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So I found the turned-tables an interesting but unexpected opportunity to explore this topic.
Probably as we develop improved techniques for explaining Epicurean philosophy quickly and clearly, we ought to look for examples that do exactly that.
Today when we did the last podcast for book 4, I made a similar observation, that romantic love probably provides a particularly good example for us to talk about precisely because it evokes such strong emotions and positions.
33. Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.
I think I see this translated at times as "there is no such thing as absolute justice" and that might be preferable to drill home the point.
Perhaps one lesson we might end up drawing from this discussion when it is over is that we need to spend more time sooner discussing the PDs on justice -- which people tend to avoid, probably for EXACTLY the reason that we are now discussing them! 
(and that reason is that the PDs on justice are a stark reminder that virtue is contextual and has no absolute basis.)
No problem at all because this helps us all to articulate better.
As to PD 31, that consideration is certainly true, but it is immediately modified and controlled by
32. For all living things which have not been able to make compacts not to harm one another, or be harmed, nothing ever is either just or unjust; and likewise, too, for all tribes of men which have been unable, OR UNWILLING, to make compacts not to harm or be harmed.
We might be experiencing here the harm that comes from segmenting the PDs into numbered separations, which to my understanding were not present in the original. I think it is important to read the entire section on justice altogether, and when one does one sees that justice is entirely contextual and really means nothing at all UNLESS there is a positive agreement. Absent an agreement (which even then can be broken when circumstances change) there is really no such thing as "justice" at all. This is a great illustration of how virtue has no meaning unless it bring pleasure.
i would like to comment on this:
Would you say that a consenting adult same-sex couple in such a culture was not Epicurean to have a relationship even at risk of death? I certainly would not.
I would say this specific scenario is the exact opposite of what I had in mind when I wrote my post,
Just so someone can correct me if I read this wrong, Elayne is asking about a society which condemns homosexuality, in which a couple chooses to pursue the relationship at risk of death. Elayne is pointing out that even though the couple may risk death, it might well be Epicurean of them to pursue their own pleasure, even though society disapproves and might put them to death. I say "might well be Epicurean" because it would be up to them to weigh the pluses and minuses and make their own decision -- there is no way for anyone else - Epicurean or not - to decide for them whether to pursue their relationship or not, because the ramifications are unpredictable and no one can decide for them how to navigate those choices. (I see that Elayne says that "I certainly would not" but I think she implicitly is saying that the choice could be analyzed in Epicurean terms either way, due to the contextual uncertainties involved in putting yourself in the position of any other particular person.)
I think this is a very good scenario to illustrate the issue, so I am not sure Don why you see this as "the exact opposite of what you had in mind"(?) Maybe there is something in your comment there, as to why you find the scenario the opposite of what you were thinking, that would help if you explained(?)
First, I believe your scenario can be analysed to spring from an "empty" opinion or belief on the part of the one feeling "disgust" and, as such, they are not acting morally, justly, or prudently, and so their action can be said to be not choice-worthy.
oh no - no - no --- I would not take that route at all! (this is why i SO dislike the "empty" word). Let me read the rest.....
But this is VERY good to explore.....
Here are my first thoughts:
6. Therefore, I would say the person holding this opinion and getting pleasure from it is not acting justly, wisely, or morally. If they experience momentary pleasure from holding this belief, it is not choice-worthy for the reasons outlined here. The opinion will not lead to a maximally pleasurable life. A person holding that belief cannot consider themselves as following an Epicurean path.
Yes that is "your" view of the situation, but the person holding the other viewpoint is in fact getting pleasure from it (under your scenario) so their pleasure is a canonical "fact" for them which they must analyze along with the fact that you disapprove of their viewpoint and may come down on them with disapproval of all kinds, including force. You may in fact choose to do that, and to force them to back off from their pleasure at pain of punishment, and that would be an example of "how the world works" which Epicurus tells us to take into account. But you would need to realize that it is only your ability to use force to enforce your opinion that "justifies" your substituting your view for theirs. From that point of view you are pursuing your own pleasure, and as Epicurus says that is the way the world works, but I don't think Epicurus would tell you that your particular position takes philosophical precedence over theirs -- it is just a matter that your view of pleasure is in conflict with theirs, and that is where in the PDs as to justice Epicurus points out that there is no natural "justice" -- if you don't agree, then you don't agree, and you can resort to force or persuasion or whatever, but if there is no agreement, then there is no "justice" to appeal to, and in the end the appeal ends up being to "might makes right."
