Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

You can't have it both ways, and both Plutarch and Cicero seem to ascribe both debauchery and ascetism to the Epicurean school. It can't be both, and so it comes across as stereotyping, hyperbole, or caricature.

Yes, great point. If you're going to be consistent you can either criticize the Epicureans for pursuing gross and debauched pleasures, or criticize them for being ascetic in their view of pleasure, but you can't logically criticize them for both.

And when you try to accuse them of both, you expose yourself to the question: "Are you lying to me when you accuse them of asceticism, or are you lying when you accuse them of debauchery?"

Given that their sublime Plato specifically endorses "noble lying," I'd wager that both are lies, and I would also wager it to be a lie when Cicero accuses Epicurus of never endorsing the pleasures of literature, history, current events, and poetry:

Quote from On Ends Book 1:VII

What pleasure do you, O Torquatus, what pleasure does this Triarius derive from literature, and history, and the knowledge of events, and the reading of poets, and his wonderful recollection of such numbers of verses? And do not say to me, Why all these things are a pleasure to me. So, too, were those noble actions to the Torquati. Epicurus never asserts this in this manner; nor would you, O Triarius, nor any man who had any wisdom, or who had ever imbibed those principles. And as to the question which is often asked, why there are so many Epicureans—there are several reasons; but this is the one which is most seductive to the multitude, namely, that people imagine that what he asserts is that those things which are right and honourable do of themselves produce joy, that is, pleasure. Those excellent men do not perceive that the whole system is overturned if that is the case. For if it were once granted, even although there were no reference whatever to the body, that these things were naturally and intrinsically pleasant; then virtue and knowledge would be intrinsically desirable. And this is the last thing which he would choose to admit.

Cicero's argument there needs more examination. I take it Cicero is arguing that Epicurus could not admit that mental pleasures are desirable apart from the body because to do so would be to admit that the mind can generate pleasure apart from the body, and Epicurus insists that all pleasures are bodily, so to admit that the mind can generate pleasure (implicitly by itself) would be to overturn the whole system.

At least one answer to that, however, is that Epicurus' point is that both the body and mind are material, and that the problem is the Platonists et al. trying to insist that the mind can exist or do things without the body. Epicurus never denies that it is perfectly appropriate and acceptable to talk at some times about the activities of the body and at other times about the activities of the mind. Epicurus simply denies that the mind can exist without the body, and so the pleasures of both go hand in hand and require each other.

Does anyone see Cicero as arguing something else beyond what is addressed by that response? Or are there better ways to respond to what Cicero argues in the last part of that passage?

I was just sent a link to a newly-published article - "Epicurean Induction and Atomism In Mathematics." At the time I am posting this I have not had a chance to read more than the opening and closing paragraphs, but it appears to be a very useful article. Here's the opening paragraph:

Quote

The Epicureans, in general, considered geometry and mathematics only for utility and practical purposes. They regarded abstract mathematics useless and they did not, overall, expect or encourage their members to do any mathematics beyond perhaps some very basic level. 2 (White 1989, pp. 297–298). There were, of course, some Epicureans quite knowledgeable in mathematics, such as Polyaenus, Philonides, Zeno and Demetrius. Also, the Epicureans did not have mathematics or logic among their primary philosophical interests or teachings. 3 (White 1989, pp. 297–298, Cicero 1914, p. 25). Their belief that all knowledge is empirical and the inductive logic that guided their philosophy, do not seem to align with some of the most important aspects of mathematics, such as abstraction, deduction and proof.

It immediately strikes me to ask, as we read this in more detail, whether this attitude toward Epicurus takes an overly negative view. It is one thing to think that Epicurus held dialectical logic and mathematics and geometry to be limited in what they are able to claim, and require that any claims they do make be validated by the senses, anticipations, and feelings. It is something very different, to take the position that the Epicureans had no interest in these topics whatsoever, or actively discouraged Epicurean students from studying them.

