REMINDER: SUNDAY WEEKLY ZOOM - January 11, 2026 -12:30 PM EDT - Ancient text study and discussion: De Rerum Natura by Lucretius - Level 03 members and above -- Line 127 - read the new update.
Nate I think this probably should be Thomas PAINE but I didn't change it....
Colonial North America versus self-described "Deists" like Thomas Young and Ethan Allen.
Also notable in the time period was Elihu Palmer, who's book "Principles of Nature" I have read in the distant past and found to be pretty good (but that was in my pre-Epicurean days, so no warranty!). Links to his work are here: https://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/lo…hu%2C+1764-1806
I don't think that there is anything more important in the way Epicurus was presenting the issues than to emphasize that he was including *everything* that feels good in any way at all (physically, mentally, emotionally, or any word we might choose to use) under the term "pleasure."
That's the way you get around the constant temptation to rank some good feelings as *better* than others.
Of course the other issue is that indulging in some pleasures in some contexts will being more pain than pleasure, but that's a contextual issue and different people will answer differently how much pain should be accepted for a particular pleasure.
The pain calculation is a "practical" consideration that varies by person and context, but the decision to include *everything* that we find feels good under the term "pleasure" (rather than insist on 50 different terms) is - to me - definitional and philosophical.
And it is something that is not at all clear to everyone, and needs to be explained.
If you want to maintain that all pleasure is good, as Epicurus did, even though every pleasure is not to be chosen at all times, then you are making a sweeping statement ("all pleasure is good") which does not allow of any exceptions. So I'd you start ranking some as more good or less good, then you're not following Epicurus' own analysis.
"Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided.". (letter to Menoeceus)
Welcome ReneLiza and thank you for that introduction! We have some very friendly and helpful people here who will be glad to answer anything you ask. And don't hesitate to ask anything no matter how basic you may think it might be. There's no better way for those of us who have been around for a while to test our own knowledge than to have an opportunity to explain things to someone new. So let us know however we can be of help.
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Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.
All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.
One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.
In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.
It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.
And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.
Welcome to the forum!
I just realized this weekend (it was pointed out to me by Kalosyni) that the "Latest Posts" link (which I have now added to the main menu top-level menu as "RECENT") will show you not only the latest posts in the Forum sections, but also latest entries on the "Walls" of each user.
i tend to navigate the forum by looking for the red dot on the "bell" icon that's at the top of the page, but that "bell" doesn't notify you of posts on peoples' walls. i am looking for a way to produce a "red dot" that indicates ALL new posts to the website, so if I can figure out how to produce that I will implement it and post about it.
In the meantime, clicking on the "FORUM / Latest Posts" dropdown menu, or on the "RECENT" menu item in the top-level menu, should produce a list of most ALL recent activity on the forum.
There are several good additional posts in this thread, but i have time at the moment to paste only this one by Nate followed by one by me:
Nate:
Philodemus offers a prescription and names it as such (pharmakos):
First up, don't fear God or divine punishment. Don't think that the Natural World responds to your intentions like a Universal Mind that is aware of your personal feelings and disposes you accordingly. Life is about learning, so if you fear being punished from masturbating, read about anatomy to dispel that fear. If you fear that life does not make sense, and only the universe acting against you can explain your circumstances, spend time re-considering how such socio-economic circumstances come to play.
Second, don't fear Death, Hell, or an afterlife. Your actions are not being tallied like a morality points in Knights of the Old Republic. Life does not reward you for playing its game after you turn off the game. Don't get distracted by empty speculation: focus on the cause-and-effect of the present. Knowing that you will be saved in an afterlife through faith can lead one to commit many self-destructive and imprudent behaviors. The opposite leads people to despair that they are cursed.
Third, remember that you can live an amazing life living with cheap food and good friendships. You are not being kept from happiness because you lack fame and wealth (just look at Will Smith and Johnny Depp). The best things in life are free, and it is easier to get them than it is a new car. A bag of rice is only a few dollars and will feed you for a week. Your stomach does not distinguish the economic value of an apple, only its digestibility. A happy stomach and a happy friend makes a happy person.
Fourth, if you are in an absolute worst-case-scenario, and the previous three points are doing nothing to ease you from either chronic pain or unmanageable anxiety, just know that the pain cannot last, and you have done a tremendous job by tolerating it, and it is almost done. If you have a psychiatric episode, know that it is closer to being done than it was a few minutes ago. If you have suffered a mortal wound, know that keeping things in perspective will make the end of life more pleasant.
