I note in her abstract that she starts off by saying that psychological states are "real."

I didn't read any further than the abstract but that is one of the key issues that we answer philosophically rather than through science. What does "real" mean really mean?

I think that is what Epicurus was focusing on in major aspects of the canon of truth. There are all sorts of ways to think about what it means to be real to us, but ultimately I think he was seeing the canonical faculties as that ultimate testing ground of reality. Whatever they report to us is ultimately something we feel to be real at that moment. That doesn't mean that our opinion about the perception and the ideas / concepts we process from it are going to be accurate in all respects to wider reality, but whatever these faculties are reporting to us at any particular moment is something that our nature tells us to process as real at that moment. And that is all we as human beings can ever have as the raw data with which to judge for ourselves what is "real" to us.

And so while she may be interested in reducing the question to a matter or neurons or other bioiogical processes, that's a reduction that may lead to many medical or other practical benefits, but on the philosophical war level the focus remains on the philosophical question of the nature or truth and reality.

Quote from Don

Exactly. LFB (I like Godfrey 's initialism) would probably call that ("what we might call") something like the ideation or idea or realization of fear and the pre-rational instance the "concept."

Ok very good. If she is doing that then her terminology would appear to be not in accord with general use of the word concept, so we'll need to be careful to take that into account in discussing that aspect of her work.

Not only is there "lack of resources" to get something started, but we also should be realistic and aware that every powerful institution that has evolved over the last 2000 years (primarily church and academia and governmental elite) are all aligned against the emergence of forms of organization that would challenge their authority. Not that we would want to necessarily bother them, of course, but that they assume to themselves the right to dictate the lifestyle choices of everyone, not just themselves.

I am not making these comments to be negative as I think they can and eventually will be overcome. But to be successful it's importance to fairly assess the obstacles in our way so that we can then target a plan to overcome them.

Which always bring to my mind this from the opening of Lucretius' Book Six:

He therefore cleansed men’s breasts with truth-telling precepts and fixed a limit to lust and fear and explained what was the chief good which we all strive to reach, and pointed out the road along which by a short cross-track we might arrive at it in a straightforward course; he showed too what evils existed in mortal affairs throughout, rising up and manifoldly flying about by a natural –call it chance or force, because nature had so brought it about – and from what gates you must sally out duly to encounter each;

Quote from Don

Epicurus specifically did not want the members of the Garden's assets to be held in common

That's very clear from the texts and a very important point since a lot of people incorporate "communism" with the lifestyle they think Epicurus was associated with. Epicurus would have had before him the example from Plato of the community of women and children and the like, and I would expect he reacted against Platonic statist/communist ideals as he did to other Platonic ideals.

It seems like Epicurus was sufficiently well-off financially to afford multiple slaves and multiple pieces of real estate, so it sounds like they were getting contributions / making money from teaching and writing in addition to whatever they brought to the table from their own financial backgrounds, so that's definitely a consideration for modern-day efforts. Resources have to come from somewhere and that's very tricky to figure out.

CASSIUS LONGINUS - JewishEncyclopedia.com

CASSIUS LONGINUS:

By: Richard Gottheil, Samuel Krauss

Questor of Crassus in Syria in 53 B.C. After the unfortunate battle of Carrhæ, Syria, he became independent governor of the province, clearing it of the Parthians, and traversing all parts of the country in order to reestablish the fallen prestige of the Romans. Thus he came to Judea, where Pitholaus, a partizan of Aristobulus, had taken up arms against the Romans.

Cassius conquered the stronghold Tarichæa, killed the valiant Pitholaus at the instigation of Antipater, and carried away captive 30,000 Jews (Josephus, "Ant." xiv. 7, § 3; idem, "B. J." i. 8, § 9). He then went to Rome and was one of the conspirators against Julius Cæsar, who had appointed him pretor of Syria in 44. After Cæsar's murder he was sent as proconsul by the Senate in 43. Thus he came again to Judea, where, upheld by four Egyptian legions, he used his power to exact money from the Jews. The frightened Antipater quickly apportioned among the provinces the 700 talents of silver demanded by Cassius; and his son Herod was the first to pay his share. Malichus, however, the friend of Hyrcanus, seems to have hesitated, whereupon Cassius led away captive the inhabitants of the four cities Gophna, Emmaus, Lydda, and Thamma, and would have also killed Malichus, had not Hyrcanus appeased him with 100 talents ("Ant." xiv. 11, § 2; according to "B. J." i. 11, § 2, it was Antipater).

