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Obviously it is the counsels that Epicurus opposed. But it could also be read as Epicurus opposing those schools, which is not true. Especially that word "directly". I would suggest re-wording this somehow.
I'm going to get to this in a future rewrite as well.
Again, Todd, thank you very much for the suggestion. The new section below has been added.
This argument cuts to the heart of the historical record in a way that cannot be dismissed as a matter of interpretation.
The ancient philosophical world was perfectly aware that someone had proposed “absence of pain” — freedom from all annoyance — as the ultimate goal of life. They did not attribute this position to Epicurus. They attributed it to Hieronymus of Rhodes, a Peripatetic philosopher who lived approximately 290–230 BC, after Epicurus, and who had Epicurus’s works available to him when he formulated his own position.
The ancient sources are explicit. Clement of Alexandria, in his Stromateis (Book II, Chapter 21, sections 127–128), records the ancient division of philosophical schools by their stated goals, explicitly placing Epicurus in the category of those who proposed pleasure as the end, and Hieronymus of Rhodes in the separate category of those who proposed absence of pain as the end. Cicero reports the same division independently in multiple works. In Academic Questions, he states it directly:
“Hieronymus placed it [the chief good] in being free from all annoyance.”
And in On Ends, Cicero stages a direct debate in which Hieronymus is explicitly named as the philosopher who held that “freedom from pain” and “pleasure” are two different things — and that “freedom from pain” is the true chief good — while Torquatus, the Epicurean spokesman, argues that pleasure is the goal and that freedom from pain is simply another name for the same condition, not a separate or superior alternative.
Several points follow from this with force:
The practical implication is direct: if you maintain that “absence of pain” rather than pleasure is the true goal of life, you are not an Epicurean. You are a Hieronymian. The irony is precise: Hieronymus of Rhodes deliberately rejected Epicurus’s position — pleasure as the goal — and substituted his own: absence of pain. That substitution is what the ancient world recorded and attributed to Hieronymus. Today, Hieronymus is forgotten and Epicurus’s name endures — but the “absence of pain” position that Hieronymus invented as a departure from Epicurus has been wrongly reattached to Epicurus himself. Epicurus has been tagged with his own successor’s rejection of his own teaching. The confusion should be corrected wherever it appears.
great comments thank you!
It is gratifying to have a generally appreciative comment on this post from Greg Sadler, whose videos I have frequently watched, and who views I very much respect.
This thread is for discussion of: "Why It Is Incorrect to Say Epicurean Philosophy Is Primarily About 'Absence of Pain'"
Maybe this discussion about "absence of pain" is an "English" thing.
I don't know that it is limited to England by any means, but I'd say that England seems to produce the highest concentration of it. Further, it goes deeper than the "stiff upper lip" and "keep calm and carry on" style of Stoicism that became identified with England in WW2. My own ethnic ancestry is English and I'd love to be able to pin this down more thoroughly. I see it as a major problem to be fixed rather than a strength to be cultivated.
I've posted the list of arguments on substack:
I should have realized when I came up with an odd number of nine arguments that i was missing something.
I have now added in a tenth, which I actually think is one of the most compelling of all. I should not have forgotten it.
So I can keep track of it I have added an easier-to-read format of it here. This is the version I will be updating going forward:
Good luck Don. Always good to try when there is any hope of success. Here is a summary of the major arguments that appear scattered in many places on this site:
"For this reason we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good." -- Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus
The claim that Epicurean philosophy is "primarily about the absence of pain" — that the Epicurean goal is a passive, featureless neutral state free from disturbance — is one of the most consequential misreadings in the history of philosophy. It transforms a vigorous, life-affirming system into something that looks, in practice, indistinguishable from the Stoic, Buddhist, or ascetic counsels that Epicurus directly opposed.
The arguments against this reading are numerous, mutually reinforcing, and grounded in the primary texts. They are collected here in condensed form.
This is the most fundamental argument, and it dissolves the apparent contrast between "pleasure" and "absence of pain" entirely.
"The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined." -- Diogenes Laertius, Book X, 34
"Surely anyone who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain." -- Torquatus in Cicero, On Ends 1.38
"I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too." -- Torquatus in Cicero, On Ends 2.16
The passage most often cited as evidence for the "absence of pain" reading is this one:
"When we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality... but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind." -- Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus
This sentence is real — but reading it in isolation while ignoring everything around it is a fundamental error of method. The Letter to Menoeceus as a whole says the opposite of what the "absence of pain" reading requires:
Reading one sentence against the grain of the entire letter is precisely the kind of selective citation that produces the misreading. The rule applies here as everywhere: a single passage, read in isolation, cannot overturn the consistent testimony of the whole.