I suspect the truth to be more as Frances Wright writes in Chapter nine of her book:

Quote from A Few Days In Athens Chapter 9

“But,” said Leontium, “the young Corinthian may be curious to know the sentiments of our master, and his advice regarding the pursuit of the sciences and the liberal arts. I can readily perceive,” addressing herself to Theon, “the origin of the two contradictory reports you have just mentioned. The first you would hear from the followers of Aristippus, who, though not acknowledging the name, follow the tenets of his philosophy, and have long been very numerous in our degenerate city. These, because Epicurus recommends but a moderate culture of those arts, which by them are too often made the elegant incentives to licentious pleasure, accuse him of neglecting them altogether. The cynics, and other austere sects, who condemn all that ministers to the luxury, ease, or recreation of man, exaggerate his moderate use of these arts into a vicious encouragement of voluptuousness and effeminacy. You will perceive, therefore, that between the two reports lies the truth. Every innocent recreation is permitted in the garden. It is not poetry, but licentious poetry, that Epicurus condemns; not music, but voluptuous music; not painting, but licentious pictures; not dancing, but loose gestures. Yet thus he displeases alike the profligate and the austere; for these he is too moderate, and for those too severe. “With regard to the sciences, if it be said, that they are neglected among us, I do not say that our master, though himself versed in them, as in all other branches of knowledge, greatly recommends them to our study but that they are not unknown, let Polyoenus be evidence.

“He, one of the most amiable men of our school, and one most highly favored by our master, you must have heard mentioned throughout Greece as a profound geometrician.”

“Yes,” replied Theon, “but I have also heard, that since entering the garden, he has ceased to respect his science.”

“I am not aware of that,” said Leontium, “though I believe he no longer devotes to it all his time, and all his faculties. Epicurus called him from his diagrams, to open to him the secrets of physics, and the beauties of ethics; to show him the springs of human action, and lead him to the study of the human mind. He taught him, that any single study, however useful and noble in itself, was yet unworthy the entire employ of a curious and powerful intellect; that the man who pursued one line of knowledge, to the exclusion of others, though he should follow it up to its very head, would never be either learned or wise; that he who pursues knowledge, should think no branch of it unworthy attention; least of all, should he confine it to those which are unconnected with the business, and add nothing to the pleasures of life; that further not our acquaintance with ourselves, nor our fellows; that tend not to enlarge the sphere of our affections, to multiply our ideas and sensations, nor extend the scope of our inquiries. On this ground, he blamed the devotion of Polyoenus to a science that leads to other truths than those of virtue, to other study than that of man.”

“I am obliged to you for the explanation,” said Theon; “not because I could any longer have given credit to the absurd reports of your master’s enemies; but because, whatever opens to me the character and opinions of such a man, interests and improves me.”

Link to full article:

https://www.athensjournals.gr/philosophy/2023-2-2-3-Aristidou.pdf

It seems to me that Plutarch in Section 7 does a particularly persuasive job of setting up the question clearly, and I see no way around a direct and pointed confrontation.

Plutarch is correct that even the "brute animals" do not deny themselves additional pleasure like singing and playing after they have fulfilled their basic needs such as for food and water. And yet Epicurus supposedly advocated that humans should pursue nothing but the most basic satisfaction of necessary needs, and then timidly refrain from any further enjoyment whatsoever as dangerous to our tranquility?

Plutarch was in a position to know the truth, so he is either shamelessly lying, or - if he were deemed to be correct - I would never recommend anyone have anything to do with Epicurean philosophy.

Plutarch is shamelessly lying, and probably for the same reason as Cicero. He hates Epicurean philosophy and he has no problem spinning noble lies in the service of what he probably sincerely but mistakenly thinks is the best interest of his readers.

And yet the criticism Plutarch makes here is not rejected by many so-called friends of Epicurus today. Many self-designated advocates for Epicurus actually accept and embrace Plutarch's accusation as the proper interpretation of what Epicurus was teaching, and defend it as a wise position.

Paraphrasing Cicero's comment as to Plato, I'd rather adopt Plutarch's philosophy than have as my guide "Epicureans" who would embrace such a low standard of pleasure. And I don't for a second believe that the widespread adoption of Epicurean views by the ancient Romans and Greeks occurred because the Epicureans actually embraced the kind of view that Plutarch is describing.

I am convinced that the truth is that the ancient Romans and Greeks understood Epicurus to be advocating pleasure as a wide term embracing all mental and physical activities which are not painful. Epicurus' innovation in advocating that pleasure is the goal of life (rather than virtue or piety or any other word) was to hold that all experiences in life are either pleasurable or painful. On that basis, Epicurus concludes that if any mental or physical experience is not painful, then we should consider it to be included under the definition of pleasure. And even painful mental and physical activities are to be chosen when they lead ultimately to more pleasure than pain.

