Posts by Cassius

Quote from Elayne

You seem to want explanations which appeal to those with less education or intelligence, whether those explanations are correct or not. But a sturdy philosophy should not repel scientists who note inaccuracies or cling to conclusions that could result in less educated people feeling threatened by published reports about new observations.

This, combined with the nearby and ongoing discussion of the mind-blowing Parmenides assertions, reminds me that I have always identified with this attitude from Thomas Jefferson's letter to Peter Carr. And I have to agree with Jefferson - I would much rather live my life in community of ploughmen than a community of Parmenides fans, and I do think the issue is the "artificial" nature of the professors' rules. Which is not to say that the ploughman doesn't have rules of his own, but that he finds them located in things that are sensible to him. All of this hark's back to Joshua's video early in the thread about Lincoln basing his reasoning on eternal forms. It still seems to me that it is usually not flaws in the reasoning once started, but flaws in the starting point, that seem to be the issue:

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Moral Philosophy. I think it lost time to attend lectures on this branch. He who made us would have been a pitiful bungler, if he had made the rules of our moral conduct a matter of science. For one man of science, there are thousands who are not. What would have become of them? Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong, merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his Nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of morality, and not the [beautiful], truth, &c., as fanciful writers have imagined. The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body. This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less one than what we call common sense. State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, & often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules. In this branch, therefore, read good books, because they will encourage, as well as direct your feelings. The writings of Sterne, particularly, form the best course of morality that ever was written. Besides these, read the books mentioned in the enclosed paper; and, above all things, lose no occasion of exercising your dispositions to be grateful, to be generous, to be charitable, to be humane, to be true, just, firm, orderly, courageous, &c. Consider every act of this kind, as an exercise which will strengthen your moral faculties & increase your worth.

Quote from Matt

If I was a Neoplatonist I would say the aggregate One manifests the universe and chain of being perpetually through emanationism. In the eternal now.

And the probable best response if you were to say that would be: "What weed are you smoking?"

Quote from Bryan

"Observation is everything" is the position of a type of skeptic, who does not want to form a workable and understandable mental model of how nature works.

Bryan put "observation is everything" in quotes, and I do think that is a very fair summary of the Wright position. But since I want to be rigorously fair in the assertion (again I agree with Bryan) that this amounts to a form of skepticism. That's a serious charge, and anyone evaluating whether it is justified ought to consider this passage from Chapter 15 of A Few Days in Athens. There is more in her later "Course of Popular Lectures" but since these are the words she places in the voice of Leontium as representing core Epicurean doctrine, this deserves special scrutiny.

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You have heard of, and studied various systems of philosophy; but real philosophy is opposed to all systems. Her whole business is observation; and the results of that observation constitute all her knowledge. She receives no truths, until she has tested them by experience; she advances no opinions, unsupported by the testimony of facts; she acknowledges no virtue, but that involved in beneficial actions; no vice, but that involved in actions hurtful to ourselves or to others. Above all, she advances no dogmas, — is slow to assert what is, — and calls nothing impossible. The science of philosophy is simply a science of observation, both as regards the world without us, and the world within; and, to advance in it, are requisite only sound senses, well developed and exercised faculties, and a mind free of prejudice. The objects she has in view, as regards the external world, are, first, to see things as they are, and secondly, to examine their structure, to ascertain their properties, and to observe their relations one to the other. — As respects the world within, or the philosophy of mind, she has in view, first, to examine our sensations, or the impressions of external things on our senses; which operation involves, and is involved in, the examination of those external things themselves: secondly, to trace back to our sensations, the first development of all our faculties; and again, from these sensations, and the exercise of our different faculties as developed by them, to trace the gradual formation of our moral feelings, and of all our other emotions: thirdly, to analyze all these our sensations, thoughts, and emotions, — that is, to examine the qualities of our own internal, sentient matter, with the same, and yet more, closeness of scrutiny, than we have applied to the examination of the matter that is without us finally, to investigate the justness of our moral feelings, and to weigh the merit and demerit of human actions; which is, in other words, to judge of their tendency to produce good or evil, — to excite pleasurable or painful feelings in ourselves or others. You will observe, therefore, that, both as regards the philosophy of physics, and the philosophy of mind, all is simply a process of investigation. It is a journey of discovery, in which, in the one case, we commission our senses to examine the qualities of that matter, which is around us, and, in the other, endeavor, by attention to the varieties of our consciousness, to gain a knowledge of those qualities of matter which constitute our susceptibilities of thought and feeling.”

