At some point we need to bring in the specific text material from Lucretius. Also, in terms of marriage in Epicurus' own context, we need to be sure we keep grounded in Epicurus' will, in which he provided for the marriage of Metrodorus' daughter.
As for "Sweet" being before your generation, that's one of the burdens of being old like I am. I remember very clearly that song playing on the radio when it first came out!
Here is a link where public domain editions of the Loeb collection can be downloaded.
And here is a direct link to the second volume of Diogenes Laertius, where the Epicurus biography is included.
I refer to his passage from Cicero's "Republic" very often to contrast it as essentially the opposite of Epicurus' view of justice, but I always have a hard time finding it when I need it. This post is just to provide some links and clips to the key passage:
Attalus: {22.} [33] L . . . True law is right reason in agreement with nature , it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment. . . .
Loeb Edition:
Note: I am not able to find a good copy of this for free and online. If someone has a link please let me know.
Yonge: (link to this version at archive.org)
Thank you for starting this thread and thanks for the text references. This is a huge area of interest for most people and we really need to explore this.
This issue of "idioms" and "expressions" is a big one and obviously is something that we face in our translations of the ancient texts too. It always pays to be cautious in thinking we read something that would not make sense from what we know about the larger context of a person. That is probably a major theme of our work in interpreting Epicurus.
Yes that comes awfully close to the idea that "it would be better never have to have been born" which may be true in some terribly tragic situations but is not generally true.
Epicurus seems to have specifically denounced that idea in the letter to Menoeceus ( is that the way you interpret it Don? ) and even if there is some ambiguity in the phrasing I certainly think he would if asked precisely.
It is difficult to even discuss theses things but we have to confront them if we have any hope of being able to take a reasonable position and stick by it. It is probably safe to say that every normal person has a painful reaction to seeing others in pain, or even thinking about others in pain, but what we do with that ability to feel that pain has to be handled prudently. We can't collapse in despair at the pain of the human condition, and yet it's also pretty clear that we should not ignore it, because we often can't - the pain of others will often impact us even if we try to love in a cave.
The whole issue has to be handled intelligently based on "the way things are"
Well presented Smoothiekiwi. Another two examples that I often think of are local animal shelters and nursing homes. It's not even necessary to think about Africa. All you have to do is think about the fact that all of us have local animal shelters or nursing homes where nice animals and people are suffering and would be happy to have any attention we would be willing to give them.
And the costs to us of doing so would be minimal.
But yet, for the most part, none of us donate a minute of our time or a cent of our money to help suffering people or animals "right down the street."
I am not saying that these decisions not to help are to be condemned or praised - bit the point before the house is that if you let yourself think of these things too much you could pretty much destroy your own mental health.
The point of my writing this is that it seems clear to me that we have to come to terms with how to analyze these issues, and Epicurus' worldview seems to me the best way to make sense of it all and actually apply a philosophicallly sound analysis to the problem.
No doubt she's talking figuratively, as that's a common figure of speech in the USA.
Welcome nixmercury !
This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.
Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.
All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.
One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.
In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.
It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.
And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.
Welcome to the forum!
I very much want to finish our series on Torquatus as efficiently as we can before we add a regular feature to the weekly podcast of answering one or more questions because I think the Torquatus material is a great outline of the most important points that we need to cover as an overview of the basics. We ought to be in the "home stretch" now but it will still take maybe as much as two months to finish - we will see.
In the meantime if questions get posed that are so basic and so frequently asked, like the cult question, we can find a way to work something in.
Do just let us know somewhere if there is a burning issue that needs more than what we do here in threads at the forum.
Cause frankly almost any question that comes up will probably fit within one of the topics Torquatus is about to list in outline form.
Yes we are going to find a way to devote some time to questions, either topical from the forums ( probably) or going through the FAQ, or both
limit is "our inevitable death"
Yes have to keep the discussion light and breezy! 
Aim high, ο φίλος μου! Aim high, my friend!
Nothing but the best for us! 
have more in common with many online individuals that I’ve never met, but corresponded with for almost 7 years than I do with many of my in person friends.
