Posts by Cassius

Quote from Godfrey

Logic they reject as misleading....Thus in _The Canon_ Epicurus says that the tests of truth are the sensations and concepts and the feelings; the Epicureans add to these the intuitive apprehensions of the mind...Is this from Bailey? If anything, I would think that "concepts" and "intuitive apprehensions of the mind" should be reversed.

Yes Godfrey that is direct from Bailey, and it is one of the reasons I instinctively find him untrustworthy. He could have used prolepsis or anticipations or preconceptions but instead he chose to muddy the water hopelessly be presuming to substitute a word that hides the issue. It's a major problem with using the Bailey material so I try to note this problem whenever possible:

Studying Epicurus is not for the faint-hearted who value tranquility above all else, because there are plenty of controversies about how to interpret Epicurus which we can resolve in our own mind, but never escape having to deal with when people read read various things on the internet.

That source is here: https://archive.org/details/Epicur…up?view=theater

Also on this point of there being an Epicurean logic, and its controversies with the Stoic variety, I highly recommend the appendix to DeLacey's book, which treats this in detail:

Philodemus: On methods of inference: a study in ancient empiricism : Philodemus : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

http://uf.catalog.fcla.edu/uf.jsp?st=UF001032148&ix=nu&I=0&V=D

archive.org

I didn't notice this earlier when I was reading your post Don. For purposes of other people reading along, that 's a quote from DeWitt, so you're saying you're not convinced by DeWitt on the point. Ultimately people evaluating this need to read DeWitt's argument on this in his book. In the meantime, I think a lot of it can be reduced to (especially on the 12 Fundamentals of Nature) that they make it impossible to maintain the importance of "idealism" / universal forms, so at that basic level as a starting point they can be used to generate the refutation of Plato (and yes, generate through a process of logical extension).

Also, as for whether the word "logic" is the correct word to use there, it sounds like Don you are questioning Bailey and other similar commentators. Which is all for the good, because I like Bailey, but the word seems to be deeply entrenched.

Dialectical logic - Wikipedia

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Dialectical logic is the system of laws of thought, developed within the Hegelian and Marxist traditions, which seeks to supplement or replace the laws of formal logic. The precise nature of the relation between dialectical and formal logic was hotly debated within the Soviet Union and China. Contrasting with the abstract formalism of traditional logic, dialectical logic in the Marxist sense was developed as the logic of motion and change and used to examine concrete forms. Its proponents claim it is a materialist approach to logic, drawing on the objective, material world.^[1]

And I don't think that Bailey was confusing this with Marxism either -- there are lots of commentaries by Bailey we can explore on that if only we had time ... time ... time ....!

Right. I agree with Martin's basic point that Epicurus was not against all forms of logic.

However, there is definitely something that has come to be known as distinctively "Stoic Logic" that appears based more on the manipulation of abstractions than Epicurus approved of, and so this is a very important subject to explore..

I am not sure yet what this page is, but it looks interesting:

THE LOGIC OF THE EPICUREANS

by Allan Marquand

When we think of the Epicureans we picture a friendly brotherhood in a garden, soothing each other's fears, and seeking to realize a life of undisturbed peace and happiness. It was easy, and to their opponents it became natural, to suppose that the Epicureans did not concern themselves with logic; and if we expect to find in their writings a highly developed formal logic, as that of the Stoics, our search will be in vain. But if we examine the letters of Epicurus, the poem of Lucretius, and the treatise of Philodemus* with a view to discovering the Epicurean mode of thought, we find a logic which outweighs in value that of their Stoic rivals. This logic is interesting to us, not only because it is the key to that school of Greek Philosophy which outlasted every other, but because a similar logic controls a powerful school of English thought.

* Gomperz: Herkulanische Studien I, Leipzig, 1865. Bahnsch: Des Epicureers Philodemus Schrift Peri sêmeiôn kai sêmeiôseôn. Eine Darlegung ihres Gedankengehalts. Lyck, 1879.

