Okay, now I need to read the paper before I comment anymore
I don't think reading the paper will change anything you've written, which I think is correct. What reading the paper might do, andi hope it will, is to get you to comment on exactly what viewpoint by some modern scholars of Epicurus she thinks needs to be opposed.
I looked up the difference because I don't use those words in everyday life, and wanted to get a better understanding:
A priori and a posteriori claims are types of knowledge distinguished by how they're justified:A priori knowledge is independent of experience (e.g., math, logic, definitions like "bachelors are unmarried"), known through pure reason; A posteriori knowledge depends on empirical experience and observation (e.g., "it's raining," scientific facts). The former relies on thought, the latter on senses or data from the world.
I want to strongly agree with this comment. "A priori" and "A prosteriori" are certainly very useful terms in the right circumstances and of course thanks to Joshua for pointing them out. But as Kalosyni says, practically no normal person in real life uses these terms or anything close to them. Not that I am a good model for anything but they just don't connect with me even after years of reading them. I therefore think they aren't the best way to explain this issue to the kind of regular people who are the target audience of Epicureanfriends.com .
On the other hand the issue being discussed is of huge importance to our target audience. I am hoping we can continue to refine how we explain these issues without reference to Greek or Latin words which smack of "lingo" with which normal people will never be able to be comfortable.
This is maye the key distinguishing feature of what Epicurean Canonics is all about and we need clear and ordinary terms by which to explain it.
I need to re-read Austin's paper and refresh my memory. I vaguely remember seeing it several years ago (I think)? Or maybe I bookmarked it in Academia.edu and didn't get back to it.
Tau Phi's point on "fear of death" is correct and I think all of us (even Warren and the people holding the viewpoint that is the target of the article) are all agreed on that.
The reason I don't recall discussing this previously, and the reason I think the article needs more discussion now, is that the main point of the article is not necessarily to make the point which we all agree. The point of the article is to point out that there is a specific position taken by major writers on Epicurus (including Warren) with which Emily Austin disagrees.
We discussed this a little on Wednesday night but haven't fleshed it out in writing. They key section revolves around whether Epicurus held all "fear of death" or "fear of dying" to be "eliminable" through philosophy.
It's going to be necessary to be precise about the implications of both "fear" and "death vs dying" but it seems clear that Austin's reason for writing the article was her intent to state a disagreement with a "mainstream" position, and it's in areas like that where I think her work is most valuable.
We won't even begin to discuss her point til are able to see clearly what she states is her intent in writing the article and what (and who) she thinks she is writing against. The article covers lots of topics so it takes some effort to get to that point.
I would say that Austin's level of analysis and willingness to depart from the mainstream here is a good example of why "Living For Pleasure" is by far the best recent book on Epicurus.
Note to Kalosyni and other admins: If the discussion of the religion angle takes off (and that's perfectly fine if it does) - Dave is raising a good issue) we'll probably split that part off into a separate thread to keep this focused on the "reason/sensation issue"
Your experience with Philodemus' On Methods of Inference seems like it would be directly relevant here:
Ah yes and you are reminding me that we have never made much effort to go through that, even though there are long and well preserved sections.
Joshua we are going to have to figure out where to put this in the list of things to talk about. Probably we need to pull out David Sedley's "On Signs" in addition to all the extensive discussion in the Delacy translation!
Given the interest in this subject maybe we need to bump it up on this list, but it will definitely take preparation, and probably some review of Sextus Empiricus as well. And it may even be possible that we ought to visit "Academic Questions" first because in a sense that's really the issue that Cicero summarizes for us there.
It seems Epicurus himself would have done these and encouraged his school to do so. I'm certain Epicurus ascribed different motivations for bowing, sacrificing, etc than would the hoi polloi but he seems to have taken part in all that.
I'd like to see this part of the conversation be very clear. I suppose that it is possible but I am not convinced that it would make sense to tag Lucretius as being significantly different from Epicurus on this. I'd say it is very possible that they are both saying the same thing, that it is ok to engage in religious-associated practices so long as you don't take seriously in your mind what some are saying about those practices. In other words it's perfectly fine to talk about Venus and Mars and Neptune and Ceres as long as you don't take seriously the idea that those are truly supernatural gods who will respond to your prayers and intervene in human actions.