Under Epicurus' viewpoint minimizing pain means exactly the same thing as maximizing pleasure, but Cicero and Plutarch and many others recognized that if you strip out from Epicurean philosophy the premise that all experiences are to be categorized as either pleasurable or painful, then the result will look like minimizing pain is a goal in itself. Minimizing pain as a goal in itself can be made to look very much like minimizing pleasure, and once you have convinced someone that this was what Epicurus was teaching, you have ripped the heart out of Epicurus' teachings. You will have created a zombie that will see its mission as to search out and destroy whatever is left of Epicurean philosophy.

The truth is that the texts amply support the conclusion that Epicurus' single test of whether to pursue a particular desire for pleasure is not basic survival through minimalism and asceticism. The true test is whether under all the circumstances you rationally evaluate that pursuing any particular course will lead you to more pleasure than pain. And strong positive emotions like joy and delight are what truly motivates humans, just like they motivate the animals that Cicero and Plutarch look down upon.

Quote

They therefore assign not only a treacherous and unsure ground of their pleasurable living, but also one in all respects despicable and little, if the escaping of evils be the matter of their complacence and last good. But now they tell us, nothing else can be so much as imagined, and nature hath no other place to bestow her good in but only that out of which her evil hath been driven; as Metrodorus speaks in his book against the Sophists. So that this single thing, to escape evil, he says, is the supreme good; for there is no room to lodge this good in where nothing of what is painful and afflicting goes out. Like unto this is that of Epicurus, where he saith: The very essence of good arises from the escaping of bad, and a man's recollecting, considering, and rejoicing within himself that this hath befallen him. For what occasions transcending joy (he saith) is some great impending evil escaped; and in this lies the very nature and essence of good, if a man attain unto it aright, and contain himself when he hath done, and not ramble and prate idly about it. Oh the rare satisfaction and felicity these men enjoy, that can thus rejoice for having undergone no evil and endured neither sorrow nor pain! Have they not reason, think you, to value themselves for such things as these, and to talk as they are wont when they style themselves immortals and equals to Gods?—and [p. 168] when, through the excessiveness and transcendency of the blessed things they enjoy, they rave even to the degree of whooping and hollowing for very satisfaction that, to the shame of all mortals, they have been the only men that could find out this celestial and divine good that lies in an exemption from all evil So that their beatitude differs little from that of swine and sheep, while they place it in a mere tolerable and contented state, either of the body, or of the mind upon the body's account. For even the wiser and more ingenious sort of brutes do not esteem escaping of evil their last end; but when they have taken their repast, they are disposed next by fulness to singing, and they divert themselves with swimming and flying; and their gayety and sprightliness prompt them to entertain themselves with attempting to counterfeit all sorts of voices and notes; and then they make their caresses to one another, by skipping and dancing one towards another; nature inciting them, after they have escaped evil, to look after some good, or rather to shake off what they find uneasy and disagreeing, as an impediment to their pursuit of something better and more congenial.

Very good use of a very good cite!

This is a cross-reference to a brief summary of the main ideas - a single sentence for each of the 31 sections.

Post

RE: Episode 295 - Plutarch's Absurd Interpretation of Epicurean Absence of Pain

There are 31 sections in this text, and to help organize the discussion here is a single sentence condensing each one. Links are to the Perseus edition:

1. 1 Colotes has written a book "That It Is Impossible To Live According to the Tenets of The Other Philosophers" and this will be in response.

2. 2 The speakers will respond to the Epicureans' name-calling against the other philosophers, and prove that it impossible to live pleasantly according to the philosophy of Epicurus.

3. 3 The Epicureans…

Cassius

August 14, 2025 at 6:53 AM

There are 31 sections in this text, and to help organize the discussion here is a single sentence condensing each one. Links are to the Perseus edition:

1. 1 Colotes has written a book "That It Is Impossible To Live According to the Tenets of The Other Philosophers" and this will be in response.

2. 2 The speakers will respond to the Epicureans' name-calling against the other philosophers, and prove that it impossible to live pleasantly according to the philosophy of Epicurus.

3. 3 The Epicureans base their claim to pleasure in the body, a "poor, rotten, and unsure" thing that experiences more pains than pleasures, both in terms of intensity and duration, and yet Epicurus has made "the removal of all that pains the common definition of pleasure."

4. 4 Epicurus' emphasis on mental pleasure is of no avail to him, because when he talks about mental pleasures he focuses on memory of bodily pleasures, and these are only an empty shadow - a dream - a fume - of the body's pleasure.

