Posts by Cassius

This search of "metaphysics" at B&N does bring up what seems to be a majority of technical philosophy books, such as by Heidegger, but also some religion, and I see one on "Tarot." Glancing over the titles reminds me that to the extent I would have been in this section of B&N in the past I would have found the titles to give off a very "bad vibe." I would likely have lumped it all in as abstract nonsense that always in the past kept me from spending more time with philosophy.

So Eikadistes I'm not sure that statistically speaking the aura of being labeled like alchemy is justified, but practically speaking I sense you are correct (again, at least in the USA and among "normal people.")

https://www.barnesandnoble.com/s/metaphysics?Nrpp=20&Ns=P_Sales_Rank%7C0&page=8

Edit: the results at Amazon are more clearly weighted toward the alchemy side of things.

Edit2: thinking further about the book titles, i suspect the term "metaphysics" might also evoke in the mind of many people the very negative "obsolete/ancient/medieval physics."

Quote from Eikadistes

After all, the Garden "supposes the study of nature provides the proper space for the voices of the facts."

Sounds like you have a particular reference in mind there Eikadistes?

Quote from Eikadistes

Barnes & Noble uses the word to advertise something closer to "magic" or "alchemy".

Thanks for that reminder. Now that you say it, I think over the years that's where I sense a strongly negative vibe from the word. It seems to be usable in philosophy in a more neutral way, but I'm concerned about how "normal people" interpret it. In many cases it probably doesn't evoke any reaction at all and it's mainly just an unfamiliar word, but the intelligent "middle class" that might have heard of it from bookstores might well attach it to "alchemy' or even "witchcraft."

This might be an American take and not have the same effect in Europe.

Joshua this is something for us to keep in mind for the podcast.

In several conversations recently, including with Martin on one of our recent Zooms (if I recall correctly) and others here privately on the forum, the question has arisen as to whether it would be better to refer to Epicurus' study of nature as "Metaphysics" rather than "Physics."

No doubt we'll continue to use "Physics" as the generic term to organize most of our discussions here, but there are definite differences between "Metaphysics" and "Physics" that would probably be useful to discuss. For example, in some conversations I get the impression that some people (sometimes even me) consider "metaphysics" to imply something of lesser importance, or to be more suspicious of, than "physics." As I read it that attitude might arise from a modern tendency to consider "science" as the trump card for all matters for which we can claim knowledge (at least of a sort) while "metaphysics" is necessary speculative and impossible to be confidence about.

Here's the opening from Wikipedia on "metaphysics":

Metaphysics - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Quote from Wikiedia - Metaphysics

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that examines the basic structure of reality. It is traditionally seen as the study of mind-independent features of the world, but some theorists view it as an inquiry into the conceptual framework of human understanding. Some philosophers, including Aristotle, designate metaphysics as first philosophy to suggest that it is more fundamental than other forms of philosophical inquiry.

Metaphysics encompasses a wide range of general and abstract topics. It investigates the nature of existence, the features all entities have in common, and their division into categories of being. An influential division is between particulars and universals. Particulars are unique individual entities, like a specific apple. Universals are general features that different particulars have in common, like the color red. Modal metaphysics examines what it means for something to be possible or necessary. Metaphysicians also explore the concepts of space, time, and change, and their connection to causality and the laws of nature. Other topics include how mind and matter are related, whether everything in the world is predetermined, and whether there is free will.

Maybe a concrete question might help:

Is the letter to Herodotus best described as "Physics," "Metaphysics," or both?

Is the poem of Lucretius "Physics," "Metaphysics," or both?

Is the conclusion that the universe is eternal in time and infinite in space Physics, Metaphysics, both, neither, or what?

Is the conclusion that there is no immortal soul that survives (for very long anyway) after death Physics, Metaphysics, or what?

I'd like to know what others here think so I can consider if I want to alter my own usage of these terms.

That IS Weird! I have no idea why....

I'll post separately that it might seem that the title of this thread and terms like "downward causation" are technicalities irrelevant to day to day life. However I'd posit that having a conceptual model of how complex systems like human beings emerge from atoms moving through the is essential to having any real confidence that the naturalistic explanation of the universe is sound.

If you can never get comfortable with the idea that non-thinking matter can give rise to thinking animals, then all the citations to 'atomism" in the world aren't going to serve the purpose for which they are needed. And in fact if you don't have a better developed understanding then you'll likely be stuck with Democrticus making some critically-damaging conclusions about the implications of atomism.

To help process the implications of this issue I recommend the following short three-minute video which Kalosyni found:

And to show that Thomas Jefferson too thought about this see the underlined section below:

Jefferson to John Adams, August 15, 1820

Full version at Founders.gov)

Here Jefferson complains to Adams about Christian theology and states that “To talk of immaterial existences is to talk of nothings. To say that the human soul, angels, god, are immaterial, is to say they are nothings, or that there is no god, no angels, no soul. I cannot reason otherwise.”