I feel exactly the same way and this is a source of much amazement and disbelief to some of my local friends to whom I mention it.
hey were very (almost too) open to all beliefs and non-beliefs.
Yes that is part of the issue (they may tend to be radical skeptics) and then there is the "humanism" issue which is probably too much of a tangent to tackle here. This is one of the areas where some of Elayne's past commentary was most helpful. She had impeccable - sterling - credentials in dealing with the people who are attracted to the UU approach (because she had been down that path and understood and agreed with many of their policy views) but she understood how selecting particular views of the "good" would be contradictory to the basics of the philosophy of an atomistic universe.
DeWitt's main argument is here:
EPICURUS NOT AN EMPIRICIST
In the chapter on the New Physics it will be shown that Epicurus set up Twelve Elementary Principles, which he demonstrated like theorems of geometry, thus classifying himself as a deductive reasoner. The presumption that he was an empiricist has been based in large part upon the zest with which he brandished certain arguments in refutation of the skeptics, who denied the validity of sensation. These arguments are succinctly recorded by Laertius and more amply by Lucretius. The succinct account begins: "Nor does anything exist that can refute the sensations, for neither can a sensation in a given class refute the sensation in the same class, because they are of equal validity, nor can the sensation in a given class refute the sensation in another class, because they are not criteria of the same phenomena." *1* The first limb of this statement has reference to the objection urged by the skeptics that one drinker reports the wine to be sour and another sweet or one bather reports the water to be warm and another cold. The answer of Epicurus was sensible, that the difference was in the observers.2 Neither does the one judgment cancel the other, because each has validity for the observer, nor does the contradiction prove the fallibility of sensation, because the sensation in each instance performs its function as a criterion.
The second limb of the statement means that the ears cannot contradict the nose if the latter registers the smell of peppermint, which calls for no comment.
A subsequent item in the list of Laertius may seem to support the advocates of empiricism: "nor again can reason refute the sensations, because it depends upon them entirely." However, to interpret this as meaning that the whole content of consciousness is derived from the sensations would be in violation of the Canon, which makes no mention of reason, and would also be contrary to the belief in Anticipations, that is, innate ideas, which is a kind of intuitionism and incompatible with empiricism. The meaning is rather that bereft of the sensations a human being is virtually dead, which, as already mentioned, we know to have been an argument of Epicurus.8
There is still another item in the list of Laertius that has been so translated as to lend plausibility to the charge of empiricism. One version runs, "For all thoughts have their origin in sensations," and another, "For all our notions are derived from perceptions." 4 The source of the error is an imprecision. The Greek noun translated above as "thoughts" or "notions" is *epinoiai,* which by virtue of its prefix signifies accessory, derivative or inferential ideas. These secondary ideas are not to be confused with others which to them are primary, *ennoiai* or *ennoemata.* For instance, Epicurus in the Little Epitome outlines seven of his Twelve Elementary Principles and then adds: "Even this brief statement affords an outline of the nature of the real existences sufficient for inferential ideas *\(epinoiais\)."* 5 To illustrate: the principle that the universe consists of atoms and void is a primary idea; the knowledge that the soul is distributed over the whole organism is secondary; it is inferred from the sensation of touch and other phenomena. 6
Other plausible reasons for ascribing empiricism and belief in the infallibility of sensation to Epicurus will disappear if the ambiguities be cleared up that inhere in the statement "all sensations are true." If "sensation" and *sensus* be a rendering of *aisthesis,* which means the perception of particulars such as color and shape, then it was idle for Cicero to be arguing against Epicurus, because Aristotle often enough declared the perception of particulars to be always true.7
It consequently follows that *sensus* must correspond to "phantasia," an inference confirmed by the evidence of Plutarch and Sextus Empiricus.8 This term was employed in the same sense by Aristotle and Epicurus; it signifies the composite image of particulars. Both recognized the possibility of error, but Epicurus was more keenly interested in this factor because by his time the vogue of skepticism had made the erection of criteria a vital necessity. He was consequently at pains to locate the source of error, and he found it in the hasty action of the automatic mind. For example, the boat on which the observer is a passenger is standing still but it seems to be moving when a second boat is passing by. In such an instance the eyes are not playing the observer false; it is the hasty judgment of the automatic mind that is in error. However odd it seems in English, Epicurus called this "the addition of opinion." In explanation of this the statement should be recalled, that "sensation is irrational and incapable of adding or subtracting anything." It is the automatic mind that adds motion to the standing ship and subtracts it from the moving ship. Lucretius cites several examples of similar errors.9