Since that page appears to be some kind of unpublished material that may disappear, here is the full page:

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THE LOGIC OF THE EPICUREANS

by Allan Marquand

When we think of the Epicureans we picture a friendly brotherhood in a garden, soothing each other's fears, and seeking to realize a life of undisturbed peace and happiness. It was easy, and to their opponents it became natural, to suppose that the Epicureans did not concern themselves with logic; and if we expect to find in their writings a highly developed formal logic, as that of the Stoics, our search will be in vain. But if we examine the letters of Epicurus, the poem of Lucretius, and the treatise of Philodemus* with a view to discovering the Epicurean mode of thought, we find a logic which outweighs in value that of their Stoic rivals. This logic is interesting to us, not only because it is the key to that school of Greek Philosophy which outlasted every other, but because a similar logic controls a powerful school of English thought.

* Gomperz: Herkulanische Studien I, Leipzig, 1865. Bahnsch: Des Epicureers Philodemus Schrift Peri sêmeiôn kai sêmeiôseôn. Eine Darlegung ihres Gedankengehalts. Lyck, 1879.

The logic of Epicurus, like that of J. S. Mill, in opposition to conceptualism, attempts to place philosophy upon an empirical basis. Words with Epicurus are signs of things, and not, as with the Stoics, of our ideas of /2/ things,* There are, therefore, two methods of inquiry: One seeks for the meanings of words; the other, for a knowledge of things. The former is regarded as a preliminary process; the latter, the only true and necessary way of reaching a philosophy of the universe.

*The hypothesis of lekta, or of immaterial notions, was a conceptualistic inconsistency on the part of the Stoics. The Epicureans and the more consistent empiricists among the Stoics rejected them. Sextus Empiricus, Math. viii, 258.

All our knowledge is to be brought to the test of sensation, pre-notion, and feeling. (Diogenes Laertius, x. 31) By these we do not understand three ultimate sources of knowledge. Democritus held to only one source, viz., Feeling; and Epicurus, who inherited his system, implicitly does the same. (Sextus, Math., vii, 140) But each of these modes of feeling has its distinguishing characteristic, and may be used to test the validity of our knowledge. It is the peculiarity of sensation to reveal to us the external world. Sensation reasons not, remembers not; it adds nothing, it subtracts nothing. (D.L., x, 31) What it gives is a simple, self-evident, and true account of the external world. Its testimony is beyond criticism. Error arises after the data of sensation become involved in the operations of intellect. If we should compare this first test of truth with Hume's "impressions," the second test, pre-notion, would correspond with Hume's "ideas." Pre-notions were copies of sensations in a generalized or typical form, arising from a repetition of similar sensations. (D.L., x, 33) Thus the belief in the gods was referred to the clear pre-notions of them. (D.L., x. 123, 124) Single effluxes from such refined beings could have no effect upon the senses, but repeated effluxes from deities sufficiently similar produce in our minds the general notion of a god. (Cicero: De Nat. Deor., I, 49; D.L.x, 139) In the same /3/ manner, but through the senses, the continued observation of horses or oxen produce in us general notions, to which we may refer a doubt concerning the nature of the animal that moves before us.

The third criterion, Feeling (in the limited sense), was the ultimate test for ethical maxims. The elementary forms are the feeling of pleasure and the feeling of pain. A fourth criterion was added, viz., The Imaginative representations of the intellect. Its use is by no means clear.

Upon this foundation rises the structure of Epicurean logic. When we leave the clear evidence of sense we pass into the region of opinion, away from the stronghold of truth to the region where error is ever struggling for the mastery of our minds. A true opinion is characterized as one for which there is evidence in favor or none against; a false opinion, one for which there is no evidence in favor or some against. (D.L., x, 34, 51) The processes by which we pass to the more general and complex forms of knowledge are four: Observation, Analogy, Resemblance, Synthesis.* By Observation, we come into contact with the data of the senses; by Analogy, we may not only enlarge and diminish our perceptions, as we do in conceiving a Cyclops or a Pygmy, but also extend to the unperceived the attributes of our perceptions, as we do in assigning properties to atoms, the soul, and the gods; by Resemblance, we know the appearance of Socrates from having seen his statue; by Synthesis, we combine sensations, as when we conceive of a Centaur.

