Posts by Cassius

I think you're on the right track and even before that -- welcome to active posting after lurking for quite a while!

As I scan through your comments I think all of them are correct. It occurs to me to say that my experience is that there are very "practical" people for whom your observations are pretty much all they ever need to see. Given those observations, which are correct, they then go back to focusing on the practical side of life, where they are most comfortable, and that's all they need to know or care about. That's fine.

But there are others who really "get into" the logical arguments that divide the two schools, and those people don't find it satisfying to stop at the observation that "the virtues" and "pleasure" go hand in hand. And it's also my experience that many of those people who don't want to stop there are some of the most devoted Stoics, because they are focused on the "epistemological" issues, even maybe more so than the physics issues.

Maybe to better explain the point I am thinking about I would suggest you read sometime (if you haven't) the latter books of Cicero's ON ENDS where he attacks Stoicism from his own more standard "Academic" perspective. His attack is really vigorous and I think makes a lot of sense even from (or especially from) a non-Epicurean perspective, and Cicero probably helps draw into the open why people should be dissatisfied with Stoicism.

So my answer to your question is "yes I think you understand it right as far as you have gone so far." And the question of whether you want to go further to focus on the more abstract issues is entirely up to you and what makes you happy - since from our Epicurean perspective your goal is in fact happiness based on pleasure, rather than as the Stoics might say, "knowledge for the sake of knowledge." For some people it takes plowing into the more abstract issues, for others it doesn't.

Quote from Godfrey

Cassius I agree with what you've written but I do question this quote. First, are you saying that we actually categorize something as part of a preconception? That seems to me to be done using reason: I understand a preconception as being more "primitive" than that, more akin to a sensation or feeling.

Yes I agree with your point Godfrey. Whatever we are talking about has to be pre-rational. As I think about it further I think in the past I may have suggested an analogy with the way that the eyes and ears work -- they see and hear within a range of naturally determined "wavelenghs" and within those ranges they perceive in certain ways - colors for example.

We can't be talking about rational categorization as for example Aristotle does with his logic. We have to be talking about something inherent in the mechanism of the human mind that is tuned to perceive relationships that we otherwise would not even perceive as significant.

Do I recall that there are examples such as whether animals looking at a TV screen even perceive the images on them? I am thinking that this mechanism must be some kind of tendency to recognize something specific (like the eyes see light and the ears hear sound) but that it functions in the field of abstract relationships. I seem to recall that was DeWitt's suggestion, though I think when he talks about it he strays too far and seems to talk about ideas themselves.

This is where I go back to that article from Jackson Barwis written in criticism of John Locke's (and others') Blank Slate theory. Barwis' point is that just because we aren't born with "ideas," that doesn't mean we aren't born with "principles of function" that precede and allow us to develop ideas from those principles:

Quote

You know, continued I, Mr. Locke advances that principles cannot be innate unless their ideas be also innate. “For, says he, if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those principles; and then they will not be innate, but be derived from some other original. For where the ideas themselves are not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental or verbal propositions about them.”

Now is there nothing in what he advances in this place that will affect your doctrine of innate principles?

I think not, answered he.

For granting that we have no innate ideas, it is by no means from thence follow, as he says, then we have no innate principles. Ideas, simply considered, are very different things from innate moral principles, or from any other principles, which constitute the nature of things. If I have not already shown, I will, by and by, endeavor more clearly to show that the propositions we compose according to our idea of things are nothing but propositions; they are not really the principles of the things treated of: the principles of the things treated of are naturally inherent and exist perpetually in them whether our ideas or propositions concerning them be true or false.

But in the part quoted there is a fallacy. He says, “if the ideas be not unique, there was a time when the mind was without those principles.” The conclusion, you see, is vague and delusive. The only just conclusion he could have drawn was, that if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those ideas, out of which the propositions are formed, which I call principles. I doubt not that you perceive they are very improperly so called in the present question. For Mr. Locke thus confounds the principles of our nature, and the ideas contained in the propositions he names, together, as if they were the same things: but they cannot be so, because the one receives existence from the prior existence of the other. That is, our moral ideas receive their existence from the prior existence of our innate moral sentiments or principles: as our ideas of light and figure are derived from the prior existence of sight.

