Quote from Godfrey

Affect is defined as a faculty of registering pleasure/displeasure and the degree of arousal. This corresponds to the Feelings and is a guide to behaviors and to forming concepts. These behaviors and concepts are formed from a very early stage of development in each individual, often through social connections, and are not innate.

I think I am with your completely on the first paragraph, but on this one I think you're making a distinction that may be in Barrett but may not be in Epicurus as to "degree of arousal."

Also the word "affect" would appear to be Barrett (?) the term in Epicurus as to the feelings would appear to be "pathe" sometimes translated "passions" and includes both pleasure and pain (Don?) but does NOT include "degree of arousal" as part of the term pathe / passions. Obviously degree of intensity or focus is something that is relevant, but I don't gather that that factor is included under the term pathe (?)

The reason I think it is important to distinguish the two categories is that "degree of arousal" or "intensity" is a huge question that involves evaluation of the pleasure as relatively more or less desirable, and that's such a deep topic that I don't think they can be merged together. We know Epicurus said not to measure relative pleasure in terms of "time" (not the longest but the most pleasant) but as far as I know he didn't give any other measurement of intensity either, so if we're trying to be as clear as possible we ought to make clear to people that there is no absolute standard (time or anything else) telling us how to compare pleasures.

Quote from Godfrey

Pattern recognition is one of the ways that we have been thinking about Anticipations and I think pretty much aligns with DeWitt. It both precedes and reacts to sensations,

I think you're intending that to mean "the faculty of pattern recognition" and the issue of "both preceding and reacting to sensations" is really the question. Is it just a "faculty for recognizing patterns" that exists at birth, or is there any faint etching or disposition to etch in a particular way that is involved. Relevant quotes from Velleius include:

"For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind." ....

"For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom, or law, but rests on the unanimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them; but a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist."

"For nature, which bestowed upon us an idea of the gods themselves, also engraved on our minds the belief that they are eternal and blessed."

Now it's maybe possible that this imprinting / engraving took place after birth by operation of images received after conception, but it appears a good or better chance that Velleius is talking about at birth, not exposure to images after birth.

And that's where the discussion would involve whether beavers are born with dam-building imprinted in their minds, or whether the behavior is fully learned from experience. I would think that these "instinct" questions deserve a lot of attention, because if and when it were to be reliably shown that animal brains contain etchings of any kind of behaviors, that would likely establish the principle that this could go on with humans too.

All of this is also part of what we (individually) need to take a position to as to "what Epicurus taught" as distinct from "what we think is in fact the fact the case."

Sounds like that elevator might go all the way to the top!

Hello and welcome to the forum @SeekingSelf !

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
2. "A Few Days In Athens" by Frances Wright
3. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
4. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
5. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
6. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
7. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
8. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
9. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
10. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
11. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
12. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

I have to now make a comment that I am going to elevate somewhere else at some point. This applies to almost every discussion, from this one to the Barrett book to any of the other complex issues.

At the same time we are exploring all these trails, we have to keep in mind the saying that the ultimate test of the worthiness of what we are doing is whether it brings real benefit. Those of us who are into the details get enjoyment and satisfaction from exploring every twist and turn, but as Epicurus said what is needed every day is not the detail but the higher level outline.

So what I have been thinking about is the issue of how we eventually express what we find to other people in a way that is productive. For example, as we go through this issue, or through the Barrett book, we cannot conceivably relate every twist and turn and speculation that is involved. We constantly have to relate the discussion back to practical application and practical benefit.

It's almost as if we ought to always be thinking: "How would I express this if the Garden of Athens invited me to give a 60 minute presentation, with slides, on what the average Epicurean needs to take away from this subject."

There are all sorts of cliches about how to organize presentations, such as "tell them what you're going to say, tell them, and then finish by telling them what you said."

If we aren't constantly doing that then I think we spin our wheels in much less productive ways.

In many of these issues we're deep in the weeds, and we need to be there, but I hope everyone (like Godfrey and Don and everyone reading today) thinks about "How will I present this when Cassius calls on me to give my presentation at the Convention of American Epicureans at Monticello next year!"

You'll only have an hour at most, and the final sentence can't be anything like "And studying this material is why I decided to once again become a Stoic!"

Quote from Don

Another potentially interesting paper, search for "memory" in text.

Here's one instance, and yes this would be relevant. The texts seem to be pretty clear that the perceptions do not involve memory. I would see that as a back-hand way of saying that while the perceptions (such as the receipt of images?) don't involve memory, memory is a function that accompanies our reactions and thoughts about what we perceive.