* D.L., x, 32. The Stoics held a similar view; see D.L., vii, 52.

As a matter of fact, Epicurus regards only two processes,—Observation and Analogy. Our knowledge, then, /4/ consists of two parts: (Philodemus: Rhet. lib. iv., i, col. xix) (1) The observed, or phenomena clear and distinct to consciousness; and (2) The unobserved, consisting of phenomena which are yet to be observed, and of hidden causes which lie forever beyond our observation.* The function of logic consists in inference from the observed to the unobserved.** This was called a sign-inference. According to Epicurus there are two methods of making such an inference; one resulting in a single explanation, the other in many explanations. (Ibid, x, 86, 87) The former may be illustrated by the argument Motion is a sign of a void. Here the void is regarded as the only explanation to be given of motion. In other cases many explanations are found equally in harmony with our experience. All celestial phenomena belong to this class. That explanation which alone represents the true cause of such a phenomenon being unknown, we must be content to admit many explanations as equally probable. Thus thunder is explained by supposing either that winds are whirling in the cavities of the clouds, or that some great fire is crackling as it is fanned by the winds, or that the clouds are being torn asunder or are rubbing against each other as they become crystallized. (Ibid., x, 100. Cf. Lucretius, lib. vi. 95-158) In thus connecting celestial and terrestrial phenomena, Epicurus aimed only to exclude supernaturalistic explanations. This done, he was satisfied.

* That is, to prosmenon kai to adêlon, D.L., x. 38

** D.L. x,32. hoden kai peri tôn adêlon apo tôn phainomenon chrê sêmeiousthai

In the garden at Athens this logic took root and grew; and by the time that Cicero visited Greece and sat at the feet of Zeno—See Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (London, 1880, p. 412, n. 3)—he may have listened to that great /5/ representative of the Epicurean School discussing such questions (Philodemus, Peri sêmeiôn, col. xix-xx) as:

1. How may we pass from the known to the unknown? Must we examine every instance before we make an induction? Must the phenomenon taken as a sign be identical with the thing signified ? Or, if differences be admitted, upon what grounds may an inductive inference be made? And, Are we not always liable to be thwarted by the existence of exceptional cases?

But such questions had no interest for Cicero. He was too much an orator and rhetorician to recognize the force of the Epicurean opposition to dialectic. The Epicurean logic to him was barren and empty. (Cicero: De Fin., I, 7, 22) It made little of definition; it said nothing of division; it erected no syllogistic forms; it did not direct us how to solve fallacies and detect ambiguities. And how many have been the historians of philosophy who have assigned almost a blank-page to Epicurean logic!

With a supreme confidence in the truth of sensation and the validity of induction the Epicureans stood in conflict with the other schools of Greek philosophy. The Stoics, treating all affirmation from the standpoint of the hypothetical proposition, acknowledged the validity of such inductions only as could be submitted to the modus tollens. The Sceptics denied the validity of induction altogether. Induction was treated as a sign-inference, and a controversy appears to have arisen concerning the nature of signs, as well as concerning the mode and validity of the inference. The Stoics divided signs into suggestive and indicative. (See Prandtl's Gen. d. Log., i. 458) By means of a suggestive sign we recall some previously associated fact: as from smoke we infer fire. By indicative signs we infer something otherwise unknown: thus motions of /6/ the body are signs of the soul. Objectively a sign was viewed as the antecedent of a valid conditional proposition, implying a consequent. Subjectively, it was a thought, mediating in some way between things on the one hand, and names and propositions on the other. The Epicureans looked upon a sign as a phenomenon, from whose characters we might infer the characters of other phenomena under conditions of existence sufficiently similar. The sign was to them an object of sense. In considering the variety of signs, the Epicureans appear to have admitted three kinds; but only two are defined in the treatise of Philodemus. (Philod. loc. cit., col. xiv) A general sign is described as a phenomenon which can exist whether the thing signified exists or not, or has a particular character or not. A particular sign is a phenomenon which can exist only on the condition that the thing signified actually exists. The relation between sign and thing signified in the former case is resemblance; in the latter, it is invariable sequence or causality. The Stoics, in developing the sign-inference, inquired, How may we pass from the antecedent to the consequent of a conditional proposition? They replied, A true sign exists only when both antecedent and consequent are true. (Sextus: Math., viii, 258) As a test, we should be able to contrapose the proposition, and see that from the negative of the consequent the negative of the antecedent followed. Only those propositions which admitted of contraposition were allowed to be treated as hypothetical. (Cicero, De Fato, 6,12; 8.15)

