Posts by Cassius

What I am reminded of reading these last two posts is that knowledge of all kinds is generally helpful and probably only rarely if ever unhelpful.

As we hopefully continue to grow as a forum over the years, the challenge will be to be sure we accommodate as many varying interests as we can, while always keeping the focus on Epicurus. And this "interest" issue is not only a matter of topic, but also a matter of "basic" vs. "advanced" in the study of Epicurus.

Probably over time we will want some more introductory or guidepost material that prepares new readers for what they will find here, and acclimates everyone from the beginning that there are natural progressions and interests and that no one should expect to want to participate in every discussion, or be turned off in any way by that fact.

I think this is probably a part of the "atomistic" nature of the universe to prepare people for - maybe it's all a subset of the point that Epicurean philosophy is more of an "operating system" that equips individuals to go out and live their own lives in their own habitats more successfully.

It isn't a monotheistic religion in which we expect everyone to do the same things in the same way and all live inside the same garden / house / commune.

We can "prepare" here, and those who like the teaching and transmission will always probably find this place a central focus, but once we understand the basics some significant number will then move on to start their own "local" or "specialized" groups that apply the principles in unique ways.

Yes the "shores" is from Humphries, which means it's the text that Charlton Griffin reads, which is why that is burned into my mind:

[159] Now, if things come from nothing, all things could
Produce all kinds of things; nothing would need
Seed of its own. Men would burst out of the sea,
And fish and birds from earth, and, wild or tame,
All kinds of beasts, of dubious origin,
Inhabit deserts and the greener fields,
Nor would the same trees bear, in constancy,
The same fruit always, but, as like as not,
Oranges would appear on apple-boughs.
If things were not produced after their kind,
Each from its own determined particles,
How could we trace the substance to the source?
But now, since all created things have come
From their own definite kinds of seed, they move
From their beginnings toward the shores of light.

I must be hallucinating as to "shores." I was sure it was there (maybe Humphries) but what I am finding is "borders":

Munro:

[159] If things came from nothing, any kind might be born of any thing, nothing would require seed. Men for instance might rise out of the sea, the scaly race out of the earth, and birds might burst out of the sky; horned and other herds, every kind of wild beasts would haunt with changing broad tilth and wilderness alike. Nor would the same fruits keep constant to trees, but would change; any tree might bear any fruit. For if there were not begetting bodies for each, how could things have a fixed unvarying mother? But in fact because things are all produced from fixed seeds, each thing is born and goes forth into the borders of light out of that in which resides its matter and first bodies; and for this reason all things cannot be gotten out of all things, because in particular things resides a distinct power.

Quote from Don

What is that section in Lucretius with "bring into the light" or something like it? I can't remember the context to determine if it's relevant here or not.

I am not in a place where I can find quotes immediately but I think at least Munro translates it as "shores of light" and it's usually (if I recall) in those sections where we are talking about the need for a comprehensive philosophy, and the cup of wormwood for its healing properties (I think). Let me see what I can find and I will paste here:

I am just writing notes now as they come to mind:

I also want to say that if we can find good documentation for something special, Cassius will be the first to call a series of "Visualization Parties" so we can all talk about and work on the technique together!

But what I am afraid of is something that Don and I both note in DeWitt: It's kind of embarrassing, and undermines his credibility somewhat, to find connections to Christianity hiding almost under every rock. I do think he's right to draw many of his connections, but he probably goes overboard and ends up turning off readers who aren't really interested in drawing out every possible connection.

That's what I am afraid of here - that if indeed there is nothing more going on here than an idiom for "examine closely" or "look closely" or "look at what's right in front of you" then to imply that there was a special and well developed Epicurean technique that goes far beyond what is obvious (sort of a pun there) could tend to be an embarassing contention to make if people go looking for the documentation, find it very meagre and too speculative and ambiguous to be of any use, and get disappointed in studying Epicurus as a result.

Ok finally I remember for this thread one of the main points I want to raise:

What I interpret to be the most important reference to "ante oculos" is the reference early in book one of Lucretius:

"Humana ante oculos foede cum vita....."

