Posts by Cassius

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I am unable to find an academic article on point, but I am sure that my searching is incomplete. Desire and Pleasure are such common topics that references to the point could be made any number of places, but we're looking for something very specific to the effect that Epicurus was looking at the topic differently from Plato and/or others. I'll keep looking!

Quote from Godfrey

Notice that Plato is discussing necessary/unnecessary pleasures, whereas Epicurus distinguishes necessary/unnecessary desires. As we've discussed elsewhere, this is an important distinction, specially since all pleasures are defined as good by Epicurus.

Yes that's why I highlighted that point in my post above. I do think the distinction makes sense, but when I see these respected translators seemingly using the words interchangeably, here and in Tusculan Disputations, I really don't know what to think. Certainly in English "desire" is a different word from "pleasure," but I hope as we continue to examine this those who are fluent in Greek and Latin will be alert to this question and point out how much reliance we should place on this distinction. I'd be a lot more confident in arguing this if we had an article by Sedley or Cyril Bailey or someone of that stature making the same point. With the new search tools available to us maybe we can find just that.

It's going to be very difficult to digest the context in which this appears, what use Plato was making of it, and how and why Epicurus objected. Nevertheless the subject is very clearly discussed by Plato in Book 8 of the Republic in reference to the best form of government. It's worthy of note that at least in this translation it is natural and necessary pleasures being discussed:

Quote

Would you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures?

I should.

Are not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid, and of which the satisfaction is a benefit to us? And they are rightly called so, because we are framed by nature to desire both what is beneficial and what is necessary, and cannot help it.

True.

We are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary?

We are not.

And the desires of which a man may get rid, if he takes pains from his youth upwards—of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in some cases the reverse of good—shall we not be right in saying that all these are unnecessary?

Yes, certainly.

Suppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have a general notion of them?

Very good.

Will not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, in so far as they are required for health and strength, be of the necessary class?

That is what I should suppose.

The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it is essential to the continuance of life?

Yes.

But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for health?

Certainly.

And the desire which goes beyond this, of more delicate food, or other luxuries, which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and trained in youth, and is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue, may be rightly called unnecessary?

Very true.

May we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money because they conduce to production?

Certainly.

And of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds good?

True.

And the drone of whom we spoke was he who was surfeited in pleasures and desires of this sort, and was the slave of the unnecessary desires, whereas he who was subject to the necessary only was miserly and oligarchical?

Very true.

....

After this he lives on, spending his money and labour and time on unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary ones; but if he be fortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have elapsed, and the heyday of passion is over—supposing that he then re-admits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not wholly give himself up to their successors—in that case he balances his pleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn; and when he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another; he despises none of them but encourages them all equally.

Very true, he said.

Neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of advice; if any one says to him that some pleasures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires, and others of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honour some and chastise and master the others—whenever this is repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and that one is as good as another.

Yes, he said; that is the way with him.

Yes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he becomes a water-drinker, and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once more living the life of a philosopher; often he is busy with politics, and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and, if he is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom; and so he goes on.

Yes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality.

Yes, I said; his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives of many;—he answers to the State which we described as fair and spangled. And many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern, and many a constitution and many an example of manners is contained in him.

Just so.

Let him then be set over against democracy; he may truly be called the democratic man.

Let that be his place, he said.

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Oh Ok good catch! I meant my comment only to apply to the issue of dividing all feelings (all good and bad, since there is nothing intrinsically good but pleasure nor bad but pain) into either pleasure or pain.

I would not want anyone to read that more broadly so glad you caught it.