Vipassana, formless meditation, the Eightfold path, raja yoga, hatha yoga, confessionals with priests, ritualistic prayer designed to elicit a deity's favor, fasting, hypnosis, cognitive-behavioral therapy, counseling, pharmaceuticals, and dietary restrictions will not work for everyone. Each has differing levels of efficacy depending on the patient. However, rejecting fear of God, fear of damnation, rejecting celebrity-worship, and keeping optimistic in the face of pain are universally healthy.
Aside from Philodemus' Tetrapharmakos, we are advised to repeat the practice of frankly speaking in a non-judgmental setting (parrhesia), which provides history with one of the first forms of psychological therapy, designed to allow one to acknowledge one's own faults and find opportunities for personal growth. It also serves to foster social bonding and encourage trust relationships between good friends, so people do not feel isolated and resigned to insurmountable obstacles.
And, of course, Epicurus directly prescribes for us to study his philosophy, for it is never to soon, nor too late to secure the health of one's soul. Reading his Epistles, the Vatican Sayings, the Wise Man Sayings, the book of fragments, the Doxai, the poetic translation of On Nature as Lucretius' De Rerum Natura, as well as supplemental literature to understand the historical context (De Witt, Long & Sedley, O'Keefe, Wilson, etc.) are all recommended practices for a person to cure their anxiety.
Cassius:
Epicurus himself made a number of references in his letters to his own pursuit of the study of nature, and of philosophy, as his method of pursuing happiness. I think that gets overlooked as too general and imprecise to be of much help, but I think there is more too it if you consider some of his other viewpoints: In chapter Four of Lucretius, there is a long discussion of the nature and function of "images," and how the mind processes the things that are around us and incorporates them into our lives - even to the extent of dreaming about them at night. And as referenced in the opening of Book Six, the way to approach serenely even issues like "the gods" is to have appropriate views about them.
This sounds a lot to me like a form of conditioning your mind and your attitudes by pursuing those activities and studies that lead to please, and that lead to understanding that help you to deal with whatever pains you choose to accept or cannot avoid.
Several people have mentioned above that as individuals we find different things pleasurable, which leads to the view too that it's up to us to understand ourselves and our circumstances and to prudently organize our lives to produced the happiest result.
There's nothing magic in all this, nor should we expect there to be in a universe that is totally natural and without supernatural creation or control.
And to me that leads to one of the most key conclusions of all - that what Epicurus was mainly concerned about was orienting us to the way the world really works, and that there are no supernatural or absolute rules we are required to follow, so that it's up to us to "make hay while the sun shines."
There was a line in Chapter Fourteen of A Few Days in Athens that Frances Wright gives to Epicurus, which he says to a young student who has become attracted to the "vibe" of happiness that Epicurus had established in his Garden, but who had yet to crack a book as to the deeper and more controversial aspects of the philosophy - the student did not know that Epicurus taught that there is no supernatural god, no afterlife, no fate). Wright has Epicurus say to that student:
"I am sorry that you presumed so much, where you knew so little."
Rather than just presume that Epicurus was a direct competitor to the Stoics, and that he had the same presumptions and was after the same goals, we need to first dig into the details of what Epicurus was really teaching so we can see the full implications of the Epicurean worldview. After we see that it seems to me that the questions about "techniques" to live better become much easier to answer.
Tonight's AFDIA Zoom Discussion Starts at 8:00 PM Eastern - Link in the Calendar Event - Visitor's Welcome!
I haven't had a chance to look closely at this but might be interesting -
Chapter 14 is as deep as Chapter 13 is short. We will spend as much time talking about the details in one session as we can. One line however that I don't want to forget to highlight is this one, spoken by Epicurus to Theon:
"But as respects your defense of my philosophy, I am sorry that you presumed so much, where you knew so little."
If that doesn't summarize the state of the majority of modern discussion about Epicurus on the internet today, I don't know what does! 
I hope that our book review, and EpicureanFriends.com, and our other efforts are small advances along the way in educating the Theons of today, who think that Epicurean philosophy is about nothing more than being gracious and smiling and "pursuing happiness," will come to understand that this statement given by "Epicurus" applies today as much as it did when delivered to Theon.
So in this chapter, we dive into deep issues such as whether an opinion can ever be morally good or morally evil, how the evidence of the senses should be used as the basis of all our opinions, and - as one of the biggest issues of the chapter - how the evidence provided by the principle of "isonomia" (existence along a spectrum from low to high) and the principle that "nature never makes a single thing of a kind" - though neither principle is named here explicitly) provide the evidence for Epicurus asserting the existence of a type of god, but not the existence of a specific god.
