Posts by Cassius

I do think that math and geometry are useful and when not considered to be magical is valuable to know.

I consider the issues involved in the recurrence of the Fibonacci ratio in nature to be fascinating and no doubt informative of something.

So it's probably not just math and geometry that is useful for making oneself appear to be a wizard - just about any advanced knowledge can be employed that way with less-educated people.

Meaning that there's certainly nothing intrinsically wrong with them but rather the use to which they can be out in the "wrong" hands

Quote from Don

That being said, if you know of a reference to Epicurus making logical arguments for pleasure as the goal, please share!

I don't want to get too far off track here by over-focusing on this particular point, but I personally consider PD3-4 to be a "logical" argument (dealing with the issue of the limit of pleasure, which is not particularly relevant or important unless you are dealing with Plato's logical "pleasure has no limit and therefore cannot be the greatest good" argument). Aside from PD3-4 there is no clear and obvious and prominently placed statement of the role of pleasure in the opening PDs, and that in itself is something that has always struck me as a fascinating difference between the PDs and the letter to Menorceus. If the PDs were intended to be a prioritized list of important things to remember (and I think they are) and if Epicurus considered identification of "the greatest good" to be important to us (which I don't think is true) why does the top ten not include "Pleasure is the greatest good."? At least according to Torquatus / Cicero that is what "all philosophers agree" to be the ultimate question. It appears to me that Cicero should not have included Epicurus in that list of "all philosophers".

Well you have observed correctly there that I need to be more accurate. Logical discussion over pleasure certainly seems to be something Epicurus or at least some Epicureans engaged in at times, probably to respond to Platonic logical arguments. They didn't just say "I am not going to discuss it."

But he doesn't rely ultimately on those for his ultimate proofs - he "points" to young living things, and observes sugar is sweet, and uses the canonical faculties which are not themselves something that do or can require logical proofs themselves.

So I think he does both at separate times and from separate perspectives and that we have to be dexteritous enough to follow him / them in the different contexts.

This conversation is driving me ever deeper to the position that Torquatus abandoned, and which Epicurus asserted, that logical proofs over the nature of pleasure are not appropriate.

And I am taking more and more the attitude that they Plutarch quote (we need to see if we can agree on a good translation) was aimed at the same target - that attempts to define a "greatest good" are intrinsically Platonic and unproductive.

Which is not a complaint Camotero but a good thing!

Let's see how Don or others would respond to your question.

I am thinking this is an area, like anticipations, where DeWitt was going in the right direction but maybe did not go far enough. I think you are interpreting DeWitt's intent correctly, but I doubt his intent is fully satisfactory - there was more to be said.

Quote from Godfrey

so what's the point?

So what's the point?????

Tsk Tsk Godfrey you will never be one of Plato's Golden and mesmerize the world with your incoerent gibberish!

Unless you polish up on your geometry you will never figure out how to get the lower classes to defer to your every whim!

I hope you wise up before it is too late!!!

I agree with all that as a matter of one way of presenting the logic of stating that pleasure is the alpha and omega and all that. However in the end the logical statement comes back to the "feeling" of pleasure which is not something that can be uniformly defined for all people at all places and all times. So i think it's necessary to be very careful once you engage in this as a logical debate. Apparently Torquatus thinks that his position on this is better than that of Epicurus, which I think should not be accepted at face value.

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Some members of our school however would refine upon this doctrine; these say that it is not enough for the judgment of good and evil to rest with the senses; the facts that pleasure is in and for itself desirable and pain in and for itself to be avoided can also be grasped by the intellect and the reason. Accordingly they declare that the perception that the one is to be sought after and the other avoided is a notion naturally implanted in our minds. Others again, with whom I agree, observing that a great many philosophers do advance a vast array of reasons to prove why pleasure should not be counted as a good nor pain as an evil, consider that we had better not be too confident of our case; in their view it requires elaborate and reasoned argument, and abstruse theoretical discussion of the nature of pleasure and pain.