OK I need to read more of this before forming final conclusions, but as I scan this is there anything here which is not said much more clearly and concisely by DeWitt? And THAT brings me to this observation: look at that list of references at the end, and search the paper for "DeWitt."

additional edit: Godfrey THANK you for finding this paper. My frustrations are of course aimed at the paper. The writer spends 25 pages of academic wandering and probably never states as clearly and concisely that the real issue appears to be the meaning of "truth" and that "all sensations are true" means "reported truly without opinion" as Dewitt states.

I am going to have to get a double refill on my blood pressure medication.

Agreed I don't think that the texts say that at all, which is why I would not think that our own modern discussions of these things go in the direction of images crowding out or superceding any of the other mental functions that surely exist.

Quote from Cassius

Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus and especially Lucretius' account of eidola in De Rerum Natura IV reveal that the school explained these various mental phenomena by analogy with sense perception: our mind is impacted by special, particularly thin and fine eidola, which in turn form the basis of our thoughts and dreams.

(that's a quote from the article) -- And so to be clear, my objection is not that images can't and don't spur thoughts, my objection is to jumping to the conclusion that images are the SOLE basis for thoughts and dreams. Just like I can see a tree in front of me and choose to contemplate it or think about something else, or hear a symphony and choose to think about something else, there seems to me to be no reason whatsoever to conclude that the mind's reception of an image would dictate that the mind occupy itself in contemplating that image to the exclusion of other thoughts.

I would also add "no reason whatsoever...." especially since we know that Epicurus considered agency to be an important attribute of human action - it would fly in the face of agency to presume that receipt of an image would compel the mind to pursue that image and nothing else -- any more than we should consider hearing or seeing something to compel our thoughts to comply with what we see or hear.

At least in my own case i think it is pretty easy to stare into space with eyes wide open, presumably seeing what is there to be seen, while my mind is off in a direction absolutely unrelated to what is in front of my eyes.

Maybe i should also consider the example that my wife frequently tells me that regardless of what i am hearing, I am sometimes / often oblivious to the words!

Maybe I am too quick to recall this as ambiguous. We'd have to drill down into the Latin, but doesn't this appear to be a straight DENIAL of Cicero's characterization of the function of the images?

Cassius had recently become a follower of the Epicurean school of philosophy.

[15.16] Cicero to Cassius

[Rome, January, 45 B.C.]

L I expect you must be just a little ashamed of yourself now that this is the third letter that has caught you before you have sent me a single leaf or even a line. But I am not pressing you, for I shall look forward to, or rather insist upon, a longer letter. As for myself, if I always had somebody to trust with them, I should send you as many as three an hour. For it somehow happens, that whenever I write anything to you, you seem to be at my very elbow; and that, not by way of visions of images, as your new friends term them, who believe that even mental visions are conjured up by what Catius calls spectres (for let me remind you that Catius the Insubrian, an Epicurean, who died lately, gives the name of spectres to what the famous Gargettian [Epicurus], and long before that Democritus, called images).

2 But, even supposing that the eye can be struck by these spectres because they run up against it quite of their own accord, how the mind can be so struck is more than I can see. It will be your duty to explain to me, when you arrive here safe and sound, whether the spectre of you is at my command to come up as soon as the whim has taken me to think about you - and not only about you, who always occupy my inmost heart, but suppose I begin thinking about the Isle of Britain, will the image of that wing its way to my consciousness?

3 But of this later on. I am only sounding you now to see in what spirit you take it. For if you are angry and annoyed, I shall have more to say, and shall insist upon your being reinstated in that school of philosophy, out of which you have been ousted "by violence and an armed force."

[15.19] Cassius to Cicero

[Brundisium, latter half of January, 45 B.C.]

L I hope that you are well. I assure you that on this tour of mine there is nothing that gives me more pleasure to do than to write to you; for I seem to be talking and joking with you face to face. And yet that does not come to pass because of those spectres; and, by way of retaliation for that, in my next letter I shall let loose upon you such a rabble of Stoic boors that you will proclaim Catius a true-born Athenian.

OMG you're right! We definitely want this full article. Here's a paste of the abstract. I am sorry to say that at least in the abstract he doesn't seem to refer to Cassius' reply, but I do see that reply as ambiguous. A really interesting topic to explore!

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Cicero vs. Lucretius on Thought and Imagination

Nathan Gilbert

The Epicureans, like other ancient philosophical schools, offered a detailed and comprehensive account of physics, including perception. This branch of philosophy was especially important for Epicureanism due to its crucial role in dispelling fears about the gods, death, and celestial phenomena—fears which Epicureans believed caused mental anxieties and threatened our acquisition of happiness (see e.g. Epicurus, Ep. ad Hdt. 79, Ep. ad Pyth. 85, KD 10-11; Lucretius, 4.33ff, 5.110ff). Therefore it was necessary for the school to advance a strictly materialist and atomistic explanation of perception and sensation, based, likely to a large extent, on the theories of the Presocratic philosopher Democritus (see Furley 1993).