With perhaps the major point being here that this is what makes "feeling" a part of the canon of truth.... that our FEELINGS of pain and pleasure are true to us, regardless of where they come from. We can choose to follow them or not .. and suffer the good or bad results of so doing ... but they are in fact the guide that nature gave to us, so in terms of "justification" our feelings need no justification from gods or from ideal forms -- or from majority or minority or even "Epicurean" viewpoints.
OK I am going to stop editing this post, wait for others to post, and then reply as needed below.
And I am constitutionally unable to run a "Meat-producing" plant like with chickens, hogs, etc. I am no vegan myself, but if it were left up to me no one would have any animal-product food available again
I'm on the other end of atypical-- I can't even stand to watch fake violence in movies, lol. So my decisions regarding potential harm to strangers need to take my atypical responses into account.
In other words, Elayne is much better suited constitutionally to being a doctor rather than an infantry captain!
The strongest true statement is that there are behaviors which are highly likely to lead to a pleasurable life for most typical members of a species. Those things are useful to know as a starting place, but for maximum life pleasure, an individual must learn if and how they are atypical-- and 100% typical humans are, in my experience, nonexistent.
I agree but I'll also offer that I think Elayne is reacting to the argument here, and i think we would probably all agree that "those things" aren't really just a starting place, but probably take is quite a way toward the goal in most instances -- but they won't all the time, and it's the exceptions that prove the rule -- and the rule is that while we can make make general conclusions which high degrees of confidence in many instances, we have to always be looking to be sure that we aren't in a situation where the facts are different from prior situations so as to cause a very different result.
In other words I don't think any of us have a problem with saying that "in general" we can use the past to point the right direction in the future, but we certainly can't do that all the time, and we have to understand that the universe isn't mechanistic or determined or fated or guided by divinity and so walk and chew gum at the same time.
As to the issue of Epicurean philosophy and how Epicureans would/do deal with difficult ethical issues, a similar question being discussed here makes me think of this recent post by Elli:
I don't know any of the details of this but reading about it sounds pretty awful! I guess that is one reason we in America don't get taught much about this today - it doesn't sound like Greece's allies in the west were much help to it.
So this is another example of something horrible people do to each other, but just like slavery, can we say that such actions are "condemned by god" or "condemned by nature" or "by nature evil" or similar formulations?
Can we say with absolute certainty that there could be no consistent Epicureans mixed in among the Turks behind the genocidal wars and population "exchange."?
Can we even say that such a thing could never find any justification under Epicurean philosophy?
If we really take to heart that there are no absolutes, then the issue of evaluating this, like every other question, comes down to the practical concerns that if the aggressor side decides to undertake this kind of project, then it better expect hard pushback from its neighbors, and it might well be in the situation referenced in the Epicurean texts about never being able to sleep well again in fear of retribution.
But if the retribution never comes? If the aggressors decide that any loss of sleep was well worth the result in clearing the countryside of hated enemies?
If we are going to be consistent (and I think Epicurus would expect us to be) we have to admit that there is no argument from "Natural sanction" or absolute virtue to sanction our condemnation of the aggressors in situations like this. And I admit also that it is frequently difficult even to determine who the "aggressors" really are!
So as I see it the practical result of thinking about issues like this is that everyone has to make up their own mind exactly how outraged by things like this that they are, because if outrages are going to be stopped, its going to be by real people taking real action (often by force) to vindicate the point, because just talking about "gods" and "heaven" and "hell" and throwing around words like "evil" and "depraved" do nothing for the victims, and just expose those who do that as hopeless dreamers.
Elli I hope I did not take your post out of context but it seemed like a good illustration.
I have to come back to this, and also emphasize I am not directing it at Don:
In fact, this issue is key to the differences between us and Stoics, and in the difficulties we face in attracting as much interest. People resist understanding that nothing defines pleasure other than the direct experience. Maximum pleasure is not modified or limited by definitions or concepts-- it simply occurs or does not.