The translators seem to view that as an interjection on the order of:

"all too conspicuous" - Humphrey

(I will get some more to add here)

But I interpret them to be saying, and it makes sense in the translation, that this is just some kind of idiom or expression for what we might say as:

• "right in front of you"
• "right before your eyes"
• "apparently"
• "obviously"
• "plain to see"
• "unmistakeably"

All of which would be normal ways of expressing something that is "right in front of you to be seen." And that's a point that is echoed later in book one, in the passage about if you can't have confidence in your senses as to what is right in front of you, you certainly can't have confidence in your opinions about anything that is hidden.

(And I need to look to see if there are other instances of ante oculos in Lucretius)

But the point of this being that if "ante oculos" is just an idiom or expression about things that are clearly right in front of you, that in itself has significance, without turning the issue into a "technique" so we can match the Stoics or some others who are really into "procedures."

Again this is not a criticism of you personally or anyone in particular who wants to search for such techniques, it's just a matter of wanting to document them very clearly before we accept something that Tsouna in the last several decades thinks she has discovered, when there doesn't seem to be any significant record of it in the rest of 2000 years of Epicurean texts.

Kind of like that other Lucretius line -- If it's true let's embrace it, if it's not true let's fight against it, but whatever, let's work to be as accurate as we can possibly be.

I think what I am really looking for is at least a couple of reliably-sourced English sentences (without major reconstructions of missing text) that make clear what is being discussed and how the term is being used.

Otherwise I would presume that something as simple could be going on as we might regularly say in discussing, for example, how to fish:

"Imagine you are in a boat on a pond getting ready to throw your line...."

"Imagine you are on the shore of a lake and you are about to cast a net...."

I could imagine all sorts of uses of words like "imagine" or "visualize" that would have very little significance as a technique beyond what is used in common conversation to set the stage for a discussion.

Now if there are lines like "Epicurus recommended as a method of thinking clearly that you intensely visualize what it is you are thinking about. Close your eyes and visualize all the colors, the shapes, the textures, and let your eyes wander all over them.... etc etc etc."

Are you seeing clear statements like that which indicate that Philodemus was emphasizing a particular method of pursuing thought about something?

If so can you point us to them? I apologize if they are in those links and I just didn't see them.

I see Forest hasn't visited since 2019. Maybe it would be helpful to develop a system to mark people as inactive, or even close old accounts, but I am not sure there is any real benefit in that. It's easy to tell from a user profile when someone last visited, and occasionally prompting them probably isn't a bad idea.

But maybe some kind of an "Active Poster" badge as a reward for active users would be desirable. Need to think about that.

Happy birthday @Forest ! You are our second birthday to come up since we opened this subforum. In writing this I don't recall if or when you have posted or whether you are still active here. I will check your profile next, and that makes me think of a new suggestion:

Since it is desirable to build a community here, it would be a good idea if we see a birthday come up for someone we don't know to take a second to visit their profile and learn what we can about them.

No doubt over time some people lose interest and we should mark them as inactive, but unless they close their account or say otherwise, we should probably presume it's a nice thing to do to say hello to them in their birthday.

Thanks Scott! Since we are devoted to studying Epicurus here rather than competing viewpoints, I doubt it would make much sense to pursue any systematic study of any "minor" religion or viewpoint unless a significant number of us here have confronted it and need "ammunition" against it.

The reason "Buddhism" in general is so relevant is of course so many people come into contact with it (maybe superficially) and need points of reference to decide whether to go further. If someone is deeply into a specific branch that would most likely be beyond the scope of our project here. I would probably refer such a person to Hiram, as he is more into those details than I would think would be appropriate here.

But I do appreciate all the good information that is coming out in these threads.

As was commented to me recently, one thing about our project is that we can expect, as people rotate in and out of this study, that the same questions are going to be asked over and over again. Covering them thoroughly as we are doing gives us a database of experiences to which we can point people going through these questions for the first time.

So we can continue and expand these discussions as our participants here find helpful. But I think I am already pleased to see that I think we are covering the situation well enough for the satisfaction of most generalists who ask "As an Epicurean should I be concerned about studying Buddhism?" And as for me I am satisfied that I would tell most people to give that a very low priority.

Most people who will come into contact with us probably will need to spend more time understanding how and why Stoicism is so incompatible with Epicurus rather than Buddhism, but for those who for whatever reason (geography or whatever) have come more into contact with Buddhism, this discussion ought to be helpful and is something I could never provide myself.

So are there intact sentences which give context to the usage?

