Posts by Cassius

Don (who likes to dive into the Greek) I was taken aback when I pasted this because I was going to paste from the Bailey version I have here, and I see Bailey used "logic" and "logicians" rather than dialectics / dialecticians. The pastes above are from Wikisource which is Hicks

Any thoughts?

Maybe we need to acknowledge that in my spare time I am a lawyer and Elayne was married to one, so the two of us are maybe too familiar with hypothetical questions....

We have been discussing hypothetical questions in the PD10 thread, but I think this topic deserves a thread of its own in the end, for the additional reason that I think it is probably related to the term "dialectics." It seems to me that hypotheticals is what Socrates/Plato were dealing in extensively, and I see several sentences in Diogenes Laertius that are translated variously as "dialectics" or "logic" - Does anyone know which term is better and if so why they are interchanged? By no means are the two issues the same (Dialectics and Hypothetical Questions) but I suspect both involve very similar issues:

I am going to start a new thread on one aspect of this I want to explore - "dialectics" Dialectics and Hypothetical Questions

Probably it's not worded the best way possible, but eventually it will be something to come back to....

You're darn right she is, because that kind of hypothetical is what we're talking about !!

Maybe we should propose a segment on the nature of a bliss pill for our 20th Skype meeting!

And to use a more classy analogy than Star Trek, this is what I would assert is expressed in Jefferson's "Head and Heart" letter. in which the heart wins out in the end

Quote from Elayne

Cassius I'm not using logic.

I see this as the root of our current disagreement and we will resolve it at some point.

I would say that a reasonable person on the street would say that you ARE using logic, in looking at the full context of all the texts, and also comparing to to the feelings that you have and that you can presume Epicurus had.

You don't wish to call that "logic" because you are referring to "formal logic" and saying that what you are doing is not "formal logic."

I'm just going to have to find some place for a definition reference, because I firmly think that the target audience we should be aiming for would be very confused by insisting that "logical" or "reasonable" implies formal logic of the Let A = B and B=C; therefore A=C variety.

I was thinking about that this afternoon. I think the target audience (at least the one I am most interested in) would see issues of "logic" vs "feeling" in terms of Spock and McCoy and Kirk.

Spock symbolizes logic and reason - he is data driven to the extreme, but he has no emotion and thus is frequently mistaken because he does not have the human faculty of feeling emotion (he can, presumably, feel pain and pleasure of a type).

McCoy symbolizes the extreme of feeling - he does in fact refer to reason and logic in his medicine, but he is caricature of someone whose emotions clearly run ahead of his reason.

Kirk, is the superior synthesis and combination of both reason and feeling. He is superior to both McCoy and Spock and thus gives the ultimate orders. Within Kirk, it is feeling that ultimately does the decision making, but he does his best to incorporate data-driven logic and reason, because he knows that that is frequently the way to unwind problems. And that is the Epicurean model as I see it.

All of us have our limitations and I am afraid this is mine. I am very aware that you are correct that there is a significant set of people who hear the words "logic" and "reason" and interpret them as you are doing, in formal terms.

The people in my daily world have no clue what "formal logic" is, and any notion they have of it is receding further into the background every day. Yes I want to explain all this to the academicians who use the formal terms,. but they are not my first concern - they are the ones who have botched Epicurean philosophy (in my eyes) for 2000+years. And I want to give the "regular people" a chance, especially because it is my understanding through Cicero that that is who Epicurus actually played to and were most enthusiastic about him.

This is where we need a division of labor and specialization. Those who move in circles which require the words "logic" and "reason" to be used "formally" will need a presentation of their own. In my view, the best compromise to deal with the largest set of people is to use terms like "abstract logic/reason" or "theoretical logic/reason" or similar words to indicate that the premises being used are not observable or verifiable or reliably repeatable through the senses.

I am going to agree with Elayne even after I said I agree with what Don quoted, and this is an interesting application of the recent back and forth Elayne and I have been having. I think the statement is correct, as far as it goes, when limited to "in one's life" as if we are talking about one of us. That's a concrete application in which I think it is correct.

But Elayne is also extending the statement to its logical conclusions, and in doing so she is showing that a flat logical reading of it WOULD go to far.

This is back to our discussion of the interplay of logic and feeling/observation. Elayne is pointing out the issue from the position of making sure that the statement is logically consistent with the whole. She is correct in how the issue should be explained in the widest context. If we limit the discussion and state our limitations, then Don's view is acceptable.

We're making progress I think in seeing that we've got to articulate things in a "logically consistent" fashion while paying attention to both the "reasonable person" standard to come up with a "rule" or a "systematic explanation" and also the particular perspective of an individual focusing on what seems real to them locally.