Principal Doctrine 3 states:
"The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once."
This doctrine has been taken as definitive proof that Epicurus reduced the goal of life to the mere absence of pain. That reading mistakes the context entirely.
There is no ambiguity about this:
"I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, of sex, of sound, and the pleasures of beautiful form." -- Epicurus, in Diogenes Laertius, Book X
"For my part I find no meaning which I can attach to what is termed good, if I take away from it the pleasures obtained by taste, if I take away the pleasures which come from listening to music, if I take away too the charm derived by the eyes from the sight of figures in movement, or other pleasures by any of the senses in the whole man." -- Epicurus, as quoted by Cicero, Tusculan Disputations
Both friendly and hostile ancient sources understood Epicurus to be teaching active pleasure, not passive absence of disturbance:
A philosophy primarily about "absence of pain" would not be described by its ancient advocates and critics alike as a philosophy of numerous, vivid, crammed-full pleasures.
This argument is practical and penetrating. Frances Wright's A Few Days In Athens captures it clearly:
The conclusion: If "absence of pain" were the prime directive, Epicurus would counsel against deep friendship. He counseled the opposite — calling friendship "the greatest of all the means which wisdom acquires to ensure happiness throughout the whole of life." The Epicurean goal must be stated as the maximum of pleasure, not the minimum of pain. These are not the same thing, and the difference shapes every practical choice.
Even where the phrase is technically defensible (because of the two-feelings doctrine), it consistently misleads:
The appropriate analogy - as used in the opening of Lucretius Book Six - is that of a "full cup" or "full vessel" which makes the relevant distinction precisely:
"[T]he Epicureans said that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures." -- Cicero, In Defense of Publius Sestius 10.23
A crammed-full cup is not a description of an "absence of pain" philosophy. It is the description of a philosophy of positive, active, abundant pleasure — guided by reason to ensure the cup is sound and the pleasures genuine.
The "absence of pain" reading did not arise from careful study of the full panoply of available texts. It arose from three cultural filters that have operated on Epicurus for centuries, all pushing in the same direction:
All three filters consistently distort the reading of Epicurus in the same direction: away from pleasure (which sounds too bodily, too individual) and toward tranquility (which sounds elevated and dignified). All three produce an Epicurus who is no longer recognizably Epicurean.
If Epicurean philosophy were primarily about the absence of pain — about minimizing desire, withdrawing from engagement, and seeking a passive featureless calm — we would expect to find this reflected in the lives of the Epicurean leaders themselves. We find the opposite at every turn.
Epicurus's own life and property:
No Epicurean leader of the ancient world is famed for asceticism:
Epicurean leaders actively recruited outsiders:
Epicurean sympathies in the courts of the powerful:
The friendship argument as lived practice:
The verdict of the historical record: Not one of the known Epicurean leaders — Epicurus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus, Philodemus, Diogenes of Oinoanda, Torquatus, Cassius Longinus, Pompeia Plotina — lived a life that could honestly be described as organized around minimizing stimulation or withdrawing from engagement. Every one of them was active, connected, productive, and committed to bringing others into the philosophy. The ascetic minimalist picture is a later distortion, not a historical reality.
| Claim | What the Texts Say |
|---|---|
| The goal is "absence of pain" | "Pleasure is the beginning and end of the blessed life." — Letter to Menoeceus |
| The goal is tranquility/ataraxia | "Pleasure is the end of the best mode of life." — Diogenes of Oinoanda, Fragment 32 |
| PD3 defines the Epicurean goal | PD3 answers Plato's "no limits" argument; it does not summarize Epicurean ethics |
| The wise man seeks minimal stimulation | "Numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind." — Torquatus |
| "Absence of pain" and "pleasure" are different things | "Surely anyone conscious of his condition must be either in pleasure or in pain." — Torquatus |
| Epicurus couldn't conceive the good without active pleasure | "I know not how to conceive the good apart from the pleasures of taste, of sex, of sound." — Epicurus |
Saying that Epicurean philosophy is "primarily about the absence of pain" is wrong in multiple independent ways simultaneously:
The Epicurean goal is a life full of positive pleasure — crammed full, as the ancient testimony puts it — pursued wisely so that the pleasures are real, lasting, and uncontaminated by the greater pains that foolish pursuit would bring. Absence of pain describes the same state from the negative side, because where pain ends, pleasure begins — but this logical equivalence should never be mistaken for an endorsement of the empty cup over the full one.
