Episode 279 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today's episode is entitled: "On Dying Before One's Time"
I see this as a significant difference in perspective:
There is no pain or pleasure apart from the two feelings. I'm not saying you are intentionally, but your phrasing makes it sound like there is some abstract absolute thing called "pain" and "pleasure." There is no pleasure apart from the feeling of pleasure; there is no pain apart from the feeling of pain.
Before I begin, I'll note something that will quickly become obvious - that this argument, which is ultimately about feelings, pathe, is also an argument about words and definition, and about how language is used and how it should be used.
And while I am not ready to state a final formulation myself, I do see my question in the latter light: It's true that pleasure is a feeling, but it is also true that "pleasure" is a word signifying a concept, and we have to be able to deal with both perspectives.
"In Epicurean theory, is ANYTHING in life (even desire) always pleasurable except pleasure, or is anything always painful except pain?"
Cicero Book 2, Section 9:
IX. We must then discard pleasure, not only in order to follow what is right, but even to be able to talk becomingly. Can we then call that the chief good in life, which we see cannot possibly be so even in a banquet?
But how is it that this philosopher speaks of three kinds of appetites,—some natural and necessary, some natural but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary? In the first place, he has not made a neat division; for out of two kinds he has made three. Now this is not dividing, but breaking in pieces. If he had said that there are two kinds of appetites, natural and superfluous ones, and that the natural appetites might be also subdivided into two kinds, necessary and not necessary, he would have been all right. And those who have learnt what he despises do usually say so. For it is a vicious division to reckon a part as a genus. However, let us pass over this, for he despises elegance in arguing; he [pg 138] speaks confusedly. We must submit to this as long as his sentiments are right. I do not, however, approve, and it is as much as I can do to endure, a philosopher speaking of the necessity of setting bounds to the desires. Is it possible to set bounds to the desires? I say that they must be banished, eradicated by the roots. For what man is there in whom appetites30 dwell, who can deny that he may with propriety be called appetitive? If so, he will be avaricious, though to a limited extent; and an adulterer, but only in moderation; and he will be luxurious in the same manner. Now what sort of a philosophy is that which does not bring with it the destruction of depravity, but is content with a moderate degree of vice? Although in this division I am altogether on his side as to the facts, only I wish he would express himself better. Let him call these feelings the wishes of nature; and let him keep the name of desire for other objects, so as, when speaking of avarice, of intemperance, and of the greatest vices, to be able to indict it as it were on a capital charge. However, all this is said by him with a good deal of freedom, and is often repeated; and I do not blame him, for it is becoming in so great a philosopher, and one of such a great reputation, to defend his own degrees fearlessly.
The Aulus Gellius defense of Epicurus is at the link below, but it does not concern natural and necessary desires.
This is Torquatus in Book 1, Section 13. I need to find Cicero's criticism:
And the consequence of this is, to make life thoroughly wretched; so that the wise man is the only one who, having cut away all vanity and error, and removed it from him, can live contented within the boundaries of nature, without melancholy and without fear. For what diversion can be either more useful or more adapted for human life than that which Epicurus employed? For he laid it down that there were three kinds of desires; the first, such as were natural and necessary; the second, such as were natural but not necessary; the third, such as were neither natural nor necessary. And these are all such, that those which are necessary are satisfied without much trouble or expense: even those which are natural and not necessary, do not require a great deal, because nature itself makes the riches, which are sufficient to content it, easy of acquisition and of limited quantity: but as for vain desires, it is impossible to find any limit to, or any moderation in them.
This question has come up at least once or more in the past, but I cannot find the prior discussions. If I find them later I will add links to this post.
This came up tonight in our Wednesday Zoom, whether as a general rule all "desire" should be viewed as painful.
We had a close split of opinion on this, so no matter whether the answer is "Yes" or "No," we have some discussion that needs to take place. From an Epicurean perspective, I feel sure that this question has a firm answer, though at present I think I could argue either side equally. So that tells me there's work to be done on this.
The "Yes" camp argument can be summarized for now as something like: All desire indicates a wish that is unmet, and an unmet wish is painful, therefore all desire is painful.
The "No" camp argument is something like "desires can in fact be enjoyable, as on Christmas Eve for presents the next day, and it is only when I desire is in fact unmet and unmeetable that a desire is generally painful."
Also in considering the answer I would ask, "In Epicurean theory, is ANYTHING in life (even desire) always pleasurable except pleasure, or is anything always painful except pain?"