I do not believe that Epicurus would say that his philosophy was anything less than rigorously logical and reasonable. We can achieve that aim, i think, and we HAVE to if we're going to be able to explain these issues to wider groups of people.

Quote from Godfrey

This quote of Don's seems like a good summary to me. It addresses hypotheticals and also provides grounds for evaluating a life of "sex, drugs and rock 'n' roll."

I completely agree with what Don stated and what Godfrey quoted too, but I do not believe it addresses, at least fully, the proper use of hypotheticals - if there is one - in philosophy. But I'll have to come back to this later....

Hello and welcome to the forum Dab !

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
2. "A Few Days In Athens" by Frances Wright
3. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
4. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
5. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
6. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
7. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
8. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
9. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
10. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
11. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
12. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

Quote from Don

"There's no way to adequately answer this hypothetical given the possible parameters we can realistically assign to it."

Ok that's very close to the same question. Must a hypothetical be "realistic" to be worth entertaining. That could be very close to the issue of "conceivability" apparently discussed by Epicurus. Is there, or should we consider there to be, a bright line against hypotheticals which are "inconceivable?" I think there are at least a couple of examples of "inconceivability" as a criterion in Lucretius but I would have to check.

Before we go too down that road we'd want to consider whether Epicurean gods are conceivable or inconceivable (presumably the former) and also whether it is conceivable to talk about a human being as a god (also presumably yes, per Epicurus' letter to menoeceus and also the reference in Lucretius to Epicurus being godlike).

Well we will soon be able to answer the question:

"Is the process of going through the details of a hypothetical of sufficient educational value to make the process worthwhile?

I would say that's probably he question. I am thinking the answer is "yes."

Yes this is the key "if it was a true bliss pill as advertised, then it would provide reliable pleasure." I understand you (Don) are unwilling to entertain that as a hypothetical so really the issue becomes are you suggesting we draw a bright line against all hypotheticals for which we have never seen an actual instance? I can see that being a reasonable position to entertain but I would think that would have far reaching implications that would require scrutiny.

Quote from Cassius

My own conclusion is that the wider interpretation DOES provide real benefits to SOME real people, but for other real people it does not.

And one of the keys to this is going to be the definition we use for "logic" and "reason" which is addressed near the end of the podcast. I am particularly interested in as much feedback as possible from people on this point, as you will understand when you listen.

Quote from Don

In the end, the argument doesn't provide benefits to real people.

Don this comment is very close to the issue that I think a number of us to have been circling around for a while on these issues. My own conclusion is that the wider interpretation DOES provide real benefits to SOME real people, but for other real people it does not.

I think you'll be really interested in the discussion we had today, so I took the time to edit it immediately so we can keep the conversation moving forward. When you find time to listen to it, be sure to listen all the way to the end, where I think some of the most important discussion takes place.

RE: Episode Fifty-Four: Reason Is Dependent On The Senses

Episode Fifty-Four of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In today's podcast we will discuss how mistaken judgments caused by illusions should not be considered to be the fault of the senses, but of the mind. Our text will be from Latin Lines: 324- 468. Thanks to Charles for reading today's text.

Well this thread was extremely helpful in our recording of Episode 54 of the Lucretius Today podcast. I will get that edited and posted as soon as possible and hopefully we will get some comments that can be used in next week's episode too.

Yep, your reaction is consistent, to say the least! This is why I recommend that everyone at least read DeWitt before making up their minds, because most people aren't going to find DeWitt's perspective anywhere else but in "Epicurus and His Philosophy." Everyone should read and come to their own conclusions.

Quote from Don

I think once one starts to say "what he's actually saying is..." that's "like butter scraped over too much bread."

I see your perspective there and think it is a good place to start. However I would not recommend stopping there, because unless you develop more of the context of the discussion it's easy to miss many implications of what is being presented. In this context I don't think Epicurus can be fully appreciated without realizing how much he amounts to a rejection of Platonic viewpoints, and that remains very important today since Platonic viewpoints are embedded in so much of modern thinking. Plato is never mentioned by name in the principle doctrines, yet it seems that Epicurus was probably thinking explicitly about the need to refute his viewpoints when he compiled his list of important doctrines. A list of principles presented as "this is important to understand" isn't fully understood until the reader understands "why this is important."