…. But enough of criticism: let me turn to your puzzling letter of May 12. on matter, spirit, motion etc. It’s crowd of scepticisms kept me from sleep. I read it, and laid it down: read it, and laid it down, again and again: and to give rest to my mind, I was obliged to recur ultimately to my habitual anodyne, ‘I feel: therefore I exist.’ I feel bodies which are not myself: there are other existencies then. I call them *matter*. I feel them changing place. This gives me motion. Where there is an absence of matter, I call it *void*, or *nothing*, or *immaterial* *space*. On the basis of sensation, of matter and motion, we may erect the fabric of all the certainties we can have or need.

I can conceive thought to be an action of a particular organisation of matter, formed for that purpose by it’s creator, as well as that attraction in an action of matter, or magnetism of loadstone. When he who denies to the Creator the power of endowing matter with the mode of action called thinking shall shew how he could endow the Sun with the mode of action called attraction, which reins the planets in the tract of their orbits, or how an absence of matter can have a will, and, by that will, put matter into motion, then the materialist may be lawfully required to explain the process by which matter exercises the faculty of thinking. When once we quit the basis of sensation, all is in the wind. To talk of *immaterial* existences is to talk of *nothings*. To say that the human soul, angels, god, are immaterial, is to say they are *nothings*, or that there is no god, no angels, no soul. I cannot reason otherwise: but I believe I am supported in my creed of materialism by Locke, Tracy, and Stewart.

In today's Zoom and also podcast this issue was discussed as a result of David Sedley's article "Epicurean Anti-Reductionism." The basic concept as I understand it it likely this:

Epicurus would have understood just as we do today that it is not intuitive how atoms, which have no properties other than shape, size, and weight, can no matter how they combine have the ability to think and assume all the other complex phenomena that we see around us. In even simpler terms, how can atoms which do not possess the property of color combine into bodies that do have the property of color. Has something been added to the body that was not present in the originating atoms?

It is one thing to say that these phenomena "emerge" from the atoms, and another to offer any kind of coherent and persuasive conceptual model of how this might be possible. And note that I say "model" rather than "explanation," as "explanation might imply we can somehow list what might be an infinite series of causes.

In "Epicurean Anti-Reductionism" Sedley builds the Epicurean case for providing an explanation how this could occur, and he gives citations to where the phenomena is discussed in the texts, including Lucretius in Book 2 discussing how the mind of a horse issues orders for the horse to emerge onto the racetrack.

This also has obvious relevance for issues of determinism.

This is a very interesting area to develop and it continues to be a matter of discussion today, often under the name of "downward causation."

Here's a clip from Sedley's article and after that I will post a number of resources. I have not read them other than to glance at the first, which came from Joshua:

(There are many more references I will add as time allows.)

Crossreference to the Zoom where this arose.

Welcome to Episode 327 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
   
This week we start are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective. We are focusing first on what is referred to as Book One, which provides an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and gives us an overview of the philosophical issues being dealt with at the time of Epicurus. This week will focus on the ending of Section 7.

Our text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackam translation here:

• Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Quote

And they say that the parts of the world are all the things which exist in it, and which are maintained by sentient nature; in which perfect reason is placed, which is also everlasting: for that there is nothing more powerful which can be the cause of its dissolution. And this power they call the soul of the world, and also its intellect and perfect wisdom. And they call it God, a providence watching over everything subject to its dominion, and, above all, over the heavenly bodies; and, next to them, over those things on earth which concern men: which also they sometimes call necessity, because nothing can be done in a manner different from that in which it has been arranged by it in a destined (if I may so say) and inevitable continuation of eternal order. Sometimes, too, they call it fortune, because it brings about many unforeseen things, which have never been expected by us, on account of the obscurity of their causes, and our ignorance of them.

[media]https://www.spreaker.com/episode/71088166/media

These are very relevant points Dave and I think about them all the time. Here's my current view.

Quote from DaveT

On the other hand I see progress away from the monarchical God and church appointed governments of the last 250 years. No longer do we accept conquest in the name of god's command to subjugate the earth.

I don't think I am violating the no-politics rule by observing that the world is on the brink of WW3 and I would say that a major reason is that most of the world is still in the grip of religious and philosophical absolutism of the very kind that Epicurus was fighting against.

Quote from DaveT

I think there is something to be said about a focus on the secular adaptation of Epicurean principles that have made their way into common society, into academia and medicine as well as government policies even though those principles are not often recognized as Epicurean.

