Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

That's where I'm uneasy about Cassius maintaining the anticipations are wrong or can be wrong, if I'm reading him correctly.

So please help me be as absolutely clear on this as possible, and let's beat the point home like a drum:

No data (sensation?) from a canonical faculty is anything other than "reported honestly" so that data is always "true to us at that moment" in the sense that it is reported truly ("honestly," "without injection of opinion.")

But at the same time, no "data" / "sensation" from a canonical faculty is ever, in itself, a "concept" or an "understanding" -- it is always simply a "feeling" or a "bit of sensory data" that must be built up in the mind into words and concepts.

This is the trademark attribute of what it means to be a canonical faculty - they operate "automatically" without injection of "opinion" ("concepts") at any time.

No "concept" is ever "absolutely true" because concepts are constructions of the human mind and are not given us by gods or through ideal Platonic forms.

Therefore in human terms, the only test of "truth" is really "true to us" which is what we build up from the set of three canonical faculties.

Now another absolutely vital concept that we haven't stated so far in this conversation is that these attributes of the canonical faculties (that they are only true to the extent we reliably build them up from our canonical faculties) is not a defect or a limitation of something to go hide in our cave and cry about. This attribute that these are the only things that are reported to us without opinion mean that they are our most prized and vital possessions which we MUST use and we MUST rely on to form our own judgments about how to live and everything else that is important in life.

The Platonists and Religionists have backed us into the corner of thinking that only if a concept is absolutely true for all people, all times, all places is it worth anything. That is absolute RUBBISH and BS and needs to be treated as such. We have to seize the moral high ground and assert not only that we are firm in going with the conclusions that we draw from our canonical faculties, but we absolutely reject and dismiss (probably even the Epicurean "spit on") the assertions of absolutely truth -- because they are childish fantasies and deserve to be treated as such.

At the risk of quoting too long an excerpt, I need to insert here the reference I have cited before as I think articulating the best way forward in understanding the difference between an "innate idea" versus an "innate principle." This is from Jackson Barwis' book against John Locke's view of innate ideas, and it is the most clear presentation of this issue I have found. I think Barwis is essentially stating the position Epicurus was describing.

This also addresses the argument which immediately must be confronted by anyone who asserts that there are truly innate "ideas." They must be confronted immediately with the question: "Well, then, give me a list of them!"

All this comes from Barwis's "Dialogues On Innate Principles"

Quote

Mr. Locke then, you know, returned I, has used several ways to prove that we have no innate principles: and though I clearly see that your arguments do make generally against them all; yet I shall be better satisfied if you will permit me to particularize some of them, if it be only to hear, from you, a refutation of them.

He bowed.

You know, continued I, Mr. Locke advances that principles cannot be innate unless their ideas be also innate. "For, says he, if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those principles; and then they will not be innate, but be derived from some other original. For where the ideas themselves are not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental or verbal propositions about them."

Now is there nothing in what he advances in this place that will affect your doctrine of innate principles?

I think not, answered he.

For granting that we have no innate ideas, it is by no means from thence follow, as he says, then we have no innate principles. Ideas, simply considered, are very different things from innate moral principles, or from any other principles, which constitute the nature of things. If I have not already shown, I will, by and by, endeavor more clearly to show that the propositions we compose according to our idea of things are nothing but propositions; they are not really the principles of the things treated of: the principles of the things treated of are naturally inherent and exist perpetually in them whether our ideas or propositions concerning them be true or false.

But in the part quoted there is a fallacy. He says, "if the ideas be not unique, there was a time when the mind was without those principles." The conclusion, you see, is vague and delusive. The only just conclusion he could have drawn was, that if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those ideas, out of which the propositions are formed, which I call principles. I doubt not that you perceive they are very improperly so called in the present question. For Mr. Locke thus confounds the principles of our nature, and the ideas contained in the propositions he names, together, as if they were the same things: but they cannot be so, because the one receives existence from the prior existence of the other. That is, our moral ideas receive their existence from the prior existence of our innate moral sentiments or principles: as our ideas of light and figure are derived from the prior existence of sight.

In this question the matter, as too frequently happens, has been puzzled and obscured by the misuse of words. Axioms, and allowed propositions, are called principles. But they are only principles formed by the human mind, in aid of its own weakness; which, in reasoning, can proceed but a little way without proved or granted propositions to rest on. They might, perhaps, with much more propriety, be called helps, assistances, or supports to the imbecility of the human mind, than principles of things. The principles which naturally inhere in every species of created beings are of a nature entirely different.

It seems, then, said I, that you agree with Mr. Locke that neither ideas or propositions can be innate: but you differ from him by denying any propositions what so ever to be properly the principles of any species of beings; and by affirming that both speculative and practical propositions are mere creatures of human invention; which whether they be true or false, that is, founded in the nature of things or not, the true natures and principles of things remain unalterably the same.

That is my meaning, replied he, and that, therefore, most of the arguments advanced by Mr. Locke against innate principles are nothing, or but very little, to the purpose; because they only tend to combat things as innate principles which are nothing like innate principles; and, if it be not too bold a thing to say of so penetrating a genius, he seems only to have been fighting with a phantom of his own creating.

Indeed, highly as I think of his genius and integrity, I should have much doubted of his sincerity in this doctrine if we had not frequently seen men of the first rate abilities suffer themselves to be carried into great absurdities by their fondness for a favorite system, or, by too hasty a desire of forming a perfect one.

It is certain, however, that nothing can be more excellent than his work as far as it regards our manner of acquiring ideas by sensation and reflection. But what should move him to advance that we have no other way of acquiring ideas; why he should exclude our moral sense and deny even its existence with the pains of so much acute false reasoning, I shall not, at present, endeavor to explain. But having so determined, he found it necessary to remove all notions of innate moral principles (and with them, all other innate principles) out of the way, in the beginning of his book: for had they been granted, another source of ideas must have been admitted besides those of sensation and reflection as explained by Mr. Locke. And I shall not hesitate to affirm that a clear and indisputable explication of this mode of acquiring ideas would have cost him much more pains in trouble than all the rest of his most ingenious work. For human actions and opinions, in the ordinary course of things, pass away in so rapid a succession as to leave no lasting traces behind them; nothing fixed to which we may refer for a renewal or a correction of our moral ideas concerning them, if our memory prove deficient. And, unless they be recorded with extraordinary accuracy, they can seldom be contemplated a second time in precisely the same light in which they were viewed at the first.

But all those ideas which arise in our minds by the impressions which external things make upon our senses being derived from objects of fixed and lasting natures, when our memory fails us, when we doubt the clearness or precision of our ideas, we can, generally, refer with ease to the objects themselves, and can renew, or rectify, our ideas at pleasure. This renders geometry so certain and indisputable as science: for the least variation or incorrectness in our ideas may be discovered and corrected by recurring to the figures themselves, which, through the medium of sight, convey invariably the same ideas to the mind. Nor is there any impediment, anything naturally interesting to our affections, in the nature of the things themselves, that should make us see them falsely or apply them irrationally.

