All of which leads to this kind of statement at wikipedia: that Epicurus "idiosyncraticlly defined pleasure as absenced of suffering and that the goal of life is not "pleasure" but "atraxia meaning untroubledness.....' No real statement of PLEASURE as the goal either here or in the opening paragraphs of the wikipedia article on epicurus himself.
Plus THIS which identifies katastematic pleasures "as the focal ones to Epicurus."
IT's this kind of thing that is the problem:
Another example which implies that katastematic pleasureis the real objective above Kinetic:
Permanent URL: https://etd.library.emory.edu/concern/etds/1r66j156t?locale=en
Published
Abstract Pleasure and the Absence of Pain: Reading Epicurus' Hedonism Through Plato's Philebus By Kelly E. Arenson
Epicurus made a name for himself in the ancient world when he identified pleasure with the absence of pain and proceeded to distinguish it from a second, seemingly different variety of pleasure--that found `in motion' (kinetic). I interpret Epicurus' distinction through the lens of Plato's Philebus and the ancient debates concerning that dialogue. At issue in these debates and the theories that arise from them is whether pleasure is a process or an end and how pleasure ought to be conceived in terms of the harmonious functioning of a living organism. I argue that Plato identifies pleasure with the perceived process of restoration of an organism's natural harmony and that he uses this description to deny that pleasure is the good. Aristotle, rebuking the Platonic position, counters that pleasures are not processes of replenishment but are associated with the activity of an organism's unimpeded functioning. In the Epicurean development of these ideas, kinetic pleasure is the perceived restoration of the natural functioning of a living organism, and katastematic pleasure is painless, natural functioning itself, or health. On this reading, Epicurus considers any perceived affection that does not involve pain to be katastematic and thus the highest pleasure, including everyday sensory pleasures, such as taste. I show that Epicurus' distinction between pleasures serves as a dialectical response to the Philebus and bears the marks of Aristotle's response to the dialogue as well.
Isn't all pleasure a sensation by Epicurean definition?
Yes and that is definitely the starting point of the analysis, and why most of the academic statements strike me as wrong.
What I am really talking about are these articles, for existence the Konstan articles you've cited. I know what these recent writers are saying, and mainly I am trying to figure how to deal with the fact that what they are saying appears wrong, and yet we don't want to be a "ghetto" here where we talk only to ourselves and therefore appear "stupid" to people on the outside who say that the "experts" say something else.
The constant situation is that people are going to read here things that (hopefully) makes sense, but then they go to the current academic articles and read a lot of spaghetti-like speculations that seem to lead nowhere (and ultimately contradict your basic observation that all pleasure is "felt").
That's the point of the Wenham article - Wenham is on our side and he fights that - and also the point of Nikolsky. But they are the minority, so it's a matter of developing the best way to articulate things here while also preparing other readers to recognize that when they go "outside" they will read something else, so that they know what the issues are and why on side makes sense and the other doesn't.
Godfrey's suggestion makes sense as a particular type of feeling of pleasure, and may be workable IF katastematic pleasure can indeed be "felt" under the authorities that talked about these issues.
The real rub is getting a consensus on whether it can be felt and then clearly delineating it from any other type of mental pleasure.
This is one of those areas where I think we just have to be flexible and realize that talking about it rather casually is one thing, but wrestling with the "experts" who have a lot more firepower in their citations is something else.
That's why for me it's a lot easier to take a position in what it is "not" (some special "higher" type of pleasure that is the "true goal" of life) than what it "is."
The first point I would like to see articulated is that Epicurus' opinions about sex and romance—whatever they turn out to be—are just that; opinions. I'm not very likely to consult a dead philosopher at all on these matters, they being so intimate and so personal, and I am especially uninterested in giving my ear to any High Priest of Epicureanism on what I should do, or what I am allowed to do when it comes to interpersonal relationships.
