One more thought / question on this point:
If we were to add a separate subforum on "Rhetoric" at some point (and not just under Philodemus) would that be clearly more appropriate for the "Ethics" section, or is it possible that it should be considered under "Canonics?"
That in itself is possibly an interesting discussion. Is part of the problem with "rhetoric" that it is being asserted to be a standard of truth? Or is it clearly and distinctly an issue of Ethics/Politics?
For the time being we'll move this to "On Rhetoric" because on first read that seems to me to be the focus of much/most of it.
Thanks again Eikadistes for writing so much about this. Maybe this will help in the "jelling" of exactly what it is that Philodemus' "On Rhetoric" is all about.
I think we have more of a fix on "Dialectic" being damaging because of it being an effort to allege that truth can be determined separately from the senses, just by playing word games and bouncing words off each other.
I don't think I can summarize what is meant by "Rhetoric" (or even whether "all rhetoric is bad(?)" nearly so easily. On that latter point, it seems Epicurus is pretty negative toward "dialectic" across the board (correct? maybe not?).
Is Epicurus also so negative about most/all aspects of "rhetoric?" Or is there "good/useful rhetoric" and "bad/destructive rhetoric?"
Oh this is excellent Ekiadistes thank you!
As to these first comments let me say:
1 - It's a long article.
2 - It's a difficult subject.
3 - It examines Philodemus' "On Rhetoric" which I find very difficult to process despite it existing in fairly well preserved form.
4 - Since I haven't really digested Philodemus on this topic I can't say that I've processed very well what Eikiadistes says here either.
However I will say that I don't think at least on first glance that it gets anywhere near violating our "No Politics" rule.
Seems to me this is a topic that deserves much more attention over time so I'll probably more it to some subforum of "Ethics" where we can eventually begin to deal with whatever implications the ancients found to be so interesting in this topic of "Rhetoric."
OK I read it. I won't echo "fascinating" but I'll certainly give it credit for "well-written" and "holds interest."
That said, I don't see why the whole issue isn't pretty much the same question as something like "what is the physical nature of thought or dreams?" or "does the brain work electrically, and if so, how long can the electrical function continue after the heart stops pumping?"
The article stays largely neutral, but even entertaining certain questions about the supernatural gives some of the positions a credence I don't think they deserve.
The field of studying the physical nature of thoughts and dreams is certainly valid and fascinating, and could lead to identifying consciousness as something in the brain that could lead to all sorts of "brain transplants to vats" and "vats to robots" and all sorts of possibilities that has in the past been explored in science fiction.
There's a section in the article about brain activity being stimulated by waves or something coming from outside, and I can see that possibility as being involved at least in part analogously to a form of magnetism or other radiation that is being received and processed by the brain:
That is a key tenet of the parapsychologists’ arguments: if there is consciousness without brain activity, then consciousness must dwell somewhere beyond the brain. Some of the parapsychologists speculate that it is a “non-local” force that pervades the universe, like electromagnetism. This force is received by the brain, but is not generated by it, the way a television receives a broadcast.
The brain being stimulated by something outside the brain like the eyes are by light or ears by sound seems to me to reasonable. In fact being influenced from the outside seems not only reasonable but likely, and that seems to me to be pretty much what Epicurus was saying about the brain receiving "images" directly. I gather there is already a lot of reproducible science about the brain being affected by cell phone radiation and other "electrical" influences.
But to take that outside stimulation and jump to the conclusion that "consciousness must dwell somewhere beyond the brain" seems to me to be going way too far and to be a non-starter.
You're definitely right that if we presume death is the shutdown of ALL systems then that answers the question. But the statements of Epicurus do not appear to be so sweeping - they focus on the end of "sensation" as sufficient to answer the question.