Thanks Don for starting this. I will try to edit and reconstruct some of my comments that we made in private. I apologize that in pasting them here there is not an entirely logical flow between them, but I think the points are relevant to the conversation, which I hope will go on much further into the details:

OK I see that I need to add Tsouna's book to my reading list, and I see why it is so attractive to Hiram (and no doubt many people) because it has a section on Therapeutic exercises. It says clearly that Philodemus was purposely going outside Epicurean doctrine. I think we can add this to the list of examples where the later Epicureans were not uniform in their views and that there were controversies as to who was or was not straying outside of Epicurean doctrine -- for good or for bad effect will be an individual contextual issue.

As to "setting before the eyes" I see she refers to this as the "so-called technique" of bringing-before-the-eyes. I wonder if anyone else in the world prior to or other than Tsouna herself identified this with specificity or called it that. I do think that in the syncretic approach there is a tendency to pull things out of context and make something different of them than existed in the original context. Maybe this is important, maybe it is not, but I generally like to see the issue stressed by the founding authorities before I accept that it was important to them (much like the issue of katastematic/kinetic distinctions).

Looks like there is another reference too, Don --- Tsouna 2003

As to Philodemus in general and his reliability:

In my opinion Philodemus is in a gray area and he's definitely not a "Founding Authority" in the sense of Epicurus or Metrodorus or Hermarchus. By the time he was writing it's likely that there were significant divisions (and Philodemus reports on them) including those issues documented by Cicero/Torquatus such as:

- How much logical exposition is appropriate to establish that pleasure is the good

- How to look at "friendship."

And I bet by this point there was probably the division too noted by Diogenes Laertius as to a "fourth leg of the canon." Since we're talking here about visualization it's interesting to think about whether that could be related to the "fourth leg" controversy.

I'm not trying to be argumentative (against Philodemus or anyone else! ). I think these are fascinating issues on which we have to keep an open mind. I do generally think that when we have a reliable text of Philodemus saying something we have a very high value source that is entitled to a lot of respect. However it's hard to say whether what is being reported has some overlay of Philodemus' own view vs that of Epicurus himself, and I think we always need to be alert to that.

I think we today have an incentive to see things that might not really be there, like Dewitt with Christianity. We're all doing the best we can to reconstruct the wider positions from narrow evidence, and it's easy to make mistakes and go too far. If the person doing the writing isn't rigorously protecting their views from outside "pollution" from their own viewpoints, then it's easy to see what we're looking for. I don't really have a grip on Tsouna's personal perspective other than to observe that she seems to rather frequently disagree with Sedley, whose instincts I personally find more likely to be similar to Epicurus.

Also keep in mind that being a lawyer I do like to constantly pit testimonies and opinions against each other, and in doing so I am not necessarily questioning the good faith of any of them, just trying to test their accuracy from different perspectives.

It's interesting to compare perspectives on how to judge Philodemus vs Lucretius. Philodemus might well have been the smarter person and a major thinker in his own right. Lucretius might have been "just" a poet. But if Lucretius was rigorously following the original texts of Epicurus, that makes him possibly a better source.

Which is a way to bring us around to the fact that the very first words of that section on Epicurus in Book One are "Ante oculos." I didn't have time to search Tsouna to see if she incorporates that in her analysis of the technique.

Note: I mean how much is there that Tsouna is able to cite? Is it a clear section that states "We have an very important Epicurean tecnhique called 'setting before the eyes' or is it just a phrase that appears several times as a natural result of thinking that it is important to visualize what we are talking about? I just haven't read enough to be sure.

---

I just finished reading Tsouna's introduction to Ethics of Philodemus. She is very clear as to the very great difficulties in the reconstructions, and that there is a lot of room for reasonable people to differ in interpretations of what she is writing about.

I think it's critical to keep those caveats in mind, and that's one of the concerns I have about the article(s) we are talking about. Frequently I don't see any reference at all to the textual uncertainties, and Tsouna's conclusions are presented (and again I am referring to these articles,and not to her) as if they are certain and that we should accept them without question as equal to the best documented texts. And I think that's a very dangerous approach apt to create conflation and improper syncretism (the words of the week!)

