafen your ears, and many other evils, the consequence of such debauches; how could this be, did not the impetuous force of the wine distract the soul as it lies diffused through the body?

Now whatever can be thus disturbed, and hindered in its operations, would (were the force to grow more violent) be destroyed and utterly deprived of future being. Besides, a person surprised with a sudden fit of a disease drops down before our eyes as if he were thunderstruck. He foams, he groans and trembles all over, he is distracted, stretches his nerves, is distorted; he pants, he tosses and tires his limbs with strange and unnatural postures. The reason is because the force of the disease, driven violently through the limbs, agitates and disturbs the mind, as the foaming waves of the sea are enraged by the strong blast of winds. And then groans are forced from the wretch, because the limbs are tormented with pain, and the seeds of the voice are thrown out from the bottom of the breast, and hurried in confusion, without any distinct accent through the mouth. The man raves, because the powers of the mind and soul are distracted, and their principles, as I said, broken, disjoined, and divided by the violence of the distemper. But when the cause of the disease gives way, and the black humor of the corrupt body retires into some convenient vessel, then the patient begins to rise, feeble and staggering; and by degrees returns to all his senses, and recovers life. Since therefore this soul is so tossed about with such strange disorders, and labors with such agonies in so miserable a manner, as it is enclosed in the body, how do you think it can subsist without the body in the open air, and exposed forever to the raging fury of all the winds?

And since we see the mind can be made sound, and be affected by the powers of medicine, as well as a disordered body, this is a strong evidence that the mind is mortal; for whoever attempts to make any alteration in the mind, or offers to change the nature of any other thing, must either add some new parts to it, or take off some of the old, or else transpose the former order and situation; but what is immortal can have nothing added to it, or taken from it, nor will admit of any change in the order of its parts: for whatever is so altered as to leave the limits of its first nature, is no more what it was, but instantly dies. The mind, therefore, whether it be distempered, or relieved by medicine, shows (as I observed) strong symptoms of its mortality. So evidently does the true matter of fact overthrow all false reasoning, that there is no possibility to escape its force; and the contrary opinion is either way fully refuted.

Besides, we often seen men perish by degrees, and lose their vital sense limb by limb; first, the nails and toes grow black, then the feet and legs rot; at length the traces of cold death proceed on, step by step, over the other parts of the body. Since therefore the soul is divided, and does not at such a time continue whole and entire, you must pronounce it mortal. But if you think the soul retires out of the dying members into the more inward parts of the body, and contracts its seeds into one place, and so withdraws the sense from the rest of the limbs, yet that place to which the soul retreats, and where so much of it is crowded together, ought to enjoy a more lively and brisker sense; but, since there is no such place, it is plain, as we said before, it is scattered piecemeal through the air, and therefore perishes. But suppose we grant which is false in itself, and allow that the soul may be huddled up together in the bodies of those who die one limb after another, yet then the soul must be confessed to be by Nature mortal. For it signifies not whether the soul dies scattered through the air, or perishes with its parts contracted into one place, while the senses steal away from the whole body more and more, and the powers of life by degrees appear less and less.

Munro:

Again we perceive that the mind is begotten along with the body and grows up together with it and becomes old along with it. For even as children go about with a tottering and weakly body, so slender sagacity of mind follows along with it; then when their life has reached the maturity of confirmed strength, the judgment too is greater and the power of the mind more developed. Afterwards when the body has been shattered by the mastering might of time and the frame has drooped with its forces dulled, then the intellect halts, the tongue dotes, the mind gives way, all faculties fail and are found wanting at the same time. It naturally follows then that the whole nature of the soul is dissolved, like smoke, into the high air; since we see it is begotten along with the body and grows up along with it and, as I have shown, breaks down at the same time worn out with age.