Here's a link to Plato's Republic Book 8, which presumably is the start of the discussion that continues into Book 9 discussing Plato's views of natural and necessary

Joshua it would probably help people reading along if you could elaborate on these two when you get time:

Quote from Joshua

Not only do I reject the Ethical side of this argument except insofar as it is restricted exclusively to pathos, I also notice that this is exactly the kind of absolutism that Cicero employs himself:

At least as I am understanding the discussion, all we are talking about here is that Epicurus held there to be only two feelings, pleasure and pain, and every feeling of every kind falls within one or the other categories. That might be read by some people to be a form of absolutism, but you specifically say that you are not talking about pathos so I don't think you mean to be read as saying that Epicurus was engaging in the kind of absolutism to which we all object.. agree that Cicero is being an absolutist in his (and the Stoics) rankings of good and bad by a criteria other than pleasure and pain.

So it would probably be good to clarify what you mean in referring to "the ethical side of this argument (?)

Quote from Joshua

So I say again, it is no good blaming Cicero for this!

Again someone may ask what "this" refers to in terms of blaming someone for something.

I don't think Sedley is "blaming" Cicero and in fact he's endorsing his terminology. And if a Latin / Greek scholar like Sedley can say that using "summum bonum" for "the good" is good Latin, then I would not hazard to disagree.

So if there's any "blame" to go around as to "summum bonum," that blame doesn't belong to Cicero or Sedley or Dewitt but to modern confusion. if there's blame to assign, it is to those people who read "highest good" as "highest pleasure" and think that this means there's a specific pleasure that's the highest. That's what I read a lot of people to be doing with "katastematic pleasure" or "tranquility" or even "ataraxia" or "aponia" and that's why object so strongly to reaching those conclusions, which are almost everywhere in modern writing about Epicurus.

I'm reading Sedley's point to be that in using summum bonum Cicero was just intending to translate Epicurus saying essentially "the good is pleasure" in the sense of "the good is pleasure as a class of feelings."

The problem comes when people start reading "summum bonum / highest pleasure" to mean a particular type of pleasure when Epicurus has not said that. He's talking about pleasure as a class, not a specific mental or physical pleasure.

Now if there are sections in Cicero where he talks about "summum voluptatem" then that would require further discussion. I wouldn't be surprised if Cicero said exactly that when he debates Torquatus in Book Two of On Ends. But even there I would explain that terminology as referring to "the highest degree of pleasure as a class" or "the highest quantity of pleasure as a class" (as in PD03) rather than meaning that Epicurus was singling out a particular pleasure as the single best pleasure.

I should say that I included the commentary above not because I think it is correct, but that it points to an important connection to Plato. In fact, I disagree with most of the commentary he gives on Epicurus, especially "For him, the pleasure that constitutes the good is not a full belly but a tranquil mind." I think that statement is very misleading and is essentially false to the extent it implies that "the true good" is "tranquility."

But at the same time, I think the starting point to understanding Epicurus requires that we incorporate what Plato (and maybe Aristotle too) had already said, so that we can see what Epicurus thought he was correcting.

Wait -- "Anorexia" in the Greek means someone suffering from a general lack of desire? And it doesn't refer specifically to food in the Greek? I didn't know that! So the term is much more applicable to to many more situations than I would have guessed. Anyone who is depressed and dejected and suffering from lack of desire to live life is anorexic! (?)

Someone without this desire—e.g., someone suffering from anorexia, which etymologically is the absence (the privative an-) of desire (orexis)—

Ok here's something of major significance from Plato. Recently Joshua brought up in a recent podcast that there's something of importance to derive from comparing Epicurus' views on individual happiness vs those of Plato in regard to the state. We didn't pursue that very far, but we need to take a look at it again. This article on Plato's Republic talks about the natural / necessary category scheme originating with Plato, and that Epicurus' division is a modification of Plato.

