Posts by Cassius

I started to post this in Rolf's "Confusion - The Feelings Are Only Two" thread, because it gets at how Epicurus can at times be speaking in broad philosophical terms. But it comes from this week's podcast, so I will put it here. This is a passage we cover in the upcoming Lucretius Today Podcast from Book 1 of Tusculan Disputations:

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XII.¶

But why are we angry with the poets? we may find some philosophers, those masters of virtue, who have taught that pain was the greatest of evils. But you, young man, when you said but just now that it appeared so to you, upon being asked by me what appeared greater than infamy, gave up that opinion at a word. Suppose I ask Epicurus the same question. He will answer, that a trifling degree of pain is a greater evil than the greatest infamy; for that there is no evil in infamy itself, unless attended with pain. What pain then attends Epicurus, when he says this very thing, that pain is the greatest evil; and yet nothing can be a greater disgrace to a philosopher than to talk thus.

I would suggest that this is another example of Epicurus speaking philosophically in ways that contradict our current modern presumptions. We today think of "evil" as supernaturally black-hearted or the like.

But while there is no "evil" in Epicurean philosophy in the sense of supernatural personified devils or sin, Epicurus does use a word that we translate as "evil" to describe pain. How do we reconcile that?

I'd say we reconcile it by saying that Epicurus is telling us to disregard the concept of sinning against gods or supernatural "evil," but instead we can make legitimate use of the word "evil" to describe something that we very much don't want to experience and which we avoid when it makes sense to avoid it.

In unwinding Cicero's statement, to me what Cicero is doing is switching the context to distort Epicurus' intent.

Epicurus could easily be saying, and apparently did say, that:

1. Pain is always "evil," because it is undesirable in itself.

2. But "infamy" is not always "evil." - An Epicurean could say that he doesn't care at all what the crowd thinks, if he thinks what he is doing is the correct thing to do, but he would care if the crowd takes action to inflict pain on him because of it.

Therefore speaking philosophically, even a trifling amount of pain, if experienced for no reason, is always "evil," while the worst "infamy" cannot be with certainty judged to be evil unless it results in actual harm to the person involved.

I'll leave the rest for the podcast discussion, but I illustrated this by referring to Cicero himself, and to Cassius Longinus.

in certain circles Cicero was held up to "infamy" for his execution of the Cataline conspirators. Likewise, Cassius was held up to "infamy" for the assassination of Julius Caesar.

But at the time they took those actions, there was no necessity that those actions would result in infamy or bad results to them at all. Cicero believed that his actions regarding Cataline were among his most heroic, and would send him down in history as the savior of the Roman Republic. If Cassius and Brutus had won the battle of Philippi, then they too would likely have been judged to have saved Rome from julius Caesar's dictatorship.

So you can support the idea that even trifling amounts of "pain" are worse than any amount of "infamy" by speaking strictly: "Pain of and for itself" is always undesirable, but no amount of "infamy" can reliably be judged as always undesirable without referring to consequences.

I don't know whether Epicurus said something like this explicitly, or whether Cicero invented the argument like he misrepresented Epicurus as saying that being in the bull of Phalaris is "sweet." But either way, we can read between the lines and unwind the points being made by Epicurus, and see that Epicurus was regularly making philosophical points ("the feelings are two, pleasure and pain, so that absence of pain is the same as pleasure.") that are easy to misrepresent if you take them out of context.

Quote from Don

I've read the complaints about the Epicurean school having to do with their being dogmatic or not disagreeing with the teacher.

I'd have to look back too to really be sure, but I am thinking that some of this criticism is included in Nussbaum's pro-Stoic "Therapy of Desire." I'm not a fan of that book but if someone were looking for that criticism, which I think is totally unfounded, that's one place I would look.

As to Stoicism, other issues in addition to divine order, plus a belief in life after death (so you start off violating Epicurus' first two doctrines right there) are their emphasis on logic over feeling/sensation and their dismissal of pleasure.

In my case I got interested in Stoicism due to high school and college courses in Latin, and my general impression (which I now see to be false) that Cicero was a Stoic. Aside from Cicero's willingness to enlist the Stoics in his defense of Virtue, Cicero delivers a strong take-down of Stoicism in one of the latter chapters of his "On Ends."