I think this is a HUGE problem. This is where people have their pre-existing virtue systems of their group or even just themselves, and they have an extremely hard time accepting that imposing their system on others cannot be justified philosophically through Epicurus or anyone else, and certainly not through religion.
This is the aspect that I think makes Epicurus so revolutionary. The upheavals brought about by Karl Marx would eventually pale in comparison to the widespread adoption of fundamental Epicurean philosophy. And there are deeply entrenched institutions throughout almost every aspect of society and every corner of the modern world that are going to do everything they possibly can to make sure (from their point of view) that such a revolution never takes place.
I am going to be bold and say that for any specific behavior/virtue you want to name as universally leading to a maximally pleasurable human life, I can name an exception. Virtues depend on pleasure for their very definition-- but feeling is a direct experience and can't be defined away. This is central to understanding Epicurus.
In fact, this issue is key to the differences between us and Stoics, and in the difficulties we face in attracting as much interest. People resist understanding that nothing defines pleasure other than the direct experience. Maximum pleasure is not modified or limited by definitions or concepts-- it simply occurs or does not.
I think this is particularly well stated and important. And I also think that it is good that Don continues to respond on this point because if there is any that we need to be as sharp as possible in explaining, it is probably this one. At least from where i sit, that is the best interpretation I have of Don's viewpoint --- we seem to be wrestling over whether it is every proper to generalize that a standard of conduct is so reliably productive of pleasure that it can be generalized into being always virtuous, or whether crossing that line is always going to violate other Epicurean observations about the contextual nature of feeling and nature itself.
That's what I get out of:
The reason that those life choices can be cautioned against is that they do not - from observation over time and multiple instances - do not reliably lead to a lifetime of pleasure. Trying to say that they do or can is living in a utopian hypothetical fantasy world.
And that is why Elayne is (in my view) responding properly with:
I am going to be bold and say that for any specific behavior/virtue you want to name as universally leading to a maximally pleasurable human life, I can name an exception. Virtues depend on pleasure for their very definition-- but feeling is a direct experience and can't be defined away.
Can't be defined away, and can't be predicted with certainty because there is no "necessity" or "fate" involved to require the outcome.
Yes welcome to the conversation Protonus....! You're dropping in as you can probably tell on a long-running sparring over some of these issues, even though I think we are very largely in agreement.
However I pick out these two quotes to make a particular point:
Virtuous activity and the degree to which it's carried out is always relative to the situation and context. Stoics would say that.
Anyone who says that being 100% truthful at all times is living in a utopian fantasy.
I certainly agree with the second, but I do think that that is exactly what the Stoics would urge, and thus that the first of these two quotes is not historically correct. It is my understanding of the Stoics that they DID view virtue as something that was absolute, and thus to be applied regardless of context. It's my understanding that they thought that there was a way to define all of the virtues, especially courage, wisdom, justice, etc -- in a way that did apply to everyone all the time and everywhere, regardless of circumstance. Of course I believe it's pretty easy to show that that is foolish (as in the example of lying to the burglar or murderer) but it's my understanding that they tool the position that one would not lie even under those circumstances. They (and I think the Platonists and Aristotelians too) did seem to think that due to their theological view of the universe that it was possible to identify virtue as an absolute ideal, and so this is a stark and important point that has to always be kept in mind.
Unless I am shown that i need to revise my understanding of the Stoics or others on this point I think that I'm probably correct, and this isn't just a minor point but perhaps why we keep sparring over PD10. Truly I think that Epicurus held that the word virtue and all of its particular instances has NO MEANING unless it actually leads to pleasure, so he basically held the word to be without content except as defined in a particular circumstance, which is exactly what the Stoics et all fought against --- they refused to accept modifications of their ideals based on context, and would have considered the very idea to be blasphemous.
I received my copy today and I'll let you know how "Pan" treats it. I'll hazard a guess that both Epicurus and Thomas Jefferson are remembered long after "cancel culture" leaves the scene, but that doesn't mean that it won't have a huge impact on us who are living through it!
....
Just scanning, I see that there is a chapter or sub-chapter devoted to the question, and this part catches my eye "...on the controversial issue of slavery, his application of Epicurean philosophy fell somewhat short of the ideal."
