Posts by Cassius

Here's the Conclusion paragraph, which I don't think does justice to the depth of the work. it's written as if the Stoics were an and advance in a proper direction from the Epicurean viewpoint. As you would expect, I think that the reverse is true - the Stoics went on a rabbit hunt that totally threw away the trail that Epicurus had pointed out. I would say that the reason that Epicurus did not "propose a positive theory of universals as concepts" is that Epicurus would have held this to be error. the mind alone does not make a rose a rose.

I think the details of the article are excellent in pointing to what Epicurus actually proposed it is that makes a rose a rose. To repeat a comment from earlier in the thread, Epicurus' way of looking at things may be foreign to us but that doesn't make it wrong. And the current world may be so caught up in Platonism and rationalism that "concepts" and 'conceptualism" are the be-all end-all of all analysis, but that doesn't make it correct, and that doesn't make Epicurus wrong. Had Epicurus in fact "proposed a positive theory of universals as concepts" - if in fact he had been a "nominalist" in that sense - he would have been violating his own premises, and I think Epicurus would reject that direction out of hand. A rose is a rose whether we assign it that name or not. The tree that falls in the forest when no one is around does make a sound. And I am also firmly convinced that we do not determine whether the cat is dead or alive by looking at it. All of these seem to me to be related issues that deserve much clarification.

And they deserve clarification and discussion early in the process of studying Epicurus! This is something that needs to be hammered out in preparation for elementary school lessons - otherwise we spend a lifetime never really grasping where Epicurus was going.

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.4. Conclusion

The comparison between the Stoic and the Epicurean criticism of Platonic ontology shows the difference between elimination and con-version of the Ideas into an ontological system which, on both accounts, denies the existence of supra-sensible items. The different forms their reactions take on, marks the difference between the Stoic view about bodies as existing and incorporeals as subsisting, and the Epicurean view that body and void alone exist. However, both accounts meet in rejecting the Ideas from reality, considering generic items to be de-pendent, to varying degrees, on the workings of the mind. With the theory of preconceptions, the Epicureans move towards a basic form of conceptualisation of reality, but it is the Stoics, with their concern with genera and species who propose a positive theory of universals as concepts.

OMG THIS is a memorable paragraph, and what a line! "A rose is a rose, that is, a whole, not a juxtaposition of properties."

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The formulae in Her. 69 all point towards considerations about body which go beyond the actual perceiving of distinct properties, the ἐπαισθήματα mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (D.L. X, 32)58: the distinct perceptions which cannot refute one another, and attest the truth, or trustworthiness of all perceptions. Rather, on the basis of the different ἐπαισθήματα (e.g. red colour perceived through sight, sweet perfume perceived through smell, velvety texture perceived through touch etc.), a perceiver has what Epicurus calls an ἔννοια, a conception, say, of a rose (Her. 69). And indeed, a rose is a rose, i.e. a whole, not a juxtaposition of properties. Thus Epicurus insists, with the repeated use of ὅλον and ἀθρόον especially in the discussion of the status of properties, that a body is really a whole or a whole is really a body, repeating twice in less than ten lines, that what is referred to as the ὅλον is «by us, called body» (Her. 70, 5 and 71, 4-5). Thus it is our mind, our way of thinking, which enables us to grasp the body as the whole it really is; for an ἔννοια, elsewhere referred to as an «ἐπίνοια» (Her. 45, also D.L. X, 32), corresponds to the further stage after sense-perception, in which reasoning and memory have a prominent role in forming a mental presentation of reality. The passage from percep-tions, («irrational and without memory») to the conceptions a person has, is described in the following manner: as always proceeding from sense-data with the addition of the mind’s arrangement of the data, through direct experience (περίπτωσις), or by analogy (ἀναλογία), by resemblance (ὁμοιότης), or by composition (σύνθεσις) and eventually also with some form of reasoning (τι καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, in D.L. X, 32).

This is very close to what I was looking for and why I think Epicurus would object to a too-superficial labeling of being a "nominalist." What an on-point article!