In this question the matter, as too frequently happens, has been puzzled and obscured by the misuse of words. Axioms, and allowed propositions, are called principles. But they are only principles formed by the human mind, in aid of its own weakness; which, in reasoning, can proceed but a little way without proved or granted propositions to rest on. They might, perhaps, with much more propriety, be called helps, assistances, or supports to the imbecility of the human mind, than principles of things. The principles which naturally inhere in every species of created beings are of a nature entirely different.

It seems, then, said I, that you agree with Mr. Locke that neither ideas or propositions can be innate: but you differ from him by denying any propositions what so ever to be properly the principles of any species of beings; and by affirming that both speculative and practical propositions are mere creatures of human invention; which whether they be true or false, that is, founded in the nature of things or not, the true natures and principles of things remain unalterably the same.

That is my meaning, replied he, and that, therefore, most of the arguments advanced by Mr. Locke against innate principles are nothing, or but very little, to the purpose; because they only tend to combat things as innate principles which are nothing like innate principles; and, if it be not too bold a thing to say of so penetrating a genius, he seems only to have been fighting with a phantom of his own creating.

Indeed, highly as I think of his genius and integrity, I should have much doubted of his sincerity in this doctrine if we had not frequently seen men of the first rate abilities suffer themselves to be carried into great absurdities by their fondness for a favorite system, or, by too hasty a desire of forming a perfect one.

It is certain, however, that nothing can be more excellent than his work as far as it regards our manner of acquiring ideas by sensation and reflection. But what should move him to advance that we have no other way of acquiring ideas; why he should exclude our moral sense and deny even its existence with the pains of so much acute false reasoning, I shall not, at present, endeavor to explain. But having so determined, he found it necessary to remove all notions of innate moral principles (and with them, all other innate principles) out of the way, in the beginning of his book: for had they been granted, another source of ideas must have been admitted besides those of sensation and reflection as explained by Mr. Locke. And I shall not hesitate to affirm that a clear and indisputable explication of this mode of acquiring ideas would have cost him much more pains in trouble than all the rest of his most ingenious work. For human actions and opinions, in the ordinary course of things, pass away in so rapid a succession as to leave no lasting traces behind them; nothing fixed to which we may refer for a renewal or a correction of our moral ideas concerning them, if our memory prove deficient. And, unless they be recorded with extraordinary accuracy, they can seldom be contemplated a second time in precisely the same light in which they were viewed at the first.

But all those ideas which arise in our minds by the impressions which external things make upon our senses being derived from objects of fixed and lasting natures, when our memory fails us, when we doubt the clearness or precision of our ideas, we can, generally, refer with ease to the objects themselves, and can renew, or rectify, our ideas at pleasure. This renders geometry so certain and indisputable as science: for the least variation or incorrectness in our ideas may be discovered and corrected by recurring to the figures themselves, which, through the medium of sight, convey invariably the same ideas to the mind. Nor is there any impediment, anything naturally interesting to our affections, in the nature of the things themselves, that should make us see them falsely or apply them irrationally.

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As those who have been here long enough know, I highly recommend the entire essay by Barwis - "Dialogue on Innate Principles." My view has been for a while, and continues to be, that working with Barwis' core point it's possible to reconstruct a very possible description of the path that Epicurus was taking on anticipations as a PRE-conceptual ("pre-ideas") faculty.

Quote from Don

Is the prolepsis (notion, anticipation, preconception, etc) of justice simply the concept that one neither harms nor inflicts harm?

Quote from Godfrey

At first blush, I would say not, that it varies from group to group and person to person.

My current opinions on this topic:

I agree with Godfrey's take with this modification: I don't think anticipations contain "black letter law." I think "black letter law" ("contracts to neither harm nor be harmed are good") is a conclusion that is reached only after rationally processing raw input data.