As far as the courtroom analogy on the "truth" of the senses as witnesses, I have never seen that developed anywhere else in my reading other than DeWitt. I too consider it to be very clarifying and likely correct and consistent with the texts. In my mind this is an example of some of DeWitt's major strengths. You may or may not agree with all his extrapolations but I think his sympathy with Epicurean positions and his attempt to find explanations that make sense are very refreshing. You'll have plenty of time in the future to get tired of those many commentators who are convinced that they are far smarter than Epicurus and like nothing more than to argue how naive Epicurus was. For all the faults that he may have, DeWitt makes an effort to reconstruct Epicurus in a sensible way.

Simon it's been my observations that extremely deep conversations about free will rarely lead many people to change their minds, but I do think it is useful to be clear about Epicurus' position and I think we can help there:

Quote from SimonC

- In a universe with a strong, perhaps dualistic, free will, a moral person could commit a crime and still remain a moral person. To claim otherwise is to claim that a moral person has something in him that prevents him from being immoral or that a person that has committed a crime is no longer a moral person, which is conceding that actions are in some sense deterministic.

I think Epicurus would disagree with this, because I think this implies that "crime" and the definition of a "moral person" are somehow absolute. I have no difficulty thinking that people who commit crimes can still be a moral person. I consider myself a moral person, and I speed on the highway on a fairly regular basis. It's simply not consistent with the Epicurean perspective on justice or on the nature of the universe to get hung up on moral absolutes.

Quote from SimonC

I guess I don't see what is so bad about determinism.

I think a large part of the answer here is that Epicurus was a very practical person and not as concerned about satisfying logicians as he was in helping ordinary people. He seems to have thought (and I would agree) that it is extremely damaging to a normal person's hope for happiness for them to come to believe that they are the slaves of any kind of fate whatsoever and that they can have no effect on their futures no matter what they do. Of course there are indeed things that cannot be changed: death, and the fact of no life after death. But there are plenty of things that normal people can do during their lives to live more happily, and hamstringing them with complicated philosophical views that - despite what they perceive - they have no control over their futures is not a very constructive way to go, from that perspective.

Quote from SimonC

The swerve does get rid of the predictability of the universe. Perhaps this is what Epicurus was worried about? That it would be difficult to insist we have free will if "fate" is true.

I would say "not at all." Epicurus held that most of the universe is indeed deterministic, and that it is in only limited circumstances relevant to us, such as in the existence of agency in higher animals, that it "breaks through" so as to effect us. I highly recommend the AA Long article "Chance and Natural Law in Epicureanism" for a discussion of this aspect of the swerve.

Welcome bribri56 !

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
2. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
3. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
4. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
5. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
6. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
7. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
8. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
9. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
10. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
11. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
12. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

I would not at all defend Jefferson as an Orthodox Epicurean, but I also take articles like that less seriously than I do Jeffersons own letters which I collect at http://www.newepicurean.com/Jefferson

He was primarily a politician and was not very straightforward in reconciling his public and private statements.

In my view he serves mainly as a rather transparent way of "legitimizing" those of us who hold Epicurean views yet still want to move somewhat in traditional society. For someone who has no need to do that there's no need to spend much time with Jefferson.

Running a forum on ideas as revolutionary Epicurus while also keeping the lights on can be a tricky business!

As I said in a private exchange recently, I think we are probably more in a 'John the Baptist' stage of preparing the way for the real Epicurean world revolution, than we are the front line revolutionaries ourselves.

So when the time comes for the next Epicurus to arise I won't be at all surprised no matter how much or how little time he or she spends with Jefferson.

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Seven of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

At this point in our podcast we have completed our first line-by-line review of the poem, and we have turned to the presentation of Epicurean ethics found in Cicero's On Ends. Last week we started section 63, but only got through the first two sentences. Today we return to section 63 and discuss the Epicurean emphasis on natural science.

Now let's join Martin reading today's text:

[63] It was indeed excellently said by Epicurus that fortune only in a small degree crosses the wise man’s path, and that his greatest and most important undertakings are executed in accordance with his own design and his own principles, and that no greater pleasure can be reaped from a life which is without end in time, than is reaped from this which we know to have its allotted end. He judged that the logic of your school possesses no efficacy either for the amelioration of life or for the facilitation of debate. He laid the greatest stress on natural science. That branch of knowledge enables us to realize clearly the force of words and the natural conditions of speech and the theory of consistent and contradictory expressions; and when we have learned the constitution of the universe we are relieved of superstition, are emancipated from the dread of death, are not agitated through ignorance of phenomena, from which ignorance, more than any thing else, terrible panics often arise; finally, our characters will also be improved when we have learned what it is that nature craves. Then again if we grasp a firm knowledge of phenomena, and uphold that canon, which almost fell from heaven into human ken, that test to which we are to bring all our judgments concerning things, we shall never succumb to any man’s eloquence and abandon our opinions.