But it is not so in moral science; it more closely concerns and is more deeply interesting to us in every point of view: it therefore throws more impediments in our way to a right understanding and clear comprehension of its truths. Our early-imbibed prejudices, misplaced affections, ill-governed passions, and jarring interests, distort and falsify our ideas in moral subjects extremely, nor can a just and natural representation of our moral sentiments or feelings take place in our minds until those delusive and turbulent enemies to moral truth be subdued or properly corrected. And also to men whose affections and passions are duly tempered, and minds naturally adjusted, moral truths may be as clear as mathematical ones, yet, from the unhappy circumstances above-mentioned, they are generally much more clouded and obscured; and are, therefore, perpetually subjected to tedious and unpleasant disputations: a very untoward and disgusting circumstance without a doubt.

But which you think, replied I, not enough so to have caused Mr. Locke to deny the existence of innate moral principles; things so essentially interesting to the calls of virtue: and which, you consider as a source of ideas, not comprehended in what he understands by sensation and reflection.

And are you not of the same mind, interrogated he, in a lively tone?

At present I am, answered I, but yet I must bid with Mr. Locke to be more clearly informed concerning the nature of those innate principles; for, says he, "nobody has yet ventured to give a catalogue of them."

By the demand of a catalog of them, said my friend, he seems only to expect a string of moral maxims or propositions: but these, we have agreed, with him, are not innate principles: we have agreed that they are not properly principles of things at all. But, before we attempt to explain farther what we mean by innate moral principles, it may not be improper to endeavor to define what we would be understood to signify by the word principle, so far, at least, as it regards our present inquiry: and so, perhaps, when we come to speak of any innate principle, after describing it as well as we can, we may be allowed to say what Mr. Locke says of the faculty of perception, which I presume is innate, viz. “who ever reflects on what passes in his own mind cannot miss it; and if he does not reflect, all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it.” So, our moral principles be innate, and of a simple nature, when we would describe the sensations or sentiments they produce in us; if by turning men's minds inward upon their own feelings we cannot make them perceive what they are, words in any other view will be vain and useless. Yet in essentials all men must be sensible of them, and capable of perceiving them, clearly enough, in plain, practical cases, for all the good purposes of human life: except, indeed, such persons as Mr. Locke very strangely, not to say preposterously, selects as the most likely to preserve a pure and perfect sense of them: viz. idiots, infants, and madmen.

He was going to proceed in the definition of his meaning by the word principle when finding we were just at home, he declined it to another opportunity; to which I assented, on a promise that it should be early next morning. And thus ended our first dialogue.

Display More

Quote

[124] For the statements of the many about the gods are not conceptions derived from sensation, but false suppositions, according to which the greatest misfortunes befall the wicked and the greatest blessings (the good) by the gift of the gods. For men being accustomed always to their own virtues welcome those like themselves, but regard all that is not of their nature as alien.

This is the Bailey version, and it is my understanding that the word here listed as "false suppositions" is or is closely related to the prolepsis word. Let's dig into that, along iwth his "conceptions derived from sensation."

This takes us squarely into the "why is it called a PRE-conception vs a conception" argument.

Quote from Don

That's where I'm uneasy about Cassius maintaining the anticipations are wrong or can be wrong, if I'm reading him correctly. My reading of Epicurus is that the senses are an accurate reflection of reality. They are "true." It's our opinions and beliefs branching off from our canonical faculties that are the problem and not the Canon itself. I think it's the same or similar with the anticipations (as implied by that quote from the Letter to M.)

Yes this is the point we need to drill down on. I firmly think (and I think DeWitt says too) that any anticipation is always (1) reported truthfully - that's what makes it canonical, BUT ALSO - (2) need not be true "to all the facts" or "to the big picture" which is why we check one anticipation against another, just like we check one sight against other sights, one hearing against another hearing, etc .

This is EXACTLY the point that DeWitt goes into in regard to the multiple meaning of "all sensations are true" -- Yes they are reported honestly, but nobody ever said they are ominiscient or "absolutely true" for everyone in the world. Each sensation and feeling of pleasure and anticipation are "reported truly to us" by the faculty that is involved, but that does not make it "true for everyone in the world." The only way we have confidence in predicting that the sensation/feeling/anticipation will remain true for us is by the REPETITION of receiving the same sensation in the same context.

This is a huge point so we need to stay with it til we all come to a clear understanding of the parts where we agree and the parts where we don't agree.

If we were to conclude that an "anticipation" were "completely true to everyone" -- such that our view of "justice" is the same for all people all times all places we would immediately be transformed into Platonists and that is exactly what Epicurus was warning against.

There is a strong tendency for us to think that "anticipations" amounts to "innate ethical conclusions" but I think that would be a disastrous conclusion and surely what Epicurus was warning exactly against.

I think we'll find these things borne out as we dig into the actual citations.

Don looks like you were typing as I was writing post 10 so be sure you see it as now finished.

My comment in response to the last two posts is that I would emphasize over an over that any single "anticipation" might be just as erroneous as any single glimpse by sight or hearing of the thing being considered. A faculty of being aware that "there's something here I need to pay attention to" does not tell you what you should "conclude" about it. I think that is the main issue that needs to be grappled with in discussing anticipations -- "faculties" are not omniscient or omnipotent and the immediate temptation to conclude "Nature tells everyone to be 'fair'' or "Nature tells us to punish the unjust" needs to be resisted because as Epicurus hammers home there IS no absolute just or unjust.

Then:

Quote from EricR

While definitions abound in trying to pin down what is pornographic and what is not, I can say with confidence that "I know it when I see it." While the context can vary historically and across cultures, I've often wondered if most people "know it when they see it" and then attempt to define it afterward. Is this an example of an Anticipation?

I would say that yes this is quite possibly the faculty of anticipations at work. You recognize that there is an issue here that needs to be evaluated and dealt with, but you are not given at birth a "rule-book" written by a Censorship Committee of what is and is not acceptable. If you did not have some natural faculty disposing you to take notice of this issue, you would stare blankly at it and see nothing of significance to you any more than a grasshopper looking at a TV screen.

Quote from EricR

What is blank are the actual ideas, thoughts, concepts, etc. that are later conceived via the interaction of the Anticipations with experiences. Am I understanding this correctly?

I agree with Don that the terms "blank slate" and even "blank" are not very useful at all, and as they ARE used by those philosophers who promote it, it is very damaging, because what they are indeed trying to do is erase all reference to natural faculties and dispositions, in favor of "logic" -- conceptual processing that they seem to believe is TOTALLY within our own minds and arrived at by our own thinking.

Quote from EricR

Now, how about "divine nature"? If we are not born with actual innate ideas, what is going on with this one? What is innate in us that refers to what we later define conceptually?

I would say that the Velleius narative in "On The Nature of the Gods" is, as DeWitt suggests, an accurate version of Epicurus' views. We are born with a faculty that allows us to recognize higher and lower states of "performance" in living, and we are at birth wired / disposed to categorize ways of living as "more or less blessed" (or any similar superlative you want to use). As we grow older from day to day we are exposed to more examples of ways of living and our minds begin to classify them according to what we begin to conclude are better or worse. As we think about these ways of life we are exposed further to stories and natural scenery that inspire us to deeper and deeper thought. We are exposed to the idea that the universe is infinite and eternal and teeming with life. We are exposed to statues and artworks and depictions of divinity that others before us have conceived. And if you take Epicurus at his word, we are exposed to "images" that stimulate our minds directly (if you want to joke, like radiation from a cell phone, or radio reception through a tooth filling) to think further about these issues.