5. 5 Mental pleasures cannot rid us of bodily pains, as we see from the fact that the Epicureans themselves suffered diseases such as strangury, gripes, consumptions and dropsies; and life in this condition cannot really be pleasant, as they claim.

6. 6 Just like the Epicureans claim that the unjust man lives in fear of punishment, they too must live in fear of bodily pain.

7. 7 It is ridiculous for the Epicureans to argue that when all pain is driven out there is no further room for pleasure, and that to be without pain makes them equal to the gods -even the brute animals sing and fly about after they have satisfied their longings, and Epicurus would deny us even that!

8. 8 Those things that we require for life do not deserve the name of good, nor even the name of pleasure, any more than does a rogue's freedom from being in jail, and even brute animals are free from the worries of hell or gods - and yet Epicurus praises such freedom so highly!

9. 9 The bodily pleasures and memories of them are but slight, and have nothing in them that is great and considerable like that which comes from the contemplative and active and heroic aspects of life.

10. 10 The pleasures of the body, or memories of our dead friends, are nothing in comparison with the pleasures of the mind that come from contemplating Homer or Xenophon.

11. 11 The Epicureans chase away the pleasures of mathematics and history and geometry and music and the like, and these are far more pleasurable than the pleasures of the body.

12. 12 Epicurus bids us to set sail and fly from these greater pleasures of liberal arts, mathematics, poets, and especially history, which was derided by Metrodorus, in favor of grosser pleasures of the body.

13. 13 Epicurus was particularly hypocritcal in disdaining the discussion or study of music and poetry, since he himself said that the wise man will love the music of public events.

14. 14 Given that we have both a mind and a body, it is ridiculous for Epicurus to place the good entirely in the body, and say that the mind has no good of its own.

15. 15 The pleasures of food and of drink and of the body are nothing in comparison to the pleasures of actions taken, such as by the heroic deeds of great men of the past.

16. 16 The pleasures of the stomach and the body that Epicurus finds so elating are nothing in comparison with the pleasures of the active and engaged life that Epicurus rejects.

17. 17 The pleasures of food and of the body are far surpassed by the pleasures of being brave and generous and honorable, and this is shown by what people choose to do in th short time left to them if they know they are about to die.

18. 18 Thus no one will believe Epicurus when he claims that he bore up to his final pains by thinking about his former bodily pleasures, and even Epicurus admits there are pleasures in fame, which is why he spent so much time writing books and exclaiming about how wise he was.

19. 19 Epicurus was illogical and hypocritcal in casting away the fame and pleasure that comes from holding public office, and serving one's country, as that is far greater than private pleasures such as eating and drinking.

20. 20 Epicurus deprives us of the pleasures that come from knowing that the gods are in control and provide for us in our misfortunes and in death.

21. 21 Yes we should root out superstition but we must retain our faith in providence, because the joy and hope that comes from a true beilef in god is much better than the bad things that come from improper fear and dread of the gods.

22. 22 It is much better and more productive to rely on the kind and powerful gods than it is to place your hopes in your friends, who are weak and will die.

23. 23 Epicurus's claim that our troubles will be short, or manageable, or that death will take us from them is no answer at all to the problems of life in comparison to relying on the gods.

24. 24 The argument so far is not complete; we must address what Epicurus' rejection of the gods really means.

25. 25 Since Epicurus said that fear of punishment is a bad thing, and it helps men refrain from doing evil if they fear punishment from the gods, men would be better off if they were more superstitious so that they feared the gods and punishment after death even more than they do, and thus refrained from doing evil.

26. 26 Men get more pleasure thinking the dead continue to exist after death.

27. 27 The belief that we cease to exist at death is demorailzing and dispiriting and thus prevents us from enjoying life.

28. 28 Taking away belief in immortality takes away the sweetest joy that most people have, as they lose the hope of a better life and seeing their friends again in the hereafter.

29. 29 Taking away life after death not only demoralizes the unfortunate and deprives them of hope for better after death, but it harms the fortunate, as it depresses them to know that they will lose the good things that they now have.

30. 30 To call not being in existence a good is to be ungrateful to existence.

31. 31 "So large a field and one of so great pleasures Epicurus wholly cuts off, when he destroys ... the hopes and graces we should derive from the Gods, and by that extinguishes both in our speculative capacity the desire of knowledge, and in our active the love of glory, and confines and abases our nature to a poor narrow thing, and that not cleanly neither, to wit, the content the mind receives by the body, as if it were capable of no higher good than the escape of evil."