[64] Moreover, unless the constitution of the world is thoroughly understood, we shall by no means be able to justify the verdicts of our senses. Further, our mental perceptions all arise from our sensations; and if these are all to be true, as the system of Epicurus proves to us, then only will cognition and perception become possible. Now those who invalidate sensations and say that perception is altogether impossible, cannot even clear the way for this very argument of theirs when they have thrust the senses aside. Moreover, when cognition and knowledge have been invalidated, every principle concerning the conduct of life and the performance of its business becomes invalidated. So from natural science we borrow courage to withstand the fear of death, and firmness to face superstitious dread, and tranquillity of mind, through the removal of ignorance concerning the mysteries of the world, and self-control, arising from the elucidation of the nature of the passions and their different classes, and as I shewed just now, our leader again has established the canon and criterion of knowledge and thus has imparted to us a method for marking off falsehood

from truth.

In contrast to the ambiguity I see everywhere in discussions of Buddhism, I think it's relatively easy to construct a list of simple points that describe the Epicurean approach to life. I think we can use Thomas Jefferson as an illustration of someone who saw the same things, and we can build on one of his letters to John Adams to show an description of the sequence. I will put the full cite at the bottom:

1. ‘I feel: therefore I exist.’
   
2. I feel bodies which are not myself: there are other existencies then. I call them matter.
   
3. I feel them changing place. This gives me motion.
   
4. Where there is an absence of matter, I call it void, or nothing, or immaterial space.
   
5. On the basis of sensation, of matter and motion, we may erect the fabric of all the certainties we can have or need.
6. I can conceive thought to be an action of a particular organization of matter, formed for that purpose by it’s creator, as well as that attraction in an action of matter, or magnetism of loadstone. When he who denies to the Creator the power of endowing matter with the mode of action called thinking shall shew how he could endow the Sun with the mode of action called attraction, which reins the planets in the tract of their orbits, or how an absence of matter can have a will, and, by that will, put matter into motion, then the materialist may be lawfully required to explain the process by which matter exercises the faculty of thinking.
7. When once we quit the basis of sensation, all is in the wind. To talk of immaterial existences is to talk of nothings. To say that the human soul, angels, god, are immaterial, is to say they are nothings, or that there is no god, no angels, no soul. I cannot reason otherwise.
   
   To That I Would Add For Purpose of This Discussion:
   
8. It is a certainty that I am not going to be here very long. I am going to die and forever cease to exist much more quickly than I would like.
9. It is a certainty that Nature gives us nothing other than pleasure and pain as the ultimate foundation of all choice and decision making.
10. Since I am going to be here for only a short time, I want to experience as much pleasure, and as little pain, as possible.
11. I consider it to be a certainty that it takes effort to remain alive, and effort means pain, and so I am ready and willing to accept some amount of pain as the price for achieving pleasure.
12. Therefore I am attracted to philosophies and religions and ways of ordering life that target the promotion of pleasure in my life.
13. And I am also repelled by philosophies and religions and ways of life that target anything other than the promotion of pleasure in my life.
14. And finally for purposes of this exercise, I consider pleasure to be a feeling that is unmistakable, so when someone tries to tell me that I should pursue a definition of pleasure that doesn't feel pleasurable to me, I run the other direction.
15. Thus I am an Epicurean and not a Buddhist.