I agree with that too with this different wording:
Epicurus was a "philosopher." He was not a "Life Coach" or a "Sex Therapist" or a "Psychologist," or a "Psychiatrist" except as we choose to think about applying his general rules to our own specific cases.
All we really know about Epicurus' personal life is that he seemed to spend most of his time in studying nature and engaging in philosophical discussions (battles) over conflicting philosophical ideas. We don't know his specific thoughts on a wide variety of specific situations.
Yes his general philosophical deductions do have applications to specifics, but only in a general way. The thrust of his work was at high levels like:
- There are no supernatural gods or life after death so live like you only live once.
- Pleasure and Pain as feels are in a general sense the real guides to life, not virtue or divinities.
- Think about all the results of your choices, long and short term, and make your decisions so as to maximize pleasure and minimize pain.
- Actions that have a high risk of painful results need to be engaged in very carefully, if you choose to engage in them at all.
I don't think Epicurus meant to be interpreted as being any more specific toward specific people than general "rules of thumb" like that. And it wouldn't make sense for him to try to, because the whole thrust of his worldview is that there is no fate and no hard determinism so everyone has to deal with their own circumstances as best they can.
Even the extended treatment of romantic love in Book Four of Lucretius is really almost just a series of semi-amusing anecdotes which try to impress among people who are intoxicated to be especially careful - not a general rule of "do this" or "don't do that" -- heck the experts can't even agree if he had a general rule for or against marriage itself, and the best unwinding of that always seems to come down to "it depends."
So I see Epicurus' general advice to be "Be Careful."
He's providing the starting point, but he's NOT telling us to take that info and go sit in a cave. He tells us also to gather friends and talk about things and apply the general rules to life, and that's the kind of thing we can do by looking at modern and specific contexts and help each other analyze things and work together as friends to apply the general rules to the specific problems.
Maybe one of the most productive ways to grapple with this involves being very clear what kinetic(active) and katastematic(static) really means, using examples.
What Kalosyni said is part of the problem: unless you take the time to study what the Greeks were saying, as Gosling and Taylor do in detail, it is natural to think that "katastematic/static/ataraxia" translates into something like:
"I'm sitting on my porch meditating and clearing my mind and just feeling good without any troubles at all."
I am convinced that if you read Gosling and Taylor's description of the words and the history, you will conclude that even THAT example is an example of a "kinetic" pleasure. It is difficult or impossible to express in normal terms how a human being can experience anything that is unchanging and therefore "katastematic." That is because the Greeks were rigorously defining kinetic to include anything which involves any experience over time at all. Therefore ANY experience over time falls under "kinetic." As a result anything that you want to call "katastematic" loses that title if you can actually "experience" it. (I don't see this in the discussions but presumably you would need to divide PAINS into kinetic and katastematic as well as pleasures, which would also be an interesting way to get at the issues.)
To be katastematic/static under the definitions G&T pull out of Plato et al would involve true and absolute "rest" -- a state of no change whatsoever. That might almost be like a "freeze-frame" in a video -- where a particular set of circumstances exists in totally unchanging form. But such "states" do not exist in an Epicurean universe: everything is a combination of atoms whirling through space, and nothing is ever exactly the same for more than a moment in time.
All this would take a lot of work and study to document adequately, and this is too short an explanation without cites. But I know I remember G&T spending a lot of time on this, and if I recall correctly this aspect -- whether katastematic pleasure can be experienced - is a focus of Wenham's paper we have online here: On Cicero's Interpretation of Katastematic Pleasure In Epicurus
Wenham's abstract from that article:
The standard interpretation of the concept of katastematic pleasure in Epicurus has it referring to “static” states from which feeling is absent. We owe the prevalence of this interpretation to Cicero’s account of Epicureanism in his De Finibus Bonorum Et Malorum. Cicero’s account, in turn, is based on the Platonic theory of pleasure. The standard interpretation, when applied to principles of Epicurean hedonism, leads to fundamental contradictions in his theory. I claim that it is not Epicurus, but the standard interpretation that generates these errors because the latter construes pleasure in Epicurus according to an attitudinal theoretical framework, whilst the account of pleasure that emerges from Epicurean epistemology sees it as experiential.