But despite all that, these things are not properly thought of as "innate ideas." We are not born Presbyterians or Islamists or atheists.

And to repeat my view is that it is very important to speak accurately and distinguish "the faculty of anticipations" which is like "the faculty of sight" as against "an anticipation" or "one or more anticipations" which is like saying "I observed elephants from a tour bus four times in my life." Those observations are extremely helpful, but they are raw data that must be processed into opinions, and once they become opinions, they are no longer strictly examples of anticipations. Your viewpoint of on whether you find elephants to be sympathetic and admirable creatures arises FROM your sensations of them in the past, and from the feelings of pleasure or pain you felt in regard to them, and from your anticipations by which you organized your views of their "justice" or "blessedness" or other abstract issues), but all of those you have processed into opinions, and those are YOUR opinions, not handed to you in final form by Nature, and YOU have to take responsibility for the correctness of your personal conclusion to be a Nature Guardian or a Big Game Hunter. Others can decide whether to judge you positively or negatively as to which of those choices you take, but everyone (you, those who judge you - everyone) are just acting to the best of your abilities. Nature hasn't programmed any of you on the final conclusion you "should" reach. There's no heavenly ranking or Platonic realm list which tells everyone how to evaluate those things.

Even though I am disagreeing with him as to the word "ideas," I believe I am essentially following, and simply expanding, on DeWitt's perspective on all this. DeWitt knows much better than I do that there can be false anticipations, as cited in the letter to Menoeceus. Once you incorporate into the big picture that no single anticipation can be considered to give you the "correct big picture," I think this "anticipations as a faculty that provides data that can be either 'right' or 'wrong' to the full facts" position is where you end up.

Eric you have highlighted a passage in DeWitt that I agree is very important but where I have a different point of view than DeWitt:

Quote

the innate ideas of justice, of the divine nature, and other such abstractions, and it puts to the test every law of the land to determine whether it harmonizes with the innate idea of justice.

In my view DeWitt would have been better off if he had not used the word "idea" here and had instead used a word like "principle." Not to split hairs, but i think to suggest that we are born with fully formed "ideas" would be a form of Platonism that Epicurus was reacting against. DeWitt consistently points out how Epicurus is antiPlatonic in many areas, and he should have carried over that analogy more clearly in this area as well.

In my view, the anticipations have to be considered to be a "faculty" that is equivalent to the five senses and the feeling of pleasure. Faculties is a reference to mechanisms that work through principles, like eyes involve natural "physical" principles of optics and hearing involves natural "physical" principles of sounds. We are not born with "ideas" of shapes or sizes or colors, we are born with a faculty of sight which perceives those qualities about things when we "see" them through the physics involved in optics. We are not born with "ideas" of music or symphonies or claps of thunder, we are born with a faculty of hearing that perceives those things when we are exposed to the physical phenomena involved with sound, for the first time after birth. We are not born with feelings of pleasure in ice cream or pleasure in sex or pleasure in dancing, we are born with a faculty that perceives those pleasures through the physical principles involved in the way we are "wired" for pleasure and pain, when we experience those phenomena for the first time.

Likewise I think it is not correct to suggest that we are born with "ideas" of justice such as equality before the law or contracts or cooperation or teamwork. We are born with a faculty of perceiving that something called "justice" is involved in certain situations and arrangements when we perceive those arrangements for the first time. We are not born with an "idea" of a god being omnipotent or omniscient of even self-sufficient. We are born with a faculty of perceiving that there is a spectrum of perfection in living beings, and that as we come into contact with examples of living beings we can recognize that there is a way to rank living beings in terms of how successful they are in living.

I think that "ideas' as that term is generally understood (fully formed concepts) is very different from "principles" of operation of the faculties that nature gave us, which is all very "preconceptual."

So I think DeWitt is correct that anticipations are something we are born with, but instead of suggesting that they are "ideas" he should have suggested that there is a "faculty of anticipations" which involved physical principles of operation that dispose us to form concepts in certain ways in those areas of human life.

And in addition, it seems to me critical to observe that just as any single sight or hearing or touch may not be "true to all the facts" of what we are seeing or hearing or touching, just as Epicurus said in the letter to Menoeceus, it is possible for "anticipations" not to be true to the facts as well, as when people have anticipations about the nature of gods that are incorrect, such as when they think that the gods are like themselves. That means that there can also be anticipations of justice that can be incorrect, such as when we think that justice can or should be the same for all people at all times and all places, which Epicurus says specifically is not the case.

I recognize that my thoughts here are not fully-formed and are more assertions than something that can be considered firmly established, but this is personally how I think is the best way to extend the direction that DeWitt was correctly moving, but (in my humble opinion) did not state quite as well as he could have.

Very interesting Joshua!

Possibly one of the ironies here is that even to engage in a discussion for the proposition "there is no highest good" or "there are no supernatural gods" you are necessarily entering into a playing field of abstract logic where you are accepting definitions which do not map perfectly to reality. Did Epicurus do that at times? Apparently, so as to show the way out of Platonic logic traps, but it seems the later Epicureans felt forced to do so more frequently (as cited by Torquatus) and even though they perhaps fought fiercely to maintain Epicurus' original point as well, it's easy for establishment victors to preserve only what they want to preserve.

I do think though that when "other" Epicureans went so far as to admit a fourth leg into the canon, which seems to me to have been done as an accomodation to "logic", was a fateful and fatal mistake.

Ok I am back!

It seems to me that in the past I've had several conversations along these lines so I'd like to try to move straight to the ultimate issues if I can -

I don't think what we're really discussing is varying views of the gods (that they exist in reality vs as ideal constructions of the human mind). We have many opinion on that here among Epicureanfriends users and I don't think we have enough evidence to choose one option as the only one that was in Epicurus' mind. In fact this might be analogous to the multiple options that he allowed in astronomical matters (as long as the options all are consistent with observable facts).

It sounds to me like what you're really arguing in the issue of gods is that we should accept that some people have views of active gods that are not destructive of and in fact beneficial to their happiness.

I think my best response to that would be to drop back and say that I think we should keep in mind the likelihood (I think a certainty) that Epicurus was aware of the need to, and constantly did, swap back and forth between talking in terms which are primarily "logical" at times, while at other times focusing on the "practical." I think he would say that doing so does not make him inconsistent but acknowledges the limits of logic (the need to always tie it to observable evidence) and the ultimate primacy of the canonical faculties given by nature.

So when you point to particular cases and say that particular people get particular hope from their particular views of a particular type of god, I believe Epicurus would say "of course that can happen." He basically says as much in his concluding remarks on agency in the letter to Menoeceus where he points to it being better to believe in myths than to succumb to hard determinism. That is the ultimate practical side of Epicurus.