Moreover we see that even as the body is liable to violent diseases and severe pain, so is the mind to sharp cares and grief and fear; it naturally follows therefore that it is its partner in death as well. Again in diseases of the body the mind often wanders and goes astray; for it loses its reason and drives in its speech and often in a profound lethargy is carried into deep and never-ending sleep with drooping eyes and head; out of which it neither hears the voices nor can recognize the faces of those who stand round calling it back to life and bedewing with tears face and cheeks. Therefore you must admit that the mind too dissolves, since the infection of disease reaches to it; for pain and disease are both forgers of death: a truth we have fully learned ere now by the death of many. Again, when the pungent strength of wine has entered into a man and its spirit has been infused into and transmitted through his veins, why is it that a heaviness of the limbs follows along with this, his legs are hampered as he reels about, his tongue falters, his mind is besotted, his eyes swim, shouting hiccupping, wranglings are rife, together with all the other usual concomitants, why is all this, if not because the overpowering violence of the wine is wont to disorder the soul within the body?

But whenever things can be disordered and hampered, they give token that if a somewhat more potent cause gained an entrance, they would perish and be robbed of all further existence. Moreover it often happens that someone constrained by the violence of disease suddenly drops down before our eyes, as by a stroke of lightning, and foams at the mouth, moans and shivers through his frame, loses his reason, stiffens his muscles, is racked, gasps for breath fitfully, and wearies his limbs with tossing. Sure enough, because the violence of the disease spreads itself through his frame and disorders him, he foams as he tries to eject his soul, just as in the salt sea the waters boil with the mastering might of the winds. A moan too is forced out, because the limbs are seized with pain, and mainly because seeds of voice are driven forth and are carried in a close mass out by the mouth, the road which they are accustomed to take and where they have a well-paved way. Loss of reason follows, because the powers of the mind and soul are disordered and, as I have shown, are riven and forced asunder, torn to pieces by the same baneful malady. Then after the cause of the disease has bent its course back and the acrid humors of the distempered body return to their hiding-places, then he first gets up like one reeling, and by little and little, comes back into full possession of his senses and regains his soul. Since therefore even within the body mind and soul are harassed by such violent distempers and so miserably racked by sufferings, why believe that they without the body in the open air can continue existence battling with fierce winds?

And since we perceive that the mind is healed like the sick body, and we see that it can be altered by medicine, this too gives warning that the mind has a mortal existence. For it is natural that whosoever essays and attempts to change the mind or seeks to alter any other nature you like, should add new parts or change the arrangement of the present, or withdraw in short some tittle from the sum. But that which is immortal wills not to have its parts transposed nor any addition to be made nor one tittle to ebb away; for whenever a thing changes and quits its proper limits, this change is at once the death of that which was before. Therefore the mind, whether it is sick or whether it is altered by medicine alike, as I have shown, gives forth mortal symptoms. So invariably is truth found to make head against false reason and to cut off all retreat from the assailant, and by a two-fold refutation to put falsehood to rout.

Again we often see a man pass gradually away and limb by limb lose vital sense; first the toes of his feet and the nails turn livid, then the feet and shanks die, then next the steps of chilly death creep with slow pace over the other members. Therefore since the nature of the soul is rent and passes away and does not at one time stand forth in its entireness, it must be reckoned mortal. But if haply you suppose that it can draw itself in through the whole frame and mass its parts together and in this way withdraw sense from all the limbs, yet then that spot into which so great a store of soul is gathered ought to show itself in possession of a greater amount of sense. But as this is nowhere found, sure enough as we said before, it is torn in pieces and scattered abroad, and therefore dies. Moreover if I were pleased for the moment to grant what is false and admit that the soul might be collected in one mass in the body of those who leave the light dying piecemeal, even then you must admit the soul to be mortal; and it makes no difference whether it perish dispersed in air, or gathered into one lump out of all its parts lose all feeling, since sense ever more and more fails the whole man throughout and less and less of life remains throughout.

