Posts by Cassius

Ha ha -- this is where I would think we would be better off saying "formal logical grounds" or "abstract logical grounds" because what you are saying is that he is relying on logic (word-play; concepts) alone without any evidence, correct?

Quote from Matt

but I would contend that purely from a conceptual standpoint on the existence of the universe, his position of something “being” as opposed to nothing ever being...is sound. In my mind at least.

But when you say it is sound it IS purely "word-play" based on definitions -- or No? Is any "observation" involved?

It seems to me that Epicurus/Lucretius' version is clearly enough based at least in part on the observation that we do not see things being created from nothing, and therefore there is no reason to think that anything could be created from nothing by a god or by any other means. This kind of reasoning is discussed fairly clearly if I recall in "On Methods of Inference." To me that whole chain of reasoning is a fairly understandable inference of a deduction based on that which has been observed to be true. It's not just an assertion based on logic but one that is grounded in observation for it's persuasiveness.

I don't see Parmenides' version being in the same league as it does not seem to be based on observation - or is it? Matt can you reword it into something more plain?

Quote from Matt

But for my purposes I see this as an important thought experiment for recognizing the eternity of the material universe.

And at the very least Parmenides represents (as I understand it) one of the major views at the time of Epicurus, so his students would have been aware of it and thus some of his positions may be directed at it -- we can't recognize that if we don't know what Parmenides argued.

So is Parmenides the one who advocated a "plenum" and that there is no such thing as void? Or is this more of a formal logical proof? And if so, of what?

If you're really into this Matt and would like to explain the background to those of us who don't know, that would be a good use of this thread in the forum. Whether it would be a good use of your time might be another question But if you'd enjoy writing it I feel sure that some of us would benefit from / enjoy reading your summary of it.

Maybe more elaborate title for the thread Matt? What would you suggest? Post it here and I will make the change and then delete some of these housekeeping comments.

Matt posted a comment about something from nothing that deserves its own thread. Something From Nothing

However it also applies here too, so here's what he said:

This is an example of the type of rule that we're discussing in this thread, but to keep this one on track, please go over to the other thread to discuss the details of the logical argument in general and/or Parmenides in particular.

This thread is more on the issue of systems / logical deductions / methods of inference IN GENERAL, of which something from nothing is a particular example, but only one of many.

Yes Matt I think that would be a good idea. The Something From Nothing issue is definitely an example of what we are talking about, but if we focus on it too much it might get the thread off track. It certainly deserves a thread of its own. I will take care of it now.

Quote from Elayne

When it comes to energy, if you want to make it the same as what Epicurus said, you've either got to classify it as matter OR as void -- it can't work as both in his model. I

In his model I presume that energy would be classified as material

Quote from Elayne

All that is necessary for the pain and pleasure understanding, pleasure as a goal, is observations of one's self and others.

I agree that that is all that is necessary for some people to be comfortable with the conclusion. Simply pointing to it and observing, as Epicurus said. But not everyone understands the point, and I would say that that is why we have philosophy to help them understand it. Simply pointing has not been sufficient, especially given the corruption of other philosophies and training, so more is required for many people.

Quote from Elayne

None of the modern physics theories include meddling gods or supernatural realms.

Isn't that the equivalent of saying: "There are no gods because the physics theorists tell me so?" That would be hearsay evidence in court, and admissible only under expert testimony rules, for which there would be conflicting testimony from creationist scientists. Even if you dismiss the creation scientists as inadmissible, you're still left with your conclusion that there is no gods resting on belief in the credibility of the physicists. I interpret Epicurus is saying that the question of this (and life after death) is so personal, and so important, that people seeking happiness through philosophy need a personal method of understanding the point which is not based on hearsay but on observations they can make for themselves. Yes this turns into what is effectively an inference about the unknown based on the known, but that is what Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (which cites other and older Epicurean philosophers and seems in no way heretical from Epicurus) was doing. A lot of people who here that everything must be based on current observation, and that there is no reasonable way to reason from current observation to a principle that explains why it is reasonable not to expect to ever find proof of a god or life after death, are going to find something that is effectively "you can never be certain because new evidence of god or life after death may be uncovered tomorrow" to be insufficient."

For those who are satisfied with a view that observations can never be translated into principles, then that position is good enough. However I don't think that's what Epicurus thought, or what he taught. It seems to me that to simply take the ethics as a starting point would remove much of the force of the philosophy.

So the question I see is more likely something like:

If Epicurus were here today would he update his physics and still incorporate the updated conclusions into a philosophical system?"

Or would he say something like: "I see what you're saying Frances, and I see what you're saying modern physicists. My conclusions about matter and void and infinity and eternality have all been proven wrong. I am through with system-building and use of logic to deduce the unknown from the known is off the table! Let's just point to animals and babies and say "Pleasure is the good" and that's all we need to know."