And as to the issue of instrumental or practical end, which is the "greatest" end?

I think we have Cicero's definition through Torquatus (We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else)

And that is the problem. We don't have Epicurus endorsing that specific formulation.

This formulation presumes that we have the ability to discover something that completely and accurately fulfills this definition for all times, all places, all people. I suspect rather strongly that that is not possible. THE end? Why should we presume that there is only one? Or that it is the same for all?

Quote from Don

Which is the definition of the "greatest good."

Well you SAY that, but I am not sure Epicurus would enthusiastically endorse that exact construction.

Is that in the PDS or even the letter to Menorceus? I don't think that "greatest good" appears there, does it?

I believe the "greatest good" discussion to be one of those things that Camotero is discussing that we seem to be unable to avoid, but which is in reality a "logic trap" that has to be approached very carefully.

My view is that Torquatus has to be viewed in that way as well -- I do not think Epicurus himself would have agreed to frame the issue the way Torquatus did without a lot of explanation, only some of which we probably have from Torquatus.

It depends entirely on your conceptual definition of "good" as to whether there is a "greatest good" -- and there is nothing that is INTRINSICALLY desirable other than pleasure itself. Add to that issue the issue that while the word pleasure is a concept, pleasure is itself ultimately a FEELING that we all experience individually, not a concept. So the entire discussion is a minefield in which contexts can be dropped at any moment to reach an erroneous result.

Quote from Don

Life can't be the "greatest good," otherwise, death would conversely be the "greatest bad." And death is nothing to us.

Pleasure (i.e., living a pleasurable life) is the goal, telos, beginning, and end.

I think that is another perspective issue. Being dead is nothing to us, but losing our lives prematurely before it is necessary is a huge thing to be avoided (that gets us into the issue of how long should we seek to live.) That's a huge issue that deserves its own discussion. It is NOT a matter of indifference to me if I die tomorrow vs 20 years from now which I might reasonably hope to do given state of health, etc. So that "Death is nothing to us" line is something else that has to be parsed VERY carefully.

So I think that we have a big issue here about being very careful about defining what we mean by the "greatest good" -- and I think we have several texts that warn about that exact issue, including the Plutarch "walking around talking about...." text.

I haven't had time to pursue this myself but I hope others will and also comment here.

Also camotero as I mentioned a moment ago in another post you're going to want to add the appendix to the DeLacy Translation of Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" to your reading list. The appendix is excellent and compares and contrasts Epicurean views on these issues to those of Aristotle and Plato. After you read the appendix you're then equipped to begin to get something out of the text, which I think is hard to do unless you read the appendix first.

You probably need to look directly at the Vellius statement in "On the Nature of the Gods" as that is all there is - and there is not much.

I personally don't see it as Platonic however - I see it as absolutely the practical inference from the fact that here on earth we "never" see "only one thing of its kind." Extraplolating that out to the rest of the universe, which we presume absent evidence to the contrary is analogous to Earth, then that turns into something we expect to find everywhere.

Now I think were you are heading there is to a discussion of Philodemus' "On Methods of Inference" and I highly recommend the DeLacy translation (free on internet everywhere) and especially his appendix which attempts to unwind the full story of Epicurean reasoning from observation to conclusions.

I am pressed for time this morning and am no doubt going to be short in these responses. Feel free to follow up.

Quote from camotero

Something like, all the possibilities that are in line with the physics are possible until one is proved to be the right one and the others proven to be wrong? Is there a PD about this?

This would be primarily PD 24If you reject any single sensation, and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion, as to the appearance awaiting confirmation, and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations, as well, with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgment. And if among the mental images created by your opinion you affirm both that which awaits confirmation, and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong.