Bailey:

Moreover, we feel that the understanding is begotten along with the body, and grows together with it, and along with it comes to old age. For as children totter with feeble and tender body, so a weak judgement of mind goes with it. Then when their years are ripe and their strength hardened, greater is their sense and increased their force of mind. Afterward, when now the body is shattered by the stern strength of time, and the frame has sunk with its force dulled, then the reason is maimed, the tongue raves, the mind stumbles, all things give way and fail at once. And so it is natural that all the nature of the mind should also be dissolved, even as is smoke, into the high breezes of the air; inasmuch as we see that it is born with the body, grows with it, and, as I have shown, at the same time becomes weary and worn with age.

Then follows this that we see that, just as the body itself suffers wasting diseases and poignant pain, so the mind too has its biting cares and grief and fear; wherefore it is natural that it should also share in death. Nay more, during the diseases of the body the mind often wanders astray; for it loses its reason and speaks raving words, and sometimes in a heavy lethargy is carried off into a deep unending sleep, when eyes and head fall nodding, in which it hears not voices, nor can know the faces of those who stand round, summoning it back to life, bedewing face and cheeks with their tears. Therefore you must needs admit that the mind too is dissolved, inasmuch as the contagion of disease pierces into it. For both pain and disease are alike fashioners of death, as we have been taught ere now by many a man’s decease. Again, when the stinging strength of wine has entered into a man, and its heat has spread abroad throughout his veins, why is it that there follows a heaviness in the limbs, his legs are entangled as he staggers, his tongue is sluggish, and his mind heavy, his eyes swim, shouting, sobbing, quarrelling grows apace, and then all the other signs of this sort that go along with them; why does this come to pass, except that the mastering might of the wine is wont to confound the soul even within the body?

But whenever things can be so confounded and entangled, they testify that, if a cause a whit stronger shall have made its way within, they must needs perish, robbed of any further life. Nay more, some man, often before our very eyes, seized suddenly by violent disease, falls, as though by a lightning-stroke, and foams at the mouth; he groans and shivers throughout his frame, he loses his wits, his muscles grow taut, he writhes, he breathes in gasps, and tossing to and fro wearies his limbs. Because, you may be sure, his soul rent asunder by the violence of disease throughout his frame, is confounded, and gathers foam, as on the salt sea the waters boil beneath the stern strength of the winds. Further, the groaning is wrung from him, because his limbs are racked with pain, and more than all because the particles of voice are driven out, and are carried crowding forth from his mouth, along the way they are wont, where is their paved path. Loss of wits comes to pass, because the force of mind and soul is confounded, and, as I have shown, is torn apart and tossed to and fro, rent asunder by that same poison. Thereafter, when by now the cause of malady has ebbed, and the biting humours of the distempered body return to their hiding-places, then, as it were staggering, he first rises, and little by little returns to all his senses, and regains his soul. When mind and soul then even within the body are tossed by such great maladies, and in wretched plight are rent asunder and distressed, why do you believe that without the body in the open air they can continue life amid the warring winds?

And since we perceive that the mind is cured, just like the sick body, and we see that it can be changed by medicine, this too forewarns us that the mind has a mortal life. For whosoever attempts and essays to alter the mind, or seeks to change any other nature, must indeed add parts to it or transfer them from their order, or take away some small whit at least from the whole. But what is immortal does not permit its parts to be transposed, nor that any whit should be added or depart from it. For whenever a thing changes and passes out of its own limits, straightway this is the death of that which was before. And so whether the mind is sick, it gives signs of its mortality, as I have proved, or whether it is changed by medicine. So surely is true fact seen to run counter to false reasoning, and to shut off retreat from him who flees, and with double-edged refutation to prove the falsehood.