So, clarify for me, please. Am I correct that neither author above was a true fan of Epicurus? If yes, then Lucretius is more correct? Or is Lucretius off base attributing to Epicurus, and imploring the reader toward either agnosticism or atheism?
There are a lot of ways to read Dave's question and we probably need to be very clear if someone is inferring that Lucretius' antipathy toward false religion is stronger than that of Epicurus. I see a lot of danger in that direction and very little reason to emphasize it without very strong evidence on which to do so. As far as I know we don't have a lot of specific information at all on Epicurus endorsing any specific mystical practices, and a lot of evidence that he opposed the mystical basis that was being used to justify them.
This is fundamentally the difference between a priori and a posteriori claims of knowledge, with Epicurus largely rejecting the former but endorsing his own philosophical interpretations of the latter.
On the earlier point that Kalosyni raised and Joshua addressed, we probably should discuss at some point whether saying that Epicurus was opposed to "formal logic" would also be accurate:
Formal logic, the abstract study of propositions, statements, or assertively used sentences and of deductive arguments. The discipline abstracts from the content of these elements the structures or logical forms that they embody. The logician customarily uses a symbolic notation to express such structures clearly and unambiguously and to enable manipulations and tests of validity to be more easily applied. Although the following discussion freely employs the technical notation of modern symbolic logic, its symbols are introduced gradually and with accompanying explanations so that the serious and attentive general reader should be able to follow the development of ideas.
Formal logic is an a priori, and not an empirical, study. In this respect it contrasts with the natural sciences and with all other disciplines that depend on observation for their data. Its nearest analogy is to pure mathematics; indeed, many logicians and pure mathematicians would regard their respective subjects as indistinguishable, or as merely two stages of the same unified discipline. Formal logic, therefore, is not to be confused with the empirical study of the processes of reasoning, which belongs to psychology. It must also be distinguished from the art of correct reasoning, which is the practical skill of applying logical principles to particular cases; and, even more sharply, it must be distinguished from the art of persuasion, in which invalid arguments are sometimes more effective than valid ones.
I think I am agreeing with Joshua when I say that I think most of us are on the same page that small "r" practical reason based on the evidence of the senses, anticipations, and feelings is a good thing to Epicurus, and he use it all the time.
The bad thing seems to be focused on propositional logic where the propositions are not tied to repeatable sensations, anticipations and feelings.
And that's related to why there can be "true reason" as opposed to "false reason." It's possible to do reason right and to do reason wrong. But the general term of "reason" as a reference to mental calculation in itself is not always a negative term at all.
Isn't virtue itself a concern of humans?
Presumably he'd say that animals don't have the same kind of virtue and classify virtue with the divine (?)
Ok so you're focusing on the title rather than the content. The article itself seems clear enough to me, but I haven't had a lot of time to digest it and it's possible I'll reread and change my opinion letter.
On first reading of the article and your comment i'd say that the both of you are coming from the same perspective. There's nothing to be concerned about after death (incorrectly thought of a "being dead") but there's a lot to be concerned about in terms of how and when we die.
And I read the takeaways of her article to be that is is ridiculous to conclude that Epicurus taught the same attitude toward "being dead" as he did toward how long we live and the circumstances under which we stop living. But that's exactly what many seem to be doing, and it turns the philosophy on its head to take that position.
I find it quite misleading because to my understanding Epicurus tried to remove (1) the fear of being dead. He never tried to remove fear of dying (2), (3), (4) because process of dying and everything connected with it belongs to the living and is painful and human beings can't switch off pain at their will.
I read that statement (and everything you wrote after it) as exactly the point of her article, Tau Phi. And she is criticizing as misleading the position taken by Warren and others for doing what you too are criticizing.
So you are agreeing with her? Or are you saying that her article is what is misleading?
Pacatus thank you again! Joshua was sick on Sunday and we missed our weekly recording session. I've been casting around for a topic to record something short so we wouldn't miss the week. This article is perfect for me to record a few excerpts and comments for this week's episode. So this was a very timely contribution!