Maybe the great usefulness that Torquatus references of this division comes from correcting the errors of Plato! Anyway here is the cite and the text:

(As I cite this I am not sure if this link is to a book that includes Plato's text and this is the commentary section, or what.)

https://books.openbookpublishers.com/10.11647/obp.0229/ch12.xhtml

Here's the key section:

Quote

Interlude: Necessary versus Unnecessary Appetites

Appetite governs the democratic soul, as it does in the oligarchic soul, but here Socrates makes a philosophically interesting distinction between kinds of appetites or desires. The democratic soul is governed by unnecessary desires, the sort the oligarch steadfastly and cautiously refused to indulge, while necessary desires govern the oligarchic soul. Socrates alluded to the distinction (without explaining it) when describing the oligarch, whom he called ‘a thrifty worker who satisfies only his necessary appetites’ (8.554a). And indeed, the distinction between necessary and unnecessary desires is implicit in the difference between the rustic and the luxurious ideal cities. The latter comes about because the citizens have ‘overstepped the limit of their necessities’ (2.373d), which suggests that in the rustic city, which Socrates regards as ‘the true city […] the healthy one’ (2.372e), the citizens satisfy only their necessary appetites, whereas satisfying the unnecessary appetites fuels the luxurious city. So how do necessary and unnecessary desires differ?

Plato gives a two-pronged definition of necessary desires: ‘those we cannot desist from and those whose satisfaction benefits us [are] rightly called necessary for we are by nature compelled to satisfy them’ (8.558e). This ‘and’ should be an ‘or’, however, since a desire that meets either criterion will count as necessary. Consider bread. As a basic element in the Greek diet, we can think of it as proxy for food generally. A desire for bread is necessary on both counts: first, we cannot desist from it—we cannot not want it, as a desire for food comes with our animal nature. Someone without this desire—e.g., someone suffering from anorexia, which etymologically is the absence (the privative an-) of desire (orexis)—would be very badly off and in an unnatural, unhealthy state. Second, satisfying a desire for bread is good for us, and indeed we enjoy it. While bread makes life possible, good bread makes life enjoyable. So, too, do the delicacies we put on the bread make life more enjoyable, but we can learn to do without them. Remember that it was the absence of delicacies that Glaucon decried in the first, rustic ideal city back in Book II (2.372c), claiming the city was fit only for pigs. So a desire for delicacies will also count as a necessary desire, since it is natural for us to desire something to put on the bread. Only an appetite that fails both counts will be unnecessary. Though Socrates does not say so, presumably this will vary from person to person: you may be able to enjoy a cocktail before and a glass or two of wine with dinner, but for an alcoholic, even a couple of drinks starts them on the road to self-destructive drunkenness. So wine—also a Greek staple—is necessary for some of us but unnecessary for others.

Though the distinction between necessary and unnecessary desires is needed for Socrates to distinguish between the oligarchic and democratic souls, the democratic person rejects it, taking all desires to be equally worthy of pursuit: the democrat ‘puts all his pleasures on an equal footing’ (8.561b). The democratic person does not deny the distinction in a conceptual way, holding it to be incoherent or non-existent. Instead, they deny that the distinction is a suitable basis for action and choice, ‘declar[ing] that all pleasures are equal and must be valued equally’ (8.561c). They do not think that necessary desires are better than unnecessary desires or that there is any reason to blush at pursuing what those frugal oligarchs regard as ‘unnecessary [desires] that aim at frivolity and display’ (9.572c). Where their fathers pursued only necessary desires, the young democrats reject this frugal austerity (and thus the order and discipline their focus on necessary desires gave rise to) and seek to indulge the desires that characterize the ne’er-do-well drones.

Although the democrat seems uninterested in thinking philosophically about Plato’s way of distinguishing necessary and unnecessary desires, we might find it worthwhile to do so, to see if there are independent reasons to reject it or at least to reformulate it, as it seems awkward to regard a desire for delicacies as necessary, since, as Socrates himself points out, we can learn to give them up. So we do not get too far afield, let us consider briefly the taxonomy of desires Epicurus (bce 341–270) proposed. First, a word of warning: though the word ‘epicurean’ has some resonance with ancient Epicureanism (which took pleasure alone to be good in itself, the view we identified in an earlier chapter as hedonism), Epicurus actually took the absence of pain and disturbance to be what pleasure truly is. For him, the pleasure that constitutes the good is not a full belly but a tranquil mind.

