Posts by Cassius

Quote from Kalosyni

I firmly believe that Epicurean philosophy should be easily explained without having to re-define a common word.

And you're on exactly the same page as Cicero, and you'll want to do more reading from Torquatus and decide whether Cicero's position or Torquatus' makes the most sense!

This is Cicero speaking to Torquatus in Book 2 of On Ends:

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, On Ends - De Finibus Bonorum Et Malorum : Cicero : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Cicero - De Finibus - translated by H. Rackham

archive.org

In the right context that's not a bad idea, but the end I don't see a way around explaining what Pleasure means in full, which is more than just sensual stimulation.

Referencing "pleasant experiences" may take some of the edge off for people who are suspicious of the word pleasure, but that may not be a good idea. In most cases we probably shouldn't be trying to accomodate people with wrong ideas, we should be trying to educate them as to why they are wrong and that there is a better way of understanding pleasure.

Works great -- thanks ----

Also, we crossposted so please note my comment about Oinoanda.

Another general comment --

in discussing "virtue" as a collective noun vs "the virtues" as particular virtues, I am afraid we are back in the territory of the relationship between "the one" and "the many" in terms of what is it that all virtues share that makes them virtuous.

There's way too much to cover in one episode but in terms of what virtue is, I suppose that's one way of getting at the question: what is it that all "the virtues" share that makes them "virtue"?

Don -- I guess we don't have the Greek to compare to this, but whatever the ambiguity of the word virtue is, it looks like the dispute crystallized, maybe after Epicurus himself was dead, into what Diogenes of Oinoanda is discussing at Fragment 32. I note that the word is used in the plural in this translation. I am thinking that this aspect (which is the means and which is the end) is what people most want us to discuss. Also, I've never been entirely sure whether these European quote marks << >> are supposed to indicate quotes within the text, or missing data which Martin Ferguson Smith has reconstructed. In this case I don't gather that its reconstructed, but rather intended to set off certain sections of text as being referenced rather than being the words of Diogenes himself, but I'm just not sure.

Quote

Fr. 32
... [the latter] being as malicious as the former.
I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now.
If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.
Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point.
Suppose, then, someone were to ask someone, though it is a naive question, «who is it whom these virtues benefit?», obviously the answer will be «man.» The virtues certainly do not make provision for these birds flying past, enabling them to fly well, or for each of the other animals: they do not desert the nature with which they live and by which they have been engendered; rather it is for the sake of this nature that the virtues do everything and exist.

Each (virtue?) therefore ............... means of (?) ... just as if a mother for whatever reasons sees that the possessing nature has been summoned there, it then being necessary to allow the court to asked what each (virtue?) is doing and for whom .................................... [We must show] both which of the desires are natural and which are not; and in general all things that [are included] in the [former category are easily attained] .....

Thanks Don --- the second link worked fine but not the first -- looks like there's maybe an error in "entry=a)reth" in that link?

Yes - just constantly referring to lists like this one does not answer the question or tell us what we need to know.

And remember, about half of what we need to address is what Epicurus said about it, but maybe more than half of what we need to do is cut through the image of virtue that most people think of today given the Stoic/Religious perspective.

The four classic cardinal virtues are:^[4]

• Prudence (φρόνησις, phrónēsis; Latin: prudentia; also Wisdom, Sophia, sapientia), the ability to discern the appropriate course of action to be taken in a given situation at the appropriate time.
• Fortitude (ἀνδρεία, andreía; Latin: fortitudo also termed courage, forbearance, strength, endurance, and the ability to confront fear, uncertainty, and intimidation.
• Temperance (σωφροσύνη, sōphrosýnē; Latin: temperantia also known as restraint, the practice of self-control, abstention, discretion, and moderation tempering the appetition. Plato considered sōphrosynē, which may also be translated as sound-mindedness, to be the most important virtue.
• Justice (δικαιοσύνη, dikaiosýnē; Latin: iustitia also considered as fairness;^[5] the Greek word also having the meaning of righteousness.

This enumeration is traced to Greek philosophy and was listed by Plato who also added piety (ὁσιότης, hosiotēs) and replaced prudence with wisdom.^[6] Some scholars consider either of the above four virtue combinations as mutually reducible and therefore not cardinal.^[7]

One more thing about planning for this program.