The goal is fullness. Not emptiness.
Also (and there are many other arguments) it is not proper to take a single sentence and not consider it in the context of the full analysis of pleasure as to whether it has a limit, which is what Plato had argued in Philebus. The main reason to consider the total removal of all pain to be the limit of pleasure of pleasure is that unless you can logically define a limit for pleasure, pleasure can always be made better by adding more.
The citations from Plato and Seneca that document this argument about pleasure from the opposing side are in the "Full Cup" article here on the site.
Because he is ignoring the well documented point, stressed by Torquayus as well, that there are only two feelings, pleasure and pain, and that the absence of one is the presence of the other.
He is talking as if less pain is something different and better than more pleasure when in fact they are exactly the same thing.
This thread is for discussion of >>
Since the terms psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism are of great interest to some, and those terms appear to originate with Henry Sidgwick, it's probably helpful to have a thread on who Sidgwick was and what he was doing with his categories, and why.
Clearly there is relevance between the thought of the Utilitarians vs Epicurus. I personally consider Utilitarianism to have been a dead end and misapplication of Epicurus' philosophy, but there's always something to learn from history.
The following is an excerpt from Wikipedia
Sidgwick summarizes his position in ethics as utilitarianism "on an Intuitional basis".[10] This reflects, and disputes, the rivalry then felt among British philosophers between the philosophies of utilitarianism and ethical intuitionism, which is illustrated, for example, by John Stuart Mill's criticism of ethical intuitionism in the first chapter of his book Utilitarianism.
Sidgwick developed this position due to his dissatisfaction with an inconsistency in Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism, between what he labels "psychological hedonism" and "ethical hedonism". Psychological hedonism states that everyone always will do what is in their self-interest, whereas ethical hedonism states that everyone ought to do what is in the general interest. Sidgwick believed neither Bentham nor Mill had an adequate answer as to how the prescription that someone ought to sacrifice their own interest to the general interest could have any force, given they combined that prescription with the claim that everyone will in fact always pursue their own individual interest. Ethical intuitions, such as those argued for by philosophers such as William Whewell, could, according to Sidgwick, provide the missing force for such normative claims.
For Sidgwick, ethics is about which actions are objectively right.[11] Our knowledge of right and wrong arises from common-sense morality, which lacks a coherent principle at its core.[12] The task of philosophy in general and ethics in particular is not so much to create new knowledge but to systematize existing knowledge.[13] Sidgwick tries to achieve this by formulating methods of ethics, which he defines as rational procedures "for determining right conduct in any particular case".[14][15] He identifies three methods: intuitionism, which involves various independently valid moral principles to determine what ought to be done, and two forms of hedonism, in which rightness only depends on the pleasure and pain following from the action. Hedonism is subdivided into egoistic hedonism, which only takes the agent's own well-being into account, and universal hedonism or utilitarianism, which is concerned with everyone's well-being.[13][14]
As Sidgwick sees it, one of the central issues of ethics is whether these three methods can be harmonized with each other. Sidgwick argues that this is possible for intuitionism and utilitarianism. But a full success of this project is impossible since egoism, which he considers as equally rational, cannot be reconciled with utilitarianism unless religious assumptions are introduced.[14] Such assumptions, for example, the existence of a personal God who rewards and punishes the agent in the afterlife, could reconcile egoism and utilitarianism.[13] But without them, we have to admit a "dualism of practical reason" that constitutes a "fundamental contradiction" in our moral consciousness.[11]
Metaethics
Sidgwick's metaethics involve an explicit defence of a non-naturalist form of moral realism. He is committed to moral cognitivism: that moral language is robustly truth-apt, and that moral properties are not reducible to any natural properties. This non-naturalist realism is combined with an ethical intuitionist epistemology to account for the possibility of knowing moral truths.[16]
Esoteric morality
Sidgwick is closely, and controversially, associated with esoteric morality: the position that a moral system (such as utilitarianism) may be acceptable, but that it is not acceptable for that moral system to be widely taught or accepted.[17]
Bernard Williams would refer to Sidgwickian esoteric utilitarianism as "Government House Utilitarianism" and claim that it reflects the elite British colonialist setting of Sidgwick's thought.[18]
Philosophical legacy
According to John Rawls, Sidgwick's importance to modern ethics rests with two contributions: providing the most sophisticated defence available of utilitarianism in its classical form, and providing in his comparative methodology an exemplar for how ethics is to be researched as an academic subject.[19] Allen Wood describes Sidgwick-inspired comparative methodology as the "standard model" of research methodology among contemporary ethicists.[20]
Despite his importance to contemporary ethicists, Sidgwick's reputation as a philosopher fell precipitously in the decades following his death, and he would be regarded as a minor figure in philosophy for a large part of the first half of the 20th century. Bart Schultz argues that this negative assessment is explained by the tastes of groups which would be influential at Cambridge in the years following Sidgwick's death: Wittgensteinian ordinary language philosophers, the remnants of British idealism, and, most importantly, the Bloomsbury Group.[21] John Deigh, however, disputes Schultz's explanation, and instead attributes this fall in interest in Sidgwick to changing philosophical understandings of axioms in mathematics, which would throw into question whether axiomatization provided an appropriate model for a foundationalist epistemology of the sort Sidgwick tried to build for ethics.[22]
That's a great opening email. You are very welcome here!
