Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

How would you interpret "the most pleasant"?

First, I am going to attempt at least for a while not to "like" too many posts here in this thread, as sometimes the "likes" tend to mean taking sides when "sides" is a bad thing to do. Who knows whether any of us at this point have the "right" interpretation? (We can come back to likes later, though, cause they do help with things over time, for those who are "persistent" in following arguments.)

I guess further I need to be sure what we mean by "right" interpretation, which I'll define for my use as "what Epicurus intended" (not necessarily what I myself might think.)

Second, I think that my starting point as above is that in the Epicurean universe there can be no single definition of the right answer here. This is why I try to emphasize "pleasure as a feeling" and that's the big implication of it being a feeling -- feelings are largely subjective and at least highly difficult (and probably impossible) to quantify in any objectively-measurable terms. "Time" is a pretty easy measure, and I personally think "intensity" is another good term, and I think I recall in some of the recent psychology material that you (Don) and Godfrey have posted another term ("affect"?). But even more than that I think that there are probably lots of other aspects that can be described and I don't think we can or should try to pin down pleasure to a limited set of categories.

That's also what I mean much of the time when I set off Pleasure or Feeling against the Platonic Ideals or the Religious "revelation" -- I see "pleasure" as a sweeping term that includes all "positive" feelings/sensations from any sense or mental activity, and in that status as "the positive feeling," I think the big philosophical war is between Idealism v. Divine Revelation vs Feeling (or Pleasure). (I am considering Idealism as essentially non-theistic in that list, even though I know Plato's version was essentially theistic if you drill down far enough - that's why idealism and revelation get along so well to fight Epicurus.)

So with all that as background I interpret "most pleasant" as a feeling that we generate (or receive) within ourselves as the most valuable to us "in total." I do think that it is reasonable to look at time (duration and persistence) as an important element, but equally or more important is "intensity" (maybe "depth" is a better word?). For example that is why I think Epicurus said that it is at times appropriate to die for a friend. The depth of pain that you would suffer from knowing that a friend died who you could have saved could be (or I could see it being) so deep and intense that no amount of time would be sufficient to make like worth living after that, so you go ahead and sacrifice your life as the proper hedonic calculus of how to proceed in such an awful situation.

I know I keep talking about pleasure being subjective and up to the individual to evaluate, and I think that's an unsatisfying way of expressing it because it's an attempt to address the problem through "logic" and "definitions."

Probably the better approach would be to point to particular feelings of love and affection you have, such as for a spouse or a child (or whatever) that we all can identify with. Then you can point and say those are examples which allow us to understand the feelings involved so that we can unwind the question. All of us are probably familiar with the examples of how lovers talk about if they only had "one more day" with their departed love one they would sacrifice everything, or one more day to spend with a departed parent or child. I think those are examples of deep and intense emotion and are probably the hard cases that help establish the point.

Some pleasures are so intense and so deep and so important to us that no lesser pleasures, no matter the duration or persistence, can stack up to them in our own estimation, and if asked to choose between them we would unhesitatingly choose the deep/intense over the longer more persistent duration.

Quote from Don

I interpret that "the most pleasant" with the idea of pleasure *over a period of time.* The *length* of time is not the focus; it's the *persistence* of pleasure over the time in question.

Oh my! I don't for a moment dispute your right and proper position in interpreting it that way for yourself. I agree that Epicurus would want you to do that if you believe it best for you! But I would not calculate it that way myself, and I suspect we would have a strong division of opinion on that if we took a poll. I would consider "intensity" or other "qualities" as at least as important as duration in time (persistence).

While "truth" is not decided by polling, and it doesn't matter how many here agree or disagree, I would like for some of our core people to weigh in on this because theirs are the opinions I respect, and I think we could all learn a lot by discussing this.

Quote from Don

I've interpreted the Cyrenaic position to be "always pleasure in the moment" grab it now. Whereas Epicurus's philosophy was to make choices that would provide sustainable pleasure and the prospect that it would persist.

I agree (at least largely) with that statement of the Cyreniac position, but I don't think I would say the second sentence is accurate. Yes clearly "sustainability" (meaning the time element) is a factor to consider, but there's definitely no way to say flatly across the board that time is ALWAYS the deciding factor or even the MOST IMPORTANT factor. That's clear from the letter to Menoeceus:

"And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant."