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This rapid overview is relevant to our present purposes in bringing forward one main point: namely that, in acknowledging certain ‘mental capacities’ (in the main, a form of reasoning and memory) in addition to sense-perception, the objects of knowledge do not shift to an intelligible realm52, but rather, on the contrary, are all the more tied down to what is observed53. For it is possible, according to Epicurus, to recognize in the observable reality, with the help of memory and λογισμός, certain regularities which are the basis for knowledge – without these being immanent or separate universals. Thus, the distinction made by Aristotle in the first chapter of the Metaphysics, namely between experience on the one hand which yields knowledge of certain particulars (Met., A 1, 981a9), and art, or science, which is of universals and of which particular individuals are instances (Met., A 1, 981a10-12 and a16) – and which a person can have also without experience, given that an art can be taught (Met., A 1, 981b9) – is resolved, on the Epicurean account, into one unique path towards knowledge. For experience is the art or science which is able to yield knowledge of regular and generic features of reality, exhibited by the individual beings which compose it, without this knowledge being limited to a specific knowledge of this or that individual. It is possible to have knowledge on the basis of experience, without there being universals and thus without knowledge being of universals.

I think this section ought to begin to point us to once and for all tune in on the role of memory as an important part of Epicurean theory;

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As for memory, it plays a central role for what a person thinks, as it is repeatedly mentioned by Epicurus, whether in reference to remembering the main tenets of Epicurean doctrine49, or remembering the προλήψεις or preconceptions a person naturally has in order to subsequently have the right beliefs and keep away from confusion and error50. Thus, for Epicurus, sense-perception alone does not provide knowledge of reality but rather the fundamental information in order to reach knowledge. For, crucially, the form of reasoning Epicurus has in mind is based on sense-data (Her. 32), as is the notion of memory he is interested in. It is a deviation from sense-data which brings on error and false beliefs51

I have to inject here that i find this article very clearly and attractively written (at least so far). This is a good reminder that we need to go back and check "Against Colotes" and perhaps add this article to a basic reading list, as it very directly addresses Epicurus against Plato and other very basic issues. Thank you again Don!

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But the way Plutarch confronts the Epicureans serves, in effect, to bring to light all the better the view of ontology, in two basic steps, which characterizes Epicureanism in direct reaction against Platonic ontology. The Epicureans thus sustain (i) that the void exists (against Parmenides), and (ii) that it exists unqualifiedly, on a par with the existence of body (against Plato). In this way, the Epicurean whole, τὸ πᾶν, reaches saturation. It is therefore a rather different whole from the Parmenidean whole, which is one and immobile21. In acknowledging the existence of void, the Epicureans, like their Atomist forerunners, acknowledge the existence of what is in motion, given that the existence of void is inferred from the realization that there is motion22. Thus the Epicurean whole is continuously in motion, and it is in this way that it is eternal and infinite, in exact opposition to the Parmenidean whole.

Quote from Godfrey

he went to great lengths to explain everything in terms of atoms and void, which I interpret as nominalism.

Yes that is the question. But I don't think it necessarily follows from the observation that nothing is eternal except matte and void to the statement that "there is nothing general except names" without drilling down very precisely into what is meant by "general."

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Epicureans and Stoics on Universals

Yes that sounds like it's exactly on point - thank you! reading now!

From the opening:

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But the Stoics discuss genera and species, claiming that they are conceptsand Epicurus re-fers to natural kinds, of which we have preconceptions. Both schools elaborate their views in reaction to the Platonic claim about the exist-ence of the Ideas: the Stoics say that the Ideas are concepts and the Epicurean view of the world as constituted by a constant flow of atoms shows that there is no place for such kinds of items. The criticism of the Ideas produces very different theories of what counts as a generic item for Stoics and Epicureans. However, one crucial point of contact between the two accounts is that, for both, universal or generic fea-tures of reality are nothing other than the result of a mental capacity to recognize them. Thus, generic features characterize certain workings of the mind, and are not themselves items in reality independent of the mind. It is the Stoics who push this capacity of recognition to a state of having concepts in the mind which are utterly mind-dependent. Thus, it is the Stoics who set up a positive theory of universals as concepts, whilst the Epicureans contribute towards a conceptualist view of uni-versals through their systematic elimination of the Ideas from ontol-ogy and epistemology.

How much should we bet that this discussion will or won't take us back into the deeper issues of "preconceptions" and "instinct"?

But hold your place on that thought because I think it has important implications. It's probably not entirely irrelevant to the main topic also.

Speaking of the main topic, any thoughts on the extent to which it is proper to label Epicurus a nominalist? Just as with accidents vs events I think there are subtleties he would both agree and disagree with.

I think the first hesitation anyone ought to have in thinking the answer is clear is that Epicurus usually finds a way to take a position that is foreign to us today to the point that we have to go looking for what it might be.

Part of what was on my mind about this is the saying in the letter to Menoeceus about all good and evil comes to us from sensation. The level of sensation I'd what really matters to us in life, and although it is not the same question, I do think Epicurus would oppose reductionism or any hint that "nothing matters to us because everything is just matter and void.".