Quote from Rolf

For sure. When it comes to pains that are chosen to avoid greater pain or achieve greater pleasure, I completely understand. However, I am more concerned about the pains that we do not choose - the unnecessary pains that serve no purpose. How do we reconcile them under Epicureanism, particularly if they are frequent? If one is truly unable to get rid of such pains, is it best to adjust one's mindset and accept them? Does Epicurus write about this sort of thing? From what I've read so far, pain is mainly mentioned in the contexts of a) pain should be avoided and b) some pains should be chosen in the name of prudence. But what of the pains that can neither be avoided nor are chosen?

We certainly sometimes are subjected to pain beyond our control. As Epicurus said to Menoeceus,

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We must then bear in mind that the future is neither ours, nor yet wholly not ours, so that we may not altogether expect it as sure to come, nor abandon hope of it, as if it will certainly not come.

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(He thinks that with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity) and some by chance, and some are within our control; for while necessity cannot be called to account, he sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame.

I think we've gone through this example before but the best is probably Epicurus own kidney disease. I don't know that he "accepted" it, but he found ways to enjoy life even in the presence of the pain. I think that's the answer to your question - what you can't get rid of you work on diluting with pleasure to the extent possible. That's not a satisfying answer to some, probably, but the fake gods and fake ideals of the Stoics and others are not going to be able to eliminate pain either, despite what they may say, and if they persuade you to give up studying nature and trying to apply your mind to solving your problem and/or diluting your pain, then they are taking away from you any real hope of bettering the situation. Because the hopes offered by supernatural religion and false philosophies aren't real.

Quote from Rolf

This here almost feels like an endorsement for the "ascetic absence of pain" argument. "To be in no pain" seems to be used here literally, rather than to mean "100% pleasure 0% pain". And, if I understand correctly, this state is put above "joyous activity of pleasure". How do you interpret this? Though perhaps it's meant to be read as "since there are only two feelings, if the hand is not in pain, then it is in pleasure, and therefore feels no need for pleasure".

Yes I think your last sentence is the explanation. There's a lot to process in the whole passage, among which is the fact that we don't think of a hand or any other part of the body as having its own separate will or thought process to think that it "lacks" anything. So there's some underlying premise here that's not being stated as to why the whole question should be interpreted as making sense. I presume that Chrysippus is reasoning something along the lines of "You Epicurus say that pleasure is the guide of ALL living things, so it ought not make any difference whether the living thing has a brain or not, so let's pick a "hand."

When you put it together with much else that Cicero says, the general point seems to be that Chrysippus is taking the orthodox position that pleasure means "stimulation." If pleasure means stimulation, and Epicurus is going to assert that all things are guided toward pleasure, then a hand should feel the lack of pleasure when it is not stimulated, and the hand should want stimulation. The fact that the hand doesn't seem to want stimulation is to Chrysippus proof that the hand does not identify pleasure as the good. And if the hand doesn't, Epicurus, then why should we presume that pleasure is nature's goal for living things -- your theory is blown to bits.

And that's why Torquatus' father told him that the argument was laughable, as it is effective against people like the Cyreniacs who identify pleasure with stimulation, but it doesn't touch Epicurus, since Epicurus' definition of pleasure is more than just stimulation, and includes healthy normal functioning. And since there is no reason to believe that Chrysippus' hand was not functioning normally at the time of the questioning, in the Epicurean view Chrysippus' hand is experiencing pleasure (because normal healthy condition is considered to be pleasure, even though that condition isn't stimulation).

For me the trickier part is where Torquatus goes further, as he does several times, and state that the absence of pain (which I think is fairly interpreted as in PD03) means not only pleasure, but the height of pleasure. To me, the various examples can reasonably be interpreted only one way (especially when Torquatus says "nothing could be more true"). What is being referred to is the logical / mathematical point (which you cited already) that when there are only two possibilities, the absence of one IS the presence of the other - which is compelled by definition to the extent words have any necessity in them at all.