That's probably a good way to put it, since he couldn't exactly write "...his application of Epicurean philosophy fell somewhat short of the example of Epicurus" ... since Epicurus held slaves too,
Slavery is an issue that will always be with us, but it's also a test of our willingness to set up our personal feelings (we abhor slavery in general and to the extent it affects us even today) against our knowledge that there are no absolute ethical values. Slavery can be (but probably is not always, depending on the details) one of the worst issues and rivals probably even genocide, but both have existed throughout human history, and indeed even today, and probably always will, in various forms, and its up to us to judge them and act on them according to our circumstances.
Wow that is a great copy! I think I did fail to understand how it is divided into volumes. Thank you Titus!
Here: https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/ercolano1767bd5/0115/thumbs
Possibly starting here: https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/ercolano1767bd5/0113
Beginning of discussion of Hermarchus: https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/ercolano1767bd5/0119
Beginning of discussion of Epicurus: https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/ercolano1767bd5/0125
Beginning of discussion of Metrodorus: https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/ercolano1767bd5/0143
I used to have a good link to view online the book from which these etchings were taken. Anyone have a good current link?
NO SORRY - THE FOLLOWING IS NOT THE RIGHT BOOK - NEED TO LOOK FURTHER___ Or Perhaps this is the wrong volume
I think this is it, but not a good link yet: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Le_Antich…rcolano_Esposte
One version: https://archive.org/details/A216167/page/n21/mode/2up
Now I need direct links to the pages where the Epicurean materials appear. I suspect that we could go page by page through this and find many Epicurean-related aspects, so if anyone has the time to help please post in the thread below and we can create a master index.
Which seems to uphold the tenets of KD5. Elayne is not going to purposefully cause pain to others because she takes pleasure in the pleasure of others.
The seed in this comment that has the potential to grow out of proportion is the unqualified "others."
Which leads me to ask: What if someone does what the average person would call selfish "morally reprehensible" actions but derives personal pleasure from them?
If in fact, per PD10, he achieves pleasure, then in fact there is nothing to criticize. Where you're going of course is that depending on circumstances "some" other people (those who disagree) can be expected to react negatively. That's a purely practical concern, but an important one.
So, it seems to me that Epicureans are still going to act virtuously to the outside observer.
And that's where I think the danger lies. If applied as written, this gives an automatic veto power over your conduct to the unqualified "outside observer" and that would be deferring to an outside force that has no more natural or idealist authority than anything Plato or Moses came up with. Of course in most cases the "outside observer" actually does exist, in distinction from Plato's idealism or Moses' God, which do not exist, so the "outside observer" has to be dealt with.
And that's where Epicurus is in my view very specific as to the core ways to deal with them (and I bet you know what I am about to cite):
39. The man who has best ordered the element of disquiet arising from external circumstances has made those things that he could akin to himself, and the rest at least not alien; but with all to which he could not do even this, he has refrained from mixing, and has expelled from his life all which it was of advantage to treat thus.
In other words, I think the key is that you do not give unqualified "Others" veto power over the goals you choose for your life. You certainly have a practical problem with those who have political power over you, but there are ways to deal with that too (Cassius Longinus followed one such alternative) and it is generally possible to consider variations on "refraining from mixing" or "expelling from your life" as well.
Absolutely there are practical issues involved in "others" resisting your preferred choices, but there are major distinctions between your family and friends being resistant (and in those cases you have a much heavier concern about THEIR pleasure) as opposed to those who are much more distant from you, about whom you probably have little concern as to their views, and Epicurus is clearly addressing those situations and pointing the way to the response.
As one small example that seems appropriate, if we here in this group did not enforce rules to separate ourselves from the Stoic and Religious majorities, this group would quickly cease to exist. We try to do that in stages, being nice and diplomatic at first to see if such a person can be persuaded to at least our general positions, and become tolerable and productive here, but progressively enforcing the rules of conduct and eventually expelling them entirely when they prove incompatible to our happiness and goals here.
I see that as pretty much exactly what Epicurus was saying about life in general, in which of course it is much harder to accomplish that, but not different in principle.
That is an interesting suggestion Michele!
I think it does have some potential, at least for certain uses.
However as to this:
it does not have a symbol with which it can be identified around the world.
.... I am not sure that the ancient Epicureans would agree --- it seems as if they did have something they used: the bust of Epicurus himself, which you are holding in your excellent avatar!