We have lots of citations we can go through with various perspectives on whether virtue is the goal of life, the same for all, its own reward, etc.

But I think we need to start out with some basic issues to set the stage for all the rest, such as:

What Is Virtue?

• How do we know what is virtuous and what is not?
• Can the same action be virtuous in one situation and not virtuous in another?
• If so, how do we distinguish between the two actions in different contexts?
• What is the source of "virtue"?
  • The gods?
  • Ideal forms?
  • Rationality?
  • Nature? Does nature tell us somehow what is virtuous?
  • Our minds? Is virtue simply what we say it is?

I've added that to the discussion outline as the place to start:

Virtue Is Not Absolute Or An End In Itself Because All Good And Evil Consists In Sensation

We're looking to get Joshua back in action and happily we are hoping for Don to participate so we should be ready with all guns blazing for the recording next week!

Yes definitely that illustration of Epicurus using wisdom and courage to stand up to the gods glowering down from the sky is a good example of conflict / confrontation and probably willingness to accept danger as well (danger not from the gods but from the fraudulent priests).

Those are very helpful Bryan!

since most of this is discussed by both Epicurus in Herodotus and Lucretius in his poem, can we fill in the chart with the latin equivalent at every step of the way? Perhaps you already have on Chart one, but it would be helpful on chart 2 as well.

Embarassing to say, I always find the Latin easier to relate to than the Greek

Quote from Don

But I'm highly skeptical of the Epicurean putting themselves in harm's way needlessly or recklessly.

Right - nothing would ever be done needlessly or recklesslessly.

But would Epicureans confront Alexander the Oracle-Monger? Yes they did, though Lucian seems to think that one did so on a poor choice of locations. And Lucian himself called for an Epicurus or Democtritus to expose the fraud.

And would Epicureans devote book after book to exposing and denouncing the errors of other schools and of religions?

Absolutely yes they did.

Would Cassius Longinus cite Epicurus himself in support of the actions he and other Epicureans like Panza took against Caesar and Antony? Yes he did.

So there is a time and season for both peace and safety and conflict and danger, all judged and weighed prudently through Epicurean principles.

That's why I wanted to clearly state that I no long er think its a good idea to consider "Peace and Safety" as a catchword -- overemphasis on "peace and safety" can be just as harmful as overemphasis of any other intermediate goal toward the ultimate goal of pleasure.

Torquatus' examples of the actions of his own ancestors also provides a good example that is exactly on point.

Quote from Bryan

When the distinction between atoms and compounds is not significant, I wanted to highlight that Epíkouros uses the term "What is corporeal (τό Σωματικὸν)" for both together:

Thanks for pointing that out. It can definitely be confusing, especially when we start talking about accidents/events and properties/qualities. Atoms have no color but their combinations and movements generate color, and so i gather that even though atoms and combinations of atoms might both be referred to as bodies, I gather you have to get to the combinations stage before you can properly start talking about accidents/events/qualities that are perceptible to us.

I know I have been tempted to say in the past that atoms have "properties" and bodies have "qualities," but I gather it can't be neatly divided like that given the different shades of meaning of the words. At the combination level you have to start dealing with "properties or qualities that can be separated without destroying the thing" vs" properties or qualities that can't be removed without destroying the thing." (And those are scare quotes, I am not representing that that is a quote from Lucretius)

Bryan if you can think of a chart or other way to make those distinctions clear that would help a lot with that section of Lucretius talking about the Trojan War (in book one as I recall).

Welcome to Episode 266 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we have one more special episode before we return to our normal seqence. This week will be an updated version of a talk I gave onJanuary 19, 2025, as part of our first EpicureanFriends Livestream.

Next week we'll be back with our co-hosts for a regular Lucretius Today episode. Until then, here is my presentation of "The Epicurean Paradigm Shift."

DeWitt's References

It may be observed in passing that St. Paul quoted the words Peace and Safety as catchwords of the Epicureans, to whom he refused the honor of mention by name.⁶⁹ In this collocation Peace signified harmonious relations with neighbors while Safety meant the security of the man as a citizen, the sort of safety that Paul himself enjoyed by virtue of Roman citizenship.