Like I say it's not the same question, but I think Epicurus would think it very important to have a theory that connects the senses and knowledge - including a theory of abstractions.

(Note: I was about to attribute the reference above to PD2, but in quoting it I see interestingly that that phrase is not there.)

Right and I think that is exactly what was intended, without the "luck" connotation that is present in English.

Ha if you get us further off track we'll just split this part out

I was recently reading the Wikipedia entry on "nominalism" and found it fairly direct and understandable. Here is the opening:

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In metaphysics, nominalism is a philosophical view which denies the existence of universals and abstract objects, but affirms the existence of general or abstract terms and predicates.^[1] There are at least two main versions of nominalism. One version denies the existence of universals – things that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things (e.g., strength, humanity). The other version specifically denies the existence of abstract objects – objects that do not exist in space and time.^[2]

Most nominalists have held that only physical particulars in space and time are real, and that universals exist only post res, that is, subsequent to particular things.^[3] However, some versions of nominalism hold that some particulars are abstract entities (e.g., numbers), while others are concrete entities – entities that do exist in space and time (e.g., pillars, snakes, bananas).

Nominalism is primarily a position on the problem of universals, which dates back at least to Plato, and is opposed to realist philosophies, such as Platonic realism, which assert that universals do exist over and above particulars. However, the name "nominalism" emerged from debates in medieval philosophy with Roscellinus. The term 'nominalism' stems from the Latin nomen, "name". John Stuart Mill summarised nominalism in the apothegm "there is nothing general except names".^[4]

This is a subject we've touched on in several earlier Lucretius Today podcasts, but not explored too deeply there or in the forum that I can recall. The article does not mention Epicurus or take a position on how Epicurean philosophy may relate to nominalism, and I think that would be worth exploring. We quite often see discussions of The Problem of Universals (link to the same article), and we can be sure that Epicurus rejected Plato's views of ideal forms, and probably Aristotle's views of "essences" as well. But does that mean that Epicurus held, in John Stuart Mill's terms, that "there is nothing general except names?"

I think there are several passages that would bear on this including the following from Lucretius Book One (Bailey translation). I should note that this is a passage where I think the translation of eventum as "accidents" would be much better as "events," but that's another argument. Here , the issue is the question of eternal properties vs. transient qualities, and how those can be viewed through the analogy of the Trojan War:

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[418] But now, to weave again at the web, which is the task of my discourse, all nature then, as it is of itself, is built of these two things: for there are bodies and the void, in which they are placed and where they move hither and thither. For that body exists is declared by the feeling which all share alike; and unless faith in this feeling be firmly grounded at once and prevail, there will be naught to which we can make appeal about things hidden, so as to prove aught by the reasoning of the mind. And next, were there not room and empty space, which we call void, nowhere could bodies be placed, nor could they wander at all hither and thither in any direction; and this I have above shown to you but a little while before.

[430] Besides these there is nothing which you could say is parted from all body and sundered from void, which could be discovered, as it were a third nature in the list. For whatever shall exist, must needs be something in itself; and if it suffer touch, however small and light, it will increase the count of body by a bulk great or maybe small, if it exists at all, and be added to its sum. But if it is not to be touched, inasmuch as it cannot on any side check anything from wandering through it and passing on its way, in truth it will be that which we call empty void. Or again, whatsoever exists by itself, will either do something or suffer itself while other things act upon it, or it will be such that things may exist and go on in it. But nothing can do or suffer without body, nor afford room again, unless it be void and empty space. And so besides void and bodies no third nature by itself can be left in the list of things, which might either at any time fall within the purview of our senses, or be grasped by any one through reasoning of the mind.

[449] For all things that have a name, you will find either properties linked to these two things or you will see them to be their accidents. That is a property which in no case can be sundered or separated without the fatal disunion of the thing, as is weight to rocks, heat to fire, moisture to water, touch to all bodies, intangibility to the void. On the other hand, slavery, poverty, riches, liberty, war, concord, and other things by whose coming and going the nature of things abides untouched, these we are used, as is natural, to call accidents. Even so time exists not by itself, but from actual things comes a feeling, what was brought to a close in time past, then what is present now, and further what is going to be hereafter. And it must be avowed that no man feels time by itself apart from the motion or quiet rest of things.