Yes Don it's time to reinforce that and confirm that we count to three rather than four. I seem to remember Cicero questioning this in On Ends, and perhapes Aulus Gellius defends Epicurus, on the same point:
1 - Natural and Necessary
2 - Natural but not Necessary
3 - Necessary but not Natural ???????
4 - Neither Natural Nor Necessary
The classifications are like priorities.
We should probably rarely, if ever, sacrifice natural necessary desires for unnatural necessary ones, when keeping long term pleasure in mind.
I started to just click "like" and move on, but on second thought I am not sure this - even with the rarely caveat - does not just restate the problem. *Are* these classifications priorities, or are they just predictions of the relative cost in pain?
I wanted to make an exception for "those things necessary to remain alive," but even that isn't absolute -- Don't we sometimes give our lives for a friend?
The "rarely, if ever" helps, but isn't that the question you are asking? What is the rule that allows you to know when those exceptions would apply, other than that this is a personal decision involving the way you personal estimate the final outcome in terms of net pleasure of all kinds over net pain of all kinds?
As a generalization I think we all can see that the classification makes sense. However you're asking the right question -- when do the exceptions apply, to to know that you have to know what *really* is the overriding analysis. I don't think we find the ultimate analysis here in this classification alone. The ultimate question is always going to be the external consideration of expected result that isn't stated in full just by stating the classes, or by stating that those desires which don't bring pain - if unfulfilled - are "empty."
Maybe another way of stating this is that the Epicureans never stated that the ultimate goal of life is "the pleasures achieved through natural and necessary desires." The goal is "pleasure," and the reason there can be no qualification is that everyone's situation is going to be different. Is it possible to generalize? Yes, definitely. But generalizing is not the same as a hard and fast rule, even of "priorities." I think Don and maybe others have given good examples of the exceptions (such as "holding your breath to dive to get out of the cave" or whatever.)
Think of empty space, no ground. Beliefs or desires that are kenos have nothing valid underpinning them or supporting them. They're a house built on sand to bring in a biblical metaphor.)
If this is the same word used in regard to atoms, then let me ask this question:
Does "empty space" necessarily have a completely negative connotation in the way we are often interpreting it? Were it not for empty space, the universe could not exist as it is - the atoms would have no place through which to move.
I'm not yet suggesting it - though I might - that being "empty" might not be a 100% negative concept in Epicurus' thinking. It's not like the atoms are "at war" against the void - they are both needed to make the world work, and without void the atoms would be able to do nothing. And if empty were looked at as a concept that has some positive benefit, then maybe that observation would need to be extended to the ethical side as well.
MIT physicists have captured the first images of individual atoms freely interacting in space. The pictures reveal correlations among the "free-range" particles that until now were predicted but never directly observed. Their findings, appearing in the journal Physical Review Letters, will help scientists visualize never-before-seen quantum phenomena in real space.
The images were taken using a technique developed by the team that first allows a cloud of atoms to move and interact freely. The researchers then turn on a lattice of light that briefly freezes the atoms in their tracks, and apply finely tuned lasers to quickly illuminate the suspended atoms, creating a picture of their positions before the atoms naturally dissipate.
DaveT thank you for joining us in our First Monday Zoom last night. As it appears that you have an interest in fiction writing, I thought I would point out the little-known piece of fiction writing by Thomas Jefferson's friend Frances Wright, which we have posted at:
We have much discussion of it here at the forum which you can look up if interested. Some caution is needed because there are definitely some questions as to whether Ms. Wright was orthodox Epicurean in her treatment of "gods" and perhaps of some aspects of skepticism. And I also usually warn people that the first chapter introducing Epicurus is a little too "flowery" for some people, so be sure to read a couple of chapters before you give up if that's the case for you.
But in general I think it's an extremely well done book which deserves to be a lot better known.
Hopefully at some point A Few Days In Athens will help inspire other fiction writers to try their hand at something similar.
Happy Birthday to Nikos K! Learn more about Nikos K and say happy birthday on Nikos K's timeline: Nikos K
Don that has me thinking too about another comment that was made tonight, I think by Tau Phi to Kalosyni, that in her example of thinking about a "jacket," that -- even for the same person - a "jacket" might one day be natural, might another day be necessary, and another day (possibly) be unnatural or unnecessary.