So how does one rank the "most pleasant"? I think the first and most important aspect of the answer to that is that there's no universal single answer. The "most pleasant" by nature (by the Epicurean physics and understanding of the cosmos) is up to the individual given his or her own tastes and circumstances and preferences. Certainly I would think most people are going to consider the time element, but what about the person who wants to say "damn the torpedoes full speed ahead" and wants to climb to the top of a mountain to be there to see for a moment, even if he knows he'll never make it back down. Can such a person be said to be "wrong"? By what standard? I think Epicurus would say that that's between you and Nature to decide, with you making the call under all your individual circumstances.

Quote from Philia

If one assumes that short-term pleasures provide the same benefits as long-term pleasures,

Yes you "could" assume that, but why would you? By definition the short-term pleasure is different from the long-term pleasure in terms of time, so they are not identical.

Please don't sense that I am disagreeing, I am simply at this point trying to understand your reasoning.

Epicurus may have said that "PD19. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure." but that is by no means the same as saying that time is an irrelevant factor. Epicurus strongly discourages suicide, and it seems clear (to me at least) that Epicurus is saying that life is desirable, so we should continue to desire to live so long as we can gain more pleasure than pain from living on. The issue I think we are discussing is what does "more" mean, because I would argue that "more" does not equate to "length of time" at all. There are many other issues, intensity being only one, and variations in types of pleasures that only the individual can just to be "worth' the pain required to attain it.

But let's stay with that passage I quoted above. I don't think Don would assume that "short-term benefits provide the SAME benefits as long-term pleasure" either, correct Don? So I am not sure where you are thinking the assumption you are naming should come from.

This comes to mind because of reading this clip from Wikipedia on Chrysippus:

The word "passion" and "passionately" probably have to us today negative connotations that hurt this as a summary. But to the extent that "pathe" is the Greek work that probably best summarizes the element of the Canon of Truth that we generally summarize as "pleasure and pain," and to the extent that Laertius says that Epicurus held that the wise man feels his emotions more deeply than the unwise, there's a large element of applicability.

Maybe the graphic serves best as a talking point in a discussion of ethics or epistemology, especially helpful in distinguishing Epicurus from the Stoics, but regardless I thought it worth committing a thread to it.

In looking up Chrysippus this afternoon I see that there is material on Wikipedia relevant to this discussion:

This below is not immediately relevant, but a good reminder for anyone who isn't aware of it and how it plays into Chryssipus' thinking:

Unfortunately this section of DeWitt does not seek to explain the "witticism" -- but does include some gratifying slams at Chrysippus and ultimately labels logicians like him as "intellectual eunuchs"

Maybe we can find some articles discussing this, because the statue or something like still exists, correct?

Quote from Philia

but if the underlying assumption is that short-term physical pleasures are equally as important as long-term mental pleasures

Yes that is the tricky part and I do not think that Epicurus would say that that can be presumed. Most generally, I think he would say that that decision has to be made individually by each person and according to life circumstances, and that it will prove to be applicable to some people but not to others (so therefore not a "general" rule). Plus, to be clear, I am not limiting the circumstances to "material well-being." People rank their pleasures in radically different ways, and two children born in the same house to a life of luxury, or to a life of poverty, could easily reach different conclusions on how they choose to spend their time to generate the most pleasure for themselves.

But I think it's pretty clear that Epicurus did not reach such a conclusion in his own case (he devoted his life to philosophical study and indeed controversy).

So the very first piece of evidence in unraveling Epicurean doctrine (how Epicurus lived his own life) would not be consistent with applying that premise across-the-board to everyone.

Quote from Cassius

who say that it is not enough to leave the question of good or evil to the decision of sense

Quote from Cassius

Others again, with whom I agree, finding that many arguments are alleged by philosophers to prove that pleasure is not to be reckoned among things good nor pain among things evil, judge that we ought not to be too condent about our case, and think that we should lead proof and argue carefully and carry on the debate about pleasure and pain by using the most elaborate reasonings.

I can almost see Epicurus gasping "OMG!!! " if he could know that some in his own school were arguing that. Though I doubt he would have restrained his response to an expression of exasperation. Someone(s) would have had a lot of explaining to do to Epicurus as to how they managed to fall so far from the prototype. For anyone who didn't get the message after he explained it to them in person, we'd probably have some good texts on excommunication if he could have lived to write about that kind of thing.

At this moment I think I would try to link this to the discussion with Philia as an example of trying to "measure pleasure by reason" and coming to a "reasoned understanding of pleasure" in order to dig out why the illustration seems (again, to me) so unsatisfying.

Part of the problem may be that this is an argument from Chrysippus, who has a Stoic was an arch-proponent of logic over

feeling, trying to make a ham-handed logic-based point about pleasure (which he detests as a feeling that distracts from virtue).