I think that the most obvious concern arises from the possibility that if Epicurus is focused only on "sensation" then what does that mean. Is the end of sensation sufficient to establish that absolutely no unpleasantness can occur after death? If consciousness exists totally independently from sensation, and an continue independently without any "new sensation" input, then the possibility would exist that consciousness could continue to rehash old experiences (old pains) from old sensations. If so, then someone might argue that death is not necessarily the complete insulation from all future unpleasantness.
There are various ways to deal with this question, but I do think the question is a valid one to ask. At least it will arise in the minds of some people given the way some people look at consciousness today as inexplicable and mysterious.
Probably related to this as well would be to consider the relationship between "the five senses" and "the feelings" and "the anticipations." Can or do the "feelings of pain and pleasure" and "the anticipations" function without "the five senses"?
In Dewitt's book he talks about them being dependent upon one another while not being identical.
That probably works, but we also don't want to be sure to steer clear of mystical "three in one" allegories.
In our conversation on the zoom there was considerable talk of consciousness being able to reflect upon "past" sensations without needing "new sensations" for added content. From that perspective, consciousness / awareness might be able to continue for some period of time without new inputs from the five senses.
But that doesn't "seem" to be the way that Epicurus was thinking in his statements, does it?
Joshuas list of words relevant to consciousness:
In our Zoom discussion of January 18 2026 we deviated from Lucretius and examined a question that Raphael raised in a video here. The title of the thread seems to be the best way to summarize the issue, but during the course of the discussion several other ways arose:
In the end a lot revolves around "can consciousness exist without sensation?" but asking the question the other ways helps focus on the subtleties.
In the most practical of terms of immediate interest to the "study and promotion of Epicurean philosophy," however, the issue involves how Epicurus meant to be understood in PD2 and the letter to Menoeceus:
PD02. Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us.
Letter to Menoeceus: Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation.
Last week's Episode was entitled "Happiness Is The Goal of Life - A Life of Happiness Is A Life of Pleasure."
As we close in on the end of Tusculan Disputations, I'd like to continue to emphasize not only that each one of these two prongs is controversial, but that there is another prong that's equally or more important:
1 - "Happiness is the goal of life" is hotly disputed by religion (which claims piety) and humanism/Platonism/Stoicism (which claims "virtue" or "being a good person." Many people loosely agree that they want to be happy, but they view happiness is a very non-Epicurean way.
2 - The dispute about prong one is why prong two is bitterly opposed. "A life of happiness is a life of pleasure" is exactly how Diogenes Laertius and Torquatus interpret Epicurus, but many - especially today - want to play word games and cite "absence of pain" or "tranquility" as the goal of life, and push "pleasure" off to the side and safely out of sight. And as a result they live lives that are very different from those which Epicurus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and the Epicurean leaders of the ancient world pursued.
3 - Prong three, which we need to address in this and coming episodes, is to emphasize that when Epicurus held that there are only two feelings with no middle ground, that means "pleasure" is everything not just physically but also mentally that we find to be agreeable. Far too many people hear the word "pleasure" and all they hear is "sex, drugs, and rock and roll." That's the way Cicero and most opponents of Epicurus chose to interpret him, and that's wrong, but it's pervasive.
We can say "Happiness is the goal of life," and "a life of happiness is a life of pleasure" all day long, but unless we can articulate the full meaning of pleasure as Epicurus advocated for it, the other two statements are largely worthless. "Happiness is the goal of life" can and has been said by many different types of philosophers, and "A life of happiness is a life of pleasure" is 9 times out of 10 going to be understood as the slogan of a party animal.
Only a clear and full explanation of Epicurus'' use of the word "pleasure" can give legitimate meaning to "happiness is the goal of life" and "a life of happiness is a life of pleasure."
Torquatus and Diogenes of Oinaoanda were able to do it, and the existence of legions of other intelligent Greek and Roman Epicureans are evidence that many others could too.
We today can do the same.