I think that in large part because preconceptions / anticipations are arranged in the canon as if they are parallel to or at the same level as to (1) the 5 senses, and also to (2) the feeling of pain and pleasure. Both of those function automatically, pre-rationally, and are not operating through rational processing and opinion.

So the parallel I would assert is that there is a "faculty of preconceptions" just like the faculty of sight and the faculty of hearing and the faculty of feeling pain and pleasure, all simply reporting and not processing data.

If that is correct, then the proper analogy would be that due to your faculty of preconceptions you have the ability to perceive that certain relationships and dealings with people are significant enough to perceive them as falling into a general category of relationships that we choose to call "justice." The particular preconception is a recognition that in the dealings of the people involved there is a relationship that we can expect to be repeated over and over and thus needs evaluation. It would be the faculty of pain and pleasure which then processes the data about the relationship and decides whether we feel pleasure or pain at the observation of the relationship. And of course we wouldn't notice it at all if we didn't have sight or hearing to make the observation in the first place.

So this is where I think DeWitt is on the right track by saying that the canonical faculties all work together, all simultanously, all serving as "reactions" which happening automatically and without (at that first stage) evaluation by reason or opinion.

It's only after all of those canonical faculties weigh in that we have the raw facts which our minds would then process and develop opinions and rational (or irrational, as the case may be) conclusions about what we "think" is going on in the situation we're considering.

And in support of this analysis I would cite the other clear text about anticipations, involving anticipations of the gods, where Epicurus seems to be saying that the false opinions about the gods also involve the processing of anticipations. So it's never anticipations themselves that are right or wrong or good or bad, but only our processing of them in the mind that leads to opinions about right or wrong or good or bad.

Anticipations wouldn't be "right" or "wrong" anymore than data from the eyes or ears is "right or wrong." What they could be is "more or less accurate" in the same way that someone's vision or hearing could be operating poorly, but even in those situations where there is some defect in the mechanism of seeing or hearing or anticipating, that doesn't mean that the reports from those faculties are "wrong" - it just means that they are less true to the facts being observed at that particular moment.

That's the way at present I interpret the direction DeWitt was going, which I think is correct. But the main and absolutely imperative point would be to reject that anticipations contain "opinion" or rational processing of any kind. If you go down the road of thinking that anticipations contain "conclusions" or "opinions" then that removes their canonical authority of being automatic and pre-rational, and puts you into a Platonic position of saying that there is some mechanism of transmitting "ideas" that are inherited at birth. Lots of things are inherited at birth, including apparently things we view as "instincts," but I think Epicurus ruled out the view that "ideas" are inherited from birth.

Quote from JJElbert

Dear me, is there to be a lot of shouting? 😅

Only when you channel the spirit of Diogenes of Oinoanda!

Welcome to Episode One Hundred of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

At this point in our podcast we have completed our first line-by-line review of the poem, and we have turned to the presentation of Epicurean ethics found in Cicero's On Ends. Today we continue with that material and focus on "Justice" starting with line fifty-three, and we cap the discussion of the Virtues with Fragment 32 of the Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda.

Now let's join Joshua reading today's text:

[53] For the passions which proceed from nature are easily satisfied without committing any wrong; while we must not succumb to those which are groundless, since they yearn for nothing worthy of our craving, and more loss is involved in the mere fact of wrong doing, than prot in the results which are produced by the wrong doing. So one would not be right in describing even justice as a thing to be wished for on its own account, but rather because it brings with it a very large amount of agreeableness. For to be the object of esteem and affection is agreeable just because it renders life safer and more replete with pleasures. Therefore we think that wickedness should be shunned, not alone on account of the disadvantages which fall to the lot of the wicked, but much rather because when it pervades a man’s soul it never permits him to breathe freely or to rest.

[54] But if the accolades passed even on the virtues themselves, over which the eloquence of all other philosophers especially runs riot, can find no vent unless it be referred to pleasure, and pleasure is the only thing which invites us to the pursuit of itself, and attracts us by reason of its own nature, then there can be no doubt that of all things good it is the supreme and ultimate good, and that a life of happiness means nothing else but a life attended by pleasure.

