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Fable of the Bees resources:
https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/mandeville1732_1.pdf
Analysis: https://fee.org/articles/the-f…ory-of-society/
Flippable pdf version: https://archive.org/details/Mandev…age/n1/mode/2up
I read over the summary there and indeed it's hard to tell, but if we substituted "pleasure" for "egoism" in that article then there might be some merit to it, and since this is a summary and we don't know to what extent "egoism" is a label applied to him, rather than his own label, it would take some reading into the original material to see what's really going on. it would also be important to know whether in in fact cites Epicurus for any of his views.
But there's enough here in the "Fable of the Bees" references that this might well be worth reading. I'll tag @EricR here to as he is much for familiar with some of the writers in that camp than I am. Maybe he's heard of Mandeville.
This reminds me that "priestcraft" is a great word! 
Published in 1720, Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church and National Happiness was his final party political tract in which he endorses the advantages of Whig governance as well as advancing a skeptical view of the religious establishment and priestcraft.
So it "might" be reasonable to identify "Against the Megarians" as primarily against dialectical logic... And of course what is "Dialectical logic" as opposed to "logic in general?" At the moment I'll continue to use "formal logic" which is a tip of hat to Plato's forms, but I am not so sure that "symbolic" logic or "syllogistic" logic isn't a better way to describe the opposing position (and even then Martin is probably right that you still have to parse further. "Syllogistic" suffers from being a word that most people don't have a firm grasp of the meaning of which might not advance the ball very much.
The Megarian school of philosophy, which flourished in the 4th century BC, was founded by Euclides of Megara, one of the pupils of Socrates. Its ethical teachings were derived from Socrates, recognizing a single good, which was apparently combined with the Eleatic doctrine of Unity. Some of Euclides' successors developed logic to such an extent that they became a separate school, known as the Dialectical school. Their work on modal logic, logical conditionals, and propositional logic played an important role in the development of logic in antiquity.
The major advantage of calling these people "Megarians" is that in "American" that sounds like they are some evil nation from some faraway planet! 
And that reminds me of this: "This is the voice of the Mysterons."
So who speaks for the Megarians?
Only time right now to mark this for further research: Who Was Bernard Mandeville referenced here?
Clip from this article: https://www.academia.edu/19860151/Rouss…=download-paper I note that it puts the "Epicurean" in quotes.
As we go through this I would appreciate any comments on DeLacy's formulation that Aristotle had held that
"inferences from signs are not reliable except in cases where the inferences can be converted into valid syllogisms."
I'm not so concerned that we be able to find a cite in Aristotle to that effect, as I think this is probably just DeLacy's general interpretation.
What I am concerned about is whether this sentence and formulation are useful in describing the issues between the Epicureans and proponents of the "pro-formal-logic" position. And of course in that regard it's necessary to really be able to articulate in a few words the opposite positions so that the discussion is clear.
It appears that Epicurus may have associated the position he is arguing against (and which Delacy may be right in asserting to Aristotle and probably Plato et al) with the "Megarians" ---- but "MEGARIAN" just doesn't cut it as a tag for the position we're arguing against.
We could call them "worshippers of logic" but that is too argumentative and I am sure they would deny that (the worship "god" even as they identify god with pure reason, and similar formulations).
And another example: I continue to agree with Martin's post 46 as to the details of what we are talking about. However in order to use our words clearly, we're going to want to come to some form of agreement (or at least be able to state our own words and definitions) as to what words to use to describe the opposing camps.
In order the decide which side we're on, and understand why, we need to be able to articulate a definition of both camps. I doubt at this point that any of us (including me) are comfortable in setting our what we think the "best labels" for the opposing camps would be. Yes we could call them "Stoic" and "Epicurean" but since we're not clear on the meanings that doesn't help much more than describing one or the other as "Megarian."
Note: If I recall this thread started off entitled with the single word "Logic." I have tried to fine-tune that so that it's now "Issues In The Meaning And Definition of Logic" to make the subject easier to find in the future. If someone wants to suggest a more appropriate title that is more representative of the topic at any point, please say so.
Mathitis Kipouros that reminds me that your native language is not English and your country of residence is not the USA, correct? If not, that's likely an advantage to you rather than a disadvantage, but it's still a relevant consideration to be sure we communicate clearly.
For example, in this thread, Martin's "No." I find to be distinctly German and it is good to know that he is German so that his directness is interpreted correctly.
It's very possible that differences in background also help explain some of our differences in perspective:
But we need not satanize concepts and abstractions, we need to agree that concepts are good
That's an example there. At this point in my study of Epicurus I prefer to try to be really specific and avoid a sweeping statement like "concepts are good" any more than I would say "concepts or bad" or "abstractions" are bad. It's probably more accurate to say "concepts can be useful" without the value judgment implied in being "good," especially without a specific statement of what concepts are being discussed.