Episode 316 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week our episode is entitled: "The Goal of Life Is Happiness - A Life of Happiness Is A Life Of Pleasure"
Welcome to Episode 317 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
We are closing in on the end of those portions of Tusculan Disputations that are most relevant to Epicurean philosophy today, so we'll pick up this week with more on Section 32 of Part 5.
You see, I imagine, how Epicurus has divided his kinds of desires, not very acutely perhaps, but yet usefully: saying, that they are “partly natural and necessary; partly natural, but not necessary; partly neither. That those which are necessary may be supplied almost for nothing; for that the things which nature requires are easily obtained.” As to the second kind of desires, his opinion is, that any one may easily either enjoy or go without them. And with regard to the third, since they are utterly frivolous, being neither allied to necessity nor nature, he thinks that they should be entirely rooted out. On this topic a great many arguments are adduced by the Epicureans; and those pleasures which they do not despise in a body, they disparage one by one, and seem rather for lessening the number of them: for as to wanton pleasures, on which subject they say a great deal, these, say they, are easy, common, and within any one’s reach; and they think that if nature requires them, they are not to be estimated by birth, condition, or rank, but by shape, age, and person: and that it is by no means difficult to refrain from them, should health, duty, or reputation require it; but that pleasures of this kind may be desirable, where they are attended with no inconvenience, but can never be of any use. And the assertions which Epicurus makes with respect to the whole of pleasure, are such as show his opinion to be that pleasure is always desirable, and to be pursued merely because it is pleasure; and for the same reason pain is to be avoided, because it is pain. So that a wise man will always adopt such a system of counterbalancing as to do himself the justice to avoid pleasure, should pain ensue from it in too great a proportion; and will submit to pain, provided the effects of it are to produce a greater pleasure: so that all pleasurable things, though the corporeal senses are the judges of them, are still to be referred to the mind, on which account the body rejoices, whilst it perceives a present pleasure; but that the mind not only perceives the present as well as the body, but foresees it, while it is coming, and even when it is past will not let it quite slip away. So that a wise man enjoys a continual series of pleasures, uniting the expectation of future pleasure to the recollection of what he has already tasted. The like notions are applied by them to high living; and the magnificence and expensiveness of entertainments are deprecated, because nature is satisfied at a small expense.
This week we will start at line 136 of Book One:
Yes I see we have two valued members with the same birthday. Happy birthday to Onenski and DaveT!
JC, FWIW, I happen to be aware that Martin is traveling this week and likely away from internet access so if he is delayed in responding that may well be a factor.
Happy Birthday to DaveT! Learn more about DaveT and say happy birthday on DaveT's timeline: DaveT
Happy Birthday to Onenski! Learn more about Onenski and say happy birthday on Onenski's timeline: Onenski
More recent discussion with the video and updated discussion of the location of Epicurus' house is here:
I am sure that this is probably included in the video but in tonight's zoom meeting it was impressed on me for the first time that I had failed to appreciate the location of Epicurus' "house." I think something about the name "Milete" led me to think that it was in an adjoining town or suburb further out of town. These maps below that Bryan included in his Epicurea show that Milete was even more centrally located -- in fact much more centrally located - than was the "Garden."
I seem to recall that this is in Don's video, but the way we've got the video currently focused on the "Garden" without reference to the "House" probably could be improved, so that we can even more forcefully make the point that Epicurus was by no means leading the life of a hermit.
Thanks for those comments Bryan. I suppose to nail down another aspect of this discussion, would you or anyone else here advocate for Lucretius taking off in a bold new direction from Epicurus as to the nature of atoms? I suppose an interesting case could be made that Lucretius differed from Epicurus on the advisability of writing poetry, but i bet even there would could find a way to reconcile them.
But before we move past this topic we probably ought to address whether there's a persuasive argument that Lucretius tried to modify any core Epicurean doctrine, which seems to be the point Nail is arguing.
Good topic Matteng but please edit your first line:
In the past I often read/here:
I it looks like you mean to say " read / hear "
because you've included a lot that I don't think you read HERE! 