Where Plato fuses necessary and natural desires, calling some desires necessary because they are natural, Epicurus distinguishes between what is natural and what is necessary. For Epicurus, a necessary desire is one whose non-satisfaction causes physical pain. When we do not eat, we experience the pangs of hunger. Thus a desire for food—for bread, as Socrates put it—counts as necessary. While every necessary desire is natural, for Epicurus, not all natural desires are necessary. The desire for bread is both natural and necessary. But desires for relishes, while natural, are not necessary. Think of a favorite dish. I love the Pha Ram Long Song at Ruam Mit Thai in downtown St Paul; its deliciousness makes my life better, but I can clearly live without it: it is a natural but unnecessary desire. If I show up only to find that the restaurant is no longer open on Sundays, I should react with mild disappointment: ‘Oh, dang it! I was really looking forward to that. Oh well.’ I will ask my companions where we should go instead. If, on the other hand, I am not disappointed but really angry that the restaurant is closed and am still muttering ‘I cannot fricking believe it!’ hours later, sulking and ruining dinner for everyone because I did not get what I wanted, then my desire is not only unnecessary, it is also unnatural. Excessive psychological distress at a desire’s not being satisfied is not natural: there is something wrong with me. So the difference between natural but unnecessary desires and unnatural and unnecessary desires is not a difference in objects desired but rather in the desirer themself. I should be able to eliminate my desire for x when x is difficult to obtain—or if x is bad for me. Epicurus thinks that the source is usually ‘a groundless opinion’—some false belief that I cannot be happy unless I have this particular Thai dish or that flavor of ice cream or that I get a promotion, etc. In fact, for Epicurus eliminating such desires is one of the keys to happiness. No gourmand himself, Epicurus thought that

Plain fare gives as much pleasure as a costly diet, when once the pain of want has been removed, while bread and water confer the highest possible pleasure when they are brought to hungry lips. To habituate oneself, therefore, to simple and inexpensive diet supplies all that is needful for health, and enables a man to meet the necessary requirements of life without shrinking, and it places us in a better condition when we approach at intervals a costly fare and renders us fearless of fortune.5

Epicurus’ taxonomy of desire seems an improvement on Plato’s largely because he separates naturalness and necessity, which Plato conflates. Plato’s way of distinguishing necessary and unnecessary seems awkward and even mistaken—but if so, it is not a fatal mistake but rather one that is easily repairable.

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I am still looking for further sources on CONVENTION but in looking at history of discussion of natural and necessary I see this (of immediate interest is the part on the CYNICS and the use of CONVENTION in this context). But this isn't a direct citation....

Plato (c. 429-347 BCE)

In the Republic (Book 8), Plato distinguished between necessary and unnecessary desires, defining necessary desires as "those we cannot desist from and those whose satisfaction benefits us" This distinction appears in his discussion of different types of political regimes and character types, particularly when contrasting the oligarchic and democratic personalities.

However, Plato conflated naturalness with necessity treating natural desires as essentially the same as necessary ones. The distinction is evident when he discusses how the "rustic city" satisfies only necessary appetites, while the "luxurious city" arises when citizens "overstep the limit of their necessities."

The Cynics (5th-4th century BCE)

The Cynics, particularly Antisthenes and Diogenes of Sinope, emphasized living according to nature and rejecting conventional desires. They advocated that a life lived according to nature requires only the bare necessities for existence, and one can become free by rejecting needs that result from convention. Diogenes taught that happiness comes from being in accord with nature and living simply and self-sufficiently, while unnatural things like power, fame, and luxuries cause discord with nature and unhappiness. However, the Cynics focused more on practical demonstration than systematic philosophical categorization—their approach was to live out their philosophy rather than develop formal taxonomies.