Epicurus’ insistence on materialistic explanations and his high standards for empirical verification of his claims yielded an account of perception which is in many ways remarkably close to modern theories. His theory, which argues that perception is caused by the impact of thin atomic films (called eidola) shed by external objects on our sense organs, and offers criteria for the verification (“witnessing”) of these mental impressions to account for and avoid optical illusions, has been justly praised for its ingenuity and continuing philosophical interest (Long and Sedley 1987: i.78; cf. Everson 1990: 183 and Asmis 2009: 100-104).

I propose to examine a more surprising and often neglected consequence of the Epicurean theory of perception: its materialistic account of imagination, thought, and dreams. Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus and especially Lucretius' account of eidola in De Rerum Natura IV reveal that the school explained these various mental phenomena by analogy with sense perception: our mind is impacted by special, particularly thin and fine eidola, which in turn form the basis of our thoughts and dreams. I propose to examine the epistemological motivations and coherency of this typically marginalized aspect of their physical system.

As a point of departure for my analysis I focus on an intriguing critique of this theory made by Cicero in his De Natura Deorum and in a private letter to C. Cassius Longinus written earlier that year (DND 1.107-9; Ad Familiares 15.16). Cicero’s arguments, which have been alternatively ignored, written off as mere “jokes” (Castner 1988: 30; Lintott 2008: 324; Bailey 1947: iii.1269), or used in the service of Quellenforschung to reconstruct the positions of the Academic Carneades (Kleve 1978: 67, followed by Asmis 1984: 119 n.2), are in fact philosophically sharp and deserve to be considered in more detail. In these passages, Cicero accepts—for the sake of argument—that Epicurus’ explanation of the five senses is correct and instead focuses his attack on the account of mental perception. He demands that his Epicurean interlocutors justify the extravagant conclusions of their theory, which would seem to necessitate an infinite availability of eidola of literally everything in every location (e.g. Fam. 15.16: “Is it the case that your [eidolon] is in my power, so that it meets up with me as soon as it pleases me to think of you? And not only of you, who cling to my very marrow, but if I start to think of the island of Britain, will its εἴδωλον fly into my heart?”).

I argue that Cicero is pressing the Epicureans on a very soft spot, and I explore possible Epicurean motivations for this seemingly strange theory. Drawing upon Lucretius Book IV, I argue that the Epicurean explanation of mental perception connects with two critical assumptions in Epicurean physics and epistemology, both of which Cicero challenges: their claims about the infinity of atoms justify a corresponding infinity of eidola of every object in every location; and their standards of scientific explanation warrant the postulation of these unverifiable and especially fine mental eidola in a way that their more rigorous requirements for explaining sense perception do not. Cicero’s critiques, then, go much deeper than an attack on a bizarre but minor consequence of Epicurean physics; they intersect with deep epistemological claims about explanation, evidence, and proof.

https://existentialcomics.com/comic/69

In recent discussions largely arising from the Lucretius Today podcast, the suggestion has been made that the Epicurean theory of images explains, and takes the place of, what might be described as the conventional view of memory as a device for storing pictures or other information and retrieving them at will.

In other words, did Epicurus intend us to understand that the mind's ability to select from images "floating through space" is how we should understand the capacity to "remember things" to function?

I will say that as to my current thinking, I personally would answer this question "no," but I can certainly see why this suggestion might be made. It would therefore be helpful to see if we can gather examples from the Epicurean texts in which functions of "memory" are apparently being discussed, and examine them to see what they might show on this question.

Despite my inclination to the "no" answer, perhaps a very clear instance that supports "yes" would be the reference in the letter of Cicero to Cassius in which Cicero teases Cassius by questioning him as to whether Cicero's thoughts of Cassius had been spurred by "spectres" floating through the air. My interpretation of the answer given by Cassius is that Cassius refutes the notion, but his answer is possibly ambiguous, and the fact that Cicero even asks the question indicates that this line of thought was a possibility.

Let's use this thread to discuss the issue, including the suggestion that modern research has disproven the notion that memory works through the storage of pictures or other specific information in the mind. Is that the case? Even if it is the case, what would that development indicate as to Epicurus' position on these questions?

In recent discussions the question has been raised as to whether there is a relationship between the Epicurean theory of Anticipations (especially as described by Velleius in his "etching" reference in "On The Nature of the Gods") and the view that is generally described as "instinct," especially as we (presumably) see examples in animals.