This is where I think Cicero intentionally leaves the the Epicurean argument incomplete, because he should have allowed Torquatus to spell that out explicitly. Instead, he leaves the implication clear but dangling. And in the case of the question regarding the comparison of the pleasure of the host who is pouring wine to the guest who is drinking wine, Cicero doesn't allow explanation by Torquatus at all -- we are just left to draw the logical conclusion that anyone who is "without pain" is at the height of pleasure - in pure pleasure - by definition.

Remember that the "height of pleasure" or "the limit of pleasure" need not be interpreted to mean "most intense" or "longest duration" or "all parts of the body." All "the limit of pleasure" really requires is that what is being measured is 100% pleasure and 0% pain. And if you say that your hand, or yourself, or anything else is "without pain" -- then if we are saying what we mean and mean what we say - then we are saying that we are at the "height of pleasure." People can balk and bark back that "that's not what I mean when I say height of pleasure!" But if they've been paying attention, Epicurus has shown them over and over that they need to think about how they are using words like "gods" and "virtue" and "pleasure" --- and "height of pleasure" is just another example of the same kind of re-statement of what a word really means.

Quote from Rolf

I'm also unsure about how this passage relates to the topic at hand (no pun intended), in terms of attitude and mindset. Or was it meant as a more general callback to the initial topic of the thread?

I was mainly referring back to the general topic of the thread, but now that you mention it there is definitely a "mindset" issue here too -- seeing "height of pleasure" and "pleasure" in more accurate terms is a matter of adjusting your mind. That's the reason I entitled one of my recent articles a "Paradigm Shift"

Quote from Rolf

Speaking of which - a vaguely related thought I want to bring up. There are times when I find myself doubting whether Epicurean philosophy can truly work for me — not because I disagree with its core ideas, but because I live with a persistent undercurrent of physical discomfort. I start to wonder if Epicureanism assumes a baseline of health that I just don’t have.

I would say that whether something "works" is defined by whether it is consistent with reality. The unreal and madeup can never "work" for any length of time. The Epicurean viewpoint is the one that is consistent with reality, so I'd say that it's the only one that could every "work" for anyone, no matter how much baseline of pain you start with. Epicurean philosophy is going to call you to do everything you can to change the situation, and even when it can't be changed, it isn't going to try to lull you into complacency with a noble lie

Quote from Rolf

In those moments, other perspectives become tempting. The “surrender to the flow” of Taoism, or the radical acceptance of Stoicism, can seem like a way to bypass the whole problem of pain — to dissolve it in detachment. And yet, they ultimately drift from reality by denying that pleasure and pain matter.

Yes that is the problem. And sure someone can go ahead and commit suicide, counting on their religion to take them to a better place. I don't see counting on fables as a workable solution - I see that as the ultimate in terrible trades and guaranteed to lead to unfortunate results. At least when you are dealing with the truth, even though the odds may be stacked against you, you aren't placing your hope in fictional rescues that will never come.

For example Rolf:

10.2. THE DOUBLE CHOICE

The first and foremost refinement of the topic in the hands of Epicurus was to draw a clear distinction between choosing an attitude, diathesis, toward action in a given sphere and choosing to do or not to do a given thing within that field. For example, a man must first choose what attitude he shall assume toward death and the gods, pleasure and pain, Necessity, Fortune, political life, monarchy, fame, friendship, diet, and several others. To exemplify from this list, the right attitude toward Necessity is to deny it, toward Fortune to defy her, toward political life to avoid it, toward fame to ignore it, and toward friendship to look upon it as the most precious of all the acquisitions of the wise man. The famous collection known as the Authorized Doctrines is rightly understood as a guide for the choice of attitudes toward the essential things in the art of living happily. The first, for instance, advises the disciple that the gods are not to be feared. This is an attitude, which is first to be chosen and then cultivated.