Unfortunately here too I am convinced that the darker side of this overwhelms the brighter. The "secular adaptation of Epicurean principles" is largely a bastardization of what Epicurus actually taught, and is in fact being used to suppress any reemergence of his actual teachings. I'll paraphrase someone I don't particularly admire and say that the most "common secular adaptations of Epicurean principles" - by which I mean the elevation the pursuit of immediate pleasure as a tranquilizer against deeper understanding of philosophical issues which undermine the word today as they did in 300 BC - are as much the opiate of the people as any religion.

Quote from DaveT

Most PEW polling shows the decline of popular participation in religious organizations.

I think you're talking about our "first world" situation primarily in the USA. Disturbingly even here I understand the evidence shows a resurgence in religious interest, particularly Catholicism, and of course I am not seeing that as a positive development. It's interesting to consider that in Catholicism we see preserved many of the same Platonic/Stoic positions that were incorporated directly into it. The early Catholic "church fathers" understood Epicurus to be strong opposition. I do think that a lot of the turmoil in organized religion presents an opportunity for the re-emergence of a true Epicureanism, but that re-emergence isn't going to be accomplish by a superficial understanding of Epicurus as a neo-Stoic / neo-Buddhist / Humanist who is running from philosophical and social engagement to live a minimalist / ascetic life.

Quote from DaveT

On your point of searching for a way to deal with newer people, I'm guessing you mean newer to the Forum. I've heard that the way to engage with others is to ask those people, who they are in real life, why they joined, what their goals are at the Forum, and perhaps when they might have the time to participate. I think those questions can be asked tactfully, not just to new people, but perhaps they might become a part of an annual discussion among the membership.

I largely agree with you here but there is a danger that I also constantly consider:

Until people understand what Epicurus was really all about, they are tempted to focus only on the surface ethical questions such as how to experience more pleasure than pain under a conventional outlook of focusing only on stimulative pleasure. There are also those who come here fully convinced that the goal of life is "tranquility" and the last thing they want to do is to face uncomfortable deeper questions. Posts from such people give us an excellent opportunity to educate them about the full meaning of the texts, but too much emphasis on "momentary pleasures" and "relief from anxiety" without understand that "relief from anxiety" does not mean a "zero state," but pleasure in the full and true meaning of the word, is difficult to deal with given existing resources.

We need more people actively writing about Epicurus from a more educated and deeper perspective, so I think the priority has to be "educating the educators" so we can better address exactly what you are talking about with people who are just beginning to read Epicurus.

Episode 326 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week our episode is entitled: "Who Cares About Infinite Divisibility? And Why?"

[media]https://www.spreaker.com/episode/70936642/media

Quote from DaveT

I think it would be a better course to maximize Epicurus’ reasons for his physics and minimize the study of the details for the average student, like me.

Probably that's the cruc of the issue. There's a wide variety of people here with different backgrounds and interests, but this is primarily a forum for the promotion of Epicurean philosophy, not for philosophy generalists (not placing you in that latter category).

I am working on how to better deal with people on the newer side but as I see it the primary need in Epicurean philosophy is not that of building bridges to people of different opinions but working to develop a core team of people who like me share the conviction that Epicurus is uniquely worth rebuilding a "team" or "camp" of those who want to approach modern problems from the perspective of actual ancient Epicureans.

In most respects other than pure technology I see mostly regression from 2000 years ago, and in order to deal with that regression we need to focus on where things went wrong and how applying core Epicurean attitudes could redress those problems.

There are plenty of places on the Internet where people can discuss raw hedonic calculus from generic point of view, but almost no one bringing to bear the insights that people like Dewitt and Sedley have written about over the last 50 years.

So I will work on both but that's the explanation for where we are.

Dave, the answer to both of your questions seems to me to be pretty much the same. These things are not "totally subjective" nor are they "just brain chemistry." As the article is discussing, emergent properties like the mind's actions are not mechanically determined by atoms and void, nor are they totally subjectively under the power of the mind. Most people cannot through mental will power find buring their hands in a fire to be pleasurable - on the other hand did not the feeling of pleasure and pain work regularly across people, there would never be any regularity at all in what people find to be pleasurable or painful.

That's why this discussion is important. Epicurus is discussing the limits and boundaries of properties of atoms and the qualities that emerge from combinations of atoms. All of this directly refutes the idea that human life is either chaotic or determined supernaturally.

And in the end what we are doing is PHILOSOPHY - we are exploring a 'systematic study of nature' that allows us to have confidence that all of this is occurring naturally and without input from or direction from gods (if you're the religious type) or chaotically (if you're the nihilist type). I suspect that you are neither and that's why you think it's ok to go right to ethics, but Epicurus thought (and I do too) that the world in general is not that way, and that everyone from childhood needs to be taught a systematic approach to the way the world works that allows us to live successfully.