In order to follow this topic through it is necessary to elucidate a point of terminology and semantic development. In all ages of the Greek language terminology was plastic. Thus Artistotle could employ *phantasia* to denote the imaginative faculty while using *phantasm* of the individual appearance, whether true or false.10 Epicurus, having a different concern, truth and error, restricted *phantasia* to true and real appearances, using *phantasm* only of the false visions of the insane or of dreamers and also of the phenomena of the heavens, which he declared too remote for clear observation.11 He even urged his disciple to scorn "those who concede dependable vision *\(phantasia\)* from distances," where the best scholars emend with misplaced ingenuity.12
Yet this is only part of the story. With Aristotle the term *phantasia,* not being restricted to true presentations, readily serves to denote visions o£ the imagination as a faculty. It is from this use that the English language has been enriched by the derivatives *fancy* and *fantasy,* which denote the absolutely unreal. From this same drift of semantic change we have the word *fantastic.* Epicurus, on the contrary, having chosen *phantasia* to denote a true presentation, employed *fantastic* to describe the objectively true or real. It becomes a synonym of *immediate* and opposed to the remote. For instance, it makes no difference whether he writes "the immediate perceptions" or "the fantastic perceptions." Both alike pertain to the joint activity of the senses and the mind, by which it is recognized that the animal standing over there is an ox or that the man approaching is Plato. These perceptions are "fantastic," strange as the usage seems, because they result in recognitions. The imagination is not involved.
While Epicurus was adamant in his determination to defend the validity of the sensations as being the means of direct contact between man and reality and as possessing precedence over reason, he exhibits no desire to defend the individual sensation. The fallacies of those who impute to him belief in the infallibility of sensation lie partly in their failure to observe the ambiguity of the word *true *and in their confusion of "truth" with "value."
It is not difficult to differentiate the various meanings of *true* and it is essential to right understanding. For example, when Epicurus declared that "the phantasms seen by the insane and in dreams are true," he meant that they were "real" and existed independently of the madman or the dreamer, because "they act as a stimulus and that which does not exist does not deliver a stimulus." 13 These phantasms, however, are not "true" in the sense that a sensation experienced by the waking observer is true. The dreamer may have a vision of a centaur but no centaurs exist in real life. If the waking man sees an ox, then the sensation is true because the stimulus is delivered by a living ox.
A still different meaning of *true* may be discerned when Epicurus denominates his system as "true philosophy." He means it is true in the sense that his Twelve Elementary Principles are true or in the sense that the modern scientist believes the accepted calculation of the speed of light to be true. This may be called absolute truth, if there is such a thing.
It remains to speak of the relatively true. The views of a tower at various distances may be cited as examples. Each is true relative to the distance; its value as evidence of the facts is another matter. This distinction was no novelty to the ancients; Sextus Empiricus sets it forth at some length in a discussion of Epicureanism.14
Also worthy of mention is the sensation which is optically true but false to the facts. An example much brandished by the skeptics was the bent image of the oar immersed in the water.18 Epicurus made logical provision for this difficulty: "Of two sensations the one cannot refute the other,16 because we give attention to all sensations." This statement alone would acquit him of belief in the infallibility of sensation, because it is distinctly implied that some sensations are employed to correct others.
The example of the tower will serve as a transition from the topic of ambiguity to that of confusion. When modern scholars seize upon the saying "all sensations are true," which appears nowhere in the extant writings of Epicurus, and stretch it to mean that all sensations are reliable or trustworthy or "that the senses cannot be deceived," they are confusing the concept of truth with the concept of value.17 They overlook the fact that even a truthful witness may fall short of delivering the whole truth or may even give false evidence. The distant view of the square tower is quite true relative to the distance but it fails to reveal the whole truth about the tower.
