Posts by Cassius

I think our discussion is what it ultimately comes down to, and the way to temper the shock value is to emphasize the vast scope of the terms pleasure and pain. Our concerns for our fellow men and art and science and all that fall under pleasure and pain too. We take pleasure generally both in knowledge and in being kind and compassionate to others, and we generally take pain in the pain of others. It's simply a matter of being clear eyed that these traits are not universally the same, and if anyone is going to prevent violation of these "norms of feeling" it has to be us humans and not supernatural gods or universal forms, which don't exist.

And that if we're going to do any of that to support a worldview based on pleasure and pain, we'd better not waste time because life is short and there are no second chances.

I see that perspective as both liberating and as radically motivating as any religious or academic wishful thinking could ever be.

"The goal of life is pleasure; one of the tools we use to get to that goal is practical wisdom using reason to make our choices and rejections."

I think that is exactly correct from our point of view.

Of course to really stick it to the Stoics et al. and cut off their retreat, it would be good to make clear that "reason" in that formulation does not mean some absolute standard, but in ethics (which is what we are talking about) the only considerations in the balance are pleasure and pain. Otherwise they will look to that "reason" word to inject all sorts of other considerations.

Which is not to say that reason is not important but that it is subservient to pleasure and not an independent goal.

Maybe something that is unstated, like being alive.

We wouldn't say the living pursuit of pleasure even though being alive is a prerequisite.

"I would offer the "rational calculus of pleasure" or "wise calculus of pleasure" i.e., phronēsis in the pursuit of pleasure"

The wording needs to be extremely precise so as not to imply that some intrinsic good is needed in addition to pleasure or else Plato will hang you from the nearest tree as he did Philebus.

And this is likely also the reason why "reason" is not part of the canon of truth.

And why Epicurus himself did not state the goal of life as "reasoned pursuit of pleasure."

In thinking about that wording the question has not occurred to me:. Does "hedonism" as a term consider pain?

That's why I don't like to use the term because I don't think there is any "authority" that can answer that question as to what "hedonism" means.

Epicurus doesn't seem to have used a term like that so I suspect we should stay away from it too.

Yes I would say unrestrained hedonism in the sense that there is nothing other than pain that restrains pleasure, and that there is no other consideration higher than pleasure ( taking these terms very broadly).

So yes there is the restraint of pain, but that I think is including in the calculus of pleasure.

So unrestrained in the sense that the calculus of pleasure has no higher consideration to which it must yield.

So maybe the proper term would be "unrestrained calculus of pleasure."

Yes those other translations are a reminder that there is *something* in addition to time that Epicurus is considering, bit it does not jump out at me with clarity what that something is. It's almost like he is talking about how much of the body and mind is engaged in that pleasure as it is occurring.

Now saying that, it might seem logical to conclude that Epicurus is saying that pleasures that grip both the mind and the body are more "intense" than those that grip only one of the two.

It may be that resistance to grappling squarely with the total individual relativity of "pleasure" is related to the concern that doing so would open the door too wide to the "unrestrained hedonism" analysis that so many fear (but which Epicurus embraces with so much fearlessness in defining the greatest good as simply pleasure).

just to muse on while I am thinking about it, it comes to mind to consider pleasures of touch.

You can compare for example warm and cold, rough and smooth. But each of those feelings may be either pleasurable or painful depending on conditions, I would think, and even degrees of smoothness ( for example) are not necessarily more or less pleasing (I would not think).

It may in fact not be possible to do much more than describe types of pleasure and what we feel about them in terms of personal preference at various times, but those descriptions may never translate into any form of "scale of pleasure" in general.

That may or may not be the case, but either way I can see the position we take on that being highly relevant to general discussions about pleasure.

I don't see that discussed very much and I am not sure why. Seems like an important point, even if the point is "it can't be done."

As to the "intensity" factor I think I would cite:

PD09. If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another

I think you are absolutely right that the answer is and must be subjective.

But does that mean that it is impossible to put into words any factors that describe the feeling of pleasure other than how long it lasts?

( ..... He asks rhetorically to no one in particular.... )

Right I am not trying to ask a trick question or box anyone in. I am not sure I can answer it myself.

But I think it is legitimate question which we should be able to use the texts to answer.

Another way to ask the question might be:. "What factors should I consider in deciding what pleasure is greatest? Can you give me any help with that?"

I think "duration" / "time" is documentable in the texts (per the quote above).

I think "intensity" is probably also documentable in terms of the references to "pure pleasure" ( I will look for the PD reference).