I am going to put most of the notes on the discussion we will have tonight under Chapter 14, where the heart of the discussion takes place, rather than here under Thirteen.
As I was reviewing these two chapters this afternoon, it keep hitting me that maybe the one thing Chapter 13 really stands for (other than setting out the blasphemy charges against Epicurus) is that instead of:
"A Few Days In Athens"
the title could have been:
"A Few Days Spent in Athens By A Young Person And the Mistakes He Makes Conversing With Philosophers While Never Cracking Open A Book!"
Back then it was said that Epicurus did not teach publicly.
The question is: Did Epicurus actually have people read the teachings themselves instead of giving lectures?
Yes I agree with what both Don and Joshua have written. I too have read the kind of statement you are citing, but I think that's another one of many exaggerations, for exactly the reasons Don and Joshua cite. I think the evidence supports the view that Epicurus was careful in choosing his forums, but there's no reason at all to think that he confined himself to writing, or to only small groups of intimate friends.
Some mathematicians and historians, such as Carl Boyer, hold that Zeno's paradoxes are simply mathematical problems, for which modern calculus provides a mathematical solution.[6] Some philosophers, however, say that Zeno's paradoxes and their variations (see Thomson's lamp) remain relevant metaphysical problems
We just finished recording the podcast and this statement from Wikipedia stands out for me. We did our best to make the issues understandable and relevant, and this quote gets to the issue of why I think Epicurus thought the subject was important: We aren't simply discussing "mathematical problems" - we're illustrating that some very compelling arguments can be drawn up on many issues that would make you doubt your ability to control your life and be confident in reasoning based on the senses. Two other quotes come to mind:
This one I included in the podcast at the end:
[500] And if reason is unable to unravel the cause, why those things which close at hand were square, are seen round from a distance, still it is better through lack of reasoning to be at fault in accounting for the causes of either shape, rather than to let things clear seen slip abroad from your grasp, and to assail the grounds of belief, and to pluck up the whole foundations on which life and existence rest. For not only would all reasoning fall away; life itself too would collapse straightway, unless you chose to trust the senses, and avoid headlong spots and all other things of this kind which must be shunned, and to make for what is opposite to these. Know, then, that all this is but an empty store of words, which has been drawn up and arrayed against the senses. (Bailey)
This one I didn't include but also seems relevant from Book One:
[102] But still I fear your caution will dispute the maxims I lay down, who all your life have trembled at the poets' frightful tales. Alas! I could even now invent such dreams as would pervert the steadiest rules of reason, and make your fortunes tremble to the bottom. No wonder! But if Men were once convinced that death was the sure end of all their pains, they might with reason, then, resist the force of all Religion, and contemn the threats of poets. Now, we have no sense, no power, to strive against prejudice, because we fear a scene of endless torments after death. (Brown)
More links:
Wikipedia: Infinite Divisibility: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infinite_divisibility
Wikipedia: Zeno's Paradoxes: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeno%27s_paradoxes
Zeno's paradoxes are a set of philosophical problems generally thought to have been devised by Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea (c. 490–430 BC) to support Parmenides' doctrine that contrary to the evidence of one's senses, the belief in plurality and change is mistaken, and in particular that motion is nothing but an illusion. It is usually assumed, based on Plato's Parmenides (128a–d), that Zeno took on the project of creating these paradoxes because other philosophers had created paradoxes against Parmenides' view. Thus Plato has Zeno say the purpose of the paradoxes "is to show that their hypothesis that existences are many, if properly followed up, leads to still more absurd results than the hypothesis that they are one."[1] Plato has Socrates claim that Zeno and Parmenides were essentially arguing exactly the same point.[2] Some of Zeno's nine surviving paradoxes (preserved in Aristotle's Physics[3][4] and Simplicius's commentary thereon) are essentially equivalent to one another. Aristotle offered a refutation of some of them.[3] Three of the strongest and most famous—that of Achilles and the tortoise, the Dichotomy argument, and that of an arrow in flight—are presented in detail below.