OH NO! A great point but far too brief! I wish she had gone into this further but she stopped before elaborating.
I'd say she's definitely right in the point below, and this is one of the most important take-aways of the article that goes far beyond the issue of death. The Epicurean goal is not perfectionism of absolute elimination of all pain before you can consider yourself to be truly happy. This section too is very understated and diplomatic, but very very implicitly critical of "wikipedia Epicureanism:'
There remains one key objection: it seems that my interpretation threatens the possibility of ataraxia. Fear, like grief, is a negative emotion, so an argument that claims we are all motivated to act in light of an ineliminable (though generally controllable) fear might appear to undercut the Epicurean quest for an anxiety-free life. If my thesis requires that Epicurus jettison a fundamental psychological principle that guides his eudaemonist ethics, interpretive consistency is very much against me. One live option is to retreat to the idea that Epicureanism is a perfectiionist ethics, according to which even the best of us can only approximate ataraxia, if only because there are some psychological and bodily limitations imposed on natural creatures. Perfectionism is not a terribly uncommon feature of ancient ethical theories, and those who are perfect are of- ten judged divine rather than human.29 Another alternative is to reconceive ataraxia in light of evidence that even sages experience characteristically negative emotions. Some texts, for instance, indicate that the sage grieves the deaths of her friends and shares their suffering. On this front, Epicureans seek to differentiate themselves from the Stoics, whose resistance to grief seemed positively inhumane (VS 66, DL X, 120; Plutarch, A Pleasant Life, 1101ab: Us. 120). If the sage achieves and maintains ataraxia, yet grieves at the same time, then ataraxia might withstand some other natural, negative human emotions.
A more general takeaway here is how this article serves as a warning to the deep issues between Epicurean commentators. A lot of this article is a very diplomatic attack on the positions of people like James Warren. I haven't devoted a lot of time over the years to criticizing Warren directly, but it seems to me that his positions are often indicative of a sort of "British Epicureanism" that has a large of element of Stoicism baked in.
That's not to slam at everything he writes or on all British writers on Epicurus. I'd say that David Sedley and/or Martin Ferguson Smith are the greatest living interpreters of Epicurus. But after them, and already exceeding them in some ways, I'd say is Emily Austin. She seems to me to be free of almost all this British Stoic/Buddhist influence which has many Epicureans at the point where they don't seem able to articulate a strong position why they would have any care as to whether this day is their last.
But there are deep problems with the British Epicureanism that is often accepted as the orthodox way to interpret Epicurus. This article is a great example of pushing back against that.
I have to stand up and cheer at this paragraph and especially the first sentence. Many modern proponents of Epicurus (not just Warren) have boxed themselves into exactly the position that Austin describes as insufficient.
This first sentence is such an understatement! As I read further into the article it's beginning to occur to me that she's having to "waste time." Some of what Warren et al have suggested are positions that I would say no one but a Stoic or Buddhist would have found entertainable in the first place. But that's where much of modern Epicurean commentary has left us, having to go through and dismiss corruptions like she is attacking here in a very understated way.
This is an excellent article.
Occupying an argumentative space in which one lacks reason to avoid
easily and ethically avoidable deaths should, I think, be a last resort. An
Epicurean, then, should first search out something other than pain to ex-
plain her decision to seek her own safety and ensure the safety of others.
For instance, she might avoid the tyrant because death at the hands of the
tyrant is unpredictable and uncertain. She might claim that mental anxiety
arising from uncertainty justifies her escape rather than the prospect of
physical pain. The standard interpretation clearly prohibits this response,
however, since anxiety about uncertain death is a species of the fear of
death, and the standard interpretation insists that all fears of death are
irrational and eliminable. Fear about when one’ s death will occur is out-
right a fear of death.
That's a great catch Pacatus thank you! I do not recall that we have discussed this or in my case that I was aware of it at all.
I see the download watermark says 2013 so I presume it's at last that old but I can't really confirm the date of publication from the PDF.