[464] Then again, when men say that ‘the rape of Tyndarus’s daughter’, or ‘the vanquishing of the Trojan tribes in war’ are things, beware that they do not perchance constrain us to avow that these things exist in themselves, just because the past ages have carried off beyond recall those races of men, of whom, in truth, these were the accidents. For firstly, we might well say that whatsoever has happened is an accident in one case of the countries, in another even of the regions of space. Or again, if there had been no substance of things nor place and space, in which all things are carried on, never would the flame of love have been fired by the beauty of Tyndaris, nor swelling deep in the Phrygian heart of Alexander have kindled the burning battles of savage war, nor unknown of the Trojans would the timber horse have set Pergama aflame at dead of night, when the sons of the Greeks issued from its womb. So that you may see clearly that all events from first to last do not exist, and are not by themselves like body, nor can they be spoken of in the same way as the being of the void, but rather so that you might justly call them the accidents of body and place, in which they are carried on, one and all.

There is also the question of whether it is possible to "know" something, and what that would mean. We have several passages on that:

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Diogenes Laertius 121: "...he will give definite teaching and not profess doubt...."

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Diogenes of Oinoanda: Fragment 5 - Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

This post is going to end up being mostly to pose the question, because this is a very deep subject that I don't think has an easy answer. So for now I will post this and come back when I have time or others add to the thread.

Yes indeed that should definitely be a part of any Epicurean discussion on money. Thanks for the reminder.

I really do not know much of anything about "Alain de Benoist" other than that he seems to be somewhat well known, and three tweets sent today crossed my timeline. So I will issue the standard disclaimer that I am not endorsing anything else whatsoever about this person other than that these tweets below hold some interest from an Epicurean perspective. I post them here because I think he is at or near a point that Epicurus probably would agree with, even if not stated explicitly in the surviving texts, in regard to the hazard of how pursuit of money "reduces all the qualities that distinguish them (different desirable things) to a simple logic of more or less." Here are the tweets:

I think these comments are correct and that this is one of the very dangerous aspects of the pursuit of money, with which Epicurus would agree due to his focus on identifying the proper limits of all things to pursue. Desirable things vary dramatically in many of their qualities, and it is dangerous to reduce them to an abstraction - any abstraction - such as "money." It might (or would?) even be dangerous to reduce desirable things the single measurement of "pleasure," except that pleasure is a feeling that we experience directly without abstract reasoning, which is why it is among the elements of the Epicurean "Canon of Truth."

For comparison, I pulled together some directly Epicurean quotes on money. If anyone has any comments on the problem of "reducing all qualities to a simple logic of more and less" please let me know:

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Epicurus VS43 - The love of money, if unjustly gained, is impious, and, if justly, shameful; for it is unseemly to be merely parsimonious even with justice on one's side.

Cicero's Torquatus, On Ends: And how is it possible that wicked actions can ever have as much influence towards alleviating \[pg 117\] the annoyances of life, as they must have towards increasing them from the consciousness of our actions, and also from the punishments inflicted by the laws and the hatred of the citizens? And yet, in some people, there is no moderation in their passion for money and for honour and for command, or in their lusts and greediness and other desires, which acquisitions, however wickedly made, do not at all diminish, but rather inflame, so that it seems we ought rather to restrain such men than to think that we can teach them better. Therefore sound wisdom invites sensible men to justice, equity, and good faith.

Cicero, _On End-Goals, Good and Bad,_ II.17.55: According to your {Epicurean} school, it is right to try to get money even at some risk; for money procures many very delightful pleasures.

Seneca, _Letters to Lucilius,_ 21.7: In order that Idomeneus may not be introduced free of charge into my letter, he shall make up the indebtedness form his own account. It was to him that Epicurus addressed his well-known saying, urging him to make Pythocles rich, but not rich in the vulgar and equivocal way. “If you wish to make Pythocles rich,” said he, “do not add to his store of money, but subtract from his desires.”

Porphyry, _On Abstinence,_ I.54 (I hesitate to post this as clearly Epicurean, but I'll post it FWIW): From causes like these, and from analogous causes, there arises an insatiable desire for longevity, wealth, money and fame, because people think that with these they will, given a longer time, increase their sum of good, and because they fear the terror of death as something without limit. The pleasure experienced from luxury comes nowhere near the pleasure experienced from self-sufficiency; it is very pleasant to think just how little one needs. Take away luxury, take away sexual excitement and the desire for external recognition, and what further need is there for inert wealth, which is useful to us for nothing but only weighs us down? This is the way to be filled full, and the pleasure from this kind of satiety is unmixed. We must also make the body unaccustomed, so far as is possible, to the pleasures of excess, but accustomed to the fulfillment which comes from satisfying hunger; we must eat in order to get through everything, and must take as our limit not the unlimited, but the necessary. Thus it too, by self-sufficiency and assimilation to the divine, can obtain the good that is possible for it. Thus it will be genuinely rich, measuring its wealth by the natural limit, not by empty beliefs. Thus it will not be suspended on hopes of the greatest pleasure, without being sure of getting it; for that pleasure causes maximum disruption. But it will be self-sufficient in what is present and in what has already happened, and will not be tormented by the thought of not remaining for longer.

