Certainly a person can feel katastematic pleasure over longer periods of time than physical pleasure. Can we agree to that?
And interestingly, no - we can't even agree to that.. The "experts" themselves are all over the board as to what pleasures really fall within katastematic and kinetic in the first place. I have been going through the Kelly Arenson book today and she - who like Emily Austin largely if not fully agrees with the fundamentals of the Gosling & Taylor and Nikolsky position cited in my article - has a very different interpretation than I have seen before.
So no - other than the flat statement that Diogenes Laertius records Epicurus himself having said, there is very little if anything we can agree on with certainty as to anything about the meaning of "katastematic" or "kinetic" or the implications of those terms.
On the other hand, there is much we can agree on about pleasure. And while the katastematic-kinetic debate occupies some for another 2000 years, normal people need a fundamental understanding of Epicurus that focuses on pleasure as the category that defines the goal.
After all, physical pain and discomfort are crucial bodily mechanisms to maintaining good health. So why is it unreasonable to distinguish the two forms of pleasure just within those distinctions?
It is not unreasonable at all to distinguish pleasures in terms of how long they last, what parts of the body they effect, and how intense they are? What is necessary about adding on words like "kinetic" and "katastematic" on top of that which Epicurus himself did not include in PD09?