As to other ancient sources beyond Diogenes Laertius and Cicero that might be of help, I see that Diogenes of Oinoanda repeats the main citations but offers no additional explanation:

Fragment 32

Each (virtue?) therefore ............... means of (?) ... just as if a mother for whatever reasons sees that the possessing nature has been summoned there, it then being necessary to allow the court to asked what each (virtue?) is doing and for whom .................................... [We must show] both which of the desires are natural and which are not; and in general all things that [are included] in the [former category are easily attained] ..

Fr. 39 lower margin (Epic. Sent. 29 = Sent. Vat. 20)

[Of the desires, some are natural and necessary; others] natural, but [not necessary]; and others neither natural nor [necessary, but the products of idle fancy.]

And perhaps Fr. 132 but there's not much here:

[However, such beings are not accustomed to obtain the good will of neighbours, nor] again [to favour whatever man they wish. If] therefore [they observe] what is natural and ...

MORE HELPFULLY HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT PHILODEMUS DOES MENTION IT, IF THIS STATEMENT FROM CLAUDE IS CORRECT. So the next place to look is going to be in Philodemus

Philodemus of Gadara (c. 110-40/35 BCE)

• His treatise On Choices and Avoidances (PHerc. 1251) explicitly discusses the classification of desires into natural and necessary, natural and unnecessary, and unnatural and unnecessary. Column VI contains a statement of the classification:

• Quote

  "(of natural pleasures) some are necessary, others not necessary; and of the former ones themselves some are necessary for life, others for the health of the body, others for living happily."

  
  

Another clue is that Claude says that Philodemus applies this classification in his work On Anger, distinguishing between natural and empty anger based on Epicurus' distinction of natural and empty desires. However without a precise quote and reference I wouldn't take that to the bank.

As to Lucretius, I am finding zero reference to the natural and necessary categories. There are lots of ethical references in Lucretius to restraining desires, but I am not seeing the specific "natural and necessary" classification.

I find this even more surprising than its absence in Frances Wright, as I have presuming that it was at least mentioned somewhere.

Again, someone please correct me if I am overlooking it in Lucretius.

Thanks for those quotes Bryan!

Those lead me to ask: In this context does "convention" focus on "agreement between multiple people"? I could almost seeing these quotes referring to "the conclusions of reason" or even something indicated by prolepsis / anticipation, with the focus on the difference between "the reasoning process" and "the direct perceptions of the senses.'

So when we hear convention should we hear "determined by agreement among people" or "determined through reason" or some combination of both?

I am going to attempt to see what other citations I can find that might shed light on the relationship. I woke up this morning thinking that given how ethically-oriented it is, surely Frances Wright at least mentions the natural and necessary categories in "A Few Days In Athens." However to my surprise so far, I find no mention of these categories whatsoever, including in chapters 3, 7, and 10, which are some of the most closely on point about how to pursue pleasure.

By no means am I a fan of arguing that Frances Wright is an ultimate authority on Epicurus, and I think she gets some major issues wrong or at least off base (determinism; nature of the gods; importance of physics of the cosmos; the importance of "theory" in connection with observation through the senses).

But I'd say the strength of her book is the way she expresses many of the ethical premises, and I find it very interesting that she does not even mention, much less give an explanation, of the natural and necessary categories.

(I know there are many passages referencing how to pursue pleasures properly, but i don't see the three categories specifically. If I am missing their appearance somewhere, please someone correct me! It's actually much easier for me to believe that I am overlooking them than it is for me to believe that she omits treating them.)

This is a discussion that originated in the recent Zoom in which we were discussing the relationship between "hedonic calculus analysis" and "natural/necessary analysis." It's really a part of that discussion, but the question is of such significance that it deserves a thread of its own.

Thread

What Is The Relationship Between "Hedonic Calculus" Analysis" and "Natural and Necessary Desire" Analysis?