Quote from elli

No, please do not mention anything about Parmenides to Elayne, she will be upset and we will confront and some other troubles. Parmenides was the great fiesta of idealists Plato and Socrates.

Sounds like all of us, and not just Elayne would line up against Parmenides. The trick would be articulating exactly WHY and WhERE we think he went wrong.

Tentatively I would say that we should apply the same analysis - that it is not Paermenides use of logic in general, but his specific application of logic and reasoning to the problem, in that he failed to ground his initial premises sufficiently in the observation of the senses, and to tie the steps in his chain or reasoning to reality verifiable through the senses.

But since I've yet to really figure out Parmenides' chain of reasoning , or his conclusions either, I can't say even that with confidence. If one of his conclusions was "motion is impossible" then we can attack that with confidence, but I can't get a fix on what his other conclusions were all about.

Quote from Elayne

Conclusions about absence of gods can't be accurately made from logic.

I agree with that, although I believe it should be stated as ".....cannot be accurately made from logic alone." I think that would be one reason why the Epicureans considered "anticipations" to be a kind of innate evidence which provides an evidentiary starting point for evaluation of the subject, so that the entire subject would not be grounded in abstract logic and speculation

Quote from Elayne

I put my confidence in my first-hand observations of nature, and in the complete absence of evidence for supernatural gods.

I think the part where we are not connecting is here. I agree that the root of the issue is first-hand observation, but I think Epicurus held that it is proper to infer conclusions from first-hand observation which we then treat as established principles and expect to be valid even in places where we have not seen any evidence (such as beyond reach of telescopes). Such a principle would be "the universe has no supernatural gods over it," or "nothing comes from or goes to nothing" treated not just as a sum of prior observations but as an established principle that can then be dealt with on an intellectual level as principles considered "proven" rather than in a category with those things which await further confirmation. That text reference to "awaiting further confirmation" I see as another indication that Epicurus held that observations must be converted to principles (to the category of "confirmed; no longer awaiting confirmation"), and those conclusions would then be a large part of the outlines he referenced in the opening of the letter to Herodotus to be used in daily processing of information.

Quote from Elayne

And whenever more detailed evidence is obtained, at the level too small or too far away to investigate without instruments, never has any researcher found any observations a god was needed to explain

Agreed, but as per the above, the conclusion that Epicurus reached from this observation was to place it in the category of knowledge which is not waiting further confirmation. We can call that category "first principles" or something else, but the category would be considered as established to the point of a fundamental of nature, not just "the sum of past observations."

Quote from Elayne

You seem to want explanations which appeal to those with less education or intelligence, whether those explanations are correct or not.

Well in response to this I will simply say that we still are not joining the issue other than that you seem to be considering words like "logic" and "reason" as in tension with having an open mind to incorporate future observations. I see this as the point being made by Epicurus when stating then wise men should be "dogmatists" and "not mere skeptics" and also as the point made by Lucretuis in considering the man who asserts that he knows nothing to be perverse or trifling or Lucian saying that an Epicurus would consider the deceit of Aristotle the Oracle Monger as a fraud, even though the did not know the precise way the fraud was being committed. We could also list here the statement by Lucretius that it would in fact be better to affirm an incorrect reason than to give up confidence in the senses; or really the entire "multivalent logic" approach where multiple possibilities are entertained where they are not contradicted by evidence. Each of these seem to me to affirm that Epicurus was suggesting that it is necessary to form our observations into principles which are then considered to be the building blocks by which we evaluate evidence and make our day to day decisions.

It seems to me that there is an issue here in how to consider whether anything is "established" in life to the point where it can be considered firm and unchallengeable within the philosophy. Thinking back to that statement of Epicurus, the point of the study of nature is not to become an encyclopedia of facts which ends with "and this is what has been discovered to this point and will be revised in our next edition" but to deduce a set of life operating principles by which we can confidently hope to live happily.

Remember the forum is "asynchronus" -- I am being called away to "real world" work right now myself!