Gosh one more comment. I think this issue HAS to be considered in context of PD18 and PD19, which we hardly ever see discussed.
How can a finite life contain as much pleasure as one that is not time limited? To me the answer to that clearly derives from a way of looking at pleasures ("by reason!") that indicates that we are engaged in a logical battle (presumably with Plato et al) at an abstract level, rather than taking a pure "feeling" comparison of the pleasures of one against the other as we normally think of pleasure.
Everyone would intuitively want the longer portion, so what Epicurus is doing is showing a way of looking at the issue that satisfies us that we are not missing anything new and categorically different by not having the longer time. It to worry about the lack of time. But a way of looking at something does not change what we are looking at - pleasures are pleasures and unless we feel them then we are essentially dead and they are nothing to us.
Bottom line : before someone comes to a resting point on what they think about katastematic pleasure I would suggest they consider how their viewpoint relates to 18 and 19.
This is something that a pig cannot do, but also something that does not appear (to us) to bother the pig. We have the need for the analysis only because it bothers us if we don't.
One thing more - as to a conclusion from all this.
After reading that, my view remains with Nikolsky that the kinetic-katastematic distinction, to the extent it was of significance to Epicurus at all (which is very unclear) arose as a response (as Konstan says) to positions taken by Plato about the nature of pleasure, and needs to be viewed primarily in that context.
Most all of us agree that pleasure is a sweeping word that contains every form of good feeling anyone can describe, and that it isn't possible to rate any kind of pleasure "objectively" as always better than another. If we try to do that (rank one type of pleasure as absolutely better than another, or "best") then we're going to involve ourselves in logical inconsistencies with the rest of Epicurean philosophy that go all the way back to its physics and epistemological bases.
So while I think this is a useful advanced topic to know about so as to navigate the logical debates of Greek philosophy wars, the suggestion that in real life we should deprecate joy and delight and mental pleasures (all of which are KINETIC) in favor of something which arguably is not even an "experience" does not provide a lot of help for us in developing therapies or practices for living real life.
It's really fascinating how this debate arose and why it perpetuates itself, and that's precisely where the Nikolsky article is essential reading.
That LacusCurtius site is great - thank you!
That is a great find and an important paper to take note of, Don, thanks. Lots of good information in it - it even discusses the Nikolsky paper.
But after scanning through it what strikes me is it is almost a debate with himself, and notes that he has changed his own views over the years. I doubt a general reader is going to be able to read that and be anything but confused over the point he is making.
To me this one is probably an illustration of how you can talk yourself into a circle if you get obsessed over trying to decide what katastematic pleasure is and whether it is somehow "highest" and whether you should somehow care about it rather than the joy and delight and even cheerfulness which Konstan admits are KINETIC pleasures.
This is definitely one I will be using in the future as it is someone who specifically wrestles with Nikolsky and Gosling and Taylor without, in my view, scoring any points against them.
Good find.
Thanks to those who joined tonight. We had a very good crowd - not counting the "zoom bombers" who we had to eliminate at the start! That was a weird experience!
think unmanaged expectations are the main source of dissatisfaction in a sexual relationship…and communication is key
Probably that applies to life in general and maybe that is in fact a huge part of Epicurus - managing expectations of what is possible and what is not.
And here is the sample I made from Nate's PNG:
For example here is how it is done in Inkscape:
I have made one that appears pretty decent, but I need to fix the attachments here so I can attach an SVG file
What we eventually need is a "vector graphic" image of that leaping pig, along the lines of what Nate already as, in a format that these vector graphic programs like Inkscape (the free one) and others can use.
That way the image can be rotated and resized and all sorts of things done to it without losing sharpness.