Again, we often behold a man pass away little by little and limb by limb lose the sensation of life; first of all the toes and nails on his feet grow livid, then the feet and legs die, thereafter through the rest of his frame, step by step, pass the traces of chill death. Since this nature of the soul is severed nor does it come forth all intact at one moment, it must be counted mortal. But if by chance you think that it could of its own power draw itself inwards through the frame, and contract its parts into one place, and so withdraw sensation from all the limbs, yet nevertheless that place, to which so great abundance of soul is gathered together, must needs be seen possessed of greater sensation; but since such place is nowhere found, you may be sure, as we said before, it is rent in pieces and scattered abroad, and so perishes. Nay more, if it were our wish to grant what is false, and allow that the soul could be massed together in the body of those, who as they die leave the light of day part by part, still you must needs confess that the soul is mortal, nor does it matter whether it passes away scattered through the air, or is drawn into one out of all its various parts and grows sottish, since sense more and more in every part fails the whole man, and in every part less and less of life remains.

Episode Forty-Two of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available.
As always we invite your comments and suggestions.

Quote from Susan Hill

There is clearly a huge epistemological concern on how one can approach fields of human knowledge and experience that cannot be measured by the usual tools of science. There seems to be a debate over whether anything can be known except by the scientific method.

For example, and on one of the most important examples, related to but separate from divinity: "Life After Death."

No one has ever reliably been shown to have "been there and come back to testify about it." Depending on your definition of "scientific" there is in fact no "scientific" proof of life after death, to my understanding anyway. If we line up 1000 scientists, I would expect 1000 of them to agree that there is no scientific proof of it.

But "1000 scientists say so" is not sufficient proof for very many good people. We can say that they ought to be better educated, or read some physics books, and that's definitely true - they should. But most of us have to deal with people who want to say:

1 - No one has ever been there so we don't know.

2 - YOU have never died and come back, so YOU don't know.

3 - There are all sorts of reports from people I trust who say that they have had "near-death" experiences.

4 - Plato had some really great arguments about recollection from past lives being the basis of the way we think.

5 - it seems that most cultures over the centuries have had some form of the view of life after death, so like the 50,000 Frenchmen, they can't all be wrong, can they?

6 - And lots more I don't have the creativity to list.

I am firmly convinced with DeWitt that Epicurus was attempting to create a "Philosophy for the Millions" and I personally think that's a highly worthwhile goal. People who live their lives in fear of hell can have those lives greatly improved, and reduce their tendency to cut our heads off, if they can be persuaded not to worry about heaven and hell. That's a highly desirable goal, and it comes down to discussing issues of evidence like we're talking about now.

Even if we didn't live in a world of propaganda wars where almost everything has been politicized to the point where nobody trusts anybody any more, I do believe that there are legitimate questions that face even the most educated of us, just like they face the less educated with greater force.

As best I understand it, there is no god and no "bright line" reason to accept any particular standard of proof as "certain" -- and that's in large part because we don't have a clear idea what "certain" means.

All of these issues are very important and very deep.

I dunno, I think you guys are off in useless speculation. Why would you care about arcane rules of reasoning like limits and boundaries, and how to weigh conflicting evidence? Don't you know that you're supposed to leave that to the Academic Experts, and that the only thing that matters about Epicurus is that the greatest pleasure is the absence of pain? Don't you know realize that all you have to know to be a true Epicurean is that you need to barricade yourself in a cave, drink only water and eat only a little cheese, reduce your bodily experiences to the smallest possible amount, concentrate on asceticism, and ignore the rest of the word?

Boy you guys have been drinking from the wrong fountain!

We could mix Lucretius in there in a similar category as Philodemus. Some people seem to think there are substantial differences between Epicurus and Lucretius -- I don't think that at all, but given the time difference there are certainly possibilities that he didn't get everything right despite his best efforts.

I think I posted on Philodemus elsewhere that I think there is a big issue with corruption of texts and issues with reconstruction in evaluating him.

Every discussion turns into a discussion of evidence, doesn't it? The best I can say is that every time we hit a controversial issue we have to look closely at the state of the text to determine how much confidence we have in that. If the text is fragmentary and we're relying on reconstuctions and have large amounts of missing context, then sometimes even something Cicero or even Plutarch records could actually be more reliable.

