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You're seeing exactly what I saw Godfrey. Even now I'm not sure what to make of the terminology. Maybe the Sedley article Don found above will help us all.
Is the reference above to "On Signs" the same as "On Methods of Inference"? It would seem likely but I haven't verified that, so it's interesting if DeLacy has already "translated" the title for us.
I just finished reading Remark O. Overall it is a very memorable slash and burn of Stoics, Priests, Government officials and others who claim virtue in public but do the opposite in private (and sometimes in public too).
It does seem to me that he has a good understanding of Epicurus, but it's hard to say whether he is going to extend it philosophically or just be content to cite him in support of his contention, which is something like that everyone in facts acts to pursue what they find pleasing so we should be honest about it.
No doubt it's easy to see why he is labeled an "egoist" but that just obscures the deeper issues in my view. I would say that Ayn Rand is faily labeled an "egoist" but I am also convinced that scratch the surface of her philosophy and she is throughout Platonist and even Stoic in her worship of reason. Labeling someone an egoist might be a decent indicator of Epicurean views (because the stoic majority views that negatively and labels most all Epicureans as egoists) but unless you drill down to the specifics you probably can't be sure what is going on in the original writings.
Here I would say there is a good chance that Mandeville combines his view of pursuit of pleasure with considerably more Epicurean philosophy. His ethics at least here do seem based on pleasure, but I don't see much if any recognition of the need for friends of the same viewpoint or much if the practical advice about evaluating the total balance of pleasure and pain.
Maybe since he is a doctor (I gather?) He is more of a materialist, but if so that's not in this section of this poem.
And I haven't seen any references to epistemology here though that's not unexpected given this subject.
So more reading would be necessary but I would rate based what I've read so far as someone who seems to be willing to go further than most in support of some of Epicurus' most controversial ethical positions.
1. I am interested to see if Martin has more to say about "maps" in reaction to the comment.
2. As to the first "no" I have never met a Californian without a good sense of humor. :-). (but I hear they do exist!)
I should also mention that that little clip of the poem seems promising to my very simple poetic tastes too, so therefore I need to be sure that the resident poet Laureate (probably Don would agree) Joshua will need to check this poem out too!
I hope others will have time to look at some of this material and comment further. Right now, after getting past that "egoism" accusation of the IEP article, I'd say that there's a good chance that Mandeville had a very well developed appreciation of Epicurus that surpasses most of what I've seen in other writers of the last several hundred years. But again that's a very preliminary assessment and while he appears to be a materialist, his views on epistemology aren't clear to me yet. But if indeed he was a medical doctor then perhaps there's a lot of promise here.
I wish Charles were still around to comment on this. Maybe he'll see this and drop by! 
Remark O ends with a very nice attack on "Virtue"!
OK definitely "Remark O" beginning on page 170 appears to be worth reading
Maybe better link for desktop -- two up format -- https://archive.org/details/Mandev…e/n161/mode/2up
Also promising, from the same section:
This looks very promising. First is the part of the poem that references Footnote (O), then the long footnote itself:
Fable of the Bees resources:
https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/mandeville1732_1.pdf
Analysis: https://fee.org/articles/the-f…ory-of-society/
Flippable pdf version: https://archive.org/details/Mandev…age/n1/mode/2up
I read over the summary there and indeed it's hard to tell, but if we substituted "pleasure" for "egoism" in that article then there might be some merit to it, and since this is a summary and we don't know to what extent "egoism" is a label applied to him, rather than his own label, it would take some reading into the original material to see what's really going on. it would also be important to know whether in in fact cites Epicurus for any of his views.
But there's enough here in the "Fable of the Bees" references that this might well be worth reading. I'll tag @EricR here to as he is much for familiar with some of the writers in that camp than I am. Maybe he's heard of Mandeville.
This reminds me that "priestcraft" is a great word! 
Published in 1720, Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church and National Happiness was his final party political tract in which he endorses the advantages of Whig governance as well as advancing a skeptical view of the religious establishment and priestcraft.
So it "might" be reasonable to identify "Against the Megarians" as primarily against dialectical logic... And of course what is "Dialectical logic" as opposed to "logic in general?" At the moment I'll continue to use "formal logic" which is a tip of hat to Plato's forms, but I am not so sure that "symbolic" logic or "syllogistic" logic isn't a better way to describe the opposing position (and even then Martin is probably right that you still have to parse further. "Syllogistic" suffers from being a word that most people don't have a firm grasp of the meaning of which might not advance the ball very much.