DIOGENES OF OINOANDA FRAGMENT 32:

... [the latter] being as malicious as the former.

I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now.

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.

Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point.

Suppose, then, someone were to ask someone, though it is a naive question, «who is it whom these virtues benefit?», obviously the answer will be «man.» The virtues certainly do not make provision for these birds flying past, enabling them to fly well, or for each of the other animals: they do not desert the nature with which they live and by which they have been engendered; rather it is for the sake of this nature that the virtues do everything and exist.

Each (virtue?) therefore ............... means of (?) ... just as if a mother for whatever reasons sees that the possessing nature has been summoned there, it then being necessary to allow the court to asked what each (virtue?) is doing and for whom .................................... [We must show] both which of the desires are natural and which are not; and in general all things that [are included] in the [former category are easily attained] .....

From the Wikipedia Page on the Battle of Philippi:

Plutarch famously reported that Brutus experienced a vision of a ghost a few months before the battle. One night he saw a huge and shadowy form appearing in front of him; when he calmly asked, "What and whence art thou?" it answered "Thy evil spirit, Brutus: I shall see thee at Philippi." He again met the ghost the night before the battle. This episode is one of the most famous in Shakespeare's play Julius Caesar. Plutarch also reports the last words of Brutus, quoted by a Greek tragedy "O wretched Virtue, thou wert but a name, and yet I worshipped thee as real indeed; but now, it seems, thou were but fortune's slave."

David Sedley on the Ethics of Brutus and Cassius

Sedley explains in significant detail that “there was no Stoic tradition of advocating either tyrannicide or any comparable means of overthrowing repressive regimes. The ultimate Stoic model was Socrates, who had willingly accepted death rather than compromise his philosophical mission or moral stands. … Likewise, the so-called “Stoic Opposition” of figures like Thrasea Paetus and Helvidus Priscus, despite their reverence for the memory of Brutus and Cassius, showed little if any interest in the assassination of emperors, and much more in courting a heroic death…. The very notion of political freedom rarely surfaces in Stoic texts….”

Sedley states that Brutus’ Platonist background led him to oppose them because the Stoics “taught that virtue alone is good, and that naturally preferable items like health, honor, and wealth are morally indifferent: when possessed, they add nothing to happiness. … Whether or not you attain them is irrelevant to happiness.” “Ultimately Stoicism had to allow that no form of government would make the happy less happy or the wretched less wretched.”

And Sedley says “There was no established Stoic tradition of placing constitutions in order of preferability. Platonism, by contrast, had always classified and ranked constitutions, and had done so explicitly on the ground that the subjects in a state can be more or less happy according to its political provisions. It was on a sliding scale of this kind that Plato in Republic 8 had declared tyranny the worst kind of enslavement.”

Cicero Letters To And From Cassius

[15.16] Cicero to Cassius [Rome, January, 45 B.C.]

L I expect you must be just a little ashamed of yourself now that this is the third letter that has caught you before you have sent me a single leaf or even a line. But I am not pressing you, for I shall look forward to, or rather insist upon, a longer letter. As for myself, if I always had somebody to trust with them, I should send you as many as three an hour. For it somehow happens, that whenever I write anything to you, you seem to be at my very elbow; and that, not by way of visions of images, as your new friends term them, who believe that even mental visions are conjured up by what Catius calls spectres (for let me remind you that Catius the Insubrian, an Epicurean, who died lately, gives the name of spectres to what the famous Gargettian [Epicurus], and long before that Democritus, called images).

2 But, even supposing that the eye can be struck by these spectres because they run up against it quite of their own accord, how the mind can be so struck is more than I can see. It will be your duty to explain to me, when you arrive here safe and sound, whether the spectre of you is at my command to come up as soon as the whim has taken me to think about you - and not only about you, who always occupy my inmost heart, but suppose I begin thinking about the Isle of Britain, will the image of that wing its way to my consciousness?