But I also think that Epicurus lived in a world dominated by Platonists and the rest who identify "logic" as the way to approach these issues, and so he also took a position on the "logical best" position to take, as he seems to have done on the issue of the "greatest good / good" even while criticizing the Peripatetics for walking around harping on it uselessly.

And I think Epicurus would say that on that purely theoretical level (which I think is where you also get the best reasoning in favor of the "idealist" view of the gods) the best way for the "average" human to view the gods so as to live the theoretical happiest life with the least possible anxiety is the way he advocated -- that as a logical ideal, "gods" should be thought of in absolute terms as supremely self-sufficient and therefore not concerned about things that they have no need to be concerned about. I see that as analogous to the point which causes so much debate and (in my view) is so easy to misinterpret - that the greatest pleasure can be equated (at least in magnitude) with the absence of pain. That observation in my view is based on the logical abstraction of quantity which results from categorizing ALL experience as either pleasure or pain. In that statement I believe he is abstracting those two words "pleasure" and "pain" and expecting us to understand that those two words cover a myriad - actually unlimited - number of experiences that are each subtlety different from each other and tied to their individual facts.

So where I end up is the view that you can definitely be right that in certain contexts certain views which we might not consider to be "ideal" can be practically useful, so it would be perverse to deny that and make "the perfect the enemy of the good."

However at the same time it is important in other contexts to be able to engage with the world around you, and if you are surrounded by Platonists instead of fundamentalist Christians, you need to be able to identify in your own mind, in response to the Platonists, a logical formulation of the "best" view of religion -- at least if you decide to play their game of accepting for the sake of discussion that there is a "best" view at all.

We probably ought to have an independent discussion of whether it is ever a good idea, and if it is, in what circumstances, to engage in these logic games despite Epicurus' insistence that there is no realm of pure logic, that logic itself is not part of the canon, that the canonical faculties are themselves the standard of truth, etc.

But just like you are pointing to realities that some people do seem to profit from their "active god" religious views, there are some people who insist on being Platonists / Stoics / and idealists of all kinds, and we live in a world were in practical terms most of us cannot escape from engaging with them.

That's the main point I wanted to make. Then there is also this:

To the extent you are saying that it seems likely to you that advanced beings would take interest in lesser beings as a matter of pleasure to themselves, I think Epicurus would also say "of course" and he would point to his position on isonomia and on infinite numbers of worlds with life on them and he would say of course there are highly advanced beings who do exactly like that, just like we do ourselves, but on a far more advanced scale that would seem to most of us as being "godlike." The isonomia view would I think allow for an infinite progression / spectrum of advancement above us.

It's only when someone insists on speculating "What about the TOP level of advancement" (as if there is such a thing, which I am not sure Epicurus would say that there is) that I think it would become appropriate to discuss his views of "perfect" beings. I would expect him to say that either virtually all or actually all of the advanced god-like beings that exist in the universe are somewhere on that spectrum other than at the logical top, so to greater or lesser degrees that might well take interest in things around them.

In my mind, it is not Epicurus' views of the theories of gods that would make him reject the claim that such things as Jesus rising from the "dead" happened, or the various miracles that they claim are true did not actually happen. In my view, Epicurus would take the position that all kinds of things that we have never seen before "may" actually come to our attention, but if they do they are not "supernatural" - a logical term which is an impossibility in terms of Epicurean reasoning.

The real persuasive objection to the claims of miracles is not the assertion of abstract logic that they "cannot" happen, but that there is no valid evidence that they do happen. Many of our technological marvels today would seem like magic to the ancient Epicureans (at least in a manner of speaking) but they would be (1) confident that the effect was not supernatural, and (2) confident that upon studying the facts long enough they would eventually be able to understand how such things were brought about naturally.

Just because we think that it is impossible for supernatural gods to exist, that doesn't mean that tomorrow our solar system isn't going to be invaded by living breathing highly-advanced aliens from another galaxy who choose to destroy the earth in an instant for some purpose of their own.

OK I have probably rambled enough but maybe some of these comments will advance the conversation.

It's 2am for me and the only thing I have time to say before I fall asleep is "You're going to have to work a lot harder before it's time to consider Banishment!" :-). Now my problem is how to remember to come back here since I've flipped the "unseen" notification. I will have much more to say.

Nope there is apparently one more -- a little different from the first two:

Looks like "the Epicureans" had a second song on Youtube, so this may be their full collection:

This was a very good question made over at Facebook which deserves a crosspost. Others may have additional thoughts that would be good to preserve on this point:

DG: "...πᾶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἐν αἰσθήσει..." All good things and bad things are in sense-perception... Letter to Menoeceus, 124. ... Are intellectual pleasures found in sense-perception? Are there any good or bad things (pleasure and pain) not found in sense-perception? Where do pleasant memories or dread of future events factor in with respect to sense-perception?

Cassius:

I think the general answer to your question is that pleasure and pain itself, as a faculty of feeling, is categorized as within the Epicurean canon of truth, and it weighs in, as a feeling, on all experiences, physical and mental, that come to our attention. So presuming you mean "found" in the sense of "included" I think the answer to the first question is "yes" and that is an extremely important point, and I would include everything we think of emotions/feelings/thoughts/bodily sensations --- everything that comes to our attention -- within the broadest definition of things that we sense and feel pleasure or pain in.

As to the second question there is an ambiguity in the definition of "sense-perception" and it can be argued that Epicurus seems to generally refer to everything that comes to our attention or consciousness as sense-perception. Consider these: PD02. "Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us." So there is nothing intrinsically good or bad in itself that is not within that wider sense of the word sensation. Also, from Torquatus in On Ends: "Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, be thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature. What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance? "

As to the third question I would say that memories and thoughts come to our attention in way analogous to seeing or hearing things, and so pleasure and pain weigh in on those just like they evaluate everything else of which we are conscious.

DG: Cassius Amicus thank you very much for this well thought out response! ... I'd like to investigate this claim further: "...and it can be argued that Epicurus seems to generally refer to everything that comes to our attention or consciousness as sense-perception." I also think that you have given me enough here to understand the lines Epicurus might take to respond to my questions. Best,

Cassius:

All this is no doubt a difficult subject and I certainly admit the possibility that I am wrong - just giving you the best analysis my limited mind can muster after some years of study. I've constantly run into the issue that the three legs of the canon (including pleasure/pain and anticipations) seem to be understandable only in terms of them being considered by Epicurus to be kinds of "faculties" in themselves - each being independent channels or connections with the outside world. There is of course much controversy over whether anticipations should be labeled in that way, and it's not altogether clear that feeling (pleasure and pain) is that way either. But if Epicurus was considering them to be co-equal "standards of truth" that were not influenced by opinion (and thus subject to error) but as faculties that should be accepted at face value (subject only to correct by later observations from the same source) then I think you do have to consider them as "faculties."

There are big questions as to whether "everything" has to come originally through the five senses, or whether pleasure/pain and anticipations are disposed in certain directions at birth. I take the position with DeWitt that Epicurus thought it was important to see those two as being at birth subject to some degree of "programming" or "disposition" but yet requiring stimulation from the five senses to be "activated." Apparently later Epicureans after Epicurus diverged from Epicurus on this point, and there again I agree with DeWitt's contention that they made a grave mistake in doing so.