On this propositional ground, therefore, the Epicurean must meet his opponent. This he does by observing that general propositions are obtained neither by contraposition nor by syllogism, nor in any other way than /7/ by induction. (Philod., loc. cit., col. xvii) The contraposed forms, being general propositions, rest also on induction. Hence, if the inductive mode of reasoning be uncertain, the same degree of uncertainty attaches to propositions in the contraposed form. (Ibid. col. ix) The Stoics, therefore, in neglecting induction, were accused of surrendering the vouchers by which alone their generalizations could be established. (Ibid. col. xxix) In like manner they were accused of hasty generalization, of inaccurate reasoning, of adopting myths, of being rhetoricians rather than investigators of Nature. Into the truth of these accusations we need not inquire. It is enough that they cleared the way for the Epicureans to set up a theory of induction.

The first question which Zeno sought to answer was, "Is it necessary that we should examine every case of a phenomenon, or only a certain number of cases?" (Ibid. col. xix, 13-15) Stoics and Sceptics answered, The former is impossible, and the latter leaves induction insecure. But Zeno replied: "It is neither necessary to take into consideration every phenomenon in our experience, nor a few cases at random; but taking many and various phenomena of the same general kind, and having obtained, both from our observation and that of others, the properties that are common to each individual, from these cases may we pass to the rest". (Ibid., col. xx, 30—col. xxi, 3) Instances taken from a class and exhibiting some invariable properties are made the basis of the inductive inference. A certain amount of variation in the properties is not excluded. Thus from the fact that the men in our region of country are short-lived, we may not infer that the inhabitants of Mt. Athos are shortlived also; for "men in our experience are seen to vary considerably in respect to length or brevity of life." (Ibid., col. xvii, 18-22) /8/ Within limits, then, we may allow for variation due to the influence of climate, food, and other physical conditions; but our inference should not greatly exceed the limits of our experience. But, in spite of variations, there are properties which in our experience are universal. Men are found to be liable to disease and old age and death; they die when their heads are cut off, or their hearts extracted; they cannot pass through solid bodies. By induction we infer that these characteristics belong to men wherever they may be found, and it is absurd to speak of men under similar conditions as not susceptible to disease or death, or as having the ability to pass through iron as we pass through the air. (Philod. loc. cit., col. xxi)

The Epicurean looks out upon Nature as already divided and subdivided into classes, each class being closely related to other classes. The inductive inference proceeds from class to class, not in a haphazard way, but from one class to that which resembles it most closely. (Ibid., col. xviii, 20; col. xxviii, 25-29) In case the classes are identical, there is no distinction of known and unknown; and hence, properly speaking, no inductive inference.(Ibid., col. vi, 8-10) In case the classes are widely different, the inference is insecure. But within a certain range of resemblance we may rely as confidently upon an inductive inference as we do upon the evidence of sense. (Ibid., col. xxxiii, 33—col. xxxiv, 34)

In speaking of the common or essential characters, the basis of induction, it was usual to connect them with the subject of discourse by the words "hêi", "katha", or "para". These words may be taken in four senses: (Ibid., col. xxxiii, 33—col. xxxiv, 34) (1) The properties may be regarded as necessary consequences; so we may say of a man that he is necessarily corporeal and liable to disease and death. (2) Or as essential to the conception or definition of the subject. This is what is /9/ conveyed in the expression, "Body as body has weight and resistance; man as man is a rational animal." (3) That certain properties are always concomitant. (4) The fourth sense, lost in the lacunae, appears from the following examples to involve degree or proportion: " The sword cuts as it has been sharpened; atoms are imperishable in so far as they are perfect; bodies gravitate in proportion to their weight."