Welcome to Episode 295 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week Joshua will be away, and Don has kindly agreed to step in during his absence. Rather than continue in Tusculan Disputations in Joshua's absence, we will briefly take up a topic we have not previously addressed: Plutarch's essay Against Colotes. Here Plutarch notes that Colotes had written an essay to the effect that it is impossible to live happily under the non-Epicurean philosophers, and Plutarch attempts to turn the tables on Colotes and argue that the opposite is true.

This essay contains many specific allegations against Epicurus that are not well documented elsewhere, so even if we have only a short time, it will be good for us to point out to our podcast listeners the existence and general content of this ancient source.

We won't have time to read long sections from the text but what we hope to do is to make you familiar with the general outline of Plutarch's argument so you can come back to it again in the future and know what to expect.

Happy birthday Robert! Good to have had you join us recently in several Zooms.

Happy Birthday to Robert! Learn more about Robert and say happy birthday on Robert's timeline: Robert

Episode 294 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today our episode is entitled: "Distinguishing Dogs From Wolves And Pleasure From Absence of Pain"

Quote from Rolf

Wow, what a mess. I’d struggle to write a more misleading and inaccurate description of Epicureanism if I tried. It’s a real shame that some people will read this and think they have an accurate impression of the philosophy.

Yes it is a mess.

And everyone needs to be aware that other than Emily Austin's book, DeWitt's book and probably a few others that don't come to mind at the moment, what is being presented in this article is by far the majority and mainstream version of what is taught about Epicurus today.

In fact you have to really work hard to find something OTHER than this interpretation.

So right from the start I like to warn people to be prepared. For this purpose I arbitrarily divide the world into two categories of people:

If you're a "Category 1" person who thinks the most important thing in life is to be calm and tranquil and avoid conflict and disagreement at any cost (which is what many people who claim to love Epicurus want you to accept was what Epicurus taught) then you've come to the wrong place in visiting EpicureanFriends!

On the other hand, if you're a "Category 2" person willing to stand up against a crowd, be independent, and read the texts for yourself, then there's nothing more rewarding than studying the ancient texts for yourself. That's the only real way to get to the bottom of what Epicurus was really saying, and that's what we are doing at Epicureanfriends - some of us in the original languages and some of us in translations.

I'd like to think it is possible to change someone from being a Category 1 person into a Category 2 person, and indeed I do think we have seen some of that over ten years at EpicureanFriends. But it is an extremely hard thing to do, and the longer and more deeply someone has accepted Stoicism or Buddhism or something similar in the past, the harder it is to do.

VS52. Friendship dances around the world, bidding us all to awaken to the recognition of happiness.

VS41. We must laugh and philosophize at the same time, and do our household duties, and employ our other faculties, and never cease proclaiming the sayings of the true philosophy.

Also Don, I think an effective counterpoint to the modern implications of "flee" (that you are running away in fear, even panic, as if someone had yelled "fire" in a theatre) I would use what you have cited from the last day of Epicurus as to arraying pleasure against pain, as in a battle.

To me a battle or opposition analogy is much more indicative of the real meaning. The word isn't by any means wide enough to cover your actions toward pain pain in every instance, because sometimes you are actually choosing pain.

So I can see why the translators might use choose and avoid, as avoid doesn't have the fear and panic associations. "Avoid" has other negative connotations of its own, however, such as a certain lack of "seriousness" as if your action is a matter of mild preference as opposed to something important.

In the end just like in so many cases words have many connotations, some accurate and intended and some not, so it's always a matter of taking care to explain when there is ambiguity.

And I would say that to take the full modern understanding of "fleeing" from pain at face value would be a huge misreading. Epicurus didn't "flee" from the gods, he stood up to them, worked to understand them, and actually embraced certain aspects of them. And as a generalization that kind of face-up-to-it -and-overcome-it where-necessary attitude is a lot more accurate picture of the correct attitude toward pain than the single word "fleeing" can convey.

flee

verb [ I or T, never passive ]

us /fliː/ uk /fliː/present participle fleeing | past tense and past participle fled

Add to word list

C1

to escape by running away, especially because of danger or fear:

flee from She fled from the room in tears.

flee to In order to escape capture, he fled to the mountains.