So to say "concepts are good" comes pretty close to what I perceive Plato and the stoics to have been doing in essentially "worshipping" formal logic. (I think I'll use "formal logic" as the term for a while.)
Perhaps we're conflating the innaccuracies of language with the innaccuracies of reason.
Perhaps so, but in this way of stating the issue, my own perspective is that "reason" and "logic" are purely inventions of the human mind and it is important to stress that they are in no way divine or superior to human affairs. I think people understand that about "language" but they tend to think that "reason" is something that exists independent of humanity, floating in the air, as if the request to "be reasonable" actually means something useful and specific in common everyday life (it most of the time does not, in my view, because the "devil is in the details").
doesn't disregard reason at all, but rather reinforces it's importance.
Same point as above. Hammers are extremely important in carpentry, but in the "great scheme of things" they have a distinctly subordinate place, and if we are evaluating philosophy and comparing Epicurus to the others, then the important thing to know about "reason" may well be that the other philosophers are absolutely wrong about how important it is (depending again on definition).
I feel a bit more confident that the term "critical thinking" could the modern meaning of "true reason".
I am personally reluctant to endorse the term "critical" even more than I would endorse the term "skeptical." Yes both have good aspects, but it seems to me in common usage both terms have developed a negative connotation that is probably well deserved when they are taken to their logical conclusions. The truth of the reason of Epicurus, I would say, is not based on it being a "critique" or "skeptical" of anything, but of it being a realistic assessment of the nature of the universe and our capabilities and limits of understanding it.
There are always going to be issues in life that you aren't going to have the evidence you would like to have to be certain of what is the "truth" of the matter. In those situations, you must have a readily-accessible method for analyzing the positive assertions you are comfortable making plus the limits of those assertions. Thus the importance of the "waiting" doctrine, and the multiple possibilities viewpoint, and the nature and role of the canonical faculties, etc. None of that is adequately expressed in terms of "being logical" or "being reasonable." I don't think there is any term even close to adequate other than "being Epicurean."
Ok, I see what you mean. But what if we're not able to go closer to the tower? (or the atoms) wouldn't it be nice to have some certainty that perhaps you have an alternative (which we do) to go to the tower? Like, with reason, formulate an indirect way of determining it's shape and testing it. Again, the testing wil involve the sensations, (so I'm not disregarding those as essential), but can you see here how reason comes as a very good thing for us. I guess no one has disputed reason that works this way, to our pleasure.
on this point I think this is the point Laertius emphasized Epicurus held to be an example of the need to "wait" before forming a firm opinion. And this situation ("we are not able to go closer to the tower) occurs many times in life, with the primary example being that of the stars, which we cannot reach to confirm our thoughts, and that is where the "multiple explanations' viewpoint comes in.
You don't have to go all the way to worship reason, but I'm arguing that recognizing the important place it evidently and materially has in our lives, is of the essence not to over simplify Epicurean Philosophy.
I agree with you in conclusion and full context, but in the context in which Epicurus was talking (which I think still applies today) the specific and important error of the general Greek philosophers essentially did amount to a "worship" of reason, which specifically and thoroughly harms the proper viewpoint expressed in the canonical principles. So I think Epicurus thought it important to stress that this isn't some minor disagreement that we can gloss over and accept that there is a difference of opinion. This is a field where an all out 'war' is necessary, and where Epicurus thought it necessary to repeatedly warn his students in the strongest of terms.
And i would say that his concern was fully justified by events, because over succeeding generations the arguments of the stoics and others playing games with logic did shake lose a significant number of Epicureans (including those who came up with the "fourth leg" of the canon, and those like Torquatus who came to believe that an elaborate logical proof or explanation of the nature of pleasure was necessary).
Accordingly, every sign is also a thing; for what is not a thing is nothing at all. Every thing, however, is not also a sign.
This would appear to be a very critically important assertion if it is in fact an accurate representation of the position that Philodemus is taking, but I have no clue how reliable this statement should be considered to be. Is this in fact an accurate summary of the way (1) philosophers in general, and (2) Philodemus, think? I immediately worry that this conclusion may be "begging the question" and assuming a position with which Philodemus may not agree.
Do we know for sure that Philodemus would agree with this?
There are signs of another kind, those which are never employed except as signs: for example, words.
So in many instances in Philodemus when he is talking about signs he may in fact referring to "words"?
It seems to me that "signs" is very ambiguous to most people in this context and we really are going to have to see if we can agree on and emphasize a clear definition here.
Godfrey are your references from chapter two quotes, or your own summaries?