But I suspect there are or should be other factors, or else we should have an explanation as to why there are not.

(Edit:. This is a topic we've referenced before so I am interested in any comments from anyone and not only Don)

How do you describe in words the attributes of one pleasure that make it more or less pleasant than another?

Thank you. What I am asking you also is "What do you take 'most pleasant' to mean"?

I don't start to many totally generic threads like this one but this seems to be a good time to reinforce what Joshua has said a couple of times in recent podcasts: That after you accomplish getting a general basic understanding of Epicurean philosophy you're "only at the beginning" because you then need to apply it.

It seems appropriate to reinforce that: We spend a lot of time discussing very specific details, and we need to do that because that's the only way to understand the big picture.

But once we have the big picture we're then faced with the real question: application. It's as if our minds are computers and the Epicurean philosophy takes us through the reboot sequence, and maybe through the loading of certain basic application programs.

But once the basic operating system, and the basic application programs are loaded, we then face the even harder question: How do we use what we have learned?

Just to refresh my memory Don do you have a preferred interpretation of what is translated as "the greatest pleasure"?

This will be an example, in fairness to DeWitt, that there are other contemporary writers who will give you that impression of isolationism in much stronger and unfair terms than does DeWitt.

If I recall correctly, Martha Nussbaum's Therapy of Desire is terrible in that regard (and in other regards as well).

The whole issue of skepticism and dogmatism and knowledge and epistemology and canonics is all very tricky, and it seems it is one of the least well developed in Epicurean discussions and even here on the forum.

There is a lot of information in Philodemus "On Signs / On Methods of Inference" that would bear on these topics that we simply haven't had time to explore, but I really encourage anyone interested in that line to start the relevant discussion threads.

Because therein (in epistemology) lays the answer to a lot of the confusion about Epicurus, in my view.

Quote

Epicurus declared himself to be "self- taught" and he arrogated to himself the title of Sage or Wise Man, a concept familiar to the Greeks.

The former title was reserved by Epicurus for himself alone, a seeming arrogance which elicited the sneers of his detractors.

I admit I have not checked the footnotes, but the first "arrogated to himself" I would not read as meaning "he was the only one in the world" and as to the second sentence I would expect that if there was accuracy in that, it might have been relevant only within "his" school, among the people with whom he interacted. Both of those would be reasonable. (and in connection with the "philosopher" name, you've probably read the controversy about Epicurus' attitude toward Leucippus, and that it is alleged that Epicurus held that he did not even exist. DeWitt argues (if I recall) that the meaning of that controversy was that Epicurus did not consider Leucippus worthy of the title of philosopher, given Epicurus' view of Leucippus' errors. So it may be that part of what we're talking about here was sort of a colloquial "worth of the title of philosopher."

I readily admit that I am speculating about all this, but I would strongly suspect that everything anyone has to go on is speculation: inference built upon inference upon inference, and that not everyone in the chain of inference was attempting to be charitable. So great caution is to be advised on all sides.

These are the kinds of questions that aren't really resolvable, but in my mind I refer them all to "what would be the most consistent with the philosophy as a whole," and the kind of unflattering "cultism" that people tag him with is hardly the only possibility and not the one most consistent with the philosophy.

I would never assert that Epicurus was perfect and without inconsistency, but since what we have are the broad outlines complemented by some significant detail that points to an overall level-headed man and level-headed bunch of people, I think it's always a poor idea, and unfair, and even illogical, to jump to an unflattering conclusion as the strongest possibility.

Quote from smoothiekiwi

Well, but when it produces more pleasure in the end than normal life, why shouldn't I sacrifice virtue and dignity for more long-time pleasure?

I think you're going in the right direction with that question, but by inserting "long-time" or "long-term" you would be focusing exclusively on the "duration" of the pleasure and I doubt that would be correct Epicurean theory. Duration would (in my understanding) be only one of the aspects, and you would need to consider "intensity" or some other measure:

Letter to Menoeceus: "And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant."

Even that quote might not be entirely clear but I think it is evidence that we measure pleasure by more than just duration in time.

And that question of determining "the most pleasant" is relevant to the bliss machine hypo at a fundamental level. The "unreality" that is the basis of so much objection to the experiment is I think sensing in part the issue that is referenced by Epicurus as "the most pleasant." The issue is probably not that there is an absolute scale of "most pleasant for everyone" or "the best pleasure" or "the highest pleasure" for everyone, but there is still an issue of "what kind of pleasure" is being experienced by the individual that is relevant to the question.