Post

RE: An Epicurean Understanding of Pleasure

1 - yes please let us know if you come up with variations/improvements of the jelly bean jar analogy. I am sure there are much better ones!

2

[…]

Absolutely I agree with that, and I think most people at first glance see it that way too. That's "instinctively" the right approach, IMO. In fact I fluctuate on how much I really accept the opposite view myself. In my (admittedly small) mind, the only reason that the "subtractive" model "works" mentally is because you know that there are only two…

Cassius

October 5, 2021 at 1:20 PM

It's probably a significant part of the issue that pleasure (as a feeling) can never really be captured by a "logic" argument.

And of course in discussing THAT issue, this from "Torquatus" shouldn't be far from our minds as a huge red flag about the attempt to bridge logic and feeling, as Epicurus himself apparently warned against it:

[31] There are however some of our own school, who want to state these principles with greater refinement, and who say that it is not enough to leave the question of good or evil to the decision of sense, but that thought and reasoning also enable us to understand both that pleasure in itself is matter for desire and that pain is in itself matter for aversion. So they say that there lies in our minds a kind of natural and inbred conception leading us to feel that the one thing is t for us to seek, the other to reject. Others again, with whom I agree, finding that many arguments are alleged by philosophers to prove that pleasure is not to be reckoned among things good nor pain among things evil, judge that we ought not to be too condent about our case, and think that we should lead proof and argue carefully and carry on the debate about pleasure and pain by using the most elaborate reasonings.

Quote from JJElbert

Of course the shift of the soul from the members or the breast to the brain simply shifts the problem. Does the brain feel the lack of the Supreme good?

Unfortunately I agree with that comment. I think in order to really understand the argument there's something about "feeling the lack" that connects "the supreme good" in a way that doesn't seem obvious (at least to me).

More to the point, I think I can come up with an elaborate explanation of it (see above) but since we are going to be talking about this to people who are new to Epicurus and philosophy in general, we need a clear and direct way of explaining what is going on here.

Just a note to Godfrey - sorry you couldn't find that Wenham article. The forum software has lots of powerful features that I don't really know how to use. But I note the search function doesn't always cover every section of the software - maybe that happened here.

In this case I have tried to highlight the nikolsky and wenham and some other core texts by marking them as "featured" which makes them show up on the home page (if you scroll down far enough) as so:

The other article on the K/K issue that sticks out as supporting the same conclusion is the chapter from Gosling and Taylor, which is here: Gosling & Taylor - On Katastematic and Kinetic Pleasure

Nikolsky tells us that is what spurred him to write his article.

Great answers. Only I can think of to add is to ask Marco:. Did you have something else in mind when you asked if there are two types of pleasure? Or was your entire question focused on time (long and short)?

1 - yes please let us know if you come up with variations/improvements of the jelly bean jar analogy. I am sure there are much better ones!

2

Quote from Philia

It is more appealing to me to see pleasure as additive, and that is probably a heuristic.

Absolutely I agree with that, and I think most people at first glance see it that way too. That's "instinctively" the right approach, IMO. In fact I fluctuate on how much I really accept the opposite view myself. In my (admittedly small) mind, the only reason that the "subtractive" model "works" mentally is because you know that there are only two categories of feelings in the Epicurean model - pleasure and pain. I think instinctively that people suspect there is a "neutral" state in which you're feeling neither one.

I can reconcile that in two ways:

(1) There is pleasure simply in being alive (if you allow yourself to recognize it) and most all people can at least take pleasure in good memories, regardless of their current circumstances. I think that's a valid observation and I don't discount its importance. However:

(2) You can view the issue as a "truism" that flows logically from having defined pleasure and pain as the only two feelings, because then all feelings are either one or the other. I see that as a more "intellectual" approach, however, which is more suited to philosophical debate than it is to immediate analysis for someone in a bad situation. But here too I see that as a valid approach and particularly important in debating the arguments against pleasure put forth by Plato in Philebus. The formula is in my mind what creates, and is the only justification for, the "absence of pain is the highest pleasure" formula. Feeling that you are totally without pain then means, by definition, that you are full of pleasure(s). But to me that is "measuring pleasure by reason" - a kind of formula has to be grasped "by those capable of figuring the problem out." I see that as an issue of measuring pleasure by reason, such as PD19. "Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure."

Also PD20. The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited, and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits, and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time; but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short, in any way, of the best life.

OK Don, Philia's question has been very helpful to me here. In the future (if I can remember!) I am going to refer to the (for me) emotionally unsatisfying phrase "absence of pain = the greatest pleasure" as "measuring pleasure by reason" and "a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good." That will probably help highlight the perspective from which that formulation makes the most sense. What do you think of that?