U567 **Diogenes Laertius, _Lives of Philosophers,_ X.121:** He will earn money, if he should be in poverty, but only for his wisdom.

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Thank you Don!

OK here's my (admittedly half-formed) thought:

I tend to see this PD35 as operating on multiple levels like most of the principle doctrines. it certainly is true from a practical point of view as written, but I don't think it is very satisfying unless it is viewed in the more abstract context of discussing the 'best life' or the "highest good."

In that context, it serves well to point out that your aren't going to be able to live the best life possible if you indeed are worried about retribution for your crimes. As the doctrine points out, once you've committed the crime you'll always wonder if it will be found out, whether you should have turned yourself in, apologized, made it good, or what. And that amount of worry is something that will always stand in the way of the at least aspirational goal of pure pleasure.

But I think it is indeed a "hard question" because Epicurean philosophy is also highly practical in realizing (in my view) that life requires pain and risk, and it's practically impossible to eliminate them. I can easily see the prudent Epicurean saying that just like the rest of life, it's a practical question of whether you should violate the seat belt law for a ten minute drive to the store, or violate the speed limit, or do any of a numberless type of crime where you might rationally deem the risk of punishment to be worth committing the crime.

So I do tend to see this one as I tend to see many of them - more of a logical observation that is good for debating the greatest good and the issues of crime and punishment in a godless universe. I do believe it's a true observation, but it's also a true observation in the Epicurean scheme that everyone is going to determine for themselves what degree of hardship and risk they want to undertake in order to gain the pleasures they want.

Now having said all that, I wonder if in listening to the podcast you heard anything about Plato's views of the ring myth that might give us subtleties on how Epicurus' viewpoint was a response?

OK I am thinking of this from Bailey's "Extant Remains": (I don't see the original source cited, but i think this is just a reworking of Usener's cites)

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II. Problems._

2. Will the wise man do things that the laws forbid, knowing that he will not be found out? A simple answer is not easy to find.

Godfrey do you recall if there are other occurrences of this doctrine in the texts beyond PD35?

I am thinking it is in Cicero too - there is this in the Torquatus narration:

"The usual consequences of crime are, first suspicion, next gossip and rumor, then comes the accuser, then the judge; many wrongdoers have even turned evidence against themselves, as happened in your consulship. And even if any think themselves well fenced and fortified against detection by their fellow men, they still dread the eye of heaven, and fancy that the pangs of anxiety night and day gnawing at their hearts are sent by Providence to punish them. But what can wickedness contribute towards lessening the annoyances of life, commensurate with its effect in increasing them, owing to the burden of a guilty conscience, the penalties of the law and the hatred of one's fellows?"

But there's a fragment somewhere that says this is a hard question.....

I am thinking i have another comment but I need to find that first.

Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 6 September 1789:

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The question Whether one generation of men has a right to bind another, seems never to have been started either on this or our side of1 the water. Yet it is a question of such consequences as not only to merit decision, but place also, among the fundamental principles of every government. The course of reflection in which we are immersed here on the elementary principles of society has presented this question to my mind; and that no such obligation can be so transmitted I think very capable of proof.—I set out on this ground, which I suppose to be self evident, ‘that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living’: that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.

Lucretius Book 3 (Munro), Approximately Line 970 (see page 104)

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With good reason methinks she would bring her charge, with reason rally and reproach; for old things give way and are supplanted by new without fail, and one thing must ever be replenished out of other things; and no one is delivered over to the pit and black Tartarus. Matter is needed for after generations to grow; all of which though will follow thee when they have finished their term of life; and thus it is that all these no less than thou have before this come to an end and hereafter will come to an end. Thus one thing will never cease to rise out of another, life is granted to none in fee-simple, to all in usufruct.

No, Don, I have not yet had time to check the Latin for usufruct!