This strikes me as being particularly poorly stated (or well stated if your goal is to misrepresent Epicurus).

Epicurus does not distrust our reasoning abilities. Epicurus insists on reason, Epicurus uses reason vigorously and thoroughly, Epicurus establishes the existence of atoms and his entire physics based on reason, Lucretius describes Epicurean philosophy as true reason.

What Epicurus is distrustful of is Stoics and others who claim for reason things that reason (in the form of dialectical logic) cannot do. Words are useful, but they are not reality, and you cannot find truth by looking to syllogisms rather than by using the senses, anticipations, and feelings along with reason.

It's not reason that is to be distrusted, but Stoicism.

Interesting choice of words that I find very telling, whether chosen consciously or subconsciously.

Don't approach pain in life as something to be overcome through reasoned effort, through realization that pleasure is the guide and goal of life, and even through the judicious use of pain for the production of greater pleasure.

No, don't approach pain with vigor and determination to keep pain in its place.

Just FLEE from pain with as much speed and abandon as you can!

That's the message of Epicurus as the Stoics and other enemies of Epicurus want you to see it.

And I see that to prevent there being any ambiguity, the authors kindly spelled out in the final words before the chapter on Epicurus that the best kind of pleasure is absence of pain, particularly of the mental variety - so no need to worry about focusing any attention on bodily pleasures!!!

I failed to notice the tag line at the top of the front cover. This pretty much says it all, and it carries the implication that the reader is not going to discard his Stoicism, just recharge it. I'd predict the Stoic reader will find plenty of ways to make his Stoicism even worse in the neo-Epicureanism of the material referenced in the first posts above.

Well thank you for starting my day with a reminder of all that is wrong with modern Epicurean philosophy!

I will check out the background of what you posted there and have much more to say.

But first I will say:

For those of us who have read extensively into the background of what the texts really say, we can grit our teeth and remember that ataraxia and aponia in now way exclude the active pleasures of life nor make us want to go live in an ascetic commune where "religion" and controversial subjects are never discussed.

But the opening you have posted there is calculated to exactly produce the kind of "beautiful obscurity" that it does produce -- a vision of total resignation from active pleasures and withdrawal from society and minimalism that is truly indistinguishable from asceticism.

All you have to do in life is negative:

• Don't have any desires (at all, because if you do then they aren't fulfilled).
• Don't be afraid of gods or death (without any explanation as to why - just don't!)
• Don't worry about anything you don't already have (because you can get by with bread and water and air).
• Don't worry about anything terrible (not covered in the opening and held untul later. They acknowledge that most people find this unconvincing, and explain it only with a reference to Marcus Aurelius repeating but not explaining what are essentially Epicurus' words ).

Again, many of the things covered here have a grain of truth to them that can be saved from the wrong construction by knowing the subtleties of Epicurus' terminology. But the real problem I have with this approach is that 98% of normal healthy vigorous people reading this will read this and see it is the philosophy of undertakers giving seminars at nursing homes, and they will run as far and as fast as they can in the opposite direction. And even though i am no longer in my most healthy and vigorous years I will do all i can to keep up with them and get as far as I can from this brand of "Epicurean" philosophy.

I may understand completely that it is not necessary to live forever in order to experience the fulness of pleasure, but that doesn't mean I am going to live like an ascetic in a stupor during the years that I do have.

Here's a note which will unfortunately probably not make sense until the episode is released, but I want to come back to it:

Near the end of the episode Joshua and I read two sections from "Academnic Questions" in which Cicero (actually his hero Antiochus) is criticizing use of the sorites method of argument. Within that passage there is a section that also criticizes the Dialecticians. It gets pretty subtle as to which side Cicero is on, but I gather that what is probably going on here is that Cicero is in fact criticizing the claims of Dialectics (such as I gather the Stoics was making) as sufficient to find truth. In other words, I am taking this as Cicero taking the side of Skepticism, and criticizing the claims even of the dialecticians to establish truth through wordplay. That would likely be a criticism with which the Epicureans would agree, but of course from this skeptical point of view Cicero/Antiochus is arguing against anyone's claim to know anything with confidence.