Zeno's arguments are perhaps the first examples of a method of proof called reductio ad absurdum, also known as proof by contradiction. They are also credited as a source of the dialectic method used by Socrates.[5] Some mathematicians and historians, such as Carl Boyer, hold that Zeno's paradoxes are simply mathematical problems, for which modern calculus provides a mathematical solution.[6] Some philosophers, however, say that Zeno's paradoxes and their variations (see Thomson's lamp) remain relevant metaphysical problems.[7][8][9] The origins of the paradoxes are somewhat unclear. Diogenes Laërtius, a fourth source for information about Zeno and his teachings, citing Favorinus, says that Zeno's teacher Parmenides was the first to introduce the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. But in a later passage, Laërtius attributes the origin of the paradox to Zeno, explaining that Favorinus disagrees.[10]
Eoghan Gardner
In Epicureanism we are giving a lot of realities and principles. Such as pleasure is the goal of life, pleasure and pain are guides to achieve this goal etc...
I think what's lacking (surely due to most of epicurus writings being so far lost) is the prescriptive nature of what to actually do. There is a sense in which Epicurus seems the type of man not to prescribe many exercises as opposed to Stoicism which is almost all prescription.
Anyway my point is from what we know of the man and his garden what do you think epicurus would prescribe as exercises?
I see many think Buddhists meditation but I don't see why epicurus would do something like that.
Maybe a gratitude journal? But keeping in mind the point of it is not to be grateful but for the pleasure gratitude brings.
Si Haves Personally I imagine Epicurus practicing gratitude, perhaps a contemplative practice of some sort maybe sitting in silence sometimes and just being in the moment. I'd to imagine him dancing happily and joyfully in the garden.
Antonio MonteroModerator
I think that the exercise is to be conscious of ourselfs, of our own nature, by making the distinction between the different kind of pleasures it brings an aware of ourself that bring that peace which is ataraxia. By observing nature and losing fear of the gods an death we keep ourselves in the present, not thinking about the suffering of death or the punishment of the gods. And by keeping and nourishing friendship and companion ship, knowing that like us, they want to avoid suffering and pain we can create a healthy society. That's my view and how I try to exercise the epicurean philosophy. Taking care of the garden of our life and our friends.
Nic ReaganHe may have, but it was lost to history. Certainly, the early Epicureans celebrated Eikas on the 20th. So, occasional celebrations/feasts are called for as a practice. I would also classify 'withdrawing from public life' and avoiding the seeking of wealth, fame, and power as a specific 'practice by not-doing'. He also encouraged contemplation of nature, atoms and Void, and their implications for non-fear and non-pain. These are a good starting point. As Epicureans, however, I feel we're free to create our OWN practices within the 'spirit' of Epicureanism, to suit our needs.
David O'ConnellI sincerely think we should discuss forming groups irl to build some sense of Epicurean community. Perhaps that's too long term.
Sherrillynn BarnesDavid O'Connell great idea.
Richard OwenI genuinely believe that Epicurus would bee a big proponent of boardgame nights, intellectual stimulation and good company!
Panos AlexiouA philosophy for community not individual supermen made out of stone. Meet friends, have good conversation, live life in moderation etc
Garrett WiseMy hunch is that this is because pleasure and pain are subjective to the individual. The things I need to do so that I minimize my pains are much different than the things that my wife must do, since she has medical issues that I don't.
Similarly, although Epicurus described the three different types of desires, each of us has to go through our own unique process of limiting our desires to those Natural and Necessary ones.
Matt JaxI imagine his prescription was basically to pursue pleasure…to be with friends, to pursue the natural desires of the body with prudence.
Tristan MelloYou know I think we should practice in the way that Epicurus would want. Celebrate friendship. Write a poem for a friend. Tell them you love them and mean it. Practice friendship. You learn from just having a friend. You learn from being a friend... how to be a friend. Like helping our friends. How your friends treat you.
Eoghan - I think a big issue modern people have (and perhaps even the ancient greeks) is that we have been told these truths by Epicurus and his successors but we are so beat down by rules and regulations that we still are looking for a how to guide.
It's kind of like a car that is broke down, a mechanic comes (the teachings of epicurus) and fixes it but sometimes the car needs a push start before it actually can move.
The recording of our session on Chapter Twelve:
For those interested in DeWitt's full thesis as to cross-references between Epicurus and Paul of Tarsus, DeWitt's full book can be read here:
Epicurism.info: http://epicurism.info/etexts/stpaulandepicurus.html
The old archived Epicurus.info: http://web.archive.org/web/2011030101…ndepicurus.html
Note For the AFDIA Zoom Book Review meeting of 5/1/22: Chapter 13 is very short, and both 13 and 14 focus on the issue of Epicurean Gods, so we will combine discussion of the two chapters- so please read both Chapter 13 and 14 for our discussion Sunday May 1.