Quote

Above all, she advances no dogmas, — is slow to assert what is, — and calls nothing impossible.

It would be interesting to discuss whether this statement can be squared with Epicurus' views on "dogmatism" and such Lucretian terminology as Epicurus coming back from his survey of the universe to tell us "what can be, and what cannot," and "the borderline, the benchmark, set forever" in the opening of Book One, not to mention the reference in Book 4 to the man who says he knows nothing as being perverse or a trifler.

This is admittedly not a perfect analogy, but I continue to see parallels between Elayne's point of view and Frances Wright -- and I just realized another - A Few Days In Athens is, if I recall correctly, almost totally devoid of argumentation based on physics.

Compare also from Chapter 14:

"In the schools you have hitherto frequented,” she continued, addressing the youth, “certain images of virtue, vice, truth, knowledge, are presented to the imagination, and these abstract qualities, or we may call them, figurative beings, are made at once the objects of speculation and adoration. A law is laid down, and the feelings and opinions of men are predicated upon it; a theory is built, and all animate and inanimate nature is made to speak in its support; an hypothesis is advanced, and all the mysteries of nature are treated as explained. You have heard of, and studied various systems of philosophy; but real philosophy is opposed to all systems. Her whole business is observation; and the results of that observation constitute all her knowledge. She receives no truths, until she has tested them by experience; she advances no opinions, unsupported by the testimony of facts; she acknowledges no virtue, but that involved in beneficial actions; no vice, but that involved in actions hurtful to ourselves or to others. Above all, she advances no dogmas, — is slow to assert what is, — and calls nothing impossible. The science of philosophy is simply a science of observation, both as regards the world without us, and the world within; and, to advance in it, are requisite only sound senses, well developed and exercised faculties, and a mind free of prejudice. The objects she has in view, as regards the external world, are, first, to see things as they are, and secondly, to examine their structure, to ascertain their properties, and to observe their relations one to the other. — As respects the world within, or the philosophy of mind, she has in view, first, to examine our sensations, or the impressions of external things on our senses; which operation involves, and is involved in, the examination of those external things themselves: secondly, to trace back to our sensations, the first development of all our faculties; and again, from these sensations, and the exercise of our different faculties as developed by them, to trace the gradual formation of our moral feelings, and of all our other emotions: thirdly, to analyze all these our sensations, thoughts, and emotions, — that is, to examine the qualities of our own internal, sentient matter, with the same, and yet more, closeness of scrutiny, than we have applied to the examination of the matter that is without us finally, to investigate the justness of our moral feelings, and to weigh the merit and demerit of human actions; which is, in other words, to judge of their tendency to produce good or evil, — to excite pleasurable or painful feelings in ourselves or others. You will observe, therefore, that, both as regards the philosophy of physics, and the philosophy of mind, all is simply a process of investigation. It is a journey of discovery, in which, in the one case, we commission our senses to examine the qualities of that matter, which is around us, and, in the other, endeavor, by attention to the varieties of our consciousness, to gain a knowledge of those qualities of matter which constitute our susceptibilities of thought and feeling.”

Quote from Elayne

I think it's inaccurate to stretch what Epicurus said to include energy.

I would say that just as the essence of atoms is that they are uncuttable, the essence of "matter" is that it can be measured through the senses, in this case through the use of technology that extends the senses to areas that the unaided senses are not able to go on their own. I don't think that Epicurus would rule that the hearing of someone who requires a hearing aid is not hearing, or that vision through an electron microscope or other detector devise is not he equivalent of seeing.

Those extensions of the senses allow us to better describe the phenomena but would be fully compatible with Epicurus' first principles of nothing from nothing and nothing to nothing and the like.

If not for having confidence in some specific set of conclusions about the universe - and claiming that these are knowledge, then where IS one's starting point other than "this is what I feel pleasure and pain about?" Would we suggest that pleasure and pain are the foundation for the position that there is no supernatural god or life after death?

Quote from Elayne

Yes, a first principle is an axiom. It's something you start with that you can't prove, nor is it logic based. An assumption that other parts of your model use but can't prove. It's not the same as a fact, because by its nature it actually can't be shown to be accurate. If it ever IS shown to be accurate by some kind of evidence, then it is no longer a first principle.

If your first principles are wrong, then anything derived from them is wrong.

However, a first principle that there exists an observable reality can't lead to other reliable conclusions without evidence... because choosing that as a first principle means observations are required for other conclusions.

When I made my posts above I had not really focused on this one from Elayne. I do not read DeWitt as following this "unprovable" perspective on "First Principles." I think both DeWitt and Epicurus were explicitly considering their principles to be proven by observation, from which point they THEN were treated as the confirmed foundation on which the rest were based.