3 But of this later on. I am only sounding you now to see in what spirit you take it. For if you are angry and annoyed, I shall have more to say, and shall insist upon your being reinstated in that school of philosophy, out of which you have been ousted "by violence and an armed force." In this formula the words "within this year" are not usually added; so even if it is now two or three years since, bewitched by the blandishments of Pleasure, you sent a notice of divorce to Virtue, I am free to act as I like. And yet to whom am I talking? To you, the most gallant gentleman in the world, who, ever since you set foot in the forum, have done nothing but what bears every mark of the most impressive distinction. Why, in that very school you have selected I apprehend there is more vitality than I should have supposed, if only because it has your approval. "

[15.19] Cassius to Cicero [Brundisium, latter half of January, 45 B.C.]

L I hope that you are well. I assure you that on this tour of mine there is nothing that gives me more pleasure to do than to write to you; for I seem to be talking and joking with you face to face. And yet that does not come to pass because of those spectres; and, by way of retaliation for that, in my next letter I shall let loose upon you such a rabble of Stoic boors that you will proclaim Catius a true-born Athenian.

2 I am glad that our friend Pansa was sped on his way by universal goodwill when he left the city in military uniform, and that not only on my own account, but also, most assuredly, on that of all our friends. For I hope that men generally will come to understand how much all the world hates cruelty, and how much it loves integrity and clemency, and that the blessings most eagerly sought and coveted by the bad ultimately find their way to the good. For it is hard to convince men that "the good is to be chosen for its own sake"; but that pleasure and tranquillity of mind is acquired by virtue, justice, and the good is both true and demonstrable. Why, Epicurus himself, from whom all the Catiuses and Amafiniuses in the world, incompetent translators of terms as they are, derive their origin, lays it down that "to live a life of pleasure is impossible without living a life of virtue and justice".

3 Consequently Pansa, who follows pleasure, keeps his hold on virtue, and those also whom you call pleasure-lovers are lovers of what is good and lovers of justice, and cultivate and keep all the virtues.

SUPPLEMENT:

Principal Doctrines and Vatican Sayings which are relevant to Justice.

PD06. Whatever you can provide yourself with to secure protection from men is a natural good.

PD07. Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous, thinking that they would thus win for themselves safety from other men. Wherefore if the life of such men is safe, they have obtained the good which nature craves; but if it is not safe, they do not possess that for which they strove at first by the instinct of nature.

PD08. No pleasure is a bad thing in itself; but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures.

PD10. If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky, and death, and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires (and of pains), we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full, with pleasures from every source, and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.

PD31. The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage, to restrain men from harming one another, and save them from being harmed.

PD32. For all living things which have not been able to make compacts not to harm one another, or be harmed, nothing ever is either just or unjust; and likewise, too, for all tribes of men which have been unable, or unwilling, to make compacts not to harm or be harmed.

PD33. Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed. [see note below]

PD34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions.

PD35. It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if, at present, he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.

PD36. In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.

PD37. Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.

PD38. Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage.

PD39. The man who has best ordered the element of disquiet arising from external circumstances has made those things that he could akin to himself, and the rest at least not alien; but with all to which he could not do even this, he has refrained from mixing, and has expelled from his life all which it was of advantage to treat thus.

PD40. As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbors, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and, after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not lament the previous departure of a dead friend, as though he were to be pitied.

VS07. It is hard for an evil-doer to escape detection, but to be confident that he will continue to escape detection indefinitely is impossible.

VS12. The just man is most free from disturbance, while the unjust is full of the utmost disturbance.

VS13. Among the things held to be just by law, whatever is proved to be of advantage in men’s dealings has the stamp of justice, whether or not it be the same for all; but if a man makes a law and it does not prove to be mutually advantageous, then this is no longer just. And if what is mutually advantageous varies, and only for a time corresponds to our concept of justice, nevertheless for that time it is just, for those who do not trouble themselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts.

VS43. The love of money, if unjustly gained, is impious, and, if justly gained, is shameful; for it is unseemly to be parsimonious, even with justice on one’s side.