The choice of attitude, however, by no means abolished the necessity of making individual choices. The proper attitude toward pain, for instance, is to regard it as inherently evil and to be avoided; nevertheless, in the individual case the lesser pain, such as that of the surgeon's knife, is endured for the sake of the greater good. Again, the proper attitude toward food is to prefer a simple diet, but this does not preclude and even approves the occasional indulgence. Neither is political life to be avoided under all circumstances; the evil is not in such a life itself but in surrendering freedom by making a career of it. Thus in spite of the choices of attitude the necessity of making the individual choice is perpetual.

Dewitt stresses that attitude is a large part of what Epicurus teaches by pointing out that many of his teachings are just that -setting attitude - by such things as "believe that a god is a living being blessed and imperishable...." And others.

Yes I agree that that is true.

Also Rolf, have you read the Chrisypus' hand challenge, and if so what do you make of it?

It's in Book One of On Ends:

[39] But actually at Athens, as my father used to tell me, when he wittily and humorously ridiculed the Stoics, there is in the Ceramicus a statue of Chrysippus, sitting with his hand extended, which hand indicates that he was fond of the following little argument: Does your hand, being in its present condition, feel the lack of anything at all? Certainly of nothing. But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack. I agree. Pleasure then is not the supreme good. My father used to say that even a statue would not talk in that way, if it had power of speech. The inference is shrewd enough as against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus. For if the only pleasure were that which, as it were, tickles the senses, if I may say so, and attended by sweetness overflows them and insinuates itself into them, neither the hand nor any other member would be able to rest satisfied with the absence of pain apart from a joyous activity of pleasure. But if it is the highest pleasure, as Epicurus believes, to be in no pain, then the first admission, that the hand in its then existing condition felt no lack, was properly made to you, Chrysippus, but the second improperly, I mean that it would have felt a lack had pleasure been the supreme good. It would certainly feel no lack, and on this ground, that anything which is cut off from the state of pain is in the state of pleasure.

Quote from Rolf

This discussion makes me wonder: How important is a conscious positive mindset/attitude to Epicurean living?

I would say it's very important. It seems to me that it's implicit in virtually all of it that you have to make conscious choices to focus your mind and decide to trust the senses and use them properly. If you don't then you end up like Cicero or worse, with an essentially supernatural or terrified or depressed view of life.

Now Cicero et al would say that it's more important to be in accord with the gods and virtue than it is to be happy, but that's again where you have to decide what kind of universe you think you live in, how you are able to learn things (if at all) and what choices you are going to make about how to live.

Quote from Don

The question, to me, is "Does the idea correlate to reality or not?" Epicurus' categorization, to my current understanding, correlates to reality while Cicero, Plato, "St." Paul, etc. do not.

Quote from Don

Cicero and Plato redefine pleasure for their own purposes, but Epicurus' all-encompassing concept of pleasure and pain just makes sense to me.

I'm not adding anything new here, but we keep talking about "definitions" and "correlating to reality" for a reason. I always worry about staying away from "reductionism" -- implying that there is no fixed outside reality and everything can be changed simply by assigning different words. It appears Democritus went in that direction, and that leads to skepticism and determinism and all sorts of problems.

Then there's the opposite problem - thinking that there is some absolute eternal reference point either in heaven (Plato) or within everything (Aristotle), and thinking that our task is just to get in touch with this ultimate reality through logic, religion, etc.

What I think Epicurus is doing and we're trying to restate in English is that we should consider as "real" what our feelings tell us as to pleasure and pain. Those feelings come in many varieties , and we can assign many different words and descriptions to them, but we don't change their nature by using different words. We legitimately "feel" certain things to be positive or negative, and we're not just arbitrarily changing the desirable or undesirable nature of the feeling by calling the good bad or the bad good.

I see this as analogous to seeing and hearing and the other core senses. We can assign all sorts of names to describe what we deduce about the inputs of the eyes or ears, but the inputs come to us, like pleasure and pain do, by nature, and without the eyes or the ears etc injecting their own opinions.

My point in writing this being that we're not just totally playing word games by dividing the feelings into two categories. When we observe that it's possible to divide the feelings into different categories, we tend to recoil and think that everything is totally a matter of how we define it, and there's no solid footing on which we can ever stand and have confidence in our conclusions. Epicurus is saying that you have freedom of thought and you can take the position that nothing in life is real or certain if you like, but if you do you will suffer very bad consequences. It's much better for you to look at nature and realize that no matter whether you like it or not, nature has given you faculties of feeling and sensation that when properly understood and used can lead to lives in which pleasure predominates.