In tonight's Zoom we went at length into the question posed in the title to this thread, but I need to explain the background. First, it appears that there is a division of opinion about whether "Hedonic Calculus" analysis is more fundamental and primary, or whether "Natural and Necessary Desire" analysis is more fundamental and primary. In other words,

1. Does one analysis come before, or override, or overrule the other?
2. Do you start with one analysis and then bring the other into play only if

…

Cassius

January 21, 2026 at 9:25 PM

In that discussion, Bryan mentioned that he thought it was significant to observe that it is possible to be more specific as to what Epicurus and/or other Greeks meant when they were discussing whether a desire is "natural" or not. At least in my own mind I tend to have a hard time getting any specificity out of "natural" because I presume that the other position is "unnatural" or "not natural." If that's all we can say, that doesn't help much, as that simply uses the same term "natural" on both sides of the equation without bringing any explanation to the picture.

Bryan says that he believes it is clear from numbers of texts (I gathered included outside the Epicurean context) that what the Greeks were really saying is that they were contrasting "what is established by nature" with "what is established by CONVENTION." In other words, they were saying that the opposite of natural is not just "unnatural" but "conventional." This would lead us to focus on understanding the things to be avoided as unnatural as those which originate "by agreement with others" or "in consensus among human minds" or other descriptions that emphasize that the issue is a product of reasoning rather than being directly given to us by nature, such as through the five senses (and presumably the feelings and the anticipations as well).

I said to Bryan during the meeting that if this could be established through citations that it would probably be very helpful to our American/modern understanding to do so. For that reason I am posting this thread to set up a place to see if we can do that.

Thanks go to Bryan as the real impetus behind this conversation.

Yes we have two parallel sets of comments. I don't think Sedley is attaching blame. He seems to accept the Latin terminology as valid and a reasonable choice by Cicero.

The trouble is on our end because we read more onto the construction than a Roman would have.

As an aside here Joshua I think we are seeing in going through Tusculan Disputations how important it was to Cicero (and presumably the Stoics) to say that there is only a single good - virtue - and that nothing else is truly good. That allows them to argue that being virtuous is totally within our control and that means that having what is good is totally within our control.

In contrast Sedley argues that Epicurus was approaching ethics like he was approaching physics. This implies Epicurus thought it essential to first and foremost establish that there is a bright line separating good from bad in general, just like there's a sharp distinction between bodies and space. Once you establish a position that there are only two options, you can categorize everything within one of the two options and rule out the existence of anything else (endless "what-aboutism" leading to radical skepticism).

And Sedley observes that in both lines of argument, Epicurus follows up this "either/or" starting point by arguing that other philosophers are wrong in asserting the existence of anything of any nature that falls outside that "either one or the other" structure.

It's pretty easy to see that this has major advantages in defending the senses and opposing radical skepticism. Skeptics are going to reject the analysis anyway, but it gives those of us who accept the legitimacy of the division a very firm starting point for rejection of otherworldliness - leading to the confidence that Cicero dislikes but cites as an Epicurean trait.

Quote from Joshua

How does he respond to Lucretius' use of Summum Bonum in the early lines of Book 6?

I dont recall that he mentions that. And in fact as I read it he's not really being critical of Cicero's choice to use "summum bonum." I gather what he's saying is that it makes perfect sense in Latin to do it the way Cicero did it.

The problem arises because in our English expectation anything translatable as "highest good" implies "the highest single good among many goods."

I gather Sedley is saying we should not infer that summum bonum is a statement as to one among many things. Rather Sedley is seeing it as a reference to "good" as a class, which is singular, without implying anything about how many particulars are in that class.

Quote

Let us take it, then, that summum bonum in Fin. 1.40–1 just represents ‘the good’. For an Epicurean, to call pleasure ‘the good’ is to label it, if not strictly as the only good thing, at least as the only underivatively good thing, that by courtesy of which other things are good—in other words, the ethical end (telos).

Quote from Cassius

In our meeting last night we had specific disagreement on that.

I should be clear too that it's not like we had a "fight" or anything! This variation on the topic is something that I don't think has been discussed here before - at least in this way - so we're very much in the mode of exploring the possibilities rather than positions being set in stone.