OK thank you that is exactly the kind of thing I was looking for! There will always be a chain of authorities for whom we have to trace back and scrutinize each link.

Thanks for the very thoughtful post. I haven't had time to watch the video yet, but I want to make a couple of comments. I'm not prepared with time enough to write lengthy response but I want to lay out what I think are the basics:

Quote from camotero

But there's something that bothers me about trying to say that Epicurus "had a lot of things right" when it comes to physics, as if, if he hadn't, everything else could be discarded as invalid.

I think when we summarize by saying that we think Epicurus "had a lot of things right" we're really saying that we think he had "the important things" right -- such that the universe runs on natural principles and is not subject to supernatural oversight. In the end, I think that is a conclusion based on a combination of physics observations and choices made in epistemology, which is probably why Laertius says that the Epicureans tended to combine the discussion of the two, as Lucretius does.

So yes I would maintain that there are things that are "essential" that he got right in his physics, that are the essential foundation of the rest, and then there are many other things that are less important, most of which he included under the heading of "we don't have enough information to know which answer is right and all we need is a set of alternatives that provide options for us to consider that are natural"

I am in agreement with you that a search for a totally consistent and comprehensive set of physics propositions, and I think Epicurus says that himself as well, especially in the passage (Herodotus? Pythocles?) where he says that what is needed is not a comprehensive theory of everything but to live happily.

However to bring that point back in a full circle, he could reach the conclusion that what is needed is to live happily ONLY because his physics and epistemology convinced him that there is no life after death to be concerned about reward/punishment, or supernatural gods to be concerned about obeying.

Quote from camotero

as I understand it, he didn't say that his physics were the foundation of his whole philosophy, but the Canon is, but I may be wrong about this.

That carries over from what I typed above, and I would say that he was confident in his epistemology NOT because it was logically sound, but because it went hand in hand and mutually supported his physics, and vice versa. The epistemology could not stand without confidence in a physics which helps us explains how the senses work, and of course our physics could not stand without our understanding and having confidence in the sense. The two are mutually supporting and both essential. The ethics follows from both together, in my view of Epicurus.

Quote from camotero

the things that we, after observation can be sure that are impossible (like having external invisible forces influencing our lives and having things appearing or disappearing to and out of nowhere),

And that's where we end up together, and our difference may only be that you seem to believe that it is self-evidently correct to take the position that "after observation we can be sure" that certain things are "impossible" with out a grounding in BOTH the physics and the epistemology. I would say yest that is the conclusion, but ONLY because we have confidence in our epistemology AND our physics. I think Epicurus would say that without that confidence in both we can NEVER be sure of our positions, thus we will always be plagued with significant doubts that will "by definition" keep us from enjoying the happiest life, free of the most anxieties, that we could otherwise experience.

Sorry I don't have time this moment for more.

I can see why it wasn't a big hit but it was actually pretty good.

At least you are pinning down the exact place to look - surely when we finish doing that we can find someone who can help - even if we have to post over on the Facebook page and Twitter.

In this Episode 84 we need to be sure we start to include reference to static electricity - I think we made it through 83 without mentioning that once.

Welcome to Episode Eighty-Four of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

For anyone who is not familiar with our podcast, please visit EpicureanFriends.com where you will find our goals and our ground rules. If you have any questions about those, please be sure to contact us at the forum for more information.

In this Episode 84 we will read approximately Latin lines 173 through 335 as we continue further into Book Six.

Now let's join Don reading today's text.

Munro Notes-

173-203: I explained before how the wind eddying about within a cloud would hollow it out: well the rapid motion heats this wind; and when it escapes from the cloud, it scatters about its seeds of fire : thus you first see the flash, and then hear the noise: this takes place when the clouds are piled up high one on the other; the winds within these make a great roaring and gather flame within them, as in a furnace, till at last they burst out.

204-218: fire of a clear gold colour sometimes darts down to the earth, because the clouds have in them many atoms of fire, and draw many from the sun; when therefore they are compressed by the wind, they emit these seeds of flame without noise or disturbance.

219-238: the marks left by the thunderbolts themselves prove them to be of the nature of fire: this fire consists of atoms of extreme fineness, which nothing is able to stop; they are far more powerful than those of the sun.

239-245: now to explain the origin and prodigious force of thunderbolts.

246-322: that thunderbolts are formed in dense masses of clouds our eyesight tells us; the wind gathers the seeds of fire in these clouds, and gets ignited by them and the heat from its own rapid motion, till it bursts forth with flashes and loud rattlings followed by heavy rain : sometimes a wind from without bursts a cloud charged with thunder; sometimes the wind gets fired on its journey, losing some of its own atoms and gathering from the air atoms of fire; sometimes the mere force of its blow strikes out fire, as cold steel strikes fire out of a stone; though the wind after such rapid motion can never be quite without warmth.

323-378: the thunderbolt derives its velocity from a union of causes: it acquires momentum within the cloud; as it bursts out of it, this is increased on the principle of missiles discharged from an engine; its atoms are extremely fine; acid to this the natural tendency downward, which increases continuously ; perhaps too it 'is aided by blows from atoms which it gathers to itself in the air : its subtle atoms pass through the pores of some things; burst asunder others; melt others. In autumn and spring thunder is most frequent, because then there is a mixture of heat and cold, of fire and wind, as well as moisture; all of which are needed to forge it.

Browne 1743

[173] And so the clouds will blaze with winged fire, and tempests will shine with trembling flame, when the winds get within a cloud, and roll about, and make it hollow (as I said before) til it grows condensed, and then by motion kindles and breaks into a flame. For things made hot by motion, we see, will fall on fire, and leaden bullets, in a long course through the air, have melted as they fled. Therefore this fiery wind, when it has burst the sides of this dark cloud, forces and instantly scatters many seeds of fire, which makes the sudden flash of lightning strike our sight. This happens when the clouds are thick and roll on heaps, one pile above another, with wondrous swiftness through the air. Nor must you think this false because the clouds, to us that stand below, seem rather broad than deep, or raised on heaps; for see how the winds will whirl along the air these rolling clouds, raised mountain-high; and on the mountain-tops the clouds, observe, are higher some than others, and piled on heaps; and, when the winds are still, the higher row will press the lower down. Then you may judge of their prodigious weight, and view their hollow caverns, formed as it were in hanging rocks, where in a tempest the rough winds are shut, and scorn to be confined, and roar with horrid noise, like savage beasts within their dens chained down. They grumble here and there, on every side, within the clouds, and striving to get free, roll every way about, and as they move collect the fiery seeds in great abundance, and in the heated caverns toss them about until the clouds burst, and then they flash in shining flame.

[204] And for this reason, perhaps, the lightning (that swift and golden stream of pure fire) flies down upon the earth, because the clouds must needs contain within themselves plenty of fiery seeds, and such as are without moisture, look bright and of a fiery color, for they must receive many fiery particles from the sun, and therefore cannot but look red, and send out flame. These, when the force of winds have pressed and driven into a narrow space, the fiery seeds, being squeezed, fly out and make that glaring flame to shine abroad.