Matt (or anyone) separate and apart from Parmenides, what do you think about these questions?

Quote from Cassius

2. I wonder if the meaning of both of the words "impossible" and "inconceivable" would be discussed as part of a program of Epicurean instruction.

3. I wonder if, absent some form of "logic from first principles" it is even possible to use words like "impossible" or "inconceivable" in an understandable manner.

4. I wonder if the need to label things as "possible/impossible" or "conceivable/inconceivable" would be an argument why an "observation is everything" approach might not be considered as a sufficient philosophy of life by Epicurus. (Or maybe he would say it would be OK - Frances Wright was willing to put essentially those words in his mouth ).

Matt this discussion takes me back to another passage of "A Few Days In Athens" I always questioned, from Chapter 14. where Wright has Epicurus say:

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To deny the existence of the gods would indeed be presumption in a philosopher; a presumption equaled only by that of him who should assert their existence.”

“How!” exclaimed the youth, with a countenance in which astonishment seemed to suspend every other expression.

“As I never saw the gods, my son,” calmly continued the Sage, “I cannot assert their existence; and, that I never saw them, is no reason for my denying it.”

“But do we believe nothing except that of which we have ocular demonstration?”

“Nothing, at least, for which we have not the evidence of one or more of our senses; that is, when we believe on just grounds, which, I grant, taking men collectively, is very seldom.”

First, I don't think this accurately reflects Epicurus' position at all, and it seems mighty presumptuous to me that Wright put these words in Epicurus' mouth. But, having got that observation out of the way, we should ask:

What should WE think of this? Is it correct? Is it the position we should take today? How does it fit with Epicurus' and Parmenides' arguments?

Quote from Matt

We simply cannot argue the opposite of this concept because it’s impossible.

1. I wonder if the Epicureans would use the word "inconceivable" rather than "impossible."

2. I wonder if the meaning of both of the words "impossible" and "inconceivable" would be discussed as part of a program of Epicurean instruction.

3. I wonder if, absent some form of "logic from first principles" it is even possible to use words like "impossible" or "inconceivable" in an understandable manner.

4. I wonder if the need to label things as "possible/impossible" or "conceivable/inconceivable" would be an argument why an "observation is everything" approach might not be considered as a sufficient philosophy of life by Epicurus. (Or maybe he would say it would be OK - Frances Wright was willing to put essentially those words in his mouth ).

Matt how do you see this relating to the way Epicurus analyzed the question. My gut reaction is that what you are describing is such high-level logic, based so strongly on the word definitions without any connections with observations in "this" world, that Epicurus would not recommend relying on such an argument. I could be wrong, but this might be a good example to show that Epicurean logic as described in Lucretius and Philodemus always starts with that which is observable and rests primarily on what we do and do not observe. However I may be misunderstanding the Parmenides position.

It's in this respect that I strongly agree with what I think is or what I think should be Elayne's main point -- that use of "pure logic" as a reasonable grounds for making big conclusions is to be ruled out as an acceptable method. In fact I might say that it sounds like Parmenides's argument would suffer from the same problems as we are discussing to be the problem with hypotheticals and abstractions in the first place -- there are too many assumptions being made for someone who is grounded in the evidence of the senses to have confidence in the result.

Ha ha -- this is where I would think we would be better off saying "formal logical grounds" or "abstract logical grounds" because what you are saying is that he is relying on logic (word-play; concepts) alone without any evidence, correct?

Quote from Matt

but I would contend that purely from a conceptual standpoint on the existence of the universe, his position of something “being” as opposed to nothing ever being...is sound. In my mind at least.

But when you say it is sound it IS purely "word-play" based on definitions -- or No? Is any "observation" involved?

It seems to me that Epicurus/Lucretius' version is clearly enough based at least in part on the observation that we do not see things being created from nothing, and therefore there is no reason to think that anything could be created from nothing by a god or by any other means. This kind of reasoning is discussed fairly clearly if I recall in "On Methods of Inference." To me that whole chain of reasoning is a fairly understandable inference of a deduction based on that which has been observed to be true. It's not just an assertion based on logic but one that is grounded in observation for it's persuasiveness.

I don't see Parmenides' version being in the same league as it does not seem to be based on observation - or is it? Matt can you reword it into something more plain?