To assume that Epicurus was unaware of these plain truths, as one must if belief in the infallibility of sensation is imputed to him, is absurd. It is because he was aware that the value of sensations, apart from their truth, varied all the way from totality to zero, that he exhorted beginners "under all circumstances to watch the sensations and especially the immediate perceptions whether of the intellect or any of the criteria whatsoever." 18 Obviously, so far from thinking the sensations infallible, he was keenly aware of the possibility of error and drew sharp attention to the superior values of immediate sensations.
When once these ambiguities and confusions have been discerned and eliminated, it is possible to state the teaching of Epicurus with some of that precision by which he set high store. In the meaning of the Canon, then, a sensation is an *aisthesis.* All such sensations may possess value; otherwise there would be no sense in saying, "We pay attention to all sensations." Their values, however, range all the way from totality to zero. The value is total only when the sensation is immediate. For example, when Aristotle says, "The sense of sight is not deceived as to color," this is true only of the close view, because colors fade in more distant views.
Sensations, however, usually present themselves in combinations of color, shape, size, smell, and so on. An immediate presentation of such a composite unit is a *phantasia.* All such presentations are true, but they do not rank as criteria in the meaning of the Canon, for the reason that the intelligence has come into play. An act of recognition *\(epaisthesis\)* has taken place in the mind of the observer, which is secondary to the primary reaction that registered color, shape, size, smell, and so forth.
That Epicurus did not regard these composite sensations as criteria is made clear by a statement of his own: "The fidelity of the recognitions guarantees the truth of the sensations." 19 For example, the animal standing yonder is recognized as a dun-colored ox. This is a secondary reaction. Only the primary perceptions of color, shape, size, and so on constitute a direct contact between man and the physical environment. The truth of these perceptions is confirmed by the fidelity of the recognition.
Again, let it be assumed that the quality of sweetness is registered by sensation. It is not, however, sensation that says, "This is honey"; a secondary reaction in the form of a recognition involving intelligence has taken place. This, in the terminology of Epicurus, is "a fantastic perception of the intelligence." These were not given the rank of criteria by Epicurus for the reason already cited. It is on record, however, that later Epicureans did so.20
So far is Epicurus from believing all sensations to be true in the meaning of the Canon that he guards against error in various ways. In the first place, attention must be paid to all sensations, as already mentioned. Next, the sensations of the individual must be checked by those of others: "Consequently attention must be paid to the immediate feelings and to the sensations, in common with others in matters of common concern and individually in matters of private concern and to all clear presentations of every one of the criteria." 21 This guardedness was imperative, because contemporary skepticism was flourishing.
The problem of skepticism is attacked disjunctively in the Authorized Doctrines: either all sensations are rejected as valid evidence or some are admitted and some rejected. The former procedure is dealt with in Doctrine 23: "If you are going to make war on all the sensations, you will not even have a standard by reference to which you shall judge those of them which you say are deceptive." This makes it plain once more that not all sensations are true but the validity of some must be checked by the evidence of others.
The Doctrine above is directed at the outright skeptics. The second limb of the disjunctive approach deals with the Platonists, who rejected terrestrial phenomena as deceptive while accepting the evidences of celestial phenomena. Epicurus denied "clear vision *\(phantasia\)* from distances," if only the text be not emended.22 He wrongly insisted that heavenly phenomena could be explained from the terrestrial. This betrayed him into committing his most notorious blunder; for the reason that the magnitude of a fire does not seem to diminish with distance as does that of concrete objects he declared the sun to be no larger or only a little larger than it appears to be.23 This ridiculous judgment calls for no comment, but it may be mentioned that Plato's belief in astral gods, however grandiose, is no more acceptable. Epicurus not only censured Plato for accepting the evidence of celestial phenomena while rejecting that of terrestrial phenomena but also condemns him as a mythologer: "Whenever a man admits one phenomenon and rejects another equally compatible with the phenomenon in question, it is manifest that he takes leave of all scientific study of nature and takes refuge in mythology." *2i *Hostility to Plato was combined in this case with contempt of mythology.