Zeno's theory of induction may be formulated in the following Canons: —

Canon I.—If we examine many and various instances of a phenomenon, and find some character common to them all, and no instance appears to the contrary, this character may be transferred to other unexamined individuals of the same class, and even to other closely related classes.

Canon II. — If in our experience a given character is found to vary, a corresponding amount of variation may be inferred to exist beyond our experience.

The most important objection made to this theory was, that phenomena exist in our experience exhibiting peculiar and exceptional characters, and that other exceptions might exist beyond our experience to vitiate any induction we may make. The following examples are given: (Philod., loc. sit., col. i., ii) The loadstone has the peculiar property of attracting iron; amber, of attracting bran; the square number 4 x 4, of having its perimeter equal to its area. Exceptional characters are found in the Alexandrian anvil-headed dwarf, the Epidaurian hermaphrodite, the Cretan giant, the pygmies in Achoris. The sun and moon also are unique; so are time and the soul. Admitting such exceptional phenomena, the Epicurean replies that the belief that a similar state of things exists beyond our experience can /10/ be justified only inductively. (Philod. loc. cit., col. xxv) And exceptional phenomena must be viewed not as closely resembling, but as being widely different from, other phenomena. Inductions concerning loadstones must be confined to loadstones, and not extended to other kinds o£ stones. Each class of exceptional phenomena offered a new field for induction, and hence could be said to strengthen and not to weaken the inductive argument. (Ibid. col. xxiv 10—col. xxv, 2)

The correctness of all inductions could be tested by the rule of Epicurus for the truth of opinion in general. An induction is true, when all known instances are in its favor, or none against; it is false, when no instances are in its favor, or some against. When the instances are partly one way and partly another, we cannot reach universal conclusions, but only such as are probable. (Ibid. col. xxv, 31-34)

This theory of induction was completed by a consideration of fallacies, summarized in a work called the "Demetriac." (Ibid., col. xxviii, 13—col. xxix, 24) These consisted in —

(1) Failing to see in what cases contraposition is applicable.

(2) Failing to see that we should make inductions not in a haphazard way, but from properties which resemble each other very closely.

(3) Failing to see that exceptional phenomena are in no way at variance with the inductive inference, but on the other hand add to its force.

(4) Failing to observe that we infer from the known to the unknown, only when all the evidence is in favor and no shadow of evidence appears to the contrary.

(5) The failure to perceive that general propositions are derived not by contraposition, but by induction.

When we compare the work of Zeno with that of /11/ Epicurus, an important logical difference is brought to view. Both are occupied with the sign-inference, and look upon inference as proceeding from the known to the unknown. Epicurus, however, sought only by means of hypothesis to explain special phenomena of Nature. Zeno investigated generalizations from experience, with a view to discovering the validity of extending them beyond our experience. This resulted in a theory of induction, which, so far as we know, Epicurus did not possess. In the system of Aristotle, induction was viewed through the forms of syllogism, and its empirical foundation was not held in view. The Epicureans, therefore, were as much opposed to the Aristotelian induction, as they were to the Aristotelian syllogism. It was Zeno the Epicurean who made the first attempt to justify the validity of induction. The record of this attempt will give the treatise of Philodemus a permanent value in the history of inductive logic.

It is refreshing to see the formalistic and rhetorical atmosphere which had surrounded the subject of logic breaking away, and an honest attempt being made to justify the premises of syllogism. As yet, this had not been done by all the moods of the philosophers.