RoseQuartzAxolotl (that's quite a user name!) tells us this:
Hello Cassius and all!
I'm 34 and I live in the Chicagoland area with my husband and our Shetland Sheepdog. I work on the systems side of education.
I grew up fairly conservative and fundamental Christian, and it took a long time to undo that knot. I've long considered myself an atheist/agnostic in my adult life, but as I enter my middle age years and leave my (relative) "youth" behind, I've looked for answers to existential and practical questions: What is the meaning of my life without religion? What set of ethics do I believe to guide my life? What legacy will I leave behind? How do I navigate this world "alone" without belief in divine intervention or an afterlife? Etc etc.
I had quickly come across Epicureanism a few years ago and I remembered it while reflecting on these questions. As I continue to delve deeper, I continue to find great truth. It's like every time I read a new (to me!) text, I laugh because I think "Aha! Finally some sense in this world!" and I feel I relate to Metrodorus when he fell to his knees after hearing Epicurus speak, feeling he had uncovered the secrets of the universe, so-to-speak. But I am not trained in philosophy at all! I received an earth science degree and most of my humanities classes revolved around arts, art history, and modern foreign language so I never even took a philosophy 101 class. I am trying not to be too intimidated by my current lack of knowledge in both philosophy AND the ancient. I remind myself learning has no age limit, the brain is extremely elastic even well into old age, and the only way to achieve the pleasure of competence is to push through the temporary pain of feeling like a fool. :p I am interested in applying Epicurean principles to modern life, learning more about how the ancient followers structured their day-to-day lives, how these principles can help modern mental health issues (alongside science, not instead of), etc. And just learning more in general!
I wanted to specifically join this forum as my husband does not seem to be nearly as thrilled as I am to discuss an ancient school of philosophy LOL. So for now, this will suffice as my Garden Community. 
I appreciate your time! Please let me know if there's anything else I need to provide or questions I need to answer. Have a good day everyone!
Welcome RoseQuartzAxolotl
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Please say "Hello" by introducing yourself, tell us what prompted your interest in Epicureanism and which particular aspects of Epicureanism most interest you, and/or post a question.
This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards and associated Terms of Use. Please be sure to read that document to understand our ground rules.
Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.
All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from most other philosophies, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit of truth and happy living through pleasure as explained in the principles of Epicurean philosophy.
One way you can be assured of your time here will be productive is to tell us a little about yourself and your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you already have.
You can also check out our Getting Started page for ideas on how to use this website.
We have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.
"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.
It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.
And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.
(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).
Welcome to the forum!
I cross-posted with Bryan and just now see his #12
This is contrasted (Academica 2.142) with "a different judgment exists for Epicurus – who thinks all judgment is established in the senses, in the acquaintance with things, and in pleasure"
This sentence covers a lot but I would think it would be true thaL
"judgment is ESTABLISHED in the senses" means more like "judgment is validated by or is tested against the perceptions of the senses , the anticipations, and the feelings."
With the key point being as in the other citations that judgment takes place in the MIND, not in any of the three categories of faculties, and this is where a major difference arises from the Stoics, who believe that some sensations are "true" and others "false" and that apparently some sensations are so "clear" that the wise man can recognize the true ones as true and the false ones as false, if he is really good at dialectic and syllogisms.
Ok we just finished recording and I am not sure that we hit your precise point Patrikios but I think you will be pleased with this episode and we can come back to that next week. The section we are in is very deep and what you are raising is definitely a part of that.