I think what's involved 's "tracing" the PNG into such a program and saving it in SVG format. I will try to experiment if I can find time, but that 's what we need - an SVG format.
Ironic, because what it means is turning an actual image of a pig into a series of electronic numbers 
Great and I will be looking forward to it.
News Items To Mention Tonight:
PD11. If we were not troubled by our suspicions of the phenomena of the sky, and about death, fearing that it concerns us, and also by our failure to grasp the limits of pains and desires, we should have no need of natural science.
PD12. A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe, but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that, without natural science, it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed.
Nate's Compilation:
**EΙ ΜΗΘEΝ ****ΗΜAΣ AΙ TΩΝ ΜETEΩΡΩΝ ΥΠΟΨΙAΙ ΗΝΩΧΛΟΥΝ**
**ΚAΙ AΙ ΠEΡΙ ΘAΝATΟΥ ****ΜΗ ΠΟTE ΠΡΟΣ ΗΜAΣ ῌ TΙ ETΙ TE TΟ**
**ΜΗ ΚATAΝΟEΙΝ ****TΟΥΣ ΟΡΟΥΣ TΩΝ AΛΓΗΔΟΝΩΝ ****ΚAΙ TΩΝ**
**EΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ ****ΟΥΚ AΝ ΠΡΟΣEΔEΟΜEΘA ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙAΣ. **
“If apprehensions relating to the heavenly bodies did not disturb us, and if the terrors of death have no concern with us, and if we had the courage to contemplate the boundaries of pain and of the desires, we should have no need of physiological studies.” Yonge (1853)
“If we had never been molested by alarms at celestial and atmospheric phenomena, nor by the misgiving that death somehow affects us, nor by neglect of the proper limits of pains and desires, we should have had no need to study natural science.” Hicks (1910)
“If we were not troubled by our suspicions of the phenomena of the sky and about death, fearing that it concerns us, and also by our failure to grasp the limits of pains and desires, we should have no need of natural science.” Bailey (1926)
“If our dread of the phenomena above us, our fear lest death concern us, and our inability to discern the limits of pains and desires were not vexations to us, we would have no need of the natural sciences.” Geer (1964)
“Were we not upset by the worries that celestial phenomena and death might matter to us, and also by failure to appreciate the limits of pains and desires, we would have no need for natural philosophy.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 155 (1987)
“If apprehensions about the heavens and our fear lest death concern us, as well as our failure to realize the limits of pains and desires, did not bother us, we would have no need of natural science.” O'Connor (1993)
“If our suspicions about heavenly phenomena and about death did not trouble us at all and were never anything to us, and, moreover, if not knowing the limits of pains and desires did not trouble us, then we would have no need of natural science.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)
“If we were never troubled by how phenomena in the sky or death might concern us, or by our failures to grasp the limits of pains and desires, we would have no need to study nature.” Anderson (2004)
“If we were never perturbed by frightful second-guessing of natural phenomena and death; if, adding to the above, we were never [beset by] failure to comprehend the proper limits of pains and pleasures: then, we would have no need of natural science.” Makridis (2005)
“If our suspicions about astronomical phenomena and about death were nothing to us and troubled us not at all, and if this were also the case regarding our ignorance about the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no need for studying what is natural.” Saint-Andre (2008)
“We would have no need for natural science unless we were worried by apprehensiveness regarding the heavenly bodies, by anxiety about the meaning of death, and also by our failure to understand the limitations of pain and desire.” Strodach (2012)
“If we were not harassed by apprehensions caused by celestial phenomena and by the fear that death somehow affects us, and by our failure to comprehend the limits of pains and desires, we would have no need for natural science.” Mensch (2018)
“If no worries about celestial things troubled us at all, or any about death possibly mattering for us, or again if we did not understand the boundaries of pain and desire, we would have no more need for the study of nature.” White (2021)
**ΟΥΚ ΗΝ TΟ ΦΟΒΟΥΜEΝΟΝ ΛΥEΙΝ ****ΥΠEΡ TΩΝ ΚΥΡΙΩTATΩΝ**
**ΜΗ ΚATEΙΔΟTA ****TΙΣ Η TΟΥ ΣΥΜΠAΝTΟΣ ΦΥΣΙΣ ****AΛΛ**
**ΥΠΟΠTEΥΟMENON ****TΙ TΩΝ ΚATA TΟΥΣ ΜΥΘΟΥΣ·**** ΩΣTE ΟΥΚ**
**ΗΝ AΝEΥ ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙAΣ AΚEΡAΙΟΥΣ ****TAΣ ΗΔΟΝAΣ**
**AΠΟΛAΜΒAΝEΙΝ. **
“It would not be possible for a person to banish all fear about those things which are called most essential, unless he knew what is the nature of the universe, or if he had any idea that the fables told about it could be true; and therefore a person cannot enjoy unmixed pleasure without physiological knowledge.” Yonge (1853)
“It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the highest importance if a man did not know the nature of the whole universe but lived in dread of what the legends tell us.