The Megarian school of philosophy, which flourished in the 4th century BC, was founded by Euclides of Megara, one of the pupils of Socrates. Its ethical teachings were derived from Socrates, recognizing a single good, which was apparently combined with the Eleatic doctrine of Unity. Some of Euclides' successors developed logic to such an extent that they became a separate school, known as the Dialectical school. Their work on modal logic, logical conditionals, and propositional logic played an important role in the development of logic in antiquity.
The major advantage of calling these people "Megarians" is that in "American" that sounds like they are some evil nation from some faraway planet!
And that reminds me of this: "This is the voice of the Mysterons."
So who speaks for the Megarians?
Only time right now to mark this for further research: Who Was Bernard Mandeville referenced here?
Clip from this article: https://www.academia.edu/19860151/Rouss…=download-paper I note that it puts the "Epicurean" in quotes.
As we go through this I would appreciate any comments on DeLacy's formulation that Aristotle had held that
"inferences from signs are not reliable except in cases where the inferences can be converted into valid syllogisms."
I'm not so concerned that we be able to find a cite in Aristotle to that effect, as I think this is probably just DeLacy's general interpretation.
What I am concerned about is whether this sentence and formulation are useful in describing the issues between the Epicureans and proponents of the "pro-formal-logic" position. And of course in that regard it's necessary to really be able to articulate in a few words the opposite positions so that the discussion is clear.
It appears that Epicurus may have associated the position he is arguing against (and which Delacy may be right in asserting to Aristotle and probably Plato et al) with the "Megarians" ---- but "MEGARIAN" just doesn't cut it as a tag for the position we're arguing against.
We could call them "worshippers of logic" but that is too argumentative and I am sure they would deny that (the worship "god" even as they identify god with pure reason, and similar formulations).
And another example: I continue to agree with Martin's post 46 as to the details of what we are talking about. However in order to use our words clearly, we're going to want to come to some form of agreement (or at least be able to state our own words and definitions) as to what words to use to describe the opposing camps.
In order the decide which side we're on, and understand why, we need to be able to articulate a definition of both camps. I doubt at this point that any of us (including me) are comfortable in setting our what we think the "best labels" for the opposing camps would be. Yes we could call them "Stoic" and "Epicurean" but since we're not clear on the meanings that doesn't help much more than describing one or the other as "Megarian."
Note: If I recall this thread started off entitled with the single word "Logic." I have tried to fine-tune that so that it's now "Issues In The Meaning And Definition of Logic" to make the subject easier to find in the future. If someone wants to suggest a more appropriate title that is more representative of the topic at any point, please say so.
Mathitis Kipouros that reminds me that your native language is not English and your country of residence is not the USA, correct? If not, that's likely an advantage to you rather than a disadvantage, but it's still a relevant consideration to be sure we communicate clearly.
For example, in this thread, Martin's "No." I find to be distinctly German and it is good to know that he is German so that his directness is interpreted correctly.
It's very possible that differences in background also help explain some of our differences in perspective:
But we need not satanize concepts and abstractions, we need to agree that concepts are good
That's an example there. At this point in my study of Epicurus I prefer to try to be really specific and avoid a sweeping statement like "concepts are good" any more than I would say "concepts or bad" or "abstractions" are bad. It's probably more accurate to say "concepts can be useful" without the value judgment implied in being "good," especially without a specific statement of what concepts are being discussed.
So to say "concepts are good" comes pretty close to what I perceive Plato and the stoics to have been doing in essentially "worshipping" formal logic. (I think I'll use "formal logic" as the term for a while.)
Perhaps we're conflating the innaccuracies of language with the innaccuracies of reason.
Perhaps so, but in this way of stating the issue, my own perspective is that "reason" and "logic" are purely inventions of the human mind and it is important to stress that they are in no way divine or superior to human affairs. I think people understand that about "language" but they tend to think that "reason" is something that exists independent of humanity, floating in the air, as if the request to "be reasonable" actually means something useful and specific in common everyday life (it most of the time does not, in my view, because the "devil is in the details").
doesn't disregard reason at all, but rather reinforces it's importance.