It is also interesting to find in the ancient world a theory of induction which rests upon observation, suggests experiment, assumes the uniformity of Nature, and allows for the variation of characters.

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Quote from Martin

The Stoics are relatively innocent and typically use logic properly for their reasoning as they have learned from Aristoteles except that some basic premises of the ancient Stoics are most likely false. There is no "Stoic logic" to refute.

I will have to come back to this too, but as to whether there is a "Stoic Logic":

Stoic logic - Wikipedia

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Stoic logic is the system of propositional logic developed by the Stoic philosophers in ancient Greece. It was one of the two great systems of logic in the classical world. It was largely built and shaped by Chrysippus, the third head of the Stoic school in the 3rd-century BCE. Chrysippus's logic differed from Aristotle's term logic because it was based on the analysis of propositions rather than terms. The smallest unit in Stoic logic is an assertible (the Stoic equivalent of a proposition) which is the content of a statement such as "it is day". Assertibles have a truth-value such that they are only true or false depending on when it was expressed (e.g. the assertible "it is night" will only be true if it is true that it is night). ^[1] In contrast, Aristollean propositions strongly affirm or deny a predicate of a subject and seek to have its truth validated or falsified. Compound assertibles can be built up from simple ones through the use of logical connectives. The resulting syllogistic was grounded on five basic indemonstrable arguments to which all other syllogisms were claimed to be reducible.

I agree with most of that Martin but this is not my understanding of the situation with Stoicism, so I will have to gather more material on this:

Quote from Martin

The Stoics are relatively innocent and typically use logic properly for their reasoning as they have learned from Aristoteles except that some basic premises of the ancient Stoics are most likely false. There is no "Stoic logic" to refute.

For now, I would generally refer to a couple of the standard texts that simply refer to "logic." I agree, and I think we discussed in the episode, that it is necessary to establish just what is being criticized, so we can deal with these uses of the word "logic" that appear in the standard translations:

Diogenes Laertius:

"...the Logicians [he called] ‘The destroyers,’"

[24] Metrodorus’ writings were as follows:

Three books _Against the Physicians. About Sensations. To Timocrates. Concerning Magnanimity. About Epicurus’ Ill Health. Against the Logicians._ Nine books _Against the Sophists. Concerning the Path To Wisdom. Concerning Change. Concerning Wealth. Against Democritus. Concerning Nobility of Birth._

[31] Logic they reject as misleading. For they say it is sufficient for physicists to be guided by what things say of themselves. Thus in _The Canon_ Epicurus says that the tests of truth are the sensations and concepts and the feelings; the Epicureans add to these the intuitive apprehensions of the mind. And this he says himself too in the summary addressed to Herodotus and in the Principal Doctrines. For, he says, all sensation is irrational and does not admit of memory; for it is not set in motion by itself, nor when it is set in motion by something else, can it add to it or take from it.

DeWitt:

...He declared dialectic a superfluity but was able to criticize Plato with great acumen and he wrote against the Megarians, the contemporary experts in logic.

...

The rejection of Plato's teachings is almost total. If the Authorized Doctrines be read item by item it may be observed that almost all are contradictions of Plato, and thus it becomes plainly manifest that the writings of Plato occupied the chief place in the youthful studies of Epicurus. The Platonic dialogues were the textbooks of dialectic and in modern parlance would be "required reading."

This almost total rejection does not, on the contrary, preclude extensive borrowing and adaptation on the part of Epicurus. Dialectic by virtue of its dramatic form is committed to a very casual employment of a great variety of analytical tricks and logical devices. If incidentally it furnishes instruction in logic, this is by a method analogous to the case system in the teaching of law. This casual use of logic is precisely what we find in the writings of Epicurus, and it was this practice that gave superficial justification to Cicero in accusing him of "abolishing definitions and offering no instruction in classifications and in partitions of subject matter." B2 Epicurus was not so foolish as to think of abolishing logic; he was merely determined to keep it in a subordinate place. This deliberate choice is additional evidence of extreme familiarity with dialectical writings.