If upon hearing the episode some hears a different point, please let me know. Here are the two sections from which we were quoting:

Posts one and three in this thread:

Thread

Sorites Argument Referenced in Cicero's Academic Questions

Going through Cicero's "Academic Questions" today I came across the following reference to the "Sorites" Argument. There is a lot of interesting material in AQ, and some good reference to Epicurus, but surrounded by a lot of gobbledygook. This is an example of good information:

https://handbook.epicureanfriends.com/Library/Text-C…icQuestions/#xv

[…]

Cassius

March 18, 2025 at 4:47 PM

Quote from Bryan

because it is not possible for the good to be placed anywhere, when nothing painful or distressing is further withdrawing."

Thanks for that one -- it seems to me now that has totally escaped my prior notice. It may not be a specific picture standing alone without more, but it's DIRECTLY on point.

.... another reason "we" need to pay more attention to Plutarch's material.

Working on editing this episode, and it is long and has a lot going on in it, so I better make this comment while it is on my mind:

One of the questions from Cicero that we address specifically is this one:

Quote

Grant that to be in pain is the greatest evil; whosoever, then, has proceeded so far as not to be in pain, is he, therefore, in immediate possession of the greatest good?

From the context I think it is pretty clear that what Cicero is saying is something like "OK I will spot you that being in pain is the greatest evil, but I still challenge you on this -- just because I remove that evil, that does mean that i am in immediate possession of the greatest good (pleasure)?"

I see this as a persuasive argument because most people are going to think that just because I remove a thorn from my toe, my toe is not therefore immediately in the greatest good (pleasure). My toe feels better when it is in a warm bath and being massaged, so you Epicurus are being ridiculous to argue that removing the thorn immediately places my toe in the *greatest* pleasure.

So that challenge demands an answer, and I think the most persuasive answer has to include another visual analogy rather than just the assertion that "absence of pain is the greatest pleasure" or "when one has no pain one has no further need for pleasure."

And as for me, the best picture analogy that I know from the texts that I can cite with authority is that of the vessel being filled in the opening of Lucretius Book SIx:

Quote from Lucretius 6:09

For when he saw that mortals had by now attained well-nigh all things which their needs crave for subsistence, and that, as far as they could, their life was established in safety, that men abounded in power through wealth and honours and renown, and were haughty in the good name of their children, and yet not one of them for all that had at home a heart less anguished, but with torture of mind lived a fretful life without any respite, and was constrained to rage with savage complaining, he then did understand that it was the vessel itself which wrought the disease, and that by its disease all things were corrupted within, whatsoever came into it gathered from without, yea even blessings; in part because he saw that it was leaking and full of holes, so that by no means could it ever be filled; in part because he perceived that it tainted as with a foul savor all things within it, which it had taken in.

To me therefore, the best analogy is to look at the question of "the highest pleasure" as referring conceptually to one's entire life (either over the whole lifespan or at a moment in time) and analogizing that life to a vessel or jar. The person who does not approach the question through Epicurean philosophy has a leaky jar, and thinks that it requires constant pouring in of new pleasure because of those leaks.

The correct philosophy allows one to see that an unlimited quantity of liquid is not required, because once you seal the leaks through correct philosophy, you find that the jar can be filled to the top (rather easily, in fact) and that once filled, you need no more liquid (pleasure) poured into it, because the jar cannot be filled any further past "full."

So yes, Cicero, a correct philosophy tells us that when we succeed in sealing the leaks and filling the jar with pleasures, we are immediately therefore in possession of the greatest pleasure, because the jar (our life) is full and cannot be filled further.

And there is no magic transformation from "a jar full of pleasures" to "absence of pain." The label "absence of pain" is a mental assessment that the jar is full of pleasures of mind and body, and that the jar contains no mixture of pain, because all pain has been dispelled.

I am sure there are probably other word pictures that can be painted. The first examples I could document from the text would be that of Chrysippus' hand, and of the example of comparing the host pouring wine to the guest drinking it, both of which are preserved by CIcero.

If anyone is aware of other analogies from the texts to which we can point, please add them here. There are probably others in Lucretius (plain vs ornate blanket, multiple opportunities for sex, plain food vs fancy food) but I am not sure that those are quite as clear as the vessel analogy in book six. Many of the "satisfaction" analogies apply, but I think those are more open to someone asking why the more luxurious option is not in fact preferable when it is available. The "vessel" analogy and the examples given by Cicero seem to me to be somewhat less open to "what about" questions.

Comparing a life to any single jar is also open to "well I want a bigger jar" but a concrete object like a jar seems to be an easier way to get agreement as to the terms of the hypothetical. And of course some people object to any and all use of hypotheticals, but maybe calling them "analogies" makes them easier to accept.