This is an interesting questions from many perspectives. It probably also relates to the use of the term "Epicurean" as the name of the philosophy rather than "hedonism" or even "atomism" or the like. Both words have uses, but neither word captures the whole philosophy like identifying it with the founder himself does.
And I think that relates too to the issue that Don refers to, such as the use of the Greek letter (such as Society of Epicurus does) representing "friendship". Anything that conveys only one aspect of the philosophy fails to capture the fullness of it, and may tend to falsely imply that one aspect of it is "the most important."
I know personally that was my immediate reaction to the letter indicating friendship, and I think that's also why I rarely refer to the philosophy as atomism or hedonism. Both words have their uses, just as this suggested symbol might.
I suspect even the christians ought to be concerned about the cross for the very same reasons. (Which is one reason I gather than the Mormons do not use the cross very often, even though they consider themselves to be christians.)
If the question were: What unicode symbol on a keyboard would work best, I doubt anyone could come up with any better.... though it would be interesting to consider the options and think about that.
1 - I haven't had a chance to review the AA material in detail, but I suspect there is some useful material there. On the other hand, I suspect it also tends a little more toward "how to control your mind and live with your weaknesses" rather than "here is a proper understanding of the world which, when you see it, you will be able to use to overcome your problems."
2 - As for the comments on Elli and hearing about Greece, I share them completely -- I just haven't been successful yet in uncovering the details.
Welcome to Episode Sixty-Three of Lucretius Today.
I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.
For anyone who is not familiar with our podcast, please check back to Episode One for a discussion of our goals and our ground rules. If you have any question about that, please be sure to contact us at EpicureanFriends.com for more information.
In this Episode 63 we will complete Book Four and our discussion of perils of romantic love.
Now let's join Charles reading today's text:
Latin Lines -1209 - 1287 (end) of Book Four.
Munro Notes
1209-1232: according as the seed of the man or woman prevails at conception, the child is more like to the one or to the other; and this is so whether the child be male or female.
1233-1277: it is not the gods who grant or withhold offspring: conception depends on the due assortment of man and wife.
1278-1287: often by her own virtues, from no divine interposition, a woman without personal attractions will endear herself to her husband.
Browne 1743
If, in the mixing of the seed, the female draws in and snatches with sudden force the male seed, the child, the female seed is prevailing, is like the mother, as he is like the father if his prevails. But those who, you observe, express jointly the resemblance, and mingle the features of both parents, are formed equally from the juices of both; for then the mutual ardor of the combatants has justly tempered the conflicting seed, which, raised by the stings of Venus, is sent in due proportion through all the limbs. The success of the battle is equal, neither is victor nor vanquished. It happens sometimes that children are like their grandfathers, and resemble the persons of their remote ancestors, because the parents have frequently many seeds concealed and variously mingled in their bodies, which preserve the features of the family, and are delivered down from one to another. These Venus forms into different figures, as the qualities of the seeds require, and represents the complexion, the voice and hair of the progenitors; for these no less arise from proper seeds than the face, the body, or any parts of it. And a female child proceeds partly from the father's seed, and a male from the mother's, for the issue always consists of the seed of both; but the greater likeness it bears to the one than to the other, it partakes of more than a just proportion of the seed of that sex, which you easily apprehend, whether the child be male or female.
Nor do divinities above ever destroy the prolific virtue of the seed, or prevent a man's being called father by a number of sweet children, or curse him all his life with unfruitful love, as some vainly think, and therefore with much concern stain the altars with the blood of many victims, and make them smoke with clouds of incense, to implore a blessing upon the showery seed and promote conception; but to no purpose they tire out the gods and fatigue the oracles, for they are frequently unfruitful because the seed is too thick or too thin. The thin seed will not stay in the parts where it was injected, but soon dissolves and flows back; and the thick has no effect, because it is sent out heavy and condensed, or it does not carry home to the mark, or it cannot rightly penetrate the passages, or if it does, it is not at all disposed to mix kindly with the female juice. For the harmony of love between the sexes is widely different; men are more prolific with some women, and women conceive more readily, and swell with their burden after the embrace of some men than with others. Many women have been barren in a first and second marriage, and been fruitful at last, have borne lusty boys and blessed the family with a sweet offspring; and men, after marrying several times without issue, have at length found out a wife of a constitution agreeable to their own, and supported their old age with many children.