But the issue of choosing prematurely is also mentioned in Lucretius and also the letter to Pythocles. We discuss this in this week's podcast which I hope to get out soon. Here is letter to Pythocles:

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[86] We must not try to force an impossible explanation, nor employ a method of inquiry like our reasoning either about the modes of life or with respect to the solution of other physical problems: witness such propositions as that ‘the universe consists of bodies and the intangible,’ or that ‘the elements are indivisible,' and all such statements in circumstances where there is only one explanation which harmonizes with phenomena. For this is not so with the things above us: they admit of more than one cause of coming into being and more than one account of their nature which harmonizes with our sensations.

[87] For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings, but we must live free from trouble.

Now all goes on without disturbance as far as regards each of those things which may be explained in several ways so as to harmonize with what we perceive, when one admits, as we are bound to do, probable theories about them. But when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth. Now we can obtain indications of what happens above from some of the phenomena on earth: for we can observe how they come to pass, though we cannot observe the phenomena in the sky: for they may be produced in several ways.

[88] Yet we must never desert the appearance of each of these phenomena, and further, as regards what is associated with it, must distinguish those things whose production in several ways is not contradicted by phenomena on earth.

Quote from camotero

What do you mean by this? I though the greatest good was life, and the objective/end (or "telos" as DeWitt puts it) is pleasure.

I think most of us (certainly me) think that DeWitt is being a little broad in saying that, and it is necessary to be very specific about what perspective is the "greatest good." Certainly neither plesure nor pain has any meaning unless we are living. Does that mean that being alive is our greatest good? Sort of, from some perspectives of that word. But does that mean that when we are alive we spend every moment thinking about staying alive? No, we pursue pleasure and avoid pain, but in the context of staying alive. Those viewpoints can be fit into all sorts of word-play constructions so you have to be careful.

Quote from camotero

is that it may be looked by many as an objective in itself, instead of pleasure, j

I agree that NOTHING is an objective in itself other than pleasure (which assumes staying alive).

Quote from camotero

you get a feeling that this philosophy is a highly individualistic one.

There is little doubt about that, and I think most of us here agree, that in practice Epicurean philosophy IS highly individualistic. However it also incorporates that your greatest pleasures are necessarily tied to having friends, so the goal is never "individualism for the sake of individualism" but "whatever works for the pleasure of myself and my friends (family, etc)." That is hard for some people to swallow but there is no mechanism in nature for feeling the feelings of other people other than through your personal contact with them. You can conceptualize "I love all humanity and all living things" and that's perfectly valid to derive pleasure from that. But there is no Supernatural or Natural mechanism in play that compels everyone to that point of view. There is the practical consideration that if you go around being "mean" others are likely to respond and smack you in the head. But that is a purely practical consideration and has no mechanism naturally or supernaturally to enforce it. Sometimes people we think are bad don't get smacked in the head - it is only if real people take real action to avenge the "wrongs" done on them that such punishment occurs.

Quote from camotero

I'd argue that an important (arguably the most important) part of the observations that we can make out of this comparison of species is that of our ability for empathy and compassion, and the pleasure we can get out of it, which, as I understand, from what I've read, was completely missing from Epicuru's description.

I would not say at all that that is completely missing. He emphasized that friendship is the most important tool for securing safety and happiness (pleasure). That means we have to be to some degree cooperative. What appears to be "missing" to many people is that because Epicurus held that there are no Gods or idealistic mechanisms to enforce the extension of friendship to the whole world, Epicurus didn't choose to invent one like Plato and the rest did. He acknowledged how Nature functions and says that's "The Way Things Are."

Quote from camotero

I'm not sure I get what you're trying to say here. Could you please explain? I do think all experiences could be categorized as either pleasurable or painful, and I like the simplicity of that. Are you saying this is not so? I'd like to learn your point of view about this.