Episode 119 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today we continue in the Letter to Herodotus to make additional observations about perception through the mechanism of atoms. Please let us know any comments or questions you have in the thread below, and please be sure to subscribe to the podcast on your telephone or other podcast aggregator.
The podcast subject next up is on the indivisibility of the atom. This has lots of implications that are not necessarily discussed in this section of the text, so if anyone has issues that we should be sure to include, please add them to this thread.
Welcome to Episode One Hundred Twenty of Lucretius Today.
This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.
I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.
If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.
Today we continue our review of Epicurus' letter to Herodotus, and we move further into fundamental physics and discuss issues related to the question of whether matter can be infinitely divided.
Now let's join Joshua reading today's text:
Bailey
Moreover, we must not either suppose that every size exists among the atoms, in order that the evidence of phenomena may not contradict us, but we must suppose that there are some variations of size. For if this be the case, we can give a better account of what occurs in our feelings and sensations.
[56] But the existence of atoms of every size is not required to explain the differences of qualities in things, and at the same time some atoms would be bound to come within our ken and be visible; but this is never seen to be the case, nor is it possible to imagine how an atom could become visible.
Besides this we must not suppose that in a limited body there can be infinite parts or parts of every degree of smallness. Therefore, we must not only do away with division into smaller and smaller parts to infinity, in order that we may not make all things weak, and so in the composition of aggregate bodies be compelled to crush and squander the things that exist into the non-existent, but we must not either suppose that in limited bodies there is a possibility of continuing to infinity in passing even to smaller and smaller parts.
[57] For if once one says that there are infinite parts in a body or parts of any degree of smallness, it is not possible to conceive how this should be, and indeed how could the body any longer be limited in size? (For it is obvious that these infinite particles must be of some size or other; and however small they may be, the size of the body too would be infinite.) And again, since the limited body has an extreme point, which is distinguishable, even though not perceptible by itself, you cannot conceive that the succeeding point to it is not similar in character, or that if you go on in this way from one point to another, it should be possible for you to proceed to infinity marking such points in your mind.
[58] We must notice also that the least thing in sensation is neither exactly like that which admits of progression from one part to another, nor again is it in every respect wholly unlike it, but it has a certain affinity with such bodies, yet cannot be divided into parts. But when on the analogy of this resemblance we think to divide off parts of it, one on the one side and another on the other, it must needs be that another point like the first meets our view. And we look at these points in succession starting from the first, not within the limits of the same point nor in contact part with part, but yet by means of their own proper characteristics measuring the size of bodies, more in a greater body and fewer in a smaller.
[59] Now we must suppose that the least part in the atom too bears the same relation to the whole; for though in smallness it is obvious that it exceeds that which is seen by sensation, yet it has the same relations. For indeed we have already declared on the ground of its relation to sensible bodies that the atom has size, only we placed it far below them in smallness. Further, we must consider these least indivisible points as boundary-marks, providing in themselves as primary units the measure of size for the atoms, both for the smaller and the greater, in our contemplation of these unseen bodies by means of thought. For the affinity which the least parts of the atom have to the homogeneous parts of sensible things is sufficient to justify our conclusion to this extent: but that they should ever come together as bodies with motion is quite impossible.
HICKS
Again, you should not suppose that the atoms have any and every size, lest you be contradicted by facts; but differences of size must be admitted; for this addition renders the facts of feeling and sensation easier of explanation.
[56] But to attribute any and every magnitude to the atoms does not help to explain the differences of quality in things; moreover, in that case atoms large enough to be seen ought to have reached us, which is never observed to occur; nor can we conceive how its occurrence should be possible, i. e. that an atom should become visible. "Besides, you must not suppose that there are parts unlimited in number, be they ever so small, in any finite body. Hence not only must we reject as impossible subdivision ad infinitum into smaller and smaller parts, lest we make all things too weak and, in our conceptions of the aggregates, be driven to pulverize the things that exist, i. e. the atoms, and annihilate them; but in dealing with finite things we must also reject as impossible the progression ad infinitum by less and less increments.
[57] For when once we have said that an infinite number of particles, however small, are contained in anything, it is not possible to conceive how it could any longer be limited or finite in size. For clearly our infinite number of particles must have some size; and then, of whatever size they were, the aggregate they made would be infinite. And, in the next place, since what is finite has an extremity which is distinguishable, even if it is not by itself observable, it is not possible to avoid thinking of another such extremity next to this. Nor can we help thinking that in this way, by proceeding forward from one to the next in order, it is possible by such a progression to arrive in thought at infinity.