Norman Dewitt Epicurus and His Philosophy Page 12

He also exhibits great familiarity with the writings of Plato and he distributed among members of his school the work of refuting or ridiculing his various dialogues. His own classification of the desires is developed from a Platonic hint and he begins to erect his structure of hedonism from the point where this topic was left by Plato. A paragraph is extant in which he warns his disciples against the Platonic view of the universe as described in the Timaeus, and elsewhere he pokes a little satirical fun at that famous opus. More than half of his forty Authorized Doctrines are direct contradictions of Platonic teachings.

In connection with this episode we should keep in mind this paragraph from Chapter X of Diogenes Laertius:

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31. They reject dialectic as superfluous; holding that in their inquiries the physicists should be content to employ the ordinary terms for things.^[43] Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our sensations and preconceptions and our feelings are the standards of truth; the Epicureans generally make perceptions of mental presentations^[44] to be also standards. His own statements are also to be found in the Summary addressed to Herodotus and in the Sovran Maxims. Every sensation, he says, is devoid of reason and incapable of memory; for neither is it self-caused nor, regarded as having an external cause, can it add anything thereto or take anything therefrom. 32. Nor is there anything which can refute sensations or convict them of error: one sensation cannot convict another and kindred sensation, for they are equally valid; nor can one sensation refute another which is not kindred but heterogeneous, for the objects which the two senses judge are not the same;^[45] nor again can reason refute them, for reason is wholly dependent on sensation; nor can one sense refute another, since we pay equal heed to all. And the reality of separate perceptions guarantees^[46] the truth of our senses. But seeing and hearing are just as real as feeling pain. Hence it is from plain facts that we must start when we draw inferences about the unknown.^[47] For all our notions are derived from perceptions, either by actual contact or by analogy, or resemblance, or composition, with some slight aid from reasoning. And the objects presented to mad-men^[48] and to people in dreams are true, for they produce effects – i.e. movements in the mind – which that which is unreal never does.

For the definition of "Dialectic" here is the 1911 Encyclopaedia Brittannica:

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DIALECTIC, or Dialectics (from Gr. διάλεκτος, discourse, debate; ἡ διαλεκτική, sc. τέχνη, the art of debate), a logical term, generally used in common parlance in a contemptuous sense for verbal or purely abstract disputation devoid of practical value. According to Aristotle, Zeno of Elea "invented" dialectic, the art of disputation by question and answer, while Plato developed it metaphysically in connexion with his doctrine of "Ideas" as the art of analysing ideas in themselves and in relation to the ultimate idea of the Good (Repub. vii.). The special function of the so-called "Socratic dialectic" was to show the inadequacy of popular beliefs. Aristotle himself used "dialectic," as opposed to "science," for that department of mental activity which examines the presuppositions lying at the back of all the particular sciences. Each particular science has its own subject matter and special principles (ἴδιαι ἀρχαί) on which the superstructure of its special discoveries is based. The Aristotelian dialectic, however, deals with the universal laws (κοιναὶ ἀρχαί) of reasoning, which can be applied to the particular arguments of all the sciences. The sciences, for example, all seek to define their own species; dialectic, on the other hand, sets forth the conditions which all definitions must satisfy whatever their subject matter. Again, the sciences all seek to educe general laws; dialectic investigates the nature of such laws, and the kind and degree of necessity to which they can attain. To this general subject matter Aristotle gives the name "Topics" (τόποι, loci, communes loci). "Dialectic" in this sense is the equivalent of "logic." Aristotle also uses the term for the science of probable reasoning as opposed to demonstrative reasoning (ἀποδεικτική). The Stoics divided λογική (logic) into rhetoric and dialectic, and from their time till the end of the middle ages dialectic was either synonymous with, or a part of, logic.

In modern philosophy the word has received certain special meanings. In Kantian terminology Dialektik is the name of that portion of the Kritik d. reinen Vernunft in which Kant discusses the impossibility of applying to "things-in-themselves" the principles which are found to govern phenomena. In the system of Hegel the word resumes its original Socratic sense, as the name of that intellectual process whereby the inadequacy of popular conceptions is exposed. Throughout its history, therefore, "dialectic" has been connected with that which is remote from, or alien to, unsystematic thought, with the a priori, or transcendental, rather than with the facts of common experience and material things.

Here is the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica on "Logic" (a very long article)

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LOGIC (λογική, sc. τέχνη, the art of reasoning), the name given to one of the four main departments of philosophy, though its sphere is very variously delimited. The present article is divided into I. The Problems of Logic, II. History.