Quote

Jefferson to John Adams, August 15, 1820:   (Full version at Founders.gov)

…. But enough of criticism: let me turn to your puzzling letter of May 12. on matter, spirit, motion etc. It’s crowd of scepticisms kept me from sleep. I read it, and laid it down: read it, and laid it down, again and again: and to give rest to my mind, I was obliged to recur ultimately to my habitual anodyne, ‘I feel: therefore I exist.’ I feel bodies which are not myself: there are other existencies then. I call them matter. I feel them changing place. This gives me motion. Where there is an absence of matter, I call it void, or nothing, or immaterial space. On the basis of sensation, of matter and motion, we may erect the fabric of all the certainties we can have or need. I can conceive thought to be an action of a particular organisation of matter, formed for that purpose by it’s creator, as well as that attraction in an action of matter, or magnetism of loadstone. When he who denies to the Creator the power of endowing matter with the mode of action called thinking shall shew how he could endow the Sun with the mode of action called attraction, which reins the planets in the tract of their orbits, or how an absence of matter can have a will, and, by that will, put matter into motion, then the materialist may be lawfully required to explain the process by which matter exercises the faculty of thinking. When once we quit the basis of sensation, all is in the wind. To talk of immaterial existences is to talk of nothings. To say that the human soul, angels, god, are immaterial, is to say they are nothings, or that there is no god, no angels, no soul. I cannot reason otherwise: but I believe I am supported in my creed of materialism by Locke, Tracy, and Stewart.

Quote from Don

But, in the *ultimate* analysis, we are simply momentary aggregates of atoms moving in the void.

I say much the same thing pretty often, but even here I would be be careful that the word "ultimate" invests that perspective with something more than it probably deserves. I guess what we're really referring to is something like either "microscopic" (figuratively) or "eternal" (more literally) perspectives. From a strong enough microscopic ("vision") perspective, all we see if we look through the instrument is something like atoms and void. From a "time" perspective, if we could stand back and look to see what it is (if anything) that exists unchanged over an eternity, all we see is matter and void.

But do the perspectives of " time" and "vision" really deserve the deference of being called "ultimate?" I think what most of us are implying when we say "ultimate" is something like "the most important perspective of importance." And if we're using that as the definition, then indeed the most important perspective of significance of importance is a matter of importance "to us" and that's a lot more complicated than matters and void. That's "our" world of qualities and events and accidents and things that rise to the "shores of light" in our level of experience.

Quote from Kalosyni

Yes, thank you Cassius! I will carry on with my Epicurean studies

LOL. That makes it sound like I am rapping the knuckles of a student in grammar school

Quote from Don

Well summarized! And, interestingly enough, there are some/many who would unfortunately describe Epicurean philosophy the same way: the removal of pain is the goal.

And unfortunately at this point in world history that "some/many" is probably the vast majority of people who've been exposed to Epicurean through the "orthodox" academic path.

I'm of course sensitive to not wanting us to be perceived as a "cult" or to accusations that this forum is dedicated to anything less than "totally free inquiry." But I think that it's almost a principal of physics to observe that the world doesn't operate in all the ways that we might like it to. Maybe we should look for an analogy to the hooks of atoms, or something else in Epicurean physics, that explains how "bodies" come into being at all, and that the universe doesn't remain a totally formless soup.

Unless we accept that there are natural principals of attraction and repulsion, and that some people will choose some paths and others will choose other paths, then we would neither have bodies and ultimately humans forming from the atoms and the void, nor would we ever have any organized patterns of thought that we could define as Epicurean or Stoic or Buddhist or anything else. The point being that the development and following of basic key principles should not be viewed as a bad thing, but as an example of how the glue of the universe works to hold anything and everything together.

And in fact my comment as to needing to know the "why" and the "how" is pretty much exactly the point made by Torquatus which is at the top of the home page now:

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Moreover, unless the constitution of the world is thoroughly understood, we shall by no means be able to justify the verdicts of our senses. Further, our mental perceptions all arise from our sensations; and if these are all to be true, as the system of Epicurus proves to us, then only will cognition and perception become possible. ... [W]hen cognition and knowledge have been invalidated, every principle concerning the conduct of life and the performance of its business becomes invalidated. So from natural science we borrow courage to withstand the fear of death, and firmness to face superstitious dread, and tranquillity of mind, through the removal of ignorance concerning the mysteries of the world, and self-control, arising from the elucidation of the nature of the passions and their different classes....

If we can't "justify the verdict of our senses" then we can't be sure of anything - that's the "skepticism" problem that Buddhism jumps off the deep in by accepting as having no solution.

And without confidence in the verdicts of our senses only then is "cognition and perception" about anything possible.
And without cognition and knowledge, "every principle concerning the conduct of life and the performance of its business" is invalidated.

As Diogoenes of Oinoanda stated it, we accept that the flux exists, but not that it is so fast that we can't come to grips with it!

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Fr. 5

[Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?

Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.