[214] Or it lightens because the clouds above are rarefied; for when the winds blow on them as they pass, and gently stretch them out, and wear them thin, the seeds of fire that make the light must needs fall out, but then it shines without much noise and terror, and causes no confusion in the sky.

[219] Now of what seeds the lightning is composed its strokes will show, and marks of fire it leaves behind, and steams of stinking sulphur in the air, for these are signs of fire, not wind or rain, for lightning will set on fire whole towns, and with swift flames consume the houses to the ground.

[225] Nature has formed this subtle fire of seeds of heat the most minute, and particles most apt to move, which nothing can resist. It passes forcibly through the walls as voice and sound. It flies through stones and brass, and in a moment melts both brass and gold. It has strange power to draw the liquor out, and leave the vessel whole: This it does by loosening the contexture of the cask, and by widening its pores every way, that so its heat may more easily find a passage through; and by then, by the swiftness of its motion, it dissolves the body of the liquor, scatters its seeds, and forces it out. And this the heat of the sun is not able to do in an age, so much stronger is the force of this bright flame, its motion more swift, and its power more irresistible.

[239] But how these fires are formed, and how they rage with so great force, as by their strokes to beat down towers, to overturn houses, to tear up posts and beams, to shake and tumble down monuments of stone, to strike men dead, and kill whole herds at once; by what power they cause such scenes of ruin, this I shall now explain, as I promised, and keep you no longer in suspense.

[246] You are to observe, then, that thunder is produced from thick clouds, raised high one above another in the air; for the thunder never roars in a clear sky, nor is discharged from clouds that are not thick and condensed; and this is evident from common observation. The clouds thicken every way over all the heavens,. as if the whole mass of darkness had left the shades of Hell, and filled the spacious hollows of the sky; and this dark heap of clouds spreads a dreadful night over our heads, and makes us tremble here below. These are the signs when a tempest is forging thunder in the air.

[256] Besides, a black cloud is often observed at sea, below the dark regions of the clouds that falls from the sky like a stream of flowing pitch into the water; and being full of fire and wind, draws a black tempest with it, loaded with storms and thunder, so that those at land tremble and fly for shelter to their houses. Those clouds then, you must think, are high above our heads. They could not overwhelm the earth with so much darkness were they not raised on heaps above, and driven between us and the sun's light; nor could they load the earth with so great showers, and make the rivers swell and drown the plains, unless the clouds were raised on heaps in the upper regions of the air.

[269] These clouds are fully charged with wind and fire, and thence the lightnings flash and thunders roar; for, as I said above, these hollow clouds are full of fiery seeds, and many they received from the sun's rays and borrow from their heat. And when the wind compels them to retreat to a closer room, it drives out many seeds of fire, and mingles with the flame. Then the loud tempest rolls along the sky, and in its heated entrails forms and points the thunder. This wind is set on fire, either by the rapidity of its own motion, or catches from the fiery seeds within the cloud, and when it is raging hot, and in a flame, it collects all its fury, and then the ripened thunder instantly splits and bursts the cloud. The fiery tempest blazes all abroad with the darts of flashing light, followed by frightful noise, as if the temples of the gods above were rent asunder. The earth below trembles dreadfully at the shock, and the loud murmurs scour through all the heavens; for the whole tempest shakes and roars aloud. Then grievous showers in great abundance follow the concussion, as if the skies were all dissolved in rain, and poured down inundations from above. So dreadful is the clap that flies abroad with red-hot lightning, when the clouds burst, and storms of fiery wind rage through the air.

[295] Or else the lightning flies when, from without, a furious wind beats hard upon a cloud, replete with thunder ripe for birth; which, when it bursts the fiery vortex falls (we in our language call it thunder) and makes its way where the strokes most prevailed.

[300] Sometimes a furious wind will burst the cloud before tis set on fire, but kindles as it flies in its long passage through the air; for in its course it throws off the heavy seeds that lay behind, and could not make their way, and brushed and carried off other small seeds from the air, which join and fall on fire as they fly. Just as a ball of lead melts in its course and, throwing off the cold and stubborn sears, takes fire and softens in the air.

[309] And the fury of the stroke, perhaps, may raise a fire, when the force of a cold wind, unkindled, beats hard with all its power; for then the seeds of fire may flow together upon the violence of the stroke, not only from the wind, but from the thing it strikes; as when we strike the flint with steel, the fire flies out; and though the iron be by nature cold, yet when it feels the blow the hot seeds of fire will spread abroad. And thus, whatever the lightning falls upon may easily be set on fire, if it be in its nature fit and disposed to burn. Nor can the wind be supposed to be perfectly cold, since it is discharged from above with so much violence; and if it be not inflamed as it drives through the air, yet it must have some degree of heat when it comes to the earth.

[323] The swiftness and heavy stroke of the thunder, and the violence of its fall, proceed from hence. The wind, shut up within a cloud, rages in all its strength, and struggles hard to get free; and when the cloud can no longer bear the fury of its efforts, it breaks out and flies abroad with mighty force, as stones and darts from mighty engines thrown.

[330] Besides, the thunder is formed of small and smooth seeds, so subtle that nothing can withstand its force. It gets between and pierces through the smallest pores; it meets with nothing that can divert its passage, and therefore flies abroad with the swiftest motion.

[335] And then, since all bodies of weight naturally descend, when blows or outward force is added to their innate gravity, their motion doubles, and the violence of the strokes drives them downwards with greater speed, and consequently they beat through every thing that obstructs their motion much sooner and with more vehemence pursue their course.

Munro 1886

[173] Also in the following manner clouds dye places with winged light and the storm flashes out with a rapid quivering movement. When the wind has made its way into a cloud and whirling about in it has, as I have shown above, made the cloud hollow with a dense crust, it becomes hot by its own velocity: thus you see all things thoroughly heated and fired by motion; nay a leaden ball in whirling through along course even melts. When therefore this wind now on fire has rent the black cloud, it scatters abroad at once seeds of fire pressed out by force so to speak, and these produce the throbbing flashes of flame; then follows a sound which strikes on the ears more slowly than the things which travel to our eyes strike on them. This you are to know takes place when the clouds are dense and at the same time piled up on high one above the other in marvelous accumulation; that you be not led into error, because we see how great their breadth is below, rather than to how great a height they are piled up. Observe, at a time when the winds shall carry clouds like to mountains with a slanting course through the air, or when you shall see them piled on the sides of great mountains one on the top of the other and pressing down from above perfectly at rest, the winds being buried on all sides. You will then be able to observe their great masses and to see caverns as it were built of hanging rocks; and when a storm has gathered and the winds have filled these, they chafe with aloud roaring shut up in the clouds, and bluster in their dens after the fashion of wild beasts: now from this point, now from that the winds send their growlings through the clouds, and seeking a way outwhirl about and roll together seeds of fire out of the clouds and then gather many into a mass and make flame rotate in the hollow furnaces within, until they have burst the cloud and shone forth in forked flashes.