And this reminds me Joshua , in all the public domain translations I have, I don't think I have a good version of a side by side Latin English in PDF that we can distribute freely. I've looked for many years for an older-date Loeb edition, but I cannot find one anywhere. If anyone knows how we might remedy that please let me know! The 1743 Edition which is included in our Podcast PDF is in fact side by side, and may suffice for many uses, but it is printed with the older font style in which "s" appears as "f" and as a result if can be inconvenient to read.

But now that I am there, here is the 1743 translation: "Beings never cease to rise from the ruins of one another, and life was given to none for a property, but only for use." Unfortunately I can't match the Latin; will have to come back.

That's possible, I guess. I was thinking about it in terms of it being focused on "the future" - which seems to be a particularly broad way of looking at things from a theoretical point of view.

Welcome to Episode Seventy-Five of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

For anyone who is not familiar with our podcast, please check back to Episode One for a discussion of our goals and our ground rules. If you have any questions about those, please be sure to contact us at EpicureanFriends.com for more information.

In this Episode 75 we will read approximately Latin line 821-924 of Book Five. We will talk about the initial forms of life on earth, and how we can judge what was possible, and what was not possible, in their arising to life.

Now let's join ________ reading today's text:

Podcast 75

Latin Lines 821-924

Munro Notes-

821-836: thus mother earth produced in the beginning every kind of living thing, till she left off bearing from age; for she and the world change like everything else: all things have a time of vigour and decay.

837-854: at first the earth tried to produce monsters of all kinds, half-men half-women, creatures without feet or without hands or mouths, or with limbs not separated; so that they could not grow up nor continue their kind: they all therefore perished off.

855-877: many races of regularly organised creatures must have died off, because they wanted either some natural power by which to protect themselves, or could not be turned to use by man and be saved thereby: these fell a prey to others and disappeared, unable to endure the struggle for existence.

878-924: but centaurs and the like with twofold natures cannot exist : the horse has reached maturity when the boy is scarcely yet weaned ; and is worn out ere the other is grown to manhood and so with Scyllas, half-maid half-fish : then since fire burns lions like other creatures, how can a chimera exist breathing out flame: earth in its freshness produced many things, but not these figments of poets or philoso- phers.—This passage is extremely well and acutely reasoned out : he covertly refutes Empedocles' notion of the XXXXX and the XXXXX which are as impossible as the centaurs Scyllas and chimeras of the poets. The man-woman or hermaphrodite is possible enough, because the natures of man and woman are not incompatible; and doubtless it and other monstrous things tried at first to continue existence; but the creatures here described never could begin to come into being.

Browne 1743

And that the earth might have some release, and not be always in labor, she at length left off, as a woman worn out and past her prime; for time changes the nature of the whole world, one body continually rises from another, no being remains long like itself, things are in a perpetual flux, one thing decays and grows weak by time, another becomes vigorous and flourishes in its strength. Thus time alters the face of the whole world; and the earth passes from one state to another. She can no more produce the creatures she once did, and now she bears what she could not do before.

The Earth, it may be supposed, was at first delivered of many monstrous births, of a wonderful shape, and of an uncommon size (and some between the two sexes, not properly of both, yet not far removed from either) some without feet, and others without hands, many without a mouth and eyes; some had their limbs growing and sticking together over all their bodies that they could do no office of life, nor move from their place, nor fly what was hurtful, nor receive food to preserve their beings. Many other monsters, and strange productions of this kind, were at first formed, but in vain! For nature was shocked, and would not suffer them to increase; they could not arrive to any maturity of age, nor could they find their food; nor taste the pleasures of love; for many circumstances, we observe, must kindly agree that creatures might be able to propagate their kind. First of all there must be proper food, and then fit organs for the genial seed to flow through from all the limbs; and that the male and female may be closely joined, they must be furnished with those parts that may promote the mutual delights of both.

And therefore many kind of animals must needs be extinct, nor could they all by propagation continue their species, for almost every race of creatures we now see living, either their cunning, or their courage, or their swiftness, have secured and preserved them from the very beginning. And there are many that, from their usefulness to mankind, have recommended themselves to our defense. And first the fierce breed of lions, and their savage race, their courage protected; craft secures the fox, and swiftness the stag. But the watchful and faithful race of dogs, all beasts of burden, the flocks and herds, all these, my Memmius, are committed to the care of man. These fly swiftly from the rage of wild beasts; they love a quiet life, and depend upon us for their fill of provision, without any labor, of their own, which we allow them plentifully, as a reward for the benefits we receive from them. But those creatures on whom Nature has bestowed no such qualities, that cannot support themselves nor afford us any advantage, why should we suffer such a race to be fed by our care, or defended by our protection? These, by the unhappy laws of their nature being destitute of all things, became an easy prey to others till their whole species was at last destroyed.