In other words, that virtually any single concrete desire we could name (excepting only extreme examples like "world dictator" or the like) might migrate between the categories based on circumstances.
If so (and i think it's yes) what does that do to the attempt to make the categories into a hard and fast list?
i put together this chart to assist in conversation in our Monday zoom discussion about this topic. My summary of each answer is brief and no doubt grossly inadequate to what the speaker had to say, but I think the variation in answers might be good food for thought as the discussion continues. No doubt each person was thinking something different, especially as I explained the question, but the fact that the result of the Yes/No question was almost evenly split indicates that the answer does not seem to be obvious to everyone..
As Tau Phi asked me, my own answer to the first two columns would be "Pleasure / No," but like everyone else I would have explanation for each answer (and that's what we are discussing in this thread.).
One thing I will say about it is that it strikes me that there is a connection between thinking it is a good idea to (1) categorize all feelings into two categories and (2) categorize all desires into four categories. There's no necessity that we do either, and we could have chosen to come up with many categories, but it makes good sense to reduce them as far as reasonably possible, and it provides a useful framework for analysis.
I would see this as Epicurus being both practical and philosophical at the same time.
Following up on Don's last comment, there seems to me to be an important issue in how we approach:
PD29. Among desires, some are natural (and necessary, some natural) but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary, but due to idle imagination.
as against -
PD03. The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.
As I see it, Torquatus was able to take a dogmatic and literalist position on the argument that when you're not in pain you're in pleasure, because it's definitional - virtually mathematical - that when one is absent the other is present.
But when referring to PD29 he talks in terms of profitability or suitableness or usefulness (depending on the translator) which seems to me a more "practical" basis for the analysis.
[45] I ask what classification is either more profitable or more suited to the life of happiness than that adopted by Epicurus? He affirmed that there is one class of passions which are both natural and needful; another class which are natural without being needful ; a third class which are neither natural nor needful; and such are the conditions of these passions that the needful class are satisfied without much trouble or expenditure ; nor is it much that the natural passions crave, since nature herself makes such wealth as will satisfy her both easy of access and moderate in amount; and it is not possible to discover any boundary or limit to false passions.
Nothing could be more useful or more conducive to well-being than Epicurus's doctrine as to the different classes of the desires. One kind he classified as both natural and necessary, a second as natural without being necessary, and a third as neither natural nor necessary; the principle of classification being that the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural desires also require but little, since nature's own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount; but for the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered.
Now I certainly think that both doctrines ( "pleasure is the absence of pain" and the "classification of the desires" ) are both practical and useful, it seems to me that the first is more clearly a definitional choice that derives from logic (it's clearly possible to break pain and pleasure into subcategories, so it's by intelligent choice that we reduce them to two). The classifications of desires are are also matters of choice, but it's harder to see because in the case of the terms "pleasure" and "pain" we all know that there are many different types of pleasures and pains. In the case of "necessary desires" however, we jump more readily to the idea that there's only a short and definable list of what is "natural" and "necessary."
Actually as I am writing this I am talking myself into a somewhat different view from where I started...... I am now liking the natural and necessary classification more, if we can link it to the same kind of broad analysis as pain and pleasure, and resist the temptation to think that there's a strict absolute list. Maybe the necessity to analyze and understand the two separate classification systems in the two different doctrines complements each other!
I want to add this: The only way it would make sense to conclude that you would never pursue anything other than natural and necessary desires would be to believe that as a matter of natural law or some other necessity or flat guarantee, that pursuing anything other than natural and necessary desires is guaranteed to lead to more pain than pleasure.
It does not appear to me that there are any grounds of necessity on which that can be argued to be the case, or that there are any such that statements in Epicurean philosophy. In contrast, the starting point is the statement that all pleasures are desirable, but some will bring more pain than pleasure. It seems to me a stretch to say that there is any flat list that always must be followed to the exclusion of the general rule, even if there are generalizations, such as excessive pursuit of sex or romantic love, that can be made as a warning against that course.
The only way there could be such a flat list would be if there were supernatural gods, or ideal forms, or some other mechanism that guaranteed such a result. Otherwise it's up to us to analyze our own circumstances to determine what is likely to result for us.
Kalosyni's search for an explicit definition is a good way of looking at the problem, but I think part of the answer will be that while all sorts of explanations can be given, a major part of any correct explanation is that no explicit flat list that applies to everyone can be given.