What I am reacting to here is that some people think that Epicurus was only talking about "Bodily" pleasure (food drink sex etc). I believe it is clear that Epicurus included EVERY activity in life, even those which we consider to be purely "mental" as experiences that generate pleasure and pain. The reason to emphasize this is that Epicureans are attacked for allegedly thinking that "their god is the belly" and that is false. Epicurus clearly stated that "mental" pleasures and pains are frequently more intense and important than "bodily" ones. (That is clearly stated in Torquatus' section in On Ends)

Quote from camotero

Unfortunately, I've done it many times; since they start from a place of ideallistic competition, they focus on winning or losing the argument,

Yes and I too think it is unavoidable. Epicurus clearly did. If you live in a world of Platonists / Stoics like we do, there's going to be no way to avoid responding to their logic games.

Quote from camotero

what I meant is not that physics are not important, but rather that the specific physical explanations of Epicurus and Lucretius don't have to be right for the rest of the philosophy to be valid, especially nowadays that we have better explanations that allow us to reach these same two conclusions you mentioned.

I would just emphasize there that the ultimate conclusions are either certainly or probably still valid. I certainly think that the ultimate conclusion is that the universe operates on natural principles (not supernatural) and that there is no human life after death. Those I put in "certain" I also personally think that the other conclusions about "infinite space" and "eternal time" and "no infinite divisibility" were also very important to Epicurus, and remain highly probable at the very least, but I certainly understand that not everyone agrees with that and it's not such an important issue to resolve immediately that we can't all work together. However anyone who admits the nose of "supernatural" or "eternal soul" under the tent is in my view simply too far outside the limits to be considered an Epicurean.

Quote from camotero

Are there any examples or anecdotes about this?

There are several references in DeWitt which discuss this, but the main two text sources that talk about the deviations are:

(1) Diogenes Laertius in discussing the number of legs of the canon, and

(2) Torquatus (in On Ends) discussing how some Epicureans (himself included) think it is necessary to prove that pleasure is the goal by abstract means

Yes I think we are pretty close. It is possible to generalize, and generalizations are generally useful.

What I generally am fighting against is what I perceive to be also a "general" point of view of most people we run into in the outside world -- that there is some "objective" measurement to which all people should conform, including their view of whether something is pleasurable or painful.

I see this as another instance where it is necessary to simultaneously affirm two things that people think are in conflict:

(1) generalizations (about the sense of pleasure and many other things) are indeed generally useful as a matter of practice, so long as we acknowledge that they derive from the particular circumstances and people involved.

BUT

(2) Generalizations do not arise from supernatural means, nor is there a Platonic ideal or an Aristotelian "essence" by which anyone can say that there is only one "right" answer to a particular question.

The general tendency of people, due to religion and false philosophy, to embrace "objective" standards for all people at all times and all places is so strong, and so pervasive, and so insidious, that I think it is necessary to constantly "shout" that (like Diogenes of Oinoanda). As I experience life, in almost every conversation with the general world we can be sure that they are thinking that such an objective standard does exist. And they are presuming that we agree with them!

And this goes much further than basic pleasure sensations, but extends (because pleasures and pain are the starting point for all choices) into every ethical question as well.

Quote from Don

But the feeling of pleasure itself is a human/animal/natural reaction all humans/animals experience (unless there's a neurological disorder). That's why Epicurus could hold it up as a standard against which our decisions could be made. Otherwise, the idea of a *canon* is meaningless.

Ok I think we disagree there. I would say it is NOT the "everyone experiences it" that makes pleasure the standard but that FOR US these faculties are our only means of perception of reality which makes it the standard. 50 million Frenchmen are often "wrong" and while the experience of others is helpful to check out own predictions, it isn't the validation that comes from others concurring that makes pleasure the standard, but our own ability to verify through repetition that is our ultimate test.

No matter how many times and people I am told that spinach is pleasing, my reality will never agree with that.

I can admit that "spinach seems to be pleasant to most people, so I hear" but that is not and will never be the reality of my own pleasure. So my reality of pleasure disagrees with theirs , but I still assert that "pleasure" is the only standard of choice, because it is the only such faculty that we have.

Aside: I hope everyone who feels they have anything productive to contribute will weigh in with comments or questions as we proceed be side that could certainly help.