VS62. Now if parents are justly angry with their children, it is certainly useless to fight against it, and not to ask for pardon; but if their anger is unjust and irrational, it is quite ridiculous to add fuel to their irrational passion by nursing one’s own indignation, and not to attempt to turn aside their wrath in other ways by gentleness.

Don Thanks for those notes. I think I left in the podcast my reference to what you would have said about something, but I forget now.

I think I also remember that "justice" is one of the situations in which the word for anticipations / preconceptions occurs -- is that what you remember?

If so, it's interesting that justice would be singled out, among the "virtues" as being something relevant to anticipations.

Episode Ninety-Nine of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In this episode we continue our examination of justice:

This conversation reminds me of a euphemism that was popular in the past for companies that wanted to fire large numbers of people without admitting what they were doing - they would call it "right-sizing." That's pretty much how I see anything good that exists in the term "moderation" - as meaning selecting whatever quantity that produces the most beneficial result under the circumstances.

Quote from Don

I don't find "temperance" in Epicurus's writings. Is it mentioned anywhere other than by "Torquatus"?

Great question and if we can't find it at all then that is good evidence in itself.

I don't mean this to be arguing with Kalosyni in any way but the quote (which is a good find) seems to me to be very helpful in explaining my contrarian view:

Quote

The poet Eubulus noted that three bowls (kylikes) were the ideal amount of wine to consume. The quantity of three bowls to represent moderation is a recurring theme throughout Greek writing (today, the standard 750 ml bottle contains roughly three to six glasses of wine, depending on serving size).[1] In his c. 375 BC play Semele or Dionysus, Eubulus has Dionysus say:

"Three bowls do I mix for the temperate: one to health, which they empty first; the second to love and pleasure; the third to sleep. When this bowl is drunk up, wise guests go home. The fourth bowl is ours no longer, but belongs to violence; the fifth to uproar; the sixth to drunken revel; the seventh to black eyes; the eighth is the policeman's; the ninth belongs to biliousness; and the tenth to madness and the hurling of furniture."

These guys are fooling no one but themselves if they think that there is an ideal of "moderation" or "ideal quantity" that has some absolute value separate from circumstances that can be referenced by referring to "moderation" in and of itself. Instead, what there is in place of that is always a quantity that makes sense based on context, which varies by fact. In this case, the proper quantity varies with things like the weight of the drinker, their built-up tolerance to alcohol, and other aspects of bodily chemistry that varies by individual. Sure you can generalize that "most people" are going to fall within certain variable limits, but that is further evidence that circumstances determine the result, not some pre-defined concept of "moderation" or "temperance" or any other similar word that comes to mind.

The other virtues are subject to the same qualification and limitation, but "temperance" or "moderation" seems to me to have not even a veneer of common sense about it. In fact it's almost a vice in itself - to look to some kind of predefined quantity rather than the right quantity that is desirable under the circumstances.

The more I think about it, I will repeat, the more I think this concern applies to all of the virtues, but I think I've seen this one praised casually too many times on facebook by Aristotelians and the supporters of the standard establishment Greek philosophers to consider it more charitably

But I do think Goldwater had it very wrong too -- you wouldn't want to be or to praise "extremism" any more than you would want to be "moderate" - both are predefined reactionary perspectives divorced from the circumstances.

If it were me it would be more like "Vigor in the pursuit of liberty is no vice, moderation in the pursuit of justice no virtue."

I think I will just insert this random thought here:

I think some people who start out in reading Epicurus read so much about the word "ataraxia" that they conclude from sheer dominance of discussion that ataraxia was the focus of Epicurus' work.

It would probably help them to lose their fixation on ataraxia to realize that the entirely separate word "aponia" was used for "absence of pain." It seems to me intuitively that if someone wanted to go off in the wrong direction and fixate on one of these words as the goal rather than pleasure, it would make more sense to fixate on "aponia" than "ataraxia." And that would also be more accurate from the point of view of the measurement of quantity and canonics aspect since - given that pain and pleasure are the only two passions - in terms of quantity "absence of pain" and "fullness of pleasure" would mean the same thing.