[204] From this cause again yon golden color of clear bright fire flies down with velocity to the earth: the clouds must themselves have very many seeds of fire; for when they are without any moisture, they are mostly of a brilliant flame color. Moreover they must take in many from the sun’s light, so that with good cause they are ruddy and shed forth fires. When therefore the wind has driven thrust squeezed together and collected into one spot these clouds, they press out and shed forth seeds which cause the colors of flame to flash out.

[214] It also lightens when the clouds of heaven are rarefied as well. For when the wind lightly unravels them and breaks them up as they move, those seeds which produce the lightning must fall perforce; and then it lightens without a hideous startling noise and without any uproar.

[219] Well, to proceed, what kind of nature thunderbolts possess, is shown by their strokes and the traces of their heat which have burnt themselves into things and the marks which exhale the noxious vapors of sulfur: all these are signs of fire, not of wind or rain. Again they often set on fire even the roofs of houses and with swift flame rule resistless within the house.

[225] This fire subtle above all fires nature, you are to know, forms of minute and lightly moving bodies, and it is such as nothing whatever can withstand. The mighty thunderbolt passes through the walls of houses, like a shout and voices, passes through stones, through brass, and in a moment of time melts brass and gold; and causes wine too in an instant to disappear, while the vessels are untouched, because sure enough its heat on reaching it readily loosens and rarefies all the earthen material of the vessel on every side and forcing a way within lightly separates and disperses the first-beginnings of the wine. This the sun’s heat would be unable to accomplish in an age, though beating on it incessantly with its quivering heat: so much more nimble and overpowering is this other force.

[239] And now in what way these are begotten and are formed with a force so resistless as to be able with their stroke to burst asunder towers, throw down houses, wrench away beams and rafters, and cast down and burn up the monuments of men, to strike men dead, prostrate cattle far and near, by what force they can do all this and the like, I will make clear and will not longer detain you with mere professions.

[246] Thunderbolts we must suppose to be begotten out of dense clouds piled up high; for they are never sent forth at all when the sky is clear or when the clouds are of a slight density. That this is so beyond all question is proved by facts evident to sense: clouds at such times form so dense a mass over the whole sky that we might imagine all its darkness had abandoned Acheron throughout and filled up the great vaults of heaven: in such numbers, gathering up out of the frightful night of storm clouds, do faces of black horror hang over us on high; what time the storm begins to forge its thunderbolts.

[256] Very often again a black storm-cloud too out at sea, like a stream of pitch sent down from heaven, falls in such wise upon the waters heavily charged with darkness afar off and draws down a black tempest big with lightnings and storms, itself so fraught above all the rest with fires and winds, that even on land men shudder and seek shelter. Thus then we must suppose that the storm above our head reaches high up; for the clouds would never bury the earth in such thick darkness, unless they were built up high heap upon heap, the sunlight totally disappearing; nor could the clouds when they descend drown it with so great a rain, as to make rivers overflow and put fields under water, if they were not piled high up in the sky.

[269] In this case then all things are filled with winds and fire; therefore thunderings and lightnings go on all about. For I have shown above that hollow clouds have very many seeds of heat, and they must also take many in from the sun’s rays and their heat. On this account when the same wind which happens to collect them into any one place, has forced out many seeds of heat and has mixed itself up with that fire, then the eddy of wind forces a way in and whirls about in the straitened room and points the thunderbolt in the fiery furnaces within; for it is kindled in two ways at once: it is heated by its own velocity and from the contact of fire. After that when the force of the wind has been thoroughly heated and the impetuous power of the fire has entered in, then the thunderbolt fully forged as it were suddenly rends the cloud, and the heat put in motion is carried on traversing all places with flashing lights. Close upon it falls so heavy a clap that it seems to crush down from above the quarters of heaven which have all at once sprung asunder. Then a trembling violently seizes the earth and rumblings run through high heaven; for the whole body of the storm then without exception quakes with the shock and loud roarings are aroused. After this shock follows so heavy and copious a rain that the whole ether seems to be turning into rain and then to be tumbling down and returning to a deluge: so great a flood of it is discharged by the bursting of the cloud and the storm of wind, when the sound flies forth from the burning stroke.

[295] At times too the force of the wind set in motion from without falls on a cloud hot with a fully forged thunderbolt; and when it has burst it, forthwith there falls down yon fiery eddying whirl which in our native speech we call a thunderbolt. The same takes place on every other side towards which the force in question has borne down.

[300] Sometimes too the power of the wind though discharged without fire, yet catches fire in the course of its long travel, and while it is passing on, it loses on the way some large bodies which cannot like the rest get through the air; and gathers together out of the air itself and carries along with it other bodies of very small size which mix with it and produce fire by their flight; very much in the same way as a leaden ball becomes hot during its course, when it loses many bodies of cold and has taken up fire in the air.

[309] Sometimes too the force of the blow itself strikes out fire, when the force of wind discharged in a cold state without fire has struck, because sure enough, when it has smitten with a powerful stroke, the elements of heat are able to stream together out of the wind itself and at the same time out of the thing which then encounters the stroke. Thus, when we strike a stone with iron, fire flies out; and none the less, because the force of the iron is cold, do its seeds of fiery brightness meet together upon the stroke. Therefore in the same way too a thing ought to beset on fire by the thunderbolt, if it has happened to be in a state suited to receive and susceptible of the flames. At the same time the might of the wind cannot lightly be thought to be absolutely and decidedly cold, seeing that it is discharged with such force from above; but if it is not already set on fire during its course, it yet arrives in a warm state with heat mixed up in it.

[323] But the velocity of thunderbolts is great and their stroke powerful, and they run through their course with a rapid descent, because their force when set in motion first in all cases collects itself in the clouds and gathers itself up for a great effort at starting; then when the cloud is no longer able to hold the increased moving power, their force is pressed out and therefore flies with a marvelous moving power, like to that with which missiles are carried when discharged from powerful engines.

[330] Then too the thunderbolt consists of small and smooth elements, and such a nature it is not easy for anything to withstand; for it flies between and passes in through the porous passages; therefore it is not checked and delayed by many collisions, and for this reason it glides and flies on with a swift moving power.

[335] Next, all weights without exception naturally pressing downward, when to this a blow is added, the velocity is doubled and yon moving power becomes so intense that the thunderbolt dashes aside more impetuously and swiftly whatever gets in its way and tries to hinder it, and pursues its journey.

Bailey 1921

[173] In this manner, too, the clouds colour places with leaping light, and the storm lightens with quivering dart. When wind has come within a cloud, and moving there has, as I have shown before, made the hollow cloud grow thick, it grows hot with its own swift movement; even as you see all things become hot and catch fire through motion, yea, even a ball of lead too, whirling in a long course, will melt. And so when this heated wind has torn through the black cloud, it scatters abroad seeds of fire, as though struck out all at once by force, and they make the pulsing flashes of flame; thereafter follows the sound, which reaches our ears more slowly than things which come to the light of our eyes. This, we must know, comes to pass in thick clouds, which are also piled up high one on the other in wondrous slope; lest you be deceived because we below see how broad they are rather than to what a height they stand piled up. For do but look, when next the winds carry athwart the air clouds in the semblance of mountains, or when you see them heaped along a mighty mountain-range one above the other, pressing down from above, at rest in their appointed place, when the winds on all sides are in their graves. Then you will be able to mark their mighty mass, and to see their caverns built up, as it were, of hanging rocks: and when the storm has risen and the winds have filled them, with loud roar they chafe prisoned in the clouds, and threaten like wild beasts in cages; now from this side, now from that they send forth their roaring through the clouds, and seeking an outlet they move round and round, and roll together the seeds of fire from out the clouds, and so drive many into a mass and set the flame whirling within the hollow furnaces, until they have rent asunder the cloud and flashed blazing out.