St. Paul in I Thessalonians 5 identified the Epicureans by their catchwords Peace and Safety. In this collocation Peace has reference to amicable relations with neighbors, while Safety refers to the security of person and property for the citizen. The best means of obtaining the latter, according to Epicurus, was to withdraw from the multitude and live a retired life, but he thought it equally important to put forward what he called the "false opinions" on the topic, as in Authorized Doctrine 7: "Some men have chosen to become celebrities and to be in the public eye, thinking thus to achieve security from the attacks of men." He does not explicitly label this a false opinion but leaves the inference to be drawn: "Consequently, if the lives of such men are safe, they have reaped the end of Nature, but if their lives are not safe, they lack that for the sake of which at the outset they reached out by the instinct of Nature." They are not free nor in control of their environment; they have placed their happiness at the mercy of a fickle populace.

It is also manifest that he looked chiefly to friendly diplomacy to keep the environment in control. Good will is a catchword of his creed no less than Peace and Safety. It is a precondition of Peace and Safety. He wrote, for instance: "A life of freedom cannot amass great wealth because of success in this being difficult apart from servitude to mobs or monarchs but it does enjoy all things in uninterrupted abundance; if, however, now and then great wealth does fall to its lot, it would gladly disburse this to win the good will of the neighbor."

The followers of Epicurus after his death, though diligent cultivators of peace and safety, continued to display the same belligerency as their founder. According to Lucian it was chiefly the Epicureans who summoned up courage to defy Alexander the False Prophet, and the only man to accuse him to his face on a specific charge was an Epicurean, who almost paid for his daring by his life.¹¹⁷ Upward of a century before the date of this alleged occurrence it was the Epicureans in Thessalonica who by their derision aroused the indignation of St. Paul, then prophesying the second coming of Christ. In his retort he denied them the honor of mention by name but identified them adequately by those catchwords of their creed, "Peace and Safety."¹¹⁸ It may be added that the Epicureans, as usual, were in the right; the prophecy was not fulfilled.

Both Thessalonica and Corinth must have been strongholds of Epicureanism. We must learn to read between the lines. Paul had been preaching at Thessalonica about the second coming of Christ, and prophecy always aroused the scorn of the Epicureans, who denied all participation of the gods in the affairs of man. The answer of Paul to these scoffers is to condemn them to instant annihilation: "For when they shall say Peace and Safety, then sudden destruction cometh upon them, as travail upon a woman with child, and they shall not escape." ^3e The Epicureans were not accorded the honor of mention by name, but Peace and Safety were catchwords of their sect. It was part of their ethics to live a retired life apart from the turmoil of the courts and the market place and so to seek security from the malice and injury of other men. Paul follows up the quarrel and predicts the coming of Antichrist, the model for which was Antiochus Epiphanes, the archenemy of his race and the patron of the hated Epicureans.³⁷

I made the following post initially in response to a private conversation, and I credit Don for researching into the background of this and helping me decide to change my opinion on it. I need to go back and cite as well the parts in DeWitt where he references this, but for now I'll just include the cite that this issue derives from from I Thessalonians 5:3:

1 Thessalonians 5:3 - Bible Gateway

BibleGateway.com: A searchable online Bible in over 150 versions and 50 languages.

www.biblegateway.com

"For when they shall say, Peace and safety; then sudden destruction cometh upon them, as travail upon a woman with child; and they shall not escape." (KJV)

ὅταν γὰρ λέγωσιν Εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια τότε αἰφνίδιος αὐτοῖς ἐφίσταται ὄλεθρος ὥσπερ ἡ ὠδὶν τῇ ἐν γαστρὶ ἐχούσῃ καὶ οὐ μὴ ἐκφύγωσιν

I don't recall DeWitt praising "Peace and Safety" as a slogan that Epicureans *should* use, but I recall that he expressed the opinion that this quotation was a direct reference to Epicureans in fact actually using this regularly, thus leading Paul to be alluding to them in this passage. I still don't doubt that the allusion does encompass the Epicureans at least in part, but I now have a different view of the full effect of what Paul was saying.

In past years after reading that I picked up that analogy and used it myself in my writing about Epicurus. I can't go back and change the past, but if I had it to do over again given my present knowledge I would not do so, and I don't plan to use it in the future either.