Happy Birthday EricR ! And you're the very first entry in our new "Happy Birthday" subforum. This isn't generated by a robot but by the poster of the event. That means that we need to monitor the "Today's Birthday" box and keep up with this (and add Happy Birthday entries) personally - which is the way it should be. Anyone who notices a "Today's Birthday" entry that doesn't have a corresponding Happy Birthday thread here, please feel free to start the thread yourself - that will help a lot!

We've been talking lately about ways to build community and get to know each other better, so today let's say "Happy Birthday" to EricR in the Frozen North -- quite possibly our highest latitude participant here on the forum.

Eric - hope you are doing well and thanks for your past participation in the forum!

And for those of you who don't know him, Eric is a talented writer and musician which you can check out on his timeline.

Ok I am going to try to start using more of the Calendar function so people can check the agenda and indicate participation.

I have set up an agenda so please comment on it there:

epicureanfriends.com/wcf/calendar/event/1394/

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that we ought always to choose the former and avoid the latter, for they are measured by quantity and not by quality.

That would seem to be either an error in the text or maybe different meanings of the word "quality." Is it "quality" in the senses of "properties of atoms v qualities of combined bodies," or "quality" in the sense of "purity" or maybe even "intensity?"

If the point is the weighing of the quantity of pleasure vs the quantity of pain, that would make more sense, but I would argue even that isn't correct unless we're getting really abstract and saying that all pleasure is the same and all we have to do is add it up in terms of quantity (of time perhaps?) -- But I don't think Epicurus taught that simplistic a view of pleasure. All pleasure is desirable, because it is pleasing, but that doesn't mean that all pleasures are identical.

I agree that this doesn't sound correct.

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Else it would be a monstrous thing for beings endowed with man's nature to forsake the most divine judgement of the mind and entrust themselves to irrational pleasures and pains.'

Yes, Christians and most of the rest of the world think that Epicureans are monsters. Or that Epicurus was an Antichrist even. This is why we can't get too complacent and think that "everyone wants to be happy" means the same thing to everyone.

Well we made it through a grand total of two - arguably three - sentences today. Note that is "sentences" not sections!

Our purpose is to use Torquatus to provide an introduction to the big issues of Epicurean philosophy, so even a moderate but still superficial treatment takes a lot of time.

But the material is deep so I think you will like the finished product.

We started on the issue of Epicurus' rejection of Stoic logic, but we reserved til next week most of the detail of Epicurus' own positions, so we will treat that next week.

One omission I now recall from today is that when we referred to "your school" we talked mostly about Stoicism. We need to remember that Cicero was only partly Stoic, however, and he was probably more a Platonist or even Aristotelian on issues of "logic".

Ah - this from Don's link is probably helpful in understanding Wallace's perspective. If this is true that he was an Idealist, Wallace can't have ultimately been very interested in interpreting Epicurus sympathetically:

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Wallace had wide intellectual sympathies and found matter of agreement with philosophers of different schools; but all, in his hands, led towards a central idealism. His work consisted in pointing out the various avenues of approach to the temple of idealism, rather than in unveiling its mysteries.

(my underlining added)

Just in case that page goes away here's a clip:

I think your statement is probably right SimonC, but it's no doubt a complex matter. There are all sorts of reasons to be careful in this controversy, or else you end up where Bailey did in his translation of this section of Diogenes Laertius - you just start using the word "concept" instead of pre-conceptions or prolepsis or anticipation:

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The concept they speak of as an apprehension or right opinion or thought or general idea stored within the mind, that is to say a recollection of what has often been presented from without, as for instance ‘Such and such a thing is a man,’ for the moment the word ‘man’ is spoken, immediately by means of the concept his form too is thought of, as the senses give us the information. Therefore the first signification of every name is immediate and clear evidence. And we could not look for the object of our search, unless we have first known it. For instance, we ask, ‘Is that standing yonder a horse or a cow?’ To do this we must know by means of a concept the shape of horse and of cow. Otherwise we could not have named them, unless we previously knew their appearance by means of a concept. So the concepts are clear and immediate evidence.