[204] For this cause, too, it comes to pass that this swift golden tinge of liquid fire flies down to earth, because it must needs be that the clouds have in themselves very many seeds of fire; for indeed when they are without any moisture, they have for the most part a bright and flaming colour. For verily it must needs be that they catch many such from the sun’s light, so that with reason they are red, and pour forth their fires. When then the wind as it drives them has pushed and packed and compelled them into one spot, they squeeze out and pour forth the seeds which make the colours of flame to flash.

[214] It lightens likewise, also when the clouds of heaven grow thin. For when the wind lightly draws them asunder as they move, and breaks them up, it must needs be that those seeds, which make the flash, fall out unbidden. Then it lightens without hideous alarm, without noise, and with no uproar.

[219] For the rest, with what kind of nature the thunderbolts are endowed, is shown by the blows and the burned markings of their heat and the brands which breathe out noisome vapours of sulphur. For these are marks of fire, not of wind nor rain. Moreover, often too they set the roofs of dwellings on fire, and with swiftly-moving flame play the tyrant even within the houses.

[225] This fire, you must know, nature has fashioned most subtle of all subtle fires, of tiny swift-moving bodies—a flame to which nothing at all can be a barrier. For the strong thunderbolt can pass through the walls of houses, even as shouts and cries, can pass through rocks, through things of bronze, and in a moment of time can melt bronze and gold; likewise it causes wine in an instant to flee away, though the vessels be untouched, because, we may be sure, its heat as it comes easily loosens all around and makes rarefied the porcelain of the vessel, and finding its way right into the wine, with quick motion dissolves and scatters the first-beginnings of the wine. Yet this the heat of the sun is seen to be unable to bring about in a long age, though it has such exceeding strength in its flashing blaze. So much swifter and more masterful is this force of the thunderbolt.

[239] Now in what manner they are fashioned and made with such force that they can with their blow burst open towers, overthrow houses, pluck up beams and joists, and upset and destroy the monuments of men, take the life from men, lay low the flocks on every side; by what force they are able to do all other things of this sort, I will set forth, nor keep thee longer waiting on my promise.

[246] We must suppose that thunderbolts are produced from thick clouds, piled up on high; for none are ever hurled abroad from the clear sky or from clouds of slight thickness. For without doubt clear-seen facts show that this comes to pass; at such times clouds grow into a mass throughout all the air, so that on all sides we might think that all darkness has left Acheron and filled the great vault of the sky; so terribly, when the noisome night of clouds has gathered together, do the shapes of black fear hang over us on high, when the storm begins to forge its thunderbolts.

[256] Moreover, very often a black storm-cloud too, over the sea, like a stream of pitch shot from the sky, falls upon the waters, laden with darkness afar off, and draws on a black storm big with thunderbolts and hurricanes, itself more than all filled full with fires and winds in such wise that even on land men shudder and leek for shelter. Thus then above our head must we suppose the storm is raised high. For indeed they would not shroud the earth in such thick gloom, unless there were many clouds built up aloft on many others, shutting out all sunlight; nor when they come could they drown it in such heavy rain, as to make the rivers overflow and the fields swim, unless the ether were filled with clouds piled up on high.

[269] Here, then, all is full of winds and fires; for this cause all around come crashings and lightnings. For verily I have shown ere now that the hollow clouds possess very many seeds of heat, and many they must needs catch from the sun’s rays and their blaze. Therefore, when the same wind, which drives them together, as it chances, into some one place, has squeezed out many seeds of heat, and at the same time has mingled itself with this fire, an eddy finds its way in there and whirls round in a narrow space and sharpens the thunderbolt in the hot furnaces within. For it is kindled in two ways, both when it grows hot with its own swift motion, and from contact with the fire. Next, when the force of the wind has grown exceeding hot, and the fierce onset of the fire has entered in, then the thunderbolt, full-forged, as it were, suddenly rends through the cloud, and shot out is borne on flooding all places with its blazing light. In its train follows a heavy crash, so that the quarters of the sky above seem to be burst asunder on a sudden and crush us. Then a trembling thrills violently through the earth, and rumblings race over the high heaven; for then all the storm is shaken into trembling and roarings move abroad. And from this shock follows rain, heavy and abundant, so that all the air seems to be turned into rain and thus falling headlong to summon earth back to deluge: so great a shower is shot forth with the rending of the cloud and the hurricane of wind, when the thunderclap flies forth with its burning blow.

[295] At times, too, the rushing force of wind falls from without upon the cloud hot with its new-forged thunderbolt; and when it has rent the cloud, straightway there falls out that fiery eddy which we call by the name our fathers gave it, the thunderbolt. The same thing happens in other directions, wherever its force has carried it.

[300] It comes to pass, too, sometimes that the force of the wind, starting without fire, yet catches fire on its course and its long wandering, as it loses in its journey, while it is approaching, certain large bodies, which cannot like the others make their way through the air; and gathering other small bodies from the air itself it carries them along, and they mingling with it make fire in their flight; in no other way than often a ball of lead grows hot in its course, when dropping many bodies of stiff cold it has taken in fire in the air.

[309] It comes to pass, too, that the force of the very blow rouses fire, when the force of the wind, starting cold without fire, has struck its stroke; because, we may be sure, when it has hit with violent blow, particles of heat can stream together out of the wind itself, and at the same time from the thing which then receives the blow; just as, when we strike a stone with iron, fire flies out, nor do the seeds of blazing heat rush together any more slowly at its blow, because the force of the iron is cold. Thus then a thing is bound to be kindled by the thunderbolt too, if by chance it is made fit and suitable for flame. Nor must we rashly think that the force of the wind can be wholly and utterly cold, when it has been discharged with such force on high; rather, if it is not beforehand on its journey kindled with fire, yet it arrives warmed and mingled with heat.

[323] But the great speed of the thunderbolt and its heavy blow comes to pass, yea, the thunderbolts always run their course with swift descent, because their force unaided is first of all set in motion in each case, and gathers itself within the clouds, and conceives a great effort for starting; and then, when the cloud has not been able to contain the growing strength of its onset, its force is squeezed out, and so flies with wondrous impulse even as the missiles which are borne on, when shot from engines of war.

[330] Remember, too, that it is made of small and smooth particles, nor is it easy for anything to withstand such a nature: for it flies in between and pierces through the hollow passages, and so it is not clogged and delayed by many obstacles, and therefore it flies on falling with swift impulse.

[335] Again, because all weights by nature always press downwards, but when a blow is given as well, their swiftness is doubled and the impulse grows stronger, so that the more violently and quickly does it scatter with its blows all that impedes it, and continues on its journey.