In general I am fairly tolerant of DeWitt finding references to Epicureans in Paul, and I don't doubt that there might be some basis that Epicureans made statements like "Be Safe" as we do today. But in the overall context I think this "Peace and Safety" passage was intended as a non-flattering reference and isn't appropriate to be picked up positively.

Even if DeWitt is correct that the Biblical passage was intended to be a reference to Epicureans, at this point I would see the intent behind the reference be slanderous. It's effect is more like See? All those guys are concerned about is avoiding any moment of pain! rather than anything worth following at face value.

Yes it is true that absence of pain = pleasure, but that doesn't mean that we always choose Peace and Safety. The goal is pleasure, so just as we sometimes choose pain in pursuit of pleasure, we must sometimes choose Conflict or Confrontation and Danger when that choice will lead to greater pleasure.

Conflict and Danger is what people like Epicurus or Diogenes of Oinoanda chose when they stood up against the "... common disease, as in a plague" of "...false notions about things" which was spreading among increasing numbers of people "...for in mutual emulation they catch the disease from one another like sheep." (fragment 3)

So at this point for me hearing the phrase "Peace and Safety" serves mainly as a reminder that we would not have Epicurean philosophy today if the founders and many other Epicureans along the way had not often chosen "Conflict and Danger." I don't think we can fully appreciate what the ancients thought it meant to be Epicurean unless we see that sometimes the same thing is required of us.

It's possible that "Confrontation" works better than "conflict" because"conflict" sounds more like physical combat, while "confrontation" sounds both mental and physical. For style purposes, "conflict and danger" works better, along the lines of "what doesn't kill us makes us stronger," but it needs to be made clear that the intellectual conflict is even more important than the physical. Either word works given the right context.

I don't have time for much more than to note that there seems to be some good material in Cicero's "Amicitia" that probably refers to Epicurean views.

Most of it is criticism, from which we can infer the positive from what he views as negative, but I suspect a lot of straight-up praise of friendship is probably the kind of things the Epicureans would have embraced too.

Just a few quotes:

Quote

Among such good men as there really are, friendship has more advantages than I can easily name. In the first place, as Ennius says: —

• “How can life be worth living, if devoid
• Of the calm trust reposed by friend in friend?
• What sweeter joy than in the kindred soul,
• Whose converse differs not from self-communion?”

How could you have full enjoyment of prosperity, unless with one whose pleasure in it was equal to your own? Nor would it be easy to bear adversity, unless with the sympathy of one on whom it rested more heavily than on your own soul. Then, too, other objects of desire are, in general, adapted, each to some specific purpose, — wealth, that you may use it; power, that you may receive the homage of those around you; posts of honor, that you may obtain reputation; sensual gratification, that you may live in pleasure; health, that you may be free from pain, and may have full exercise of your bodily powers and faculties. But friendship combines the largest number of utilities. Wherever you turn, it is at hand. No place shuts it out. It is never unseasonable, never annoying. Thus, as the proverb says, “You cannot put water or fire to more uses than friendship serves.”

Apparent criticism of Epicureanism:

Quote

For as we are beneficent and generous, not in order to exact kindnesses in return (for we do not put our kind offices to interest), but are by nature inclined to be generous, so, in my opinion, friendship is not to be sought for its wages, but because its revenue consists entirely in the love which it implies. Those, however, who, after the manner of beasts, refer everything to pleasure,1 think very differently. Nor is it wonderful that they do; for men who have degraded all their thoughts to so mean and contemptible an end can rise to the contemplation of nothing lofty, nothing magnificent and divine. We may, therefore, leave them out of this discussion. But let us have it well understood that the feeling of love and the endearments of mutual affection spring from nature, in case there is a well-established assurance of moral worth in the person thus loved. Those who desire to become friends approach each other, and enter into relation with each other, that each may enjoy the society and the character of him whom he has begun to love; and they are equal in love, and on either side are more inclined to bestow obligations than to claim a return, so that in this matter there is an honorable rivalry between them. Thus will the greatest benefits be derived from friendship, and it will have a more solid and genuine foundation as tracing its origin to nature than if it proceeded from human weakness. For if it were utility that cemented friendships, an altered aspect of utility would dissolve them.