Over time I expect this question to recur so let's use this thread as a discussion starter.

1. What is "instinct"?
2. Does the common conception that certain animals are born "hard-wired" to certain behaviors at birth, prior to any experience of any observations of that behavior, really exist?
3. If it exists, does it have anything to say about the possibility that certain behaviors in humans may also be "hard-wired" from birth, prior to experience?
4. if such hard wiring actually exists in humans to any degree, is there any relationship between this phenomena and what Epicurus described as anticipations / preconceptions / prolepsis?

I restored this thread but Godfrey posted this in a thread started by Joshua on "The Sculpted Word"

I just noticed I missed seeing Don's posts 11 and 12 -- I didn't intend to ignore them. I'll add "memory" to the agenda for tonight

Quote from Godfrey

I think we agree that language developed over time and is not inborn but learned, possibly beginning in utero. So there wasn't a model for it. I'm suggesting that it's the same for the birds and the beavers.

If you take a baby beaver away from its parents and all other beavers at birth, and release it into the wild later, having never been near an example of a dam, it will still build dams, won't it?

Quote from Godfrey

nest-building birds or dam-building beavers beings or nature? What are their models?

Great question, and this is part of why I am in the DeWitt camp on anticipations as "etchings" from birth. I don't think most people have a problem with animals having the ability to pass programming on prior to personal experience, so why should humans not have the same ability.

Or would we maintain that unless beavers and birds saw their parents building dams and nests they wouldn't be doing it themselves? I don't think that's the case, is it?

I don't really disagree with what you've written in those last two posts, but I do think this is an area where we have to keep separate what Epicurus was saying from what "modern science" might say is a different mechanism. I do think that there are references in the text which would justify holding that Epicurus held a conventional view that the mind can store information / pictures and retrieve it at will. There are also clearly references (the ones we are going over now) to the mind being stimulated from the outside by images. At least as to me I do not see these two as being mutually incompatible at all, but I am definitely open and looking for further development of these issues over time. For me the current evidence indicates that both processes exist, and I agree with your comment that "most people" think in those terms, so I think the Epicureans would have too. If Epicurus intended to eject or disprove or invalidate that mode of mental operation, I think he would have been very specific and clear in making that point, so I see the burden of proof on this issue to be with those who would say that Epicurus intended to replace in full conventional views of memory with the "images" mechanism. If anyone has any academic articles on this point I hope they will cite them, but we've only recently over the last couple of months begun to discuss this issue, so there's lots of room for more development.

Quote from Don

And we know smelling something or hearing something can stir a memory. Hmmm... Maybe Epicurus was on to something

And I particularly agree with that, which is why I am not willing to write off as impossible a theory that would be based on the mind (brain, presumably) being able to receive stimulation from outside which is not visible to the eyes, ears, etc. By no means do I think that there is enough evidence to accept Epicurus' images theory at face value, but I do not think it wise to label it as "ridiculous" or "impossible." In that I am referring first to just the possibility of the mind receiving impressions from things around us; the contention that people can receive images from across the reaches of space would require much more evidence to entertain. If I were looking to develop THAT theory, I would start here.

Quote from Don

The right answer is not easy to find.

It sure isn't!!

Quote from Don

I'm still not clear how imagination works in an Epicurean context. Do we combine images and concepts that are extant in the world?

I see why you would say that because I recall especially Elayne making remarks in podcasts from book four connecting "images" and "imagination." I would say that she was doing so, as you say, considering the whole idea of images to be a sort of allegory, and not to be taken literally. From her perspective she ruled out the use of the mind as a "suprasensory' organism (I think that's the term DeWitt applied to it) so she was making sense of it as best she could as something she maintains cannot be taken literally.

I would not take that approach - I think these passages were meant to be taken literally - so I would not at all consider "imagination" as we use that term to be connected to Epicurean "images." Therefore i don't think it is possible to understand the Epicurean context or Lucretius' view of this theory without taking him literally that there are "images" made of particles which our eyes cannot see but which retain - as they travel through space - shape and/or other characteristic information of the thing from which they are emitted.

So if somewhat wants to think about what WE consider to be "imagination" they would simply be talking about the storage of concepts and/or pictures (again something that Elayne questioned, if i recall) in the mind, and then the mind's manipulation of those memories as part of the thinking process.

If someone wants to think about what Epicurus/Lucretius was talking about, In my opinion I think they have to start with the premise that the main subject indeed involves the flow of elemental particles off of all bodies, how those flows travel through space and interfere with each other, and how the mind as a direct sensory organism receives them from outside the brain and processes them.