(In fact I am going to bookmark Philia's "It is more appealing to me to see pleasure as additive" as the trigger for me seeing the "measuring pleasure by reason" formula, and a linkage to PD19 and PD20, that I should be embarrassed not to have seen as a boy!

I think I am now repeating myself but every time I read this paragraph I come back to it wondering exactly what is going on. So now I can wonder about the Reid version:

Quote

[39] But actually at Athens, as my father used to tell me, when he wittily and humorously ridiculed the Stoics, there is in the Ceramicus a statue of Chrysippus, sitting with his hand extended, which hand indicates that he was fond of the following little argument: Does your hand, being in its present condition, feel the lack of anything at all? Certainly of nothing. But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack. I agree. Pleasure then is not the supreme good. My father used to say that even a statue would not talk in that way, if it had power of speech. The inference is shrewd enough as against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus. For if the only pleasure were that which, as it were, tickles the senses, if I may say so, and attended by sweetness overows them and insinuates itself into them, neither the hand nor any other member would be able to rest satised with the absence of pain apart from a joyous activity of pleasure. But if it is the highest pleasure, as Epicurus believes, to be in no pain, then the rst admission, that the hand in its then existing condition felt no lack, was properly made to you, Chrysippus, but the second improperly, I mean that it would have felt a lack had pleasure been the supreme good. It would certainly feel no lack, and on this ground, that anything which is cut off from the state of pain is in the state of pleasure.

I am all in favor of wittily ridiculing the Stoics, but am I the only one who finds Chrysippus' witticism hard to follow?

Is it necessary to feel a lack of it (when it is absent) in order to identify something as the supreme good?

Or maybe there's some entirely different point.

I certainly think I understand the issue on how the Cyreniac position differs from Epicurus, in that the Cyreniacs considered only "active/ joy/delight" to be pleasure, while Epicurus' definition of pleasure is more wide so as to include any feeling which is not pain, but it's just not clear to me that it is obvious that we would feel the lack of the supreme good if it is missing.

The unstated premise must be something about the supreme good must be present and available at all times or else it is missed? (And maybe that's reference back to the Platonic continuity issue that led Epicurus to his "continuous pleasure" statement.)

But regardless of that the Epicureans must have thought this illustration was helpful and important, and I think in order for us to see it so we need to articulate what exactly is going on.

I have completed a transcription of the Reid translation over to the forum, and I am going to feature it instead of the Rackham version in the "Core Texts" links. Here it is: Cicero's "Torquatus" Presentation of Epicurean Ethics - from "On Ends"

All comments on the differences between this and Rackham are welcome so if you have any please post.

Another aspect of this to consider is the opening of Book Two:

Quote

'Tis pleasant, when a tempest drives the waves in the wide sea, to view the sad distress of others from the land; not that the pleasure is so sweet that others suffer, but the joy is this, to look upon the ills from which yourself are free. It likewise gives delight to view the bloody conflicts of a war, in battle ranged all over the plains, without a share of danger to yourself: But nothing is more sweet than to attain the serene 'tho lofty heights of true philosophy, well fortified by learning of the wise, and thence look down on others, and behold mankind wandering and roving every way, to find a path to happiness; they strive for wit, contend for nobility, labor nights and days with anxious care for heaps of wealth, and to be ministers of state.

O wretched are the thoughts of men! How blind their souls! In what dark roads they grope their way, in what distress is this life spent, short as it is! Don't you see Nature requires no more than the body free from pain, she may enjoy the mind easy and cheerful, removed from care and fear?

As bad as our current troubles might be, they are nothing compared to what they might be in a plague, and we can take comfort in realizing that at least for the moment we are safe from these harms -- and with the study of nature and application of that knowledge we may even have confidence of avoiding them.

I wonder also if there might be a "Horror Movie" aspect of this -- to use the last passages to shock people out of their complacency as they end the poem, and back to the realization that despite the ultimate death sentence, we ourselves have time to make more good use of our lives to live pleasantly:

VS47. I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and I have closed off every one of your devious entrances. And we will not give ourselves up as captives, to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who cling to it maundering, we will leave from life singing aloud a glorious triumph-song on how nicely we lived.

Here is one passage I want to be sure we talk about:

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But the most wretched and deplorable thing of all, at this time, was that when once a person found himself infected with the disease, as if a sentence of death had passed upon him, his spirits failed him, he fell into melancholy and despair, thought of nothing but death, and so gave up the ghost.