The information you included in that post seems highly helpful and very important, but I am not yet shaking the feeling that a lot more is going to be needed to make the points clear. "Contraposition" might actually be easier to understand because we don't have a preconceived notion of what that means. But "sign" is a word we think we understand, and it seems to be used here in a very technical sense that is going to be easy to confuse. If I recall OMOI is full of sentences using the word 'sign' so it would really be nice if we could articulate something that would get people comfortable with use of the word "sign" in a context like what they are going to read.
I have no feel for whether the Augustine quote is accurate or trustworthy or not, but I do think that an elaboration and explanation like he is giving there (but maybe considerably longer) is what is needed.
Well yes that is a good incentive, but also it's probably desirable to have people be straightforward in admitting what they have and have not read There's certainly a point in life when most of us had never read any of these and that's nothing to be embarrassed about.
And when I set up the poll I specifically made sure to check the post that allows people to change their answers, so the expectation is that the answers do in fact change over time!
Plus it's probably not nearly as embarrassing to admit that someone hasn't read some of these as it is for me to have gone through almost the complete Lucretius podcast never having read Sedley's "Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom!"
On Martin's posts, I agree that post 46 is a very good summary of the proper conclusions.
On post 44 I am not sure where that quote is coming from, but I do think that in common usage that position stated is correct, as something very similar occurs in the Torquatus narrative:
You are pleased to think him uneducated. The reason is that he refused to consider any education worth the name that did not help to school us in happiness. Was he to spend his time, as you encourage Triarius and me to do, in perusing poets, who give us nothing solid and useful, but merely childish amusement? Was he to occupy himself like Plato with music and geometry, arithmetic and astronomy, which starting from false premises cannot be true, and which moreover if they were true would contribute nothing to make our lives pleasanter and therefore better? Was he, I say, to study arts like these, and neglect the master art, so difficult and correspondingly so fruitful, the art of living?
On post 43 I think we are also probably disagreeing only in details. When I refer to "map" there I refer to the kind that those of us old enough used to know before google - the large fold-up paper variety that we used to carry in our car gloveboxes. I would say that we never need a paper map to navigate our local neighborhoods, and what we internalize after learning our way around it is our experience - we have not committed a paper map to memory. And a paper map and a physical compass with spinning pointer are what I think we are referring to in making the analogies we are making.
To repeat I think Martin's post 46 is very well stated and a good summary of the proper conclusions to draw. The main thing i would add to that is to go back to Delacy's point and reassert that Aristotle and Plato were insisting that nothing be considered fully true unless it could be stated as a syllogism, and in pointing out the differences between true and false logic and reasoning, we need to be sure that the full significance of their position - their error - sinks in. they were not just inaccurate in their expressions, they were concsiously embracing a highly damaging point of view of life.
What Martin is saying was my impression as well. Epicurus was fully against using logic and rhetoric and argument to obfuscate the truth or to mislead people.
I think "poetry" probably goes in that list as well.
Welcome @hastingst794 !
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Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.
All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.
One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.
In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.
It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.
And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.
Welcome to the forum!
The page in Delacy I return to time and again is this one: https://archive.org/details/philod…ter&q=syllogism
I believe we are going to find that the concept of syllogisms is critical to this discussion, and that Aristotle (and even more so Plato and the Stoics) were invested in "syllogistic logic" as the ultimate standard of truth, and that that is something Epicurus firmly rejected. And what's the definition of syllogistic logic? As Godfrey says, "film at eleven," but I think that if that term means anything it refers to a formal symbolic kind of process in which you convert particular observations into "concepts" or "universals" or some other term denoting a symbol taking the place of a sensation (or any data from the canonical faculties). And of course the problem is as stated in our recent conversations to the effect that "the map is not the terrain," etc.
Which is of course not to say that symbolic / syllogistic logic cannot be valuable at times, but is to say that symbolic / syllogistic logic should never be (but often is, by its advocates) confused with reality itself. Our only real connections with reality are the data we get from the canonical faculties, and that's what makes THEM (and not symbolic/syllogistic logic) the ultimate standard of truth. We don't consider maps necessary to our being able day-to-day to navigate in reality, and we shouldn't consider syllogistic logic to be a requirement of our being confident in our day-to-day thinking either.
Here's the quote I was looking for above about the repeatability of the senses being the guarantee of their accuracy. Someone might say that's not exactly the same point as being discussed, but I think it pretty much is, because it seems implicit that if we're talking about the truth of our senses we're talking about the truth of the opinions that we can confidently reach based on what the senses repeatedly tell us:
**Diogenes Laertius, _Lives of Philosophers,_ X.31:** They reject the dialectic as superfluous; holding that in their inquiries the physicists should be content to employ the ordinary terms for things. Now in _The Canon_ Epicurus states that the sensations, the prolepses, and the passions are the criteria of truth; the Epicureans generally make perceptions of mental presentations to be also standards. ... Every sensation, he says, is devoid of reason and incapable of memory; for neither is it self-caused nor regarded as having an external cause, can it add anything thereto or take anything therefrom. Nor is there anything which can refute sensations or convict them of error: one sensation cannot convict another and kindred sensation, for they are equally valid; nor can one sensation refute another which is not kindred but heterogeneous, for the objects which the two senses judge are not the same; nor again can reason refute them, for reason is wholly dependent on sensation; nor can one sense refute another, since we pay equal heed to all. And the reality of separate perceptions guarantees the truth of our senses. But seeing and hearing are just as real as feeling pain. Hence it is from plain facts that we must start when we draw inferences about the unknown. For all our notions are derived from perceptions, either by actual contact or by analogy, or resemblance, or composition, with some slight aid from reasoning. And the objects presented to madmen and to people in dreams are true, for they produce effects – i.e., movements in the mind – which that which is unreal never does.