Once you realize that there is not one but two Greek words that are used in this context, maybe it becomes more understandable that it's necessary to look deeper - back to the original word of pleasure - than to take these other statements about tranqility and absence of pain in isolation.

What is pecan pie "porter"? I know what pecan pie is, but "porter?"

I agree with Don. The post is good. In contrast utilitarianism seems mostly designed to avoid using the word pleasure and to in fact obscufate the whole issue of what their goal in life really is.

.

Quote from Godfrey

Could this be due to the fears inherent in "idealism"? Particularly the fear of looking like a fool?

I agree with your comment about craving for power. I don't think I have heard you comment previously about fear being inherent in idealism. What are your thoughts on that?

Quote from Don

that science is "rediscoverable" and religion is not.

It might be necessary to be a little more precise about the meaning of "religion." I would expect that Christianity or Judaism or precise religions would not be rediscoverable, but there seems to be a lot in the Epicurean texts about how humans sort of "naturally" fell into the mistake of thinking that there are supernatural forces.

So in the generic sense of "religion" meaning "belief in something supernatural" that might be something that humans on desert islands might not only rediscover but be "naturally" inclined towards.

Just thinking out loud there mostly.

Quote from JJElbert

But minds are imperfect, and memory is frail---so that a certain degree of 'regular maintenance' is necessary to keep one's philosophy on a right heading

Yes that is true and in addition even the best minds and memories are influenced by our surroundings - the Epicurean material on images stresses that. So that when we are surrounded by antiEpicurean images every day, as most of us are, we have to take steps to innoculate ourselves from their influence.

I don't like always sounding the "call to battle" alarm but I think it is clear that such a conflict is constantly going on whether we acknowledge it or not. Unless we find a desert island and live without TV and internet that's unlikely to change.

It appears even the Epicurean gods werent unchanging as the basis of their deathlessness but that they found the power to replace their own makeup from the flow of atoms - a useful analogy for us I think (Joshua's "regular maintenance").

I will get the podcast up as soon as possible, but in the meantime I should clarify that the reason we were talking about this was in the context of justice. The point was made that we can in fact derive much useful guidance from observing the nature of things -- how things work for us and to us -- how we do in fact have to eat and drink and do all sorts of things due to the way we are "created by nature."

But the warning stressed so strongly by Lucretius is the real point, and we discussed that he's not making this point simply as a biological observation. He's asserting that just because we use the eyes to see that does not mean that SOMEONE OR SOMETHING DESIGNED THEM THAT WAY.

And so by analogy, just because we observe that certain patterns of conduct do produce more pleasure, and others produce more pain, that too is a PRACTICAL conclusion about "the way things are." It doesn't mean that just because things are that way now, that "Venus / Nature" or some supernatural god designed them that way for our benefit and for us to follow as an ironclad absolute rule. Simply because we can observe that in many contexts things generally work out in the end or pleasure, or for pain, that does not mean that we should treat those observations as "absolute natural law" that have to be honored in the same way that we would honor them if some supernatural god handed them to us as an eternal law (as for example Moses was allegedly handed the ten commandments), nor are that written somehow mystically "in the stars" - or somewhere else - and are discernable to us through geometry or mathematics or "logic" (as or example Plato and Aristotle proposed).

This is such a deep subject and this post is not intended to be the last word on anything - just an explanation as to why this cite appears in the notes to this podcast. Martin and Charles and Joshua can correct me if my summary is wrong, and once the podcast is posted everyone is of course invited to comment.

Now for the alternatives:

BAILEY:

[823] Herein you must eagerly desire to shun this fault, and with foresighted fear to avoid this error; do not think that the bright light of the eyes was created in order that we may be able to look before us, or that, in order that we may have power to plant long paces, therefore the tops of shanks and thighs, based upon the feet, are able to bend; or again, that the forearms are jointed to the strong upper arms and hands given us to serve us on either side, in order that we might be able to do what was needful for life. All other ideas of this sort, which men proclaim, by distorted reasoning set effect for cause, since nothing at all was born in the body that we might be able to use it, but what is born creates its own use. Nor did sight exist before the light of the eyes was born, nor pleading in words before the tongue was created, but rather the birth of the tongue came long before discourse, and the ears were created much before sound was heard, and in short all the limbs, I trow, existed before their use came about: they cannot then have grown for the purpose of using them.