At first glance and before reading the whole thing the parts I have skimmed strike me as very good. Her interpretations of Epicurus are reasonable here as they are in her book - she seems to be saying that Epicurus does not demand total absence of pain and that he realizes that some fear of death is inevitable and even useful.
If that's her position then this should prove to be a very useful addition to arguments that Epicurus should not be interpreted as setting up a neo-mystical state of "total elimination of all pain" as his goal.
Rather, as to death and everything else, he's focused on a practical view of happiness seen as a practical balance of pleasure over pain in which we are happy even as we inevitably, and sometimes voluntarily, experience some pain.
I have argued that Epicurus does not believe all forms of the fear of death
are irrational and eliminable. At least one fear – the fear of violent death
caused by others – is brute and must be managed politically. If I am right,
Epicurus’ beliefs would seem much more reasonable to many people who
recognize that we have a vested interest in controlling the fear of death,
but who are skeptical about our ability to eliminate it. Epicurus would no
longer believe that a person can study a set of arguments, believe them,
chant them regularly to herself or with friends, and thereby rid herself of
the many varieties of the fear of death. Others, however, might think my
thesis renders Epicurus’ beliefs about the fear of death much less exciting.
If one is primarily interested in Epicurus’ views on death because his extre-
mism makes him a useful foil, then he might no longer be the biggest
target. Likewise, if one looks to Epicurus to eliminate all varieties of one’ s
own fear of death, then one might need to seek extra assistance.
I remember reading this Ayn Rand essay on the topic many years ago. I'm sure today I would side with Nietszsche's assessment with which Rand disagrees, but these paragraphs probably help make what is being debated more clear:
The issue in this case is the alleged dichotomy of reason versus emotion. This dichotomy has been presented in many variants in the history of philosophy, but its most colorfully eloquent statement was given by Friedrich Nietzsche.
In The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, Nietzsche claims that he observed two opposite elements in Greek tragedies, which he saw as metaphysical principles inherent in the nature of reality. He named them after two Greek gods: Apollo, the god of light, and Dionysus, the god of wine.
Apollo, in Nietzsche's metaphysics, is the symbol of beauty, order, wisdom, efficacy—though Nietzsche equivocates about this last—that is, the symbol of reason. Dionysus is the symbol of drunkenness or, rather, Nietzsche cites drunkenness as his identification of what Dionysus stands for: wild, primeval feelings, orgiastic joy, the dark, the savage, the unintelligible element in man; that is, the symbol of emotion.
Apollo, according to Nietzsche, is a necessary element, but an unreliable and thus inferior guide to existence that gives man a superficial view of reality: the illusion of an orderly universe. Dionysus is the free, unfettered spirit that offers man—by means of a mysterious intuition induced by wine and drugs—a more profound vision of a different kind of reality, and is thus the superior.
And, indicating that Nietzsche knew clearly what he was talking about, even though he chose to express it in a safely, drunkenly Dionysian manner, Apollo represents the principle of individuality, while Dionysus leads man, quote, "into complete self-forgetfulness," unquote, and into merging with the "oneness” of nature. Those who, at a superficial reading, take Nietzsche to be an advocate of individualism, please note.
This much is true: reason is the faculty of an individual, to be exercised individually; and it is only dark, irrational emotions, obliterating his mind, that can enable a man to melt, merge and dissolve into a mob or a tribe. We may accept Nietzsche's symbols, but not his estimate of their respective values, nor the metaphysical necessity of a reason/emotion dichotomy.
It is not true that reason and emotion are irreconcilable antagonists or that emotions are a wild, unknowable, ineffable element in men. But this is what emotions become for those who do not care to know what they feel, and who attempt to subordinate reason to their emotions. For every variant of such attempts—as well as for their consequences—the image of Dionysus is an
appropriate symbol.Symbolic figures are a valuable adjunct to philosophy. They help men to integrate and bear in mind the essential meaning of complex issues. Apollo and Dionysus represent the fundamental conflict of our age. And for those who may regard them as floating abstractions, reality has offered two perfect, fiction-like dramatizations of these abstract symbols—at Cape Kennedy and at Woodstock.
I haven't re-read the rest of that essay but I do think it's true that the subject of whether there is a conflict between Apollo vs Dionysus and how to frame it is of relevance to how we explain Epicurus.