I. The Problems of Logic.

Introduction.—Logic is the science of the processes of inference. What, then, is inference? It is that mental operation which proceeds by combining two premises so as to cause a consequent conclusion. Some suppose that we may infer from one premise by a so-called “immediate inference.” But one premise can only reproduce itself in another form, e.g. all men are some animals; therefore some animals are men. It requires the combination of at least two premises to infer a conclusion different from both. There are as many kinds of inference as there are different ways of combining premises, and in the main three types:—

1. Analogical Inference, from particular to particular: e.g. border-war between Thebes and Phocis is evil; border-war between Thebes and Athens is similar to that between Thebes and Phocis; therefore, border-war between Thebes and Athens is evil.

2. Inductive Inference, from particular to universal: e.g. border-war between Thebes and Phocis is evil; all border-war is like that between Thebes and Phocis; therefore, all border-war is evil.

3. Deductive or Syllogistic Inference, from universal to particular, e.g. all border-war is evil; border-war between Thebes and Athens is border-war; therefore border-war between Thebes and Athens is evil.

In each of these kinds of inference there are three mental judgments capable of being expressed as above in three linguistic propositions; and the two first are the premises which are combined, while the third is the conclusion which is consequent on their combination. Each proposition consists of two terms, the subject and its predicate, united by the copula. Each inference contains three terms. In syllogistic inference the subject of the conclusion is the minor term, and its predicate the major term, while between these two extremes the term common to the two premises is the middle term, and the premise containing the middle and major terms is the major premise, the premise containing the middle and minor terms the minor premise. Thus in the example of syllogism given above, “border-war between Thebes and Athens” is the minor term, “evil” the major term, and “border-war” the middle term. Using S for minor, P for major and M for middle, and preserving these signs for corresponding terms in analogical and inductive inferences, we obtain the following formula of the three inferences:—

Analogical.	Inductive.	Deductive or Syllogistic.
S1 is P	S is P	Every	M is P
S2 is similar to S1	Every M is similar to S		S is M
∴⁠S2 is P.	∴⁠Every M is P.	∴	S is P.

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Here is the 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica on "Reason."

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REASON (Lat. ratio, through French raison), in philosophy, the faculty or process of drawing logical inferences. Thus we speak of man as essentially a rational animal, it being implied that man differs from all other animals in that he can consciously draw inferences from premises. It is, however, exceedingly difficult in this respect to draw an absolute distinction between men and animals, observation of which undoubtedly suggests that the latter have a certain power of making inferences. Between the higher animals and the lower types of mankind the distinction is so hard to draw that many psychologists argue that the difference is one of degree rather than of kind (see also Instinct). There can be little doubt, however, that inference by man differs from that of the brute creation in respect of self-consciousness, and, though there can be no doubt that some animals dream, it is difficult to find evidence for the presence of ideal images in the minds of any but the highest animals. In the nature of the case satisfactory conclusions as to the rationality which may be predicated of animals are impossible.

The term "reason" is also used in several narrower senses. Thus reason is opposed to sensation, perception, feeling, desire, as the faculty (the existence of which is denied by empiricists) by which fundamental truths are intuitively apprehended. These fundamental truths are the causes or "reasons" (ἁρχαί) of all derivative facts. With Kant, reason (Vernunft) is the power of synthesizing into unity, by means of comprehensive principles, the concepts provided by the intellect (Verstand). The reason which gives a priori principles Kant calls "Pure Reason" (cf. the Kritik der reinen Vernunft), as distinguished from the "Practical Reason" (praktische Vernunft) which is specially concerned with the performance of particular actions. In formal logic the drawing of inferences (frequently called "ratiocination," from Lat. ratiocinari, to use the reasoning faculty) is classified from Aristotle downwards as deductive (from generals to particulars) and inductive (from particulars to generals); see Logic, Induction, Syllogism. In theology, reason, as distinguished from faith, is the human intelligence exercised upon religious truth whether by way of discovery or by way of explanation. The limits within which the reason may be used have been laid down differently in different churches and periods of thought: on the whole, modern Christianity, especially in the Protestant churches, tends to allow to reason a wide field, reserving, however, as the sphere of faith the ultimate (supernatural) truths of theology.

The Greek words for reason are νοῦς and λόγος, both vaguely used. In Aristotle the λόγος of a thing is its definition, including its formal cause, while the ultimate principles of a science are ἁρχαί, the "reasons" (in a common modern sense) which explain all its particular facts.^[1] Nois in Plato and Aristotle is used both widely for all the meanings which "reason" can have, and strictly for the faculty which apprehends intuitively. Thus, in the Republic, van is the faculty which apprehends necessary truth, while δόξα (opinion) is concerned with phenomena.

For the Stoic and Neoplatonic uses of Aόγος, as also for those of Philo Judaeus and the Fathers, see Logos.