I think that's very significant. We are ALL under sentence of death because we all die. That's one of the Vatican Sayings (which one?) that we have all drunk a draft of death (?)

So here he is condemning as wretched and deplorable the "giving up" that comes from realizing that we are going to die. In contrast, we all should live with that realization every day, and not turn nihilist, but take that much more pleasure in the time we have because of it!

In fact at the moment I would tentatively see this as one of the most important aspects of the whole plague sequence: we are all under a death sentence from the moment we are born, but that doesn't mean we should become nihilists and run about crazily and fail to be friendly with each other and help our friends through hard times. We treasure life while we have it, and the loss of it may be inevitable but no reason to give up what we can gain while we have it.

Quote from Patrick

I don't think commandments from a supposed god or some kind of secular moral code is going to stop them.

Yes your main point there and the rest of your post is directly stated in the first paragraph of DIogenes of Oinoanda fragment 20

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Fr. 20

[So it is obvious that wrong-doers, given that they do not fear the penalties imposed by the laws, are not] afraid of [the gods.] This [has to be] conceded. For if they were [afraid, they] would not [do wrong]. As for [all] the others, [it is my opinion] that the [wise] are not [(reasoning indicates) righteous] on account of the gods, but on account of [thinking] correctly and the [opinions] they hold [regarding] certain things [and especially] pains and death (for indeed invariably and without exception human beings do wrong either on account of fear or on account of pleasures), and that ordinary people on the other hand are righteous, in so far as they are righteous, on account of the laws and the penalties, imposed by the laws, hanging over them. But even if some of their number are conscientious on account of the laws, they are few: only just two or three individuals are to be found among great segments of multitudes, and not even these are steadfast in acting righteously; for they are not soundly persuaded about providence. A clear indication of the complete inability of the gods to prevent wrong-doings is provided by the nations of the Jews and Egyptians, who, as well as being the most superstitious of all peoples, are the vilest of all peoples.

On account of what kind of gods, then, will human beings be righteous? For they are not righteous on account of the real ones or on account of Plato’s and Socrates’ Judges in Hades. We are left with this conclusion; otherwise, why should not those who disregard the laws scorn fables much more?

So, with regard to righteousness, neither does our doctrine do harm [not does] the opposite [doctrine help], while, with regard to the other condition, the opposite doctrine not only does not help, but on the contrary also does harm, whereas our doctrine not only does not harm, but also helps. For the one removes disturbances, while the other adds them, as has already been made clear to you before.

That not only [is our doctrine] helpful, [but also the opposite doctrine harmful, is clearly shown by] the [Stoics as they go astray. For they say in opposition to us] that the god both is maker of [the] world and takes providential care of it, providing for all things, including human beings. Well, in the first place, we come to this question: was it, may I ask, for his own sake that the god created the world [or for the sake of human beings? For it is obvious that it was from a wish to benefit either himself or human beings that he embarked on this] undertaking. For how could it have been otherwise, if nothing is produced without a cause and these things are produced by a god? Let us then examine this view and what Stoics mean. It was, they say, from a wish to have a city and fellow-citizens, just as if [he were an exile from a city, that] the god [created the world and human beings. However, this supposition, a concoction of empty talking, is] self-evidently a fable, composed to gain the attention of an audience, not a natural philosopher’s argument searching for the truth and inferring from probabilities things not palpable to sense. Yet even if, in the belief that he was doing some good [to himself, the god] really [made the world and human beings], .................

For god [is, I say], a living being, indestructible [and] blessed from [age to] age, having complete [self-sufficiency]. Moreover, what [god, if] he had existed for infinite [time] and enjoyed tranquillity [for thousands of years, would have got] this idea that he needed a city and fellow-citizens? Add to this absurdity that he, being a god, should seek to have beings as fellow-citizens.

And there is this further point too: if he had created the world as a habitation and city for himself, I seek to know where he was living before the world was created; I do not find an answer, at any rate not one consistent with the doctrine of these people when they declare that this world is unique. So for that infinite time, apparently, the god of these people was cityless and homeless and, like an unfortunate man — I do not say «god» —, having neither city nor fellow-citizens, he was destitute and roaming about at random. If therefore the divine nature shall be deemed to have created things for its own sake, all this is absurd; and if for the sake of men, there are yet other more absurd consequences.

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Quote from Cleveland Okie

Haris Dimitriades.

I've had many good exchanges with Haris over the last ten years via Facebook, and I have his book too. Among the recent ones that focus on the more practical aspect of applying Epicurean philosophy I think his is one of the better ones.