Nevertheless Doctrine 23 throws light upon the working of the mind in respect of the criteria. Mental activity may be automatic or volitional. It is the automatic mind that errs; it may judge the distant tower to be round; this is the error of "opinion." The discreet observer knows the distant view to be deceptive and suspends judgment until the tower is observed at close hand. A tentative judgment is then confirmed or disproved.25 In the case of the size of the sun, which is visible but never at close hand, the judgment held good, as Epicurus believed, because not contradicted.
The sensations are consistently regarded as witnesses in court.28 Their evidence may be false, as in the case of the oar half-immersed in the water, which appears to be bent. False evidence is to be corrected by that of other sensations. The evidence of all witnesses must receive attention. The volitional mind, as opposed to the automatic mind, which errs, functions as judge.
By way of concluding this account of the Sensations as criteria it is well to present a synoptic view of the evidence. Nowhere in our extant Little Epitome or the Authorized Doctrines do we find the statement "that all sensations are true." On the contrary, the Epitome begins by urging the student "to give heed to the sensations under all circumstances and especially the immediate perceptions whether of the intelligence or of any criterion whatsoever," which manifestly allows some value to all sensations and special value to immediate sensations.27 At the end of the Epitome the student is warned to check his own observations by those of others.28 These authentic statements are incompatible with belief in the infallibility of sensation. They presume belief in gradations of value among sensations and also the need of perpetual caution against error.
Of three Authorized Doctrines devoted to the topic, 23, 24, and 25, the first urges attention to "all the clear evidence"; the second warns that the rejection of all the sensations leaves the observer without the means of checking sensation by sensation; the third warns of the confusion resulting from rejecting any particular sensation. All of these are of the nature of warnings and completely belie the reckless verdict of an otherwise meticulous scholar "that the Epicureans boldly said that every impression of sense is true and trustworthy." 29
Lastly, in every instance above mentioned the word for sensation is *aisthesis *and not *phantasia.* That somewhere Epicurus had actually written "all phantasias are true" seems certain; in which of his writings it is unknown, but the evidence is sufficient.30 This statement, as being assailable, was pounced upon by his detractors and zealously ventilated. If, however, the extant texts of Epicurus be taken as a guide, the phantasia or "fantastic" perception is merely the highest grade of evidence; the *aisthesis, *the perception of particulars, is the criterion.
Some key paragraphs:
Chapter 7:
It is an even worse mistake to have confused the tests of truth with the content of truth, that is, the tools of precision with the stones of the wall. This was the blunder of Pierre Gassendi, who revived the study of Epicurus in the seventeenth century. It was his finding "that there is nothing in the intellect which has not been in the senses." From this position John Locke, in turn, set out as the founder of modern empiricism. Thus a misunderstanding of Epicurus underlies a main trend of modern philosophy. This astonishing fact begets an even greater concern for a correct interpretation, which may cause Locke to appear slightly naive.
Example of the chain reasoning issue:
It still remains to glance at the paradox in which Epicurus involves himself by employing reason to dethrone reason as the chief criterion. He places himself in a position similar to that of the skeptic who denies the possibility of certainty in knowledge, thus depriving his own skepticism of certainty.
This paradox, moreover, does not stand alone. It is also paradoxical that Epicurus should have omitted reason from his Canon and at the same time accepted a great body of truth accumulated by the reasonings of predecessors and set these down among his Twelve Elementary Principles of Physics. From this inconsistency he thought to escape by treating each of these principles as if a theorem of geometry. For example, to demonstrate that the universe is infinite in respect of both matter and space, he resorts to a disjunctive syllogism.14 If matter were infinite and space finite, the latter could not contain the former. Again, if matter were finite and space infinite, then matter would be lost in space and no clashes or combinations of atoms would occur. Since these alternative assumptions lead to absurdities, the conclusion is that the original proposition is true. With such reasoning even a Stoic logician could find no fault.