I think we can agree with all you wrote their yet we seem to be separate on something - and I perceive the issue is still the question of whether pleasure is any any sense "objective" across people(s) or is always a matter of individual perceptions.

I would say yes the faculty of pleasure is always the faculty of pleasure, but different people have different pleasure responses to exactly the same stimulus - and some people will find that exact stimulus painful. This means presumably that while it is fair to say that "pleasure" is the same faculty for all, there is no "objective" sense of pleasure that we can point to as leading to the same pleasure response in all situations, so we must always defer to the people involved and ask them "Do YOU find this pleasurable?"

These are good points to move the discussion along. Let me comment on them:

Quote from Don

I'm interpreting some things posted here to say that everyone has their own standard. No. I can't see how that can be correct. Everyone has their own opinions, beliefs, interpretations, etc., but the Canon provides a standard against which those opinions and beliefs are measured. You can't say a belief or opinion is "empty" κενός if you have nothing against which to measure it. Otherwise, the Canon has no meaning. You can't say the standard is not a standard. That doesn't place a value judgement. It a belief does not START with a canonical sensation, preconception, or feeling, it's not a valid belief. Not all beliefs are equal. How else could you say that a belief that the gods influence my actions is vain/empty/κενός without referring to the yardstick/ruler/Canon?

Let's start with that one: Yes I do think that everyone has there on sense of pleasure, and I think that is the easiest one to deal with. Some people find pleasure in many different ways -- do we agree on that?

If we do, then that's the first indication that a canonical faculty gives different results for different people.

Don't we also agree that people see colors in different ways (for example some are color-blind) and hear in different ways (some are "tone-deaf")? I think we'll agree there too.

As for anticipations, that's really the question we're discussing, so let's defer whether people have different instances of anticipations, though I will assert eventually that those differ too.

Where I think you are going, though, is that yes I agree that we can "generalize" and find that MOST people's sense of pleasure and pain, and their senses of sight and sound etc, do fall within ranges or bell curves or whatever. I would think that those "ranges" or "statistical probabilities" are what we are all thinking form the basis for our generalizations as to what is desirable and what is not desirable for most human beings.

But the real point there is that these are just generalizations, and they vary (sometimes dramatically) by individual, so while it is correct to say "generally" that most people (or most "Amerians") or most "men," or most of many other types of categories that we could come up with, do perceive things in a general way, that's pretty much the same as any other kind of statistical generalization. While yes that generalization does arise from nature, it's not really the kind of "absolute" standard at all that most people think about.

Now when we are talking about purely "mechanical" observations like length or width or weight or many many other things that can be "measured" yes we can come up with rulers and yardsticks and ways to measure them that are in fact 'objective' in way, but even there it is us (rather than nature) that is selecting an arbitrary standard to compare them against. Our confidence that those measurements always remains the same comes from the fact that we can reliably repeat them over and over and get the same result, not from any reference to an absolute standard "floating in the air"

Quote from Don

The Canon provides no ethical or conceptual content. All the canonic faculties (I think that's a good word) function pre-conceptually. "Images" impact the senses. Preconceptions/anticipations are exactly that: they are "before concepts" or "anticipate" concepts. The feelings of pleasure and pain are automatic. We cannot (really) control whether we feel pleasure or pain. We can decide to endure pain as a choice. But we feel pleasure or pain prior to any conceptual understanding of it or "meaning" behind it.

I think we are completely in agreement here, with the exception that pleasure and pain are the foundation of all ethical choices, and so I doubt that it is really proper to completely sever ethics from the canonical discussion.

Quote from Don

As far as determining whether something is just or not, whether there is justice in a given situation, that is entirely a matter for Ethics and the social contract. The most basic social contract - according to Epicurus - is "to neither harm nor to be harmed." That's not the prolepsis of justice. Granted, I'm still wrestling with what the "Prolepsis of Justice" is, but I'm leaning toward it having to do something with those animal experiments, especially since their working out something preverbally and maybe preconceptually but rather instinctually. The "prolepsis of justice" will not "tell" us whether something is just or not. That's determined by the social contract of a particular time and place.