I will give Bailey credit for honesty, because I think what he is describing is "conceptual reasoning" and certainly it does occur. We see or think of things over time, we form a definition of what is common or essential to a variety of things that we see (or just think about) to which we assign a name, and then we use that concept over time to discuss new instances of the same thing we have reduced to a definition.

But what Epicurus seems to be describing is something that occurs before we reach the stage of assigning a definition or even before we see any examples of a thing (this is where I think DeWitt rightly points to the Velleius material).

Plus, the process of assigning words (and aren't words pretty close to concepts?) would seem to be discretionary, and that's where you get the issue of opinion which is where error becomes possible, and it does not seem consistent to include a process where we know errors enter in to be a part of the "canon of truth" which seems to be uniformly "pre-rational."

I am not suggesting that what I am writing here is "correct" any more than previous attempts. I suppose the point here is that I don't see William Wallace's formulation as any more helpful than any of the other discussions.

As Nate has done for the translations, we probably would profit from trying to assemble the various options (DeWitt's, Bailey's, this one, etc etc etc) because it is even hard to state a list of the varying positions. I doubt that is at the top of my list to do, but assembling a list of the major positions on anticipations (sort of like we sometimes refer to idealist and realist views of the gods) would be very helpful. Simply saying "The DeWitt position" vs. "the Bailey position" vs. the "Voula Tsouna position" isn't really very helpful.

Quote from Nate

And here, perhaps, is a fundamental fallacy of Epicureanism. It holds that truth is identical with what is clearly and distinctly conceived. It substitutes imagination for thought. Unlike Spinoza, who contrasts the imperfect conception of the imagination with the adequate knowledge of understanding, Epicurus abides by what is easily and satisfactorily presented to the mind under a pictorial or semi-sensuous aspect.

This is an example of the generally hostile tone toward Epicurus I pick up in Wallace's writing when I last tried to read this book. There's a lot going on here - another example is in referencing Berkeley, and I don't find Wallace persuasive in even being clear what his point is, much lest making it in a compelling way.

Quote from Nate

What the Epicureans principally objected to, we infer, were the principles—the axioms, postulates, and definitions: though others of them, like Zeno the Sidonian, went further, and urged that there were points involved in the demonstrations which had not been explicitly accepted in the preliminary principles.

This is a reference to geometry, but again I am not able to clearly say where Wallace is going. Is he saying that Epicurus was going too far in objecting to mathematics, or is he endorsing what I gather was Frances Wright's final viewpoint, that all efforts to conclude that any theory is sound, beyond just observation, is bound to fail.

It's definitely useful to add Wallace's translations to the big collection of variations of the texts, but I have not found his commentaries to be very helpful.

[Not posting this to be argumentative, just as a marker that if someone who is newer reads a long paragraph like that, and doesn't really follow where Wallace is going, that person is not alone.]

At the very least, if he is going to suggest that he is smarter than Epicurus and say something like this: "And here, perhaps, is a fundamental fallacy of Epicureanism. It holds that truth is identical with what is clearly and distinctly conceived. It substitutes imagination for thought." then I would like him to clearly explain why he thinks Epicurus was wrong and what he thinks the correct answer is. Does this mean he is a Platonist or religionist and finds truth in ideal forms or divine revelation or some kind of logic ("thought")?

Ok Matt's comment was in the back of my mind. It's more fun here to talk than just go to Wikipedia. So this IS or IS not that same person that Matt refers to? I have a feeling the dates don't quite match up

Thank you. What is this Nate?

I think that would mean sometime from about 12 pm eastern to be reasonable for the west coast USA to about 3 pm eastern so as not to be too late for Europe. Let's see what other responses come in.

Correcting now to "good" from " food"!

We have four already signed up at Facebook and I think this is the kind of activity that we will probably get good participation from the Facebook-oriented people.