The Jews captured by Caius Cassius, as he is called, were liberated by a decree of Mark Antony ("Ant." xiv. 12, § 3), and it was ordered that Cassius' other depredations be repaired (ib. 12, § 5). During the war of Cassius and Brutus against Octavius Cæsar and Antony, Cassius, who was at that time in Syria, sought to gain the support of Herod by promising him the kingdom of Judea; Malichus was urged to poison Antipater ("Ant." xiv. 11, § 4; "B. J." i. 11, § 4). While Herod took the part of Cassius and the republicans, Malichus was looking forward to the victory of the Cæsarean party; so that it was in the interest of Cassius that Herod had the murderer of his father assassinated at Tyre, the old and weak Hyrcanus being induced to believe that the deed was instigated by Cassius ("Ant." xiv. 11, § 6; "B. J." i. 11, § 8). The anti-Herodian party joined issue with a certain Marion whom Cassius had left behind as master of Tyre; Herod, however, vanquished his enemies ("Ant." xiv. 11, § 7; 12, § 1; "B. J." i. 12, § 2) and thus put an end to Cassius' rule in Judea. Cassius soon after slew himself in the battle of Philippi, 42 B.C. ("B. J." i. 14, § 3).

Images of pages

V:3 P:605

V:3 P:606

I just came across on the Wikipedia page that this bust is being suggested as the true image of Cassius Longinus, rather than "Corbulo" as previously identified. The reasoning for this is contained in the book by Sheldon Nodelman: "Ancient Portraits In the J Paul Getty Museum" which can be downloaded here.

Much of the reasoning for assigning this to Cassius is contained in footnote 59 on page 59:

I note that the book contains lots of interesting material, not the least of which is this representation of the very modern-looking bust of Cassius' collaborator, Brutus:

My two cents comments:

Quote from Philia

And is anyone else interested in this too? I would love to know, as networking could be the key to creating this.

Networking is what we are all about so start a thread somewhere as you please: Perhaps here: Daily Life As An Epicurean We could expand into a separate section later.

Quote from Philia

Can we agree on a set of Epicurean postulates?

That is always hard and I wouldn't recommend you start with a full set or you'll never get started. It was very difficult to come up with the "Not-NeoEpicurean" list, even though such a list is needed for an elaborate project (like this forum). As an even more basic "litmus test" the set of four premises in the gold box is what I currently recommend as a distinguishing starting point for consensus in any level of complexity of project. Even there, while the first two are clear enough, the "all good and evil" quote is what I suggest to focus on the "negative" assertion that there is no absolute virtue, and the "pleasure is the beginning" is the focus on the positive assertion that feeling is the guide. If people can't agree that Epicurus was at least firm on those basics, my personal view is that they really aren't Epicurean at all.

OK I am trying to keep not only the big picture but also just the thread title in focus as we go forward. The issue under discussion is broadly speaking (I think) whether "concepts" as that word is commonly used are a part of the Epicurean canon of truth.

Some translators seem to take that position (that "concepts" are part of the canon of truth), but I think it is fair to say the majority (and those I personally find most persuasive) do not take that position. They think Epicurus was referring to something pre-rational, potentially "intuitive," that functions in parallel (and analogously, I think it is fair to say, as pre-rational) with the five senses and with the pleasure/pain mechanism.

So I think I am reading the Feldman-Barrett comments to say that she also agrees that there is a pre-rational mechanism going on that pre-exists in the sequence of things before the arisal of what we might call "the concept of fear."

If I am reading that correctly that that makes FB a useful data point in supporting Epicurus' contentions and explaining them as part of Epicurean philosophy.

(?)

Well if she is saying that "fear" is a word and that the definition of a word is contextual (with different words in different languages) then I have no problem with that.

If she is saying that the emotion that we call fear in English but which all animals and all humans appear to share - because we feel it prerationally -does not exist until a word is put to it after thinking about it, then that would be something else entirely.

Quote from Godfrey

Without a concept for “Fear,” you cannot experience fear.”