I am pretty sure here is where we will disagree. First, I don't really think there is a sanction for saying that Epicurus really endorsed a 'social contract' in the first place, other than his observations that when people do agree not to harm each other, we can call that the foundation of any concept of "justice" that may exist. But he is also very clear that circumstances can and do change at a moment's notice, so that agreements which may have been "just" yesterday can become "unjust" today or tomorrow. And I think that just emphasizes the ephemeral nature of justice and that nothing is ever just in and of itself. He's really saying that any relationship that leads to the happiness of the person concerned with it may be considered just, but he's also saying that if we choose not to enter into any such arrangement (or for some reason we're not capable of it) there is no justice involved.

While it's possible to correctly generalize that most people in most situations benefit if they agree with each other, all those caveats to me simply emphasize that there is no such thing as absolute natural justice, social contract or not, so that the entire discussion just becomes another illustration that there is no such thing as absolute virtue (with justice simply being a subset of virtue).

As to this sentence "The "prolepsis of justice" will not "tell" us whether something is just or not. That's determined by the social contract of a particular time and place." I doubt I agree with that. I am thinking that would be better stated as something like "When I was a child I had four friends and the ice cream man gave us four ice cream cones so one of us didn't have one so we shared them equally anyway." I think that child found PLEASURE in seeing herself and all her friends get the same amount of ice cream. She found pleasure in that, however, only because her faculty of anticipations told her to recognize that there was an issue in everyone getting a a similar amount. Some of the other children could also have recognized the issue but thought "I am older so I should get more." And another one could think "I haven't eaten lunch so I should get more." And another one could think "I don't care what she thinks I am stronger and they depend on me so I deserve more." and many other possibilities could occur along the same lines.

In that scenario I would think that is an example that there is no natural sanction for a "social contract" for everyone to agree to divide equally, although that is ONE among several options that they could choose to follow. It was the sense of pleasure that ultimately provided the stop and go signal as each child evaluated (using their anticipations that there was an issue to consider) the situation that they might or might not choose to divide the ice cream equally. And to make Epicurus' point, they could choose to "agree" to divide it equally if they want, and they can call that "justice" if they want and "injustice" if someone breaks the agreement, but that ultimately if someone chooses to exit they agreement because it is no longer in their view mutually beneficial to them, they can simply choose to do so and no "injustice" is then involved. The word "just" becomes from that point of view as maleable as any other virtue - none of which are "absolute."

So ultimately I come down to the canonical faculty of pleasure as ultimately determining the "ethical choice" to be made. But it's also significant to note that no one would have ever even considered "ethics" to be involved at all if they didn't have an "anticipation" that "ethics" was a factor that they needed to consider as to how best to divide the ice cream. They could have, without that anticipattory disposition, just grabbed for all of the ice cream and each one tried to devour it all themselves just like we might say that a "savage" or some other primitive or hungry set of animals might do.

This continues to be a key passage too. To any question of whether Nature gives us any standard of conduct whatsoever, in the form of "ideas" "concepts" "justice" or whatever - there is only ONE answer: "What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?'" (and of course the answer implanted there is NOTHING)

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Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, be thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature.

What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance? Some members of our school however would refine upon this doctrine; these say that it is not enough for the judgment of good and evil to rest with the senses; the facts that pleasure is in and for itself desirable and pain in and for itself to be avoided can also be grasped by the intellect and the reason. Accordingly they declare that the perception that the one is to be sought after and the other avoided is a notion naturally implanted in our minds. Others again, with whom I agree, observing that a great many philosophers do advance a vast array of reasons to prove why pleasure should not be counted as a good nor pain as an evil, consider that we had better not be too confident of our case; in their view it requires elaborate and reasoned argument, and abstruse theoretical discussion of the nature of pleasure and pain.