My classic example of this is the "tetrapharmakon." It seems to be very clear, but there is little or no (I always hedge and say "little or no" but I think the truth is, there is NO) context from surrounding paragraphs to tell us who was saying this, or why. And since what I read in the tetrapharmakon seems to be a gross oversimplification of the first four PDs, which I think it was intended to mirror, then I don't accept any implication of the tetrapharmakon that conflicts with the first four PDs.

So considering the ranking of Philodemus vs DeWitt, there are definitely caveats that have to be considered that separate them.

Quote from Susan Hill

From Philodemus "On Piety", referring to Epicurus' "On Nature", Bk. 13. Translation from "The Epicurus Reader" by Brad Inwood

"In book 13 [he mentions] the congeniality which god feels for some and the alienation [for others]."

This is the first quote I would focus on here, but I'll discuss it below in context of Elayne's comment.

Quote from Elayne

This is another reason, besides the material implausibility, that I do not think the original Epicurean description of the gods is compatible with where Philodemus has taken it.

First, I agree with the drift of Elayne's post that this quote needs to be scrutinized very closely. On it's face, it would contradict the most basic statements that gods show no concern whatsoever for humans, plus even more, it contradicts the specific statement that they don't play favorites and enemies.

But rather than assume that this is where Philodemus has taken it, I first question the accuracy of the rendition. Even as quoted, it appears to be a fragment, and indeed if in Book 13 Epicurus did "mention" the issue of congeniality and alienation, I would first and strongly presume that he mentioned it only to denounce it - and it doesn't seem firm from the quote which is the case. This (when the rendition creates a clear conflict) is an example where I don't trust the compilers whatsoever, and would not put any stock in that until we traced back exactly what condition this particular text was in that produced this rendition.

Without intending to sound negative toward anyone in particular, almost every time I have gone back to the more academic texts which print renditions of the texts in addition to the proposed translation, it seems to me that I have found HIGHLY fragmentary material, wherein even the fragments that are left are largely guesswork on which we are relying on someone we may not even know at all to recreate the letters. Despite the best of intentions, people have a tendency to see what they want to see, or what they expect to see, so whenever there is a proposed rendition that would conflict with a more basic principle, the highest level of scrutiny should be required.

Thus while I am prepared to believe that Philodemus may not always have been an "orthodox" Epicurean, I tend to give him the benefit of the doubt and put the suspicion on the transmission rather than on the original text.

So in this example, for instance, it's highly helpful to cite these along with the proposed rendition. Now the task is up to those of us who can find the time to do it to trace back further and see where In Inwood and Gerson got their original text.

All of this keeps constantly bouncing me back and forth between the divinity and the "methods of inference" discussion. I don't think we have any choice in much of what we do but to rely on "experts." I certainly don't know a word of Greek myself. But even worse than that is that we have to trust that the texts are not corrupted, and in many cases we have no idea about the chain of transmission.

What do we do in those cases? Roughly speaking,. we have to verify the experts as much as we can, I think, and then we are basically in the situation discussed in Hermotimus.

You're probably correct that it's too aggressive for now. I would like to point in that direction for the future, however, because I am thinking that ultimately the issues involved are not really something that need as much detailed documentation as they do sort of generalist command of the alternative positions. Yes a command of the texts is an important part of getting to that understanding, but I'm thinking that the "fun" would not be so much a matter of citing texts as much as it should be the ability to articulate the "conclusions" of the alternative points.

Here I think I am following the drift of many of Elayne's comments - ultimately we're not making our decisions today on how many texts we can stack up, but on how we ourselves are able to put together the positions into something that makes sense to us.

Or at least that's what I am thinking is really the goal of most of what we're doing here - real life application rather than purely academic citations of references.

Thanks Don! So part of what you are saying as to singular / plural is that Epicurus seemed to be more refering to "divinity" (even, the "concept of divinity") rather than to a particular god or gods?

I tend to think that would be especially true in the Principal Doctrines, in that my view of them, especially the first ones, is that they are more on the order of logical propositions about death, divinity, pain, and pleasure, than they are specific assertions about particular instances.