[843] But, on the other side, to join hands in the strife of battle, to mangle limbs and befoul the body with gore; these things were known long before gleaming darts flew abroad, and nature constrained men to avoid a wounding blow, before the left arm, trained by art, held up the defence of a shield. And of a surety to trust the tired body to rest was a habit far older than the soft-spread bed, and the slaking of the thirst was born before cups. These things, then, which are invented to suit the needs of life, might well be thought to have been discovered for the purpose of using them. But all those other things lie apart, which were first born themselves, and thereafter revealed the concept of their usefulness. In this class first of all we see the senses and the limbs; wherefore, again and again, it cannot be that you should believe that they could have been created for the purpose of useful service.

BROWN:

But in subjects of this nature, guard yourself to the utmost of your power against that error, that gross mistake, and never believe that those bright orbs, the eyes, were made that we might see; of that our legs were made upright, and things fixed upon them, and were supported by feet, that we might walk and take large strides; that our arms were braced with strong sinews, and that our hands hung on both sides, to assist us in those offices that are necessary to the support of life. And whatever constructions they put upon other parts of the body, they are all absurd and against reason; for no member of the body was made for any particular use, but after it was made each member found out a use proper to itself; for there was no such thing as to see before the eyes were made, nor to speak before the tongue was formed, but the tongue was rather in being before there was speech, and the ears were made long before any sound was heard. In short, all the members, in my opinion, were in being before their particular uses were set out.

This is so true that, to engage in battle, to mangle the limbs, and to stain the body over with blood, these were in being before any shining darts flew through the air, and nature taught us to avoid a wound before the left hand learnt to oppose a shield in our defense; and so, to commit the body to rest was long before the invention of soft beds, and to quench the thirst was practiced before the use of cups. All these things, we may believe, were invented for common benefit, as they were found proper and convenient for the occasions of life. All things therefore that were in being before the use of them was determined applied themselves afterwards to the office that was most suitable and serviceable to them. Of this kind principally are the senses and members of our bodies, and therefore you are to avoid, upon all accounts, so much as to think that they were at first formed for any particular design or use.

MUNRO:

And herein you should desire with all your might to shun the weakness, with a lively apprehension to avoid the mistake of supposing that the bright lights of the eyes were made in order that we might see; and that the tapering ends of the shanks and hams are attached to the feet as a base in order to enable us to step out with long strides; or again that the forearms were slung to the stout upper arms and ministering hands given us on each side, that we might be able to discharge the needful duties of life. Other explanations of like sort which men give, one and all put effect for cause through wrongheaded reasoning; since nothing was born in the body that we might use it, but that which is born begets itself a use: thus seeing did not exist before the eyes were born, nor the employment of speech ere the tongue was made; but rather the birth of the tongue was long anterior to language and the ears were made long before sound was heard, and all the limbs, I trow, existed before there was any employment for them: they could not therefore have grown for the purpose of being used.

But on the other hand, engaging in the strife of battle and mangling the body and staining the limbs with gore were in vogue long before glittering darts ever flew; and nature prompted to shun a wound or ever the left arm by the help of art held up before the person the defense of a shield. Yes, and consigning the tired body to rest is much older than a soft-cushioned bed, and the slaking of thirst had birth before cups. These things therefore which have been invented in accordance with the uses and wants of life, may well be believed to have been discovered for the purpose of being used. Far otherwise is it with all those things which first were born, then afterwards made known the purposes to which they might be put; at the head of which class we see the senses and the limbs. Wherefore again and again I repeat, it is quite impossible to believe that they could have been made for the duties which they discharge.

Darn my guess was wrong -- book FOUR around line 800 or so!

I am guess it is is book five and it ought to jump out at me which book, and which section, because that is a very frequently referenced statement. We'll find it!