Quote from Matt

But for my purposes I see this as an important thought experiment for recognizing the eternity of the material universe.

And at the very least Parmenides represents (as I understand it) one of the major views at the time of Epicurus, so his students would have been aware of it and thus some of his positions may be directed at it -- we can't recognize that if we don't know what Parmenides argued.

So is Parmenides the one who advocated a "plenum" and that there is no such thing as void? Or is this more of a formal logical proof? And if so, of what?

If you're really into this Matt and would like to explain the background to those of us who don't know, that would be a good use of this thread in the forum. Whether it would be a good use of your time might be another question But if you'd enjoy writing it I feel sure that some of us would benefit from / enjoy reading your summary of it.

Maybe more elaborate title for the thread Matt? What would you suggest? Post it here and I will make the change and then delete some of these housekeeping comments.

Matt posted a comment about something from nothing that deserves its own thread. Something From Nothing

However it also applies here too, so here's what he said:

This is an example of the type of rule that we're discussing in this thread, but to keep this one on track, please go over to the other thread to discuss the details of the logical argument in general and/or Parmenides in particular.

This thread is more on the issue of systems / logical deductions / methods of inference IN GENERAL, of which something from nothing is a particular example, but only one of many.

Yes Matt I think that would be a good idea. The Something From Nothing issue is definitely an example of what we are talking about, but if we focus on it too much it might get the thread off track. It certainly deserves a thread of its own. I will take care of it now.

Quote from Elayne

When it comes to energy, if you want to make it the same as what Epicurus said, you've either got to classify it as matter OR as void -- it can't work as both in his model. I

In his model I presume that energy would be classified as material

Quote from Elayne

All that is necessary for the pain and pleasure understanding, pleasure as a goal, is observations of one's self and others.

I agree that that is all that is necessary for some people to be comfortable with the conclusion. Simply pointing to it and observing, as Epicurus said. But not everyone understands the point, and I would say that that is why we have philosophy to help them understand it. Simply pointing has not been sufficient, especially given the corruption of other philosophies and training, so more is required for many people.

Quote from Elayne

None of the modern physics theories include meddling gods or supernatural realms.

Isn't that the equivalent of saying: "There are no gods because the physics theorists tell me so?" That would be hearsay evidence in court, and admissible only under expert testimony rules, for which there would be conflicting testimony from creationist scientists. Even if you dismiss the creation scientists as inadmissible, you're still left with your conclusion that there is no gods resting on belief in the credibility of the physicists. I interpret Epicurus is saying that the question of this (and life after death) is so personal, and so important, that people seeking happiness through philosophy need a personal method of understanding the point which is not based on hearsay but on observations they can make for themselves. Yes this turns into what is effectively an inference about the unknown based on the known, but that is what Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (which cites other and older Epicurean philosophers and seems in no way heretical from Epicurus) was doing. A lot of people who here that everything must be based on current observation, and that there is no reasonable way to reason from current observation to a principle that explains why it is reasonable not to expect to ever find proof of a god or life after death, are going to find something that is effectively "you can never be certain because new evidence of god or life after death may be uncovered tomorrow" to be insufficient."

For those who are satisfied with a view that observations can never be translated into principles, then that position is good enough. However I don't think that's what Epicurus thought, or what he taught. It seems to me that to simply take the ethics as a starting point would remove much of the force of the philosophy.

So the question I see is more likely something like:

If Epicurus were here today would he update his physics and still incorporate the updated conclusions into a philosophical system?"

Or would he say something like: "I see what you're saying Frances, and I see what you're saying modern physicists. My conclusions about matter and void and infinity and eternality have all been proven wrong. I am through with system-building and use of logic to deduce the unknown from the known is off the table! Let's just point to animals and babies and say "Pleasure is the good" and that's all we need to know."

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Above all, she advances no dogmas, — is slow to assert what is, — and calls nothing impossible.

It would be interesting to discuss whether this statement can be squared with Epicurus' views on "dogmatism" and such Lucretian terminology as Epicurus coming back from his survey of the universe to tell us "what can be, and what cannot," and "the borderline, the benchmark, set forever" in the opening of Book One, not to mention the reference in Book 4 to the man who says he knows nothing as being perverse or a trifler.