Chapter Eight:
THE criteria are three, but the prevailing custom is to reduce them to one by merging the Anticipations and the Feelings with the Sensations. This error arises from classifying Epicurus as an empiricist, ascribing to him belief in the infallibility of sensation, and then employing this false assumption as a major premise.
I think Joshua's points are correct as far as they go, but in order to really grapple with DeWitt's full opinion on this we would need to go to his chapters on epistemology to pull out exactly what he says about it, especially the sections where he contrasts Epicurus with John Locke and calls Locke's (or was it Gassendi's?) view of Epicurus's empiricism and calls that "naive."
(I am going to write this from memory first before I check the sources.)
What I recall is that the point is more centered on (1) anticipations, which Joshua touched on, but also (2) Epicurus' use of deductive logic, which firmly depends on the senses, but *does* go beyond them.
Let's take (2) first, and as I write this I am struck by how important this issue is and how it no doubt is something that a Frances Wright will not swallow. In my view this is why she writes her material late in AFDIA about the essence of science being observation, and basically rejecting all turning of observation into theory. (If you want to trace that further, she does that even more explicitly in some of her collected lectures that were published later.)
As I recall DeWitt pointing out, Epicurean physics goes further than just observation to take positions on things that can never be touched or observed directly by the senses -- such things as the existence of atoms and on many basic questions of the universe (Is it eternal? Did it have a beginning in time? Does it have an end in space?)
DeWitt points out that Epicurus took firm positions on these issues through deductive chain reasoning (I clearly recall reference to chain reasoning in this context so we can word search on that too).
As such, the theory of Epicurean physics is validated by observation that the information of the senses does not contradict the theory, and in fact supports the theory so strongly that we can be "certain" of it -- but the theory itself was never first in the senses.
And this goes further into the profound issues to of Death (we've never been there to observe it first hand) and the gods (more complex due to the issue of images, but we've never been to the intermundia to observe it directly as one might argue a "strict empiricist" would demand.
Now yes, DeWitt also links this issue to anticipations, and here is where DeWitt uses the word "intuitionist" in contrast to empiricist. We've had many discussions on this difficult issue but this is where deWitt references the Velleius material and says that at least one aspect of the anticipations is to provide sort of a genetic code that unfolds like a flower which does not at birth contain any stored information (wisdom? knowledge? data?) but which is genetically coded to dispose us to think in particular directions (the two topics Epicurus mentions DeWitt says are justice and divinity - and maybe time too? I would have to check on time).
This puts Epicurus in direct contradiction to Aristotelian and Lockeian "blank slate" theory which is more consistent with empiricism ('nothing in the mind that did not first come through the senses').
So I think Dewitt is really ultimately making his statement in the context of the blank slate contention, which I think is tightly related to empiricism (and is or should be findable if we looked up empiricism and studied its origins).
That's a start let me save this before i lose it.
But yes I think DeWitt is correct on this. And in my mind, I link this to the argument I regularly reference in the book by Jackson Barrwis "Dialogue on innate Principles" which is a full-front attack on John Locke based largely on this same issue. (Which I thought highly enough to make a site about, although it appears to need total revamping as only some of the links work.)
Yes this has to happen in stages. But I do think we all need to be clear about the eventual goal , which is real-life local friendships, real-life marriages, real life Epicurean children and childhood education, etc.! The whole nine yards that they had in the ancient world.
So to be reasonable for Europe we'd have to do maybe 2 or 3 eastern time at the latest, which would put us into the morning on the west coast. I am thinking Europe is generally about six hours ahead of the USA, right?
Yes I am thinking like Simon in terms of public meeting places -- probably libraries in most communities. There's probably too much danger in inviting people to one's homes until we get to know them fairly well. Just like here on the forum where we need to "get to know" people for a while before giving them higher posting rights, there will need to be a vetting process that takes place at public locations first.
But I agree -- open to everyone and be more generic and diplomatic at the open meetings than we would in private conversations. It won't take long for people to get the message that an Epicurean group isn't a cooking or boating club.