Note: Just in case I am not being clear with the term "flat list," I mean "flat" in the sense of evenly and explicitly applying to everyone at all times in all places and in all circumstances. So a "flat list" would be an explicit list of do's or "don'ts" that always applies without any exception whatsoever.
So Epicurus would tell everyone to buy a single black jacket when they reach 18 or full height, and never buy another one until that one falls into rags? As a matter of principle, why would anyone using the NNUU formula do more than that?
Because you like different colors? That's unnecessary.
Because you like different styles? That's unnecessary.
Because you don't like to look at worn threadbare clothing? That's unnecessary.
And on and on...
How does the classification itself lead to any other result?
My point is that the classification itself standing alone is useless or even harmful, just like "pleasure is the absence of pain" can be destructive, without other overriding information.
In one case, the additional information that is needed is that there are only two feelings, which means that the absence of one is the presence of the other. In this case, the additional information is that all pleasure is desirable and worthy of choice if it brings more pleasure than pain, therefore you will never think of limiting yourself only to desires that are "necessary and natural," especially since you also know that there are no supernatural gods or ideal forms that require everyone to follow a prescribed list of what is "natural" or "necessary" for them.
New jackets in many (but not all) cases are going to bring more pleasure than pain. Thus the "principle of the classification" (as Torquatus says) explains that "unnatural and unnecessary" can be expected to cost more in pain.
I'd say the classification system was not intended to be a hard and fast rule philosophical rule, but a tool, almost like a price predictor or cost estimator - a way of predicting how much pain to expect from an action so that you can then decide if the pleasure will be worth it. The future isn't certain and we disdain fortune-telling, but that doesn't mean we don't need a practical way of predicting what will happen from pursuing alternative choices.
And as a rule of prediction, it works very well - "nothing could be more useful...." per Torquatus. So it's very productive to use the classification system to predict the costs of your pleasures. But the overriding rule is to seek out more pleasure than pain using the cost estimator, not to use the cost estimator as an end in itself.
So I would also analogize this classification system to "virtue," which is necessary to consider in order to obtain happiness, but which is not the end in itself. Both "virtue" and this classification system can be very destructive if taken out of context and put into the place of the end rather than of the means.
As a tangential comment Eikadistes, I also perceive a tendency in the "fourth leg" argument to conclude that the assignment of a word to a particular thing (the grasping part, i gather) involves a little more steering by nature than I think is consistent with Epicurus.
As I read the discussion of language and civil society in Lucretius, it seems to me that the real stress is on "these developed naturally rather than being given by supernatural gods," rather than "nature leads us to associate certain words with certain things" or "nature leads us to a proper word choice" or "nature leads us to a proper system of government." I see both those as a "trial and error" process in which there are lots of different languages, and lots of different systems of government, that can all be equally consistent with "nature."
I have a lot of respect for some who argue that there's a fourth leg, and clearly Diogenes Laertius says that "the Epicureans generally" (I think is the phrase) embraced the fourth leg. But to the extent that these other Epicureans deviated from Epicurus I think they were mistaken in doing so. The whole thing sounds to me like an improper attempt to reconcile with Stoicism.
I look forward to Don and Bryan and anyone else fluent in Greek commenting on this. But your conclusion Eikadistes I continue to share: There are three legs of the canon, and they can be counted on because they do not involve opinion - i.e., they are never true or false, they just are.
An operation of the mind which involves an opinion that is true or false (as would appear from your cite) cannot properly be thought of as a test of truth. That would be testing one opinion against another opinion.
I suspect that the "fourth leg" position comes about from people knowing that comparing opinion against opinion is an important part of reasoning, and that's absolutely true. But that isn't the way you get back to and test opinions against raw data - you have to have a starting point which is not itself an opinion - you have to have a "yardstick." And opinions are not given to us by nature such that we can consider them to be a baseline yardstick.
I always have trouble with DeWitt's footnotes since they are in such small text, but it's on page 30 of his book:
For this ambitious program of expansion the school was prepared as no Greek school had ever been or ever would be. Not only was every convert obligated to become a missionary; he was also a colporteur who had available a pamphlet for every need. "Are you bloated with love of praise? There are infallible rites," wrote Horace, "which can restore your health if only you will read a pamphlet three times with open mind," "Send him a pamphlet," cried Cicero in the senate-house, taunting the Epicurean Piso about the ambition of his son·in·law Julius Caesar. Could better evidence be cited to prove that Epicureans were pamphleteers?
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