Thanks to Eikadistes for his latest graphic:
This calls to my mind that at least as for me personally I have never come to terms with all the ink that has been spilled in philosophy over the apparent conflict between Apollo and Dionysus or what the controversy is even about apart from very basic allusions about drunkenness.
I could probably dig into those two articles and come up with something that was satisfactory, but given that there is so much attention paid to this I think it might be worthwhile to discuss what would have been Epicurus' attitude about this controversy. I suspect that he would end up finding something good in both and something also to revise.
If anyone here has reviewed this and has a firm viewpoint on how ancient Epicurean would have viewed this, please post.
Definitely part of the Physics forum and I would probably put it under the Infinite / eternal universe section. I will move it to a better place now. Move it further if you see a better place later.
Also: I like that the title includes the word "Known" in it.
Epicurus = "pleasure" is the telos (end) of the best life and the word "pleasure" leads most people to hear that Epicurus gave more importance to bodily sensation.
In my view you're no doubt right that '"most people hear Epicurus to be saying that he gave more importance to bodily sensation" and in my view also those people are making very incorrect about what Epicurus was saying. There are ample reliable texts indicating how wrong they are.
Aristotle = "living well and doing well" is the telos (end) of the best life and humans find their highest fulfillment in exercising reason, especially through contemplation.
And yes that is a key point about Aristotle, the response to which has many aspects but one of the primary of which is that there is nothing divine about human reason, and by focusing on it to the exclusion of the rest of the human, and of nature itself, is to divorce the mind from the body in a way that is totally unjustified, improper, and disastrous. One writer who makes that point very well is Cosma Raimondi. This was directed to the Stoics but much of it applies to Aristotle too:
If we were indeed composed solely of a mind, I should be inclined to call Regulus “happy” and entertain the Stoic view that we should find happiness in virtue alone. But since we are composed of a mind and a body, why do they leave out of this account of human happiness something that is part of mankind and properly pertains to it? Why do they consider only the mind and neglect the body, when the body houses the mind and is the other half of what man is? If you are seeking the totality of something made up of various parts, and yet some part is missing, I cannot think it perfect and complete. We use the term ‘human’, I take it, to refer to a being with both a mind and a body. And in the same way that the body is not to be thought healthy when some part of it is sick, so man himself cannot be thought happy if he is suffering in some part of himself. As for their assigning happiness to the mind alone on the grounds that it is in some sense the master and ruler of man’s body, it is quite absurd to disregard the body when the mind itself often depends on the state and condition of the body and indeed can do nothing without it. Should we not deride someone we saw sitting on a throne and calling himself a king when he had no courtiers or servants? Should we think someone a fine prince whose servants were slovenly and misshapen? Yet those who would separate the mind from the body in defining human happiness and think that someone whose body is being savaged and tortured may still be happy are just as ludicrous.
I find it surprising that these clever Stoics did not remember when investigating the subject that they themselves were men. Their conclusions came not from what human nature demanded but from what they could contrive in argument. Some of them, in my view, placed so much reliance on their ingenuity and facility in debate that they did not concern themselves with what was actually relevant to the inquiry. They were carried away instead by their enthusiasm for intellectual display, and tended to write what was merely novel and surprising — things we might aspire to, but not ones we should spend any effort in attaining. Then there were some rather cantankerous individuals who thought that we should only aim for what they themselves could imitate or lay claim to. Nature had produced some boorish and inhuman philosophers whose senses had been dulled or cut off altogether, ones who took no pleasure in anything; and these people laid down that the rest of mankind should avoid what their own natural severity and austerity shrank from. Others subsequently entered the debate, men of great and various intellectual abilities, who all delivered a view on what constituted the supreme good according to their own individual disposition. But in the middle of all this error and confusion, Epicurus finally appeared to correct and amend the mistakes of the older philosophers and put forward his own true and certain teaching on happiness.
Thanks Patrikios!
My first reaction to that one is that it is pretty much in line with the others, but maybe not the best of the three. Once again on this one I would give the author credit for focusing first on the issues of the absence of supernatural and life after death.