These are the issues we are really talking about and that Epicurus is addressing. Epicurus could care less whether we call fundamental particles atoms or protons or neurons or quarks or anything else, and I think if he were here today those who focus on that perspective are in fact lost and will never see the bigger picture until they back up and decide philosophically what "reality" really means.

Thanks for your question, Dave. It comes up frequently so I have updated the FAQ. Here's the short version:

Epicurus would be the last person to insist we cling to 2,000-year-old technical details in physics just because he said them. He was emphatically committed to observation and experience over authority — including his own. So when you say modern physics has advanced what Epicurus encouraged, I agree completely. The question is really: what specifically did Epicurus encourage in the area of physics, and why does it still matter to how we live?

Here's the crux: Epicurean physics was never really about the technical details of atoms for their own sake. It was constructed to do a specific job — to address three towering sources of human misery:

1. The fear that supernatural gods are watching us, judging us, and will punish us after death.

2. The fear that the universe is governed by Fate or Necessity, that nothing we do matters, and that we have no real agency in our own lives.

3. The view that what we see around us is not real, and that our lives and everything we value is essentially 'unreal."

Epicurus built his physics — the atoms, the void, the swerve, the emergent properties of compound things — specifically to establish that the natural world we experience is self-sufficient and self-explanatory. Nothing comes from nothing; nothing goes to nothing; the universe operates by natural processes, not divine whim or iron destiny. That framework is what allows the ethics to work. Pull out the physics, and you immediately create space for the supernatural to rush back in — which is exactly what Epicurus' rivals (Plato, the Stoics, and later the Christians) did with great success.

Now, as to the Sedley article specifically — and the question of whether Epicurus was a "reductionist" — this turns out to be very relevant to modern Epicurean life, more than it might first appear. Sedley's argument is that Epicurus was not a strict reductionist: he did not say that your feelings of pleasure and pain, your lived experience, your psychological states are "mere illusions" that dissolve into atomic physics if you look closely enough. The qualities of compound things — including the pleasure and pain we feel — are real, not eliminable, and must be understood at their own level. That is philosophically powerful ammunition against the modern dismissal of Epicurean ethics as "merely subjective" or "just brain chemistry."

So the short answer to your question "why should I care about the atoms debate if so much science has changed?" is: care not because the technical atomic details are sacred, but because the method and framework Epicurus established — natural causation, no supernatural intervention, emergent reality at the level of lived experience — is exactly what you need to build and defend a life philosophy grounded in nature. And you need confidence in a framework that establishes that your life and the things you value are truly real. The details update as science advances; the framework remains as essential as it ever was.

The full updated FAQ answer is here:

Why Should I Care About Epicurean Physics When So Much Science Has Changed in the Last 2,000 Years? - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

Eikadistes I thought of your article in reading David Sedley's "Epicurean Anti-Reductionism," and I wanted to be sure you saw this.

I don't recall all the details of your article, but I think you'd find the concluding section of Sedley's article supportive of the argument that Epicurus should really not be considered primarily an atomist.

The following is a quotation translated by David Sedley from Epicurus' On Nature 34.21-2. It comes from Sedley's discussion of "Downward Causation" in how the mind itself can influence the atoms. There are numerous implications that can be drawn from it but to my observation it's not a well-known quote so I therefore give this its own thread. The clip comes from Sedley's "Epicurean Anti-Reductionism" page 319.

In this article Sedley refers several time to aetiology and ontology and discusses which aspect is primary to Epicurus on a particular point. It might help to have this explanation before reading the article (pasted from our good friends at ChatGPT):

The phrase “aetiologically rather than ontologically primary” distinguishes two different senses in which something can be considered “primary” or fundamental.

1. Aetiologically primary (causally primary)

• Aetiology means cause or explanation of origin.
• If something is aetiologically primary, it is:
  • The cause or source of something else
  • What explains how or why something comes to be

👉 In simple terms:
It comes first in the order of explanation or causation.

2. Ontologically primary (being primary)

• Ontology concerns what exists and what is fundamentally real.
• If something is ontologically primary, it is:
  • More fundamental in reality
  • What other things depend on for their existence

👉 In simple terms:
It comes first in the order of being or reality.

This topic was also discussed in a recent zoom meeting. The answer appears debatable, and I see that Sedley's article "Epicurean Anti-Reductionism" has this to say (see especially footnote 29):

Here is the translation from Demetrius Lacon cited on page 306:

There's a LOT of interest in that article. Here's a section that both interesting and "funny" as to what should probably be our love-hate relationship with Cyril Bailey:

From the Sedley Article "Epicurean Anti-Reductionism"