This was a point of contention either on or off the air of some of those podcasts from book four. I certainly am not in a position of saying with confidence that I agree with Epicurus and Lucretius that such a mechanism in fact exists, but I am not ready to rule it out as impossible. With more confidence, however, I would say that it's clear to me that Epicurus and Lucretius took this contention seriously, so no matter to what extent we agree or disagree that Epicurus was right about this aspect of his theology, I do believe they intended to be taken literally.

Also - and I am glad you reminded me to say this! - there was a point or two in the podcast where you made the point being made here to the effect that the images traveling through space are the main way that we "know" of the existence of gods. I think that's not the best reading of the Velleius material, and I think DeWitt is correct that Velleius' reference is pretty clearly that anticipations of the gods are engraved on the mind at birth, before any "images" from or to the gods have been transmitted. So at least as for me when I am discussing the theology it's my intent to always state that the texts support two potential means of information about the gods: (1) transmission of the images, and (2) the innate etching on the brain which exists at birth but develops naturally as we age.

Getting back specifically to "Do we combine images and concepts that are extant in the world?" I would say that the answer there under the theory would most certainly be yes, but I would connect the "extant in the world" to the eternal universe premise. For that reason there has never been a time when all parts of the universe were not full of images flowing through the air, some of which maintain their original shape/information while others have so interfered with each other, or traveled such distances that they are distorted to the point of losing most or all of their original shapes. I think that seems to be what they are saying, but again I see that process as very distinct from memory - the storing of information data in the mind and the manipulation of that data into new combinations as we process that data. I would see those processes to be so different and distinct as to be pretty much totally disconnected from each other, except to the extent that thoughts are influenced by new images constantly being received, just like our thoughts are affected by the things we see or hear as we are thinking.

Ok so this is what Velleius says:

Quote

“These discoveries of Epicurus are so acute in themselves and so subtly expressed that not everyone would be capable of appreciating them. Still I may rely on your intelligence, and make my exposition briefer than the subject demands. Epicurus then, as he not merely discerns abstruse and recondite things with his mind's eye, but handles them as tangible realities, teaches that the substance and nature of the gods is such that, in the first place, it is perceived not by the senses but by the mind, and not materially or individually, like the solid objects which Epicurus in virtue of their substantiality entitles steremnia; but by our perceiving images owing to their similarity and succession, because an endless train of precisely similar images arises from the innumerable atoms and streams towards the gods, our mind with the keenest feelings of pleasure fixes its gaze on these images, and so attains an understanding of the nature of a being both blessed and eternal.

So this is indeed something i had missed previously -- i was thinking that it was just a stream of elemental particles that kept the gods alive in their quasi-bodies, but it appears that the word used is images, not particles, and I can't help but think that that makes a difference. What the difference might be, I don't really know, but there has to be some significance to the things streaming toward the gods being "images" (which I take to be particles organized in shape deriving from their source) rather than just random elemental particles.

To save time for anyone reading along, the heart of the sections in Philebus and Seneca I am referring to are:

SOCRATES: I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: O my beautiful Philebus, the goddess, methinks, seeing the universal wantonness and wickedness of all things, and that there was in them no limit to pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and order, whereby, as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I maintain, delivers the soul. — What think you, Protarchus?

…

SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?

PHILEBUS: They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree.

SOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good. But now — admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature of the infinite — in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on this point.

PHILEBUS: You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god.

SOCRATES: And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question.

…

SOCRATES: And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies but in every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source?

PROTARCHUS: Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source.

SOCRATES: Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the attributes of wisdom; — we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things?

PROTARCHUS: Such a supposition is quite unreasonable.

SOCRATES: Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind?

PROTARCHUS: Most justly.

-----

We can find the same point made by Seneca in the following letters:

Quote Seneca’s Letters – Book I – Letter XVI: This also is a saying of Epicurus: “If you live according to nature, you will never be poor; if you live according to opinion, you will never be rich.” Nature’s wants are slight; the demands of opinion are boundless. Suppose that the property of many millionaires is heaped up in your possession. Assume that fortune carries you far beyond the limits of a private income, decks you with gold, clothes you in purple, and brings you to such a degree of luxury and wealth that you can bury the earth under your marble floors; that you may not only possess, but tread upon, riches. Add statues, paintings, and whatever any art has devised for the luxury; you will only learn from such things to crave still greater. Natural desires are limited; but those which spring from false opinion can have no stopping point. The false has no limits.

Quote Seneca’s Letters – To Lucilius – 66.45: “What can be added to that which is perfect? Nothing otherwise that was not perfect to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect.”“