Hence, without the study of nature there was no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures.”
Hicks (1910)
“It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the highest importance, if a man did not know the nature of the whole universe, but lived in dread of what the legends tell us. Hence without the study of nature there was no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures.” Hicks (1925)
“A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that without natural science it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed.” Bailey (1926)
“It is impossible for men to dispel the fear concerning things of supreme importance not understanding the nature of the whole universe but suspecting there may be some truth in the stories related in the myths. Consequently it is impossible without the knowledge of Nature to enjoy the pleasures unalloyed.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 305 (1954)
“It is not possible for one to rid himself of his fears about the most important things if he does not understand the nature of the universe but dreads some of the things he has learned in the myths. Therefore, it is not possible to gain unmixed happiness without natural science.” Geer (1964)
“There is no way to dispel the fear about matters of supreme importance, for someone who does not know what the nature of the universe is but retains some of the fears based on mythology. Hence without natural philosophy there is no way of securing the purity of our pleasures.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 155 (1987)
“It is impossible for anyone to dispel his fear over the most important matters, if he does not know what is the nature of the universe but instead suspects something that happens in myth. Therefore, it is impossible to obtain unmitigated pleasure without natural science.” O'Connor (1993)
“It is impossible for someone ignorant about the nature of the universe but still suspicious about the subjects of the myths to dissolve his feelings of fear about the most important matters. So it is impossible to receive unmixed pleasures without knowing natural science.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)
“One cannot rid himself of his primal fears if he does not understand the nature of the universe but instead suspects the truth of some mythical story. So without the study of nature, there can be no enjoyment of pure pleasure.” Anderson (2004)
“It is impossible to be released from fear about the most important things for one who, not having adequate knowledge as to what the nature of the whole is, is trying to second-guess this or that in accordance with the [traditional] fairy tales. Hence, it is impossible to enjoy the pleasures in full unless one has studied natural science.” Makridis (2005)
“It is impossible for someone who is completely ignorant about nature to wash away his fears about the most important matters if he retains some suspicions about the myths.
So it is impossible to experience undiluted enjoyment without studying what is natural.” Saint-Andre (2008)
“It is impossible to get rid of our anxieties about essentials if we do not understand the nature of the universe and are apprehensive about some of the theological accounts.
Hence it is impossible to enjoy our pleasures unadulterated without natural science.” Strodach (2012)
“It would not be possible to dispel fear about the most important matters if a man did not know the nature of the universe, but lived in dread of what the myths describe.
Hence, it would be impossible without the study of nature to enjoy unmixed pleasures.” Mensch (2018)
“There was no way to release someone from fear about the most important things if he does not know the nature of the entirety [sc. universe] and if he is worried about any of the tales sung of old; and so there was no way to obtain unmixed pleasures without studying nature.” White (2021)
Great! I hear Godfrey may join us too!