Quote

Now those who maintain that friendships are formed from motives of utility annul, as it seems to me, the most endearing bond of friendship; for it is not so much benefit obtained through a friend as it is the very love of the friend that gives delight. What comes from a friend confers pleasure, only in case it bears tokens of his interest in us; and so far is it from the truth that friendships are cultivated from a sense of need, that those fully endowed with wealth and resources, especially with virtue, which is the surest safeguard, and thus in no need of friends, are the very persons who are the most generous and munificent. Indeed, I hardly know whether it may not be desirable that our friends should never have need of our services. Yet in the case of Scipio and myself, what room would there have been for the active exercise of my zeal in his behalf, had he never needed my counsel or help at home or in the field? In this instance, however, the service came after the friendship, not the friendship after the service.

Quote

15. If these things are so, men who are given up to pleasure are not to be listened to when they express their opinions about friendship, of which they can have no knowledge either by experience or by reflection. For, by the faith of gods and men, who is there that would be willing to have a super-abundance of all objects of desire and to live in the utmost fulness of wealth and what wealth can bring, on condition of neither loving any one nor being loved by any one? This, indeed, is the life of tyrants, in which there is no good faith, no affection, no fixed confidence in kindly feeling, perpetual suspicion and anxiety, and no room for friendship; for who can love either him whom he fears, or him by whom he thinks that he is feared? Yet they receive the show of homage, but only while the occasion for it lasts.

Quote

23. The more blameworthy are they who are so very careless in a matter of so essential importance. Indeed, among things appertaining to human life, it is friendship alone that has the unanimous voice of all men as to its capacity of service. By many even virtue is scorned, and is said to be a mere matter of display and ostentation. Many despise wealth, and, contented with little, take pleasure in slender diet and inexpensive living Though some are inflamed with desire for office, many there are who hold it in so low esteem that they can imagine nothing more inane or worthless. Other things, too, which seem to some admirable, very many regard as of no value. But all have the same feeling as to friendship, — alike those who devote themselves to the public service, those who take delight in learning and philosophy, those who manage their own affairs in a quiet way, and, lastly, those who are wholly given up to sensual pleasure. They all agree that without friendship life cannot be, if one only means to live in some form or measure respectably.

Regretfully I am going to have to announce another one week postponement of this episode. Several additional conflicts have developed that cause the prudent course to be to record this on February 9th rather than February 2nd.

I have, however, made further progress on the discussion outline, so feel free to reference it here:

Virtue Is Not Absolute Or An End In Itself Because All Good And Evil Consists In Sensation

As you'll see if you click over there, I've already collected far too many citations to cover in a single episode.

As I see it the most important thing for us to cover as an introductory discussion for new students of Epicurus (and remember, that's our target audience, not professional academics) boils down to something like:

Plato and Aristotle had held that virtue is essential to a happy life, but they defined happiness in terms of rationality or piety to the gods. The Stoics went further and held virtue to be an end in itself, and the same for all people at all times and places. Epicurus rejected virtue as an end itself, or the same for all, but instead held that virtue is a necessary and inseparable tool, to be applied contextually, for achieving the best life - a life of pleasure.

Also let me repeat that I invite anyone to suggest issues to cover, as did Matteng in post 5 above.

Matteng's suggestions from Stoic criticisms are good general aspects such as:

- Virtue is in our power but pleasure/tranquility depends on externals

- Without Virtue nothing is good

- Only with virtue can anything be useful

Feel free to add to our list and we'll try to cover them.

I better immediately interject that this book is not by Norman DeWitt but by William DeWitt Hyde -- who so far as I know are not connected at all.

- Now I'll read the rest of the post. Seems like something I should have gotten back to in the five years since I first started the thread.

Update:

YES! Great quote!

Happy Birthday to Jo.! Learn more about Jo. and say happy birthday on Jo.'s timeline: Jo.

For those who come across this thread you'll want to read the follow-up here:

Article

Giving Credit Where It Is Due: Samuel Dunster, Likely Author of the 1743 Prose Translation of Lucretius

For over two hundred years, obscurity has surrounded the identity of the anonymous translator of one of the first readable prose editions of Lucretius in the English language. In this article, Joshua tracks down the evidence and concludes that it points in one direction.

Joshua

July 18, 2024 at 3:07 PM