Of so great concern it is that the seed of both should kindly mix and mutually glow with genial heat, that the thick and the thin should incorporate together, and that the woman, in the art of love, should engage with a man whose nature be suitable to her own. And the food we live upon is of no small importance, for the seed increases through the limbs by some meats, and it becomes watery and feeble by others. [1743 TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: "I can translate no further. Dryden, in his Miscelllanies, goes on in full vigor, and keeps up to the original."] If like importance is the posture, too, in which the genial feat of love we do. For, as the females of the four-foot kind receive the leapings of their males behind, so the good wives, with loins uplifted high, and leaning on their hands, the fruitful stroke may try. For in that posture they will best conceive, not when supinely laid they frisk and heave, for active motions only break the flow, and more of strumpet than of wives they show; when answering stroke with stroke, the mingled liquors flow. Endearment eager, and too brisk a bound, throw off the plow-share from the furrowed ground. But common harlots in conjunction heave, because tis less their business to conceive than to delight and to provoke the deed, a trick which honest wives but little need.
Nor is it from the gods, or the darts of Venus, that a woman of ordinary beauty is sometimes beloved. She often secures the affection by her discreet conduct, by the sweetness of her deportment, and an exactness in the decency of her person, so that a man by use, may spend his life happily with her. To sum it all up: it is custom that reconciles the delights of love, for beat upon anything with constant blows, though ever so lightly, it is overcome at last, and crumbles to pieces. Have not you observed how drops of water falling upon a hard stone, by length of time, wear it away?
Munro 1886
And when haply in mixing her seed with the man’s, the woman by sudden force has overpowered and seized for herself his force, then children are formed from the mothers’ seed like to the mothers, as from the fathers’ seed like to the fathers. But those whom you see with a share of both forms, blending equally the features of the parents, grow from the union of the father’s body and the mother’s blood, when the mutual ardor of desire working in concert has brought and clashed together the seeds roused throughout the frame by the goads of Venus; and neither of the two has gotten the mastery nor has been mastered. Sometimes too the children may spring up like their grandfathers and often resemble the forms of their grandfathers’ fathers, because the parents often keep concealed in their bodies many first-beginnings mixed in many ways, which first proceeding from the original stock one father hands down to the next father; and then from these Venus produces forms after a manifold chance and repeats not only the features, but the voices and hair of their forefathers. And the female sex equally springs from the father’s seed and males go forth equally formed from the mother’s body; since these distinctions no more proceed from the fixed seed of one or other parent than our faces and bodies and limbs: the birth is always formed out of the two seeds; and whichever parent that which is produced more resembles of that parent it has more than an equal share; as you may equally observe, whether it is a male child or a female birth.
Nor do the divine powers debar anybody from the power of begetting, forbidding him ever to receive the name of father from sweet children and forcing him to pass his life in a barren wedlock; as men commonly fancy when in sorrow they drench the altars with much blood and pile the raised altars with offerings, to make their wives pregnant with abundant seed. In vain they weary the divinity of the gods and the sacred lots. They are barren sometimes from the too great thickness of the seed, sometimes from its undue fluidity and thinness: because the thin is unable to get a firm hold on the right spots, it at once passes away and is repelled and withdrawn abortively: since by others again a too thick seed is discharged in a state more solid than is suitable, it either does not fly forth with so prolonged a stroke or cannot equally pass into the proper spots or when it has passed in with difficulty mixes with the woman’s seed. For well-assorted matches are found to be of great importance; and some males impregnate some females more readily than others, and other females conceive and become pregnant more readily from other males. And many women have hitherto been barren during several marriages and have yet in the end found mates from whom they could conceive children and be enriched with a sweet offspring. And often even for those to whom hitherto wives however fruitful had been unable in their house to bear, has been found a compatible nature, enabling them to fortify their age with sons.