All of what I see you raise are good questions so while I appreciate your last statement I firmly think the discussion we're having is very valuable. I do think, however, in general, that we are suffering from the difficulty of really having a bright line definition of many of these words (logic, reason, dialectic, dialectical logic, etc). And much of the reason for that is they these words are commonly used in very similar ways, so each discussion about each word almost requires a clarification each time it is used.
So, rhetoric? Which may have been considered logic, but it's not. Am I wrong?
Rhetoric is another word that in my view isn't so clear in common usage.
So he is not talking at all about reason, as in what we understand as logic
Just citing that to reinforce the issue that "reason" seems to have a number of connotations that may or may not make it similar in usage as logic depending on context.
Also, it's been stated over and over again that while that sensations can and are always true (in that they bring a pure impression) they can be, as DeWitt puts it, valueless as a criterion (the round/square tower example). And how are we going to discern this if not by reason?
Of all the comments this is probably the most important to articulate better. We confirm that the tower is in fact square by walking toward it, viewing it from different angles, touching it, etc. It is never reason *alone* which does the confirming, it is the reliability of subsequent multiple sensations. There's a really good cite from Epicurus directly on that point (that the reliability of our conclusions / opinions comes from the repeatability of the sensation) that if my mind were quicker I'd like to post, but can't. If someone else can I hope they will add this to the thread.
Now someone may want to argue, "Well, comparing multiple sensations to see which is reliably repeated IS a form of "reason" or even "logic!" If someone goes down that path then they've really got to disentangle what they mean by reason and logic, because such a wide definition essentially converts every example of looking for consistency into reason and logic and that clearly is not Epicurus' target.
Otherwise we are perceiving reality, alright, but if we don't process it with reason, we're no different than other animals.
Ok now on that point it is my position (and I think Epicurus') that there IS no essential difference between humans and other animals. And that precise argument is stated very clearly by Cicero who complains that Epicurus reduces us to the state of animals by not worshiping reason/logic as he (Cicero) does. Can't easily remember the cite there but I think it's in Academic Questions.
: "How do we know something is true? I can feel when something is true". I don't think this is true, but I'm open to be corrected. I'm pretty sure the person who said this didn't mean it and said it rhetorically or lightly as no one objected it.
This is very valuable for you to call this into question. Are you talking about something Elayne said? I don't suppose you have a time cite do you? I remember being uneasy with certain formulations of some of that discussion and it might be that it would be good to make some notes on that episode to clarify. I am remembering that it was Elayne who said something like that and (if I recall) I considered it a reasonable formulation of the "feeling of certainty" that we do in fact get when we are legitimately convinced that our conclusion is correct. And in a way (depending on the words that were used) it is correct to argue that certainty / confidence in Epicurean terms comes from our ability to confirm our opinions through the data we observe through the senses and all the canonical faculties.
It is also possible that what you're referring to was in discussion of "abstractions'" and I also think there may have been some statements made at times that may have been more critical of abstractions than would be warranted. But there is an important point there too about the limitations of abstractions, so it would be necessary to pull out the precise statements and consider them carefully.
Anytime you (or anyone) feels like certain statements in the podcast might warrant clarification or revision please make note of it (preferably in the discussion for that episode) and try to record the time it appears and we'll go back and address those. It would be very valuable for everyone to do that.
The real heavy lifting / lot of work seems to be getting an series of "courses" off the ground. In the end it might be necessary to start small with Quizzes here on the forum rather than a full "moodle' package, but hopefully all these intermediate steps like the reading list will help build the momentum toward full "courses"
perhaps that game wouldn't make sense at all to me. I may be at fault of not remembering it well enough
1 - I first read DeWitt over ten years ago now and I frequently misremember it.
2 - Plus I suppose to be clear about deWitt, his goal and his merit is in providing the wide overview that gives us an orientation, and the book isn't nearly long or detailed enough to give us all the raw material and argument that we'd like to have, so that's where we have to fill in the gaps. I think DeWitt's usually right or close to right in most of his views, but in all of the details we have to work through them ourselves.