This quote seems particularly stark to me in making clear that it is important to define what is meant by this word "concept" because the view expressed here is almost certainly not the view that is implicit in the ancient debates, where by my reading a concept is something formed after thought based on experience.

Now fear is an emotion / feeling and a human would most certainly experience fear as a natural feeling before ever thinking and describing the experience in words, which seems to be a central part of concepts.

Use of Feldman Barrett or anyone else to describe the processes actually involved will be helpful, but I also think to keep the conversation on course we have to focus on the debate in traditional terms, and there it seems to me that the word concept is closely related to "ideas" and "forms" and the ultimate questions of whether there are external locations (realm of ideas, religion/gods, formal logic /virtue) to which we must conform our thoughts and actions.

On the other hand focusing on what is actually going on is obviously good, so there's a balance involved!

Quote from Godfrey

But he's obviously not a Skeptic: the verification comes from direct experience.

Indeed, THAT is the function of the canon of truth!

And Nate thank you again for having a better memory than I do, because this is another thread where we need to suit up Don on one side vs Norman DeWitt on the other (and apparently Archontia Liontaki too) as to whether to read sovereignty / kingship into Epicurus' writings on self-protection.

(But we were talking earlier about PD14 there. RE: PD14 - Alternate Translations Nevertheless a related issue?)

Elli has been away for a while but I hope this will encourage her to drop by again soon!

Thanks to Nate's summary I can paste here the ones that seem to me to be of the same mind that we are NOT talking "full-blown concepts" --

Hicks 1910 : or in feeling or in any mental apprehension

Hicks 1925 : or in feelings or in any presentative perception of the mind

Bailey: or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind

Long: through feelings, and through every focusing of thought into an impression

O'Connor: or in feelings or in any immediate perception of the mind,

Inwood and Gerson: the feelings, and every application of the intellect to presentations,

Anderson: every intuitive faculty of mind,

Makridis: the passions, or some other imaginary twist of mind

St Andre: your feelings, and all the layers of imagination involved in your thoughts

Strodach: or in the feelings or some percept of the mind itself

Mensch: feeling, or perception

Wow we'll have to see what Don thinks of that!

Quote from Don

This seems to be the sticking point. This goes against the "withhold judgement" ideas of Epicurus's philosophy.

That's referring to "beyond any need for seconds further data or reflection."

So I don't think that goes far enough. I don't think we can deal entirely within the Epicurean viewpoint here (unless you want to specify an Epicurean definition of "concept") because "concept" has a pretty clear and definite meaning among most of us today, and we're not going to be able to have public conversations about "concepts" unless we are clear on the terms.

And "concepts" are pretty darn close, if not identical, to "Platonic forms" and/or "universals." Certainly we can agree that concepts can be changed, but at any particular moment a "concept" i think is generally understood to be "a general notion or idea; conception" which at the time it is being discussed is considered to be something special.

Yikes who is Odysseus Makridis and should we consider him a good source?

Odysseus Makridis | Fairleigh Dickinson University

www.fdu.edu

Yes Joshua that is what I am thinking too - but I definitely still want your "why" as that will help flesh out the question.

I suspect Don might say that "Christianity" is pretty much on order with the "non-aggression principle' as a "platonic universal." And yes, that analysis is probably correct, and leads to the conclusion I think that is likely, which is that this formulation doesn't work, because a "mental examination of a confirmed concept" or at least a "confirmed concept" IS a Platonic universal. Is that correct / do we agree on that?

To be fair to Geer and test his wording I am looking to see whether there is any way in which a confirmed Epicurean might consider a "mental examination of a confirmed concept" to be a standard of truth(?)

OK I don't think that answer really gets to where we need to go so maybe I should drop back even further to the issue of:

What is a "mental examination of a confirmed concept" if one were to accept that version of the doctrine?

In asking about a "non-aggression principle" maybe that is too complex an example. If the suggested translation were to be accepted as accurate, what would be an example of a "mental examination of a confirmed concept" that would then be considered a canonical standard of truth?

Again, I am not convinced this translation is a good one, but in order to examine it let's presume that it is and look for an example of how to apply it on its own terms. Can this construction be applied consistently with what we know about the rest of Epicurean philosophy?

No one has responded yet to my question in this post:. RE: PD14 - Alternate Translations

Anyone? I Want to check my thinking in this issue.