Same point as above. Hammers are extremely important in carpentry, but in the "great scheme of things" they have a distinctly subordinate place, and if we are evaluating philosophy and comparing Epicurus to the others, then the important thing to know about "reason" may well be that the other philosophers are absolutely wrong about how important it is (depending again on definition).
I feel a bit more confident that the term "critical thinking" could the modern meaning of "true reason".
I am personally reluctant to endorse the term "critical" even more than I would endorse the term "skeptical." Yes both have good aspects, but it seems to me in common usage both terms have developed a negative connotation that is probably well deserved when they are taken to their logical conclusions. The truth of the reason of Epicurus, I would say, is not based on it being a "critique" or "skeptical" of anything, but of it being a realistic assessment of the nature of the universe and our capabilities and limits of understanding it.
There are always going to be issues in life that you aren't going to have the evidence you would like to have to be certain of what is the "truth" of the matter. In those situations, you must have a readily-accessible method for analyzing the positive assertions you are comfortable making plus the limits of those assertions. Thus the importance of the "waiting" doctrine, and the multiple possibilities viewpoint, and the nature and role of the canonical faculties, etc. None of that is adequately expressed in terms of "being logical" or "being reasonable." I don't think there is any term even close to adequate other than "being Epicurean."
Ok, I see what you mean. But what if we're not able to go closer to the tower? (or the atoms) wouldn't it be nice to have some certainty that perhaps you have an alternative (which we do) to go to the tower? Like, with reason, formulate an indirect way of determining it's shape and testing it. Again, the testing wil involve the sensations, (so I'm not disregarding those as essential), but can you see here how reason comes as a very good thing for us. I guess no one has disputed reason that works this way, to our pleasure.
on this point I think this is the point Laertius emphasized Epicurus held to be an example of the need to "wait" before forming a firm opinion. And this situation ("we are not able to go closer to the tower) occurs many times in life, with the primary example being that of the stars, which we cannot reach to confirm our thoughts, and that is where the "multiple explanations' viewpoint comes in.
You don't have to go all the way to worship reason, but I'm arguing that recognizing the important place it evidently and materially has in our lives, is of the essence not to over simplify Epicurean Philosophy.
I agree with you in conclusion and full context, but in the context in which Epicurus was talking (which I think still applies today) the specific and important error of the general Greek philosophers essentially did amount to a "worship" of reason, which specifically and thoroughly harms the proper viewpoint expressed in the canonical principles. So I think Epicurus thought it important to stress that this isn't some minor disagreement that we can gloss over and accept that there is a difference of opinion. This is a field where an all out 'war' is necessary, and where Epicurus thought it necessary to repeatedly warn his students in the strongest of terms.
And i would say that his concern was fully justified by events, because over succeeding generations the arguments of the stoics and others playing games with logic did shake lose a significant number of Epicureans (including those who came up with the "fourth leg" of the canon, and those like Torquatus who came to believe that an elaborate logical proof or explanation of the nature of pleasure was necessary).
Accordingly, every sign is also a thing; for what is not a thing is nothing at all. Every thing, however, is not also a sign.
This would appear to be a very critically important assertion if it is in fact an accurate representation of the position that Philodemus is taking, but I have no clue how reliable this statement should be considered to be. Is this in fact an accurate summary of the way (1) philosophers in general, and (2) Philodemus, think? I immediately worry that this conclusion may be "begging the question" and assuming a position with which Philodemus may not agree.
Do we know for sure that Philodemus would agree with this?
There are signs of another kind, those which are never employed except as signs: for example, words.
So in many instances in Philodemus when he is talking about signs he may in fact referring to "words"?
It seems to me that "signs" is very ambiguous to most people in this context and we really are going to have to see if we can agree on and emphasize a clear definition here.
Godfrey are your references from chapter two quotes, or your own summaries?
The information you included in that post seems highly helpful and very important, but I am not yet shaking the feeling that a lot more is going to be needed to make the points clear. "Contraposition" might actually be easier to understand because we don't have a preconceived notion of what that means. But "sign" is a word we think we understand, and it seems to be used here in a very technical sense that is going to be easy to confuse. If I recall OMOI is full of sentences using the word 'sign' so it would really be nice if we could articulate something that would get people comfortable with use of the word "sign" in a context like what they are going to read.
I have no feel for whether the Augustine quote is accurate or trustworthy or not, but I do think that an elaboration and explanation like he is giving there (but maybe considerably longer) is what is needed.