But never have there been any such things as centaurs, nor could a creature at any time be formed from a doubtful nature, from two bodies, and out of members so different and disagreeable. The limbs and faculties of a man and a horse could never act uniformly together, with all their power; and this is obvious to a very mean apprehension. For a horse at three years old is strong and active; a child is far from being so, at that age he is commonly feeling for the mother’s breast in his sleep; and when the horse’s strength decays by old age, and his feeble limbs fail him at the end of life, then the boy flourishes in the prime of youth, and the beginnings of a beard appear upon his cheeks. Never think, therefore, that there is or ever can be such a creature as a centaur, made up of a human nature and the servile seed of a horse; or that there are any such things as Scyllas, having their loins surrounded with the ravenous bodies of half sea-dogs. Believe nothing of other monsters like these, whose members we observe so opposite and disagreeing, which neither live to the same age, nor grow strong or decay together, which are neither inflamed with the same sort of love, nor have the same dispositions, nor preserve their bodies by the same food; for goats, we see, often grow fat with hemlock, which to men is sharp poison. And since fire will scorch and burn the yellow body of a lion, as well as the bowels of any other creature living with blood in its veins, how could a chimera, with his body of three kinds, with a lion’s head, a dragon’s tail, and the middle like a goat, blow abroad a fierce flame out of his body?

Munro 1886

But because she must have some limit set to her bearing, she ceased like a woman worn out by length of days. For time changes the nature of the whole world and all things must pass on from one condition to another, and nothing continues like to itself: all things quit their bounds, all things nature changes and compels to alter. One thing crumbles away and is worn and enfeebled with age, then another comes unto honor and issues out of its state of contempt. In this way then time changes the nature of the whole world and the earth passes out of one condition into another: what once it could, it can bear no more, in order to be able to bear what before it did not bear.

And many monsters too the earth at that time essayed to produce, things coming up with strange face and limbs, the man-woman, a thing between the two and neither the one sex nor the other, widely differing from both; some things deprived of feet, others again destitute of hands, others too proving dumb without mouth, or blind without eyes, and things bound fast by the adhesion of their limbs overall the body, so that they could not do anything nor go anywhere nor avoid the evil nor take what their needs required. Every other monster and portent of this kind she would produce, but all in vain, since nature set a ban on their increase and they could not reach the coveted flower of age nor find food nor be united in marriage. For we see that many conditions must meet together in things in order that they may beget and continue their kinds; first a supply of food, then a way by which the birth-producing seeds throughout the frame may stream from the relaxed limbs; also in order that the woman may be united with the male, the possession of organs whereby they may each interchange mutual joys.

And many races of living things must then have died out and been unable to beget and continue their breed. For in the case of all things which you see breathing the breath of life, either craft or courage or else speed has from the beginning of its existence protected and preserved each particular race. And there are many things which, recommended to us by their useful services, continue to exist consigned to our protection.

In the first place the fierce breed of lions and the savage races their courage has protected, foxes their craft and stags their proneness to flight. But light-sleeping dogs with faithful heart in breast and every kind which is born of the seed of beasts of burden and at the same time the woolly flocks and the horned herds are all consigned, Memmius, to the protection of man. For they have ever fled with eagerness from wild beasts and have ensued peace and plenty of food obtained without their own labor, as we give it in requital of their useful services.

But those to whom nature has granted none of these qualities, so that they could neither live by their own means nor perform for us any useful service in return for which we should suffer their kind to feed and be safe under our protection, those, you are to know, would lie exposed as a prey and booty of others, hampered all in their own death-bringing shackles, until nature brought that kind to utter destruction.

But Centaurs never have existed, and at no time can there exist things of twofold nature and double body formed into one frame out of limbs of alien kinds, such that the faculties and powers of this and that portion cannot be sufficiently like. This however dull of understanding you may learn from what follows:

To begin, a horse when three years have gone round is in the prime of his vigor, far different the boy: often even at that age he will call in his sleep for the milk of the breast. Afterwards when in advanced age his lusty strength and limbs now faint with ebbing life fail the horse, then and not till then youth in the flower of age commences for that boy and clothes his cheeks in soft down; that you may not haply believe that out of a man and the burden-carrying seed of horses Centaurs can be formed and have being; or that Scyllas with bodies half those of fishes girdled round with raving dogs can exist, and all other things of the kind, whose limbs we see cannot harmonize together; as they neither come to their flower at the same time nor reach the fulness of their bodily strength nor lose it in advanced old age, nor burn with similar passions nor have compatible manners, nor feel the same things give pleasure throughout their frames. Thus we may see bearded goats often fatten on hemlock which for man is rank poison.