[58] We must consider the minimum perceptible by sense as not corresponding to that which is capable of being traversed, i.e. is extended, nor again as utterly unlike it, but as having something in common with the things capable of being traversed, though it is without distinction of parts. But when from the illusion created by this common property we think we shall distinguish something in the minimum, one part on one side and another part on the other side, it must be another minimum equal to the first which catches our eye. In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space; nor do we see them touch one another's parts with their parts, but we see that by virtue of their own peculiar character (i.e. as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes: there are more of them, if the magnitude measured is greater; fewer of them, if the magnitude measured is less.
[59] We must recognize that this analogy also holds of the minimum in the atom; it is only in minuteness that it differs from that which is observed by sense, but it follows the same analogy. On the analogy of things within our experience we have declared that the atom has magnitude; and this, small as it is, we have merely reproduced on a larger scale. And further, the least and simplest things must be regarded as extremities of lengths, furnishing from themselves as units the means of measuring lengths, whether greater or less, the mental vision being employed, since direct observation is impossible. For the community which exists between them and the unchangeable parts (i.e. the minimal parts of area or surface) is sufficient to justify the conclusion so far as this goes. But it is not possible that these minima of the atom should group themselves together through the possession of motion.
YONGE
Hence these somethings capable of being diversely arranged must be indestructible, exempt from change, but possessed each of its own distinctive mass and configuration. This must remain.
[55] "For in the case of changes of configuration within our experience the figure is supposed to be inherent when other qualities are stripped off, but the qualities are not supposed, like the shape which is left behind, to inhere in the subject of change, but to vanish altogether from the body. Thus, then, what is left behind is sufficient to account for the differences in composite bodies, since something at least must necessarily be left remaining and be immune from annihilation. "Again, you should not suppose that the atoms have any and every size, lest you be contradicted by facts; but differences of size must be admitted; for this addition renders the facts of feeling and sensation easier of explanation.
[56] But to attribute any and every magnitude to the atoms does not help to explain the differences of quality in things; moreover, in that case atoms large enough to be seen ought to have reached us, which is never observed to occur; nor can we conceive how its occurrence should be possible, i. e. that an atom should become visible. "Besides, you must not suppose that there are parts unlimited in number, be they ever so small, in any finite body. Hence not only must we reject as impossible subdivision ad infinitum into smaller and smaller parts, lest we make all things too weak and, in our conceptions of the aggregates, be driven to pulverize the things that exist, i. e. the atoms, and annihilate them; but in dealing with finite things we must also reject as impossible the progression ad infinitum by less and less increments.
[57] "For when once we have said that an infinite number of particles, however small, are contained in anything, it is not possible to conceive how it could any longer be limited or finite in size. For clearly our infinite number of particles must have some size; and then, of whatever size they were, the aggregate they made would be infinite. And, in the next place, since what is finite has an extremity which is distinguishable, even if it is not by itself observable, it is not possible to avoid thinking of another such extremity next to this. Nor can we help thinking that in this way, by proceeding forward from one to the next in order, it is possible by such a progression to arrive in thought at infinity.
[58] We must consider the minimum perceptible by sense as not corresponding to that which is capable of being traversed, i. e. is extended, nor again as utterly unlike it, but as having something in common with the things capable of being traversed, though it is without distinction of parts. But when from the illusion created by this common property we think we shall distinguish something in the minimum, one part on one side and another part on the other side, it must be another minimum equal to the first which catches our eye. In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space; nor do we see them touch one another's parts with their parts, but we see that by virtue of their own peculiar character (i. e. as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes: there are more of them, if the magnitude measured is greater; fewer of them, if the magnitude measured is less.
[59] We must recognize that this analogy also holds of the minimum in the atom; it is only in minuteness that it differs from that which is observed by sense, but it follows the same analogy. On the analogy of things within our experience we have declared that the atom has magnitude; and this, small as it is, we have merely reproduced on a larger scale. And further, the least and simplest things must be regarded as extremities of lengths, furnishing from themselves as units the means of measuring lengths, whether greater or less, the mental vision being employed, since direct observation is impossible. For the community which exists between them and the unchangeable parts (i. e. the minimal parts of area or surface) is sufficient to justify the conclusion so far as this goes. But it is not possible that these minima of the atom should group themselves together through the possession of motion.