This may be another situation where a word ("first principle" or even "axiom") is being used more loosely than it might be in formal logic, but it does seem to me that the "proven" version of a first principle is the way that DeWitt and Epicurus were looking at things, and that's the way that makes the most sense to me too. To say that your first principle is unprovable (let's assume an imaginary line with only length but no width) immediately rules if out of my mind as a candidate for being a first principle.

Quote from JJElbert

What Lincoln is proposing here (as memorably acted by Daniel Day-Lewis, and brilliantly scripted by Tony Kushner) is that moral laws of justice and equality can be derived from the logic of geometry. What's so striking about this scene is that it so perfectly mimics Platonism and Pythagoreanism and their geometric foundations. Lincoln is making a worthwhile and commendable moral stand, but his reasoning is faulty. There's nothing in geometry that can actually answer, with any kind of logical finality, these moral questions. In spite of the worthiness of the cause, it amounts to an abuse of reason.

Joshua the way I would say that slightly differently is that Lincoln's argument shows how important it is to trace back one's reasoning to determine what the "first principles" are. Lincoln's first principle here is erroneous - he is explicitly citing Euclidian / Platonic universals. Even though it leads him in this case to a conclusion with which we agree. However because the first principle is wrong, his reasoning on other issues could go into other "absolutist" directions with which we would disagree.

I think this is why Epicurus was so concerned to establish confidence in an explicit and firm set of "first principles" (such as nothing comes or goes to nothing) and that he did in fact consider his principles of physics to be just such starting points for all other reasoning (specifically including ethics), as DeWitt is suggesting.

I remember the different perspectives that some of us had on this surfacing in the discussion of some of the recent "Reverence and Awe" issues. My view is that anyone who suggested that communicating with gods could be a part of Epicurean philosophy would forever be barred from successfully arguing that due to PD1, which serves as such an axiom or first principle. My view is that PD1 should be considered as forever ruling out such an approach in an Epicurean Philosophy context. Not everyone agreed that that line of reasoning would suffice as an absolute bar.

My thinking on that hasn't changed -- Epicurus intended (in my view) that the basic principles such as the 12 Principles of Nature and to a lesser extent (because they are more loose, such as at the end) be considered bedrock principles that serve that purpose of anchoring the philosophy in something firm, and that absent that anchor the philosophy would be just another person's set of assertions and entitled to no more deference. Identifying a set of bedrock principles anchors them in Nature rather than in Epicurus' personal preferences.

This is turning into an interesting thread indeed!

We don't want to turn this into a debate on DeWitt's reliability, because I think that what he's saying here is probably agreed with by the commentators - this isn't (to my understanding) an area of controversy.

So to repeat, we need to figure out if Epicurus did indeed consider these principles of physics to be the equivalent of axioms which are to be considered the ultimate building blocks of the philosophy. I will go ahead and say that that is indeed the way I view the Epicurus' take on this subject. These principles of the nature of things are ultimately something that can be converted into the methods by which the universe is concluded to be natural and not supernatural, so I see room for latitude in updating them. But I think Epicurus considered them to be so well established as to be "certain" and that reasoning based on them would be among the most certain of truths that we can be confident of.

That's the way I treat them and to the extent that we part of what we have to do is to report what it is that Epicurus held, I would think this is a central part of the philosophy.

Quote from Elayne

"Nothing comes from nothing" is not a first principle, or if it was thought to be, that's an error. It's an observation, which may or may not be correct.

This is certainly a key question we need to clarify.

Was DeWitt holding "nothing from nothing" to be a first principle?

Was Epicurus holding something like "nothing from nothing" to be a first principle?

How does this relate to the Twelve Fundamentals of Nature? https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/index.php?…tals-of-nature/

One interesting aspect of this is that if I read DeWitt correctly, he is saying that Epicurus put the strongest indicia of reliability on "deduction from first principles." And he is saying that analogy from the visible (observation?) to the invisible, and ordinary human intelligence, are less reliable.

So is DeWitt not saying that the most reliable kind of reasoning is deduction based on "first principles" which would be from something like "nothing comes from nothing?"

It is very difficult for me not to see that (deduction from a first principle) as not being well described in modern colloquial terminology with words like logic and reason.

That's why I think it's necessary to have a presentation to new students of Epicurus that would help them distinguish between acceptable forms of logic and reason and unacceptable forms.

Quote from Don

But I may be fantasizing.

No I don't think so.

Relevant to this discussion to is this below. I don't know that I agree with this division, but I do think that a division exists that needs to be articulated

This is going to be a hugely useful article -- thanks again! https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/