Since flame moreover is wont to scorch and burn the tawny bodies of lions just as much as any other kind of flesh and blood existing on earth, how could it be that a single chimera with triple body, in front a lion, behind a dragon, in the middle the goat whose name it bears, could breathe out at the mouth fierce flame from its body?

Bailey 1921

[826] But because she must needs come to some end of child-bearing, she ceased, like a woman worn with the lapse of age. For time changes the nature of the whole world, and one state after another must needs overtake all things, nor does anything abide like itself: all things change their abode, nature alters all things and constrains them to turn. For one thing rots away and grows faint and feeble with age, thereon another grows up and issues from its place of scorn. So then time changes the nature of the whole world, and one state after another overtakes the earth, so that it cannot bear what it did, but can bear what it did not of old.

[837] And many monsters too earth then essayed to create, born with strange faces and strange limbs, the man-woman, between the two, yet not either, sundered from both sexes, some things bereft of feet, or in turn robbed of hands, things too found dumb without mouths, or blind without eyes, or locked through the whole body by the clinging of the limbs, so that they could not do anything or move towards any side or avoid calamity or take what they needed. All other monsters and prodigies of this sort she would create; all in vain, since nature forbade their increase, nor could they reach the coveted bloom of age nor find food nor join in the work of Venus. For we see that many happenings must be united for things, that they may be able to beget and propagate their races; first that they may have food, and then a way whereby birth-giving seeds may pass through their frames, and issue from their slackened limbs; and that woman may be joined with man, they must needs each have means whereby they can interchange mutual joys.

[855] And it must needs be that many races of living things then perished and could not beget and propagate their offspring. For whatever animals you see feeding on the breath of life, either their craft or bravery, aye or their swiftness has protected and preserved their kind from the beginning of their being. And many there are, which by their usefulness are commended to us, and so abide, trusted to our tutelage.

[862] First of all the fierce race of lions, that savage stock, their bravery has protected, foxes their cunning, and deer their fleet foot. But the lightly-sleeping minds of dogs with their loyal heart, and all the race which is born of the seed of beasts of burden, and withal the fleecy flocks and the horned herds, are all trusted to the tutelage of men, Memmius. For eagerly did they flee the wild beasts and ensue peace and bounteous fodder gained without toil of theirs, which we grant them as a reward because of their usefulness.

[871] But those to whom nature granted none of these things, neither that they might live on by themselves of their own might, nor do us any useful service, for which we might suffer their kind to feed and be kept safe under our defence, you may know that these fell a prey and spoil to others, all entangled in the fateful trammels of their own being, until nature brought their kind to destruction.

[875] But neither were there Centaurs, nor at any time can there be animals of twofold nature and double body, put together of limbs of alien birth, so that the power and strength of each, derived from this parent and that, could be equal. That we may learn, however dull be our understanding, from this.

[883] First of all, when three years have come round, the horse is in the prime of vigour, but the child by no means so; for often even now in his sleep he will clutch for the milky paps of his mother’s breasts. Afterwards, when the stout strength and limbs of horses fail through old age and droop, as life flees from them, then at last youth sets in in the prime of boyish years, and clothes the cheeks with soft down; that you may not by chance believe that Centaurs can be created or exist, formed of a man and the load-laden breed of horses, or Scyllas either, with bodies half of sea-monsters, girt about with ravening dogs, or any other beasts of their kind, whose limbs we see cannot agree one with another; for they neither reach their prime together nor gain the full strength of their bodies nor let it fall away in old age, nor are they fired with a like love, nor do they agree in a single character, nor are the same things pleasant to them throughout their frame. Indeed, we may see the bearded goats often grow fat on hemlock, which to man is rank poison.

[901] Since moreover flame is wont to scorch and burn the tawny bodies of lions just as much as every kind of flesh and blood that exists on the earth, how could it have come to pass that the Chimaera, one in her threefold body, in front a lion, in the rear a dragon, in the middle, as her name shows, a goat, should breathe out at her mouth fierce flame from her body?

But I don't think the Stoics could ever endorse it due to their insistence on fate and divine providence, correct? Or no? The ancient, consistent, Stoics, I mean, not the modern variety

Yes that's the attitude that should be instilled in people at as young an age as possible, especially instead of filling their heads with much about their "fate" or "god's will" or "hard determinism"