Of such great importance is it in order that seeds may agree and blend with seeds in a way to promote birth whether the thick comes into contact with the fluid and the fluid with the thick. And on this point it matters much on what diet life is supported; for by some foods seed is thickened in the limbs, and by others again is thinned and wasted. And in what modes the intercourse goes on, is likewise of very great moment; for women are commonly thought to conceive more readily after the manner of wild beasts and quadrupeds, because the seeds in this way can find the proper spots in consequence of the position of the body. Nor have wives the least use for effeminate motions: a woman hinders and stands in the way of her own conceiving, when thus she acts; for she drives the furrow out of the direct course and path of the share and turns away from the proper spots the stroke of the seed. And thus for their own ends harlots are wont to move, in order not to conceive and lie in child-bed frequently, and at the same time to render Venus more attractive to men. This our wives have surely no need of.
Sometimes too by no divine grace and arrows of Venus a sorry woman of inferior beauty comes to be loved; for the wife sometimes by her own acts and accommodating manners and by elegant neatness of person readily habituates you to pass your life with her. Moreover custom renders love attractive; for that which is struck by oft-repeated blows however lightly, yet after long course of time is overpowered and gives way. See you not too that drops of water falling on stones after long course of time scoop a hole through these stones?
Bailey 1921
And often when in the mingling of sex the woman by sudden force has mastered the man’s might and seized on it with her own, then children are borne like the mother, thanks to the mother’s seed, just as the father’s seed may make them like the father. But those whom you see with the form of both, mingling side by side the features of both parents, spring alike from the father’s body and the mother’s blood. It comes to pass too sometimes that they can be created like their grandparents, and often recall the form of their grandparents’ parents, for the reason that many first-beginnings in many ways are often mingled and concealed in the body of their parents, which, starting from the stock of the race, father hands on to father; therefrom Venus unfolds forms with varying chance, and recalls the look, the voice, the hair of ancestors; since indeed these things are none the more created from a seed determined than are our faces and bodies and limbs. Again the female sex may spring from the father’s seed, and males come forth formed from the mother’s body. For every offspring is fashioned of the two seeds, and whichever of the two that which is created more resembles, of that parent it has more than an equal share; as you can yourself discern, whether it be a male offspring or a female birth.
Nor do powers divine deny to any man a fruitful sowing of seed, that he may never be called father by sweet children, but must live out his years in barren wedlock; as men believe for the most part, and sorrowing sprinkle the altars with streams of blood and fire the high places with their gifts, that they may make their wives pregnant with bounteous seed. Yet all in vain they weary the majesty of the gods and their sacred lots. For some of them are barren through seed overthick, and again overliquid and thin in turn. The thin seed, because it cannot fix its fastenings, suddenly trickles away and retracing its path departs abortively. Further since for others seed too thick is emitted, either it does not shoot forward with such far-reaching blow, or else it cannot equally penetrate to vital spots, or having penetrated it mingles ill with the woman's seed. For the couplings in wedlock are seen to be very diverse. And many women have been barren in several wedlocks before, yet at length have found a mate from whom they might conceive children, and grow rich with sweet offspring. And often even for those, for whom wives fruitful ere now in the house had been unable to bear, a well-matched nature has been found, so that they might fortify their old age with children.
Of so great import is it that the one seed should be able to mingle with the other in a manner suited for generation, and that thick should unite with liquid and liquid with thick. And herein it is of import on what diet life is sustained; for on some food seeds swell within the limbs and on others they are thinned away and grow weak instead. And in what way even the enticing act of love is performed, that too is of great import; since for the most part it is thought that women conceive best after the fashion of beasts and in the manner of quadrupeds, because the seeds can thus take up their position when the breast is below and the loins are raised. Nor have wives any need at all for lascivious movements. For the woman prevents herself from conceiving and fights against it, if despite her joy she withdraws from the man's passion with her buttocks and receives the moist fluid with all her breast relaxed. For thus she drives the furrow of the plough from the true direction of the path, and turns aside the blow of seed from the vital parts. Such motions whores are wont to make for their own sake, that they be not filled with seed and lie pregnant, and also that the act of love may be more seductive to men. But nought of this is seen to be needful for our wives.
Sometimes ’tis by no divine act or through the shafts of Venus that a woman of form less fair is loved. For at times a woman may bring it about by her own doing, by her unselfish ways, and the neat adornment of her body, that she accustoms you easily to live your life with her. Nay more, habit alone can win love; for that which is struck ever and again by a blow, however light, is yet mastered in long lapse of time, and gives way. Do you not see too how drops of water falling upon rocks in long lapse of time drill through the rocks?