Rolf I'll say publicly what I told you privately - I do not judge your questioning to be pessimistic or too persistent. You are asking excellent questions and doing us a great favor by boring in on a key issue like this. Please keep it up and feel free to expand the questioning to other topics when you are through with this one!

Quote from Don

I would disagree with Cassius 's wording. Your mind can never be in neutral. Your mind doesn't "generate" positive feelings, it experiences them before you can think about generating

We should talk further about (1) how to regard idle or non-Epicurean thought processes, and (2) whether it is appropriate to consider the mind as generating pleasure and pain. I am in general agreement with Don's post, but I think how we choose to use our minds does generate pleasure or pain.

Also, while I think it is very reasonable and justifiable to divide all feelings between pleasure and pain, and to insist that there is no neutral state, I am not prepared to say that Epicurus' categorization plan is the only one that can be proposed and discussed. Cicero and Plato have a different definition of pleasure than does Epicurus, and they call absence of stimulation 'neutral.'

I think they are wrong to regard it that way, but does that mean that their position cannot be acknowledged and discussed to explain the problem they cause for themselves? Is Epicurean philosophy best seen as the best choice for how to live because it generates the most happiness, or is Epicurean philosophy best seen as the way everyone in fact lives whether they admit it or not?

The latter view sounds to me like that "psychological hedonism" argument that I find extremely unhelpful, and yet I acknowledge that the argument exists. So too I would accept that it is possible to view the world as does a Stoic or a Buddhist, even though I would classify that view as wrong because it is harmful.

But for now I have no problem rewording "should never be in a neutral state" to "should never be considered to be in a neutral state."

Quote from Rolf

When I'm in a "neutral state" - not sick, injured, etc. - and I focus on my body's senses, I pretty much always notice some kind of ache, tenseness, stomach pain, itchiness, or some other uncomfortable feeling that I'm generally able to ignore when I'm not not fixating on it. This isn't some new sensation either - this has been my general experience for as long as I can remember, and I don't have any kind of underlying medical issues (that I know of) that would cause this kind of thing.

I think a lot of people would say this, and I wouldn't disagree. What I would cite in response is the example of Epicurus on his last day or the hypo of being in the bull of Phalaris. Your mind should never be in neutral - it always has the capacity to generate positive feelings which are (or should be) more significant to us than those aches and pains you are speaking about. This would be another reason why I would emphasize the importance of the "philosophic approach" over and above any implication that we can find what most people think of as bodily pleasure simply by minimizing bodily pain.

These two examples (Epicurus last day and the bull of Phalaris) combine well with the hand of Chrysippus to lead in this direction. There's no magic underlying feeling that suddenly leaps to the fore when we eliminate pains -- we have to mentally appreciate being alive in order to generate the result we are looking for. The person who does not apply Epicurean philosophy in this way will find nothing but emptiness when he drains his experience of feeling, and that's when he (the non-Epicurean) starts looking for "meaning" and supernatural escape.

Quote from Rolf

How does reason justify the application, exactly?

Great question. Here I would say that this is where the study of nature comes in. You look at the universe and derive from what you see that it is natural and has no gods over it nor needs any outside justification. You realize that your consciousness is available to you but for a short time. You realize that being alive without pain is "good" and a privilege and a pleasure that is available only for a while. You decide based on all the facts that being alive is something that feels right AND you consciously desire to continue it and to make the best of it.

All sorts of reasoning can be used from all sorts of direction to reinforce this, but in the end the assessment you make of the universe and your place is that it is desirable - maybe as Nietzsche might say you say "Yes" to existence and the world, and you choose to value every moment of it that is available to you. Lots of Epicurean sayings reinforce that positive outlook on life. That's the direction I would take that answer.

Quote from Patrikios

You just have to tune your mind in to the small pleasures that your body is experiencing when it is just operating normally.

And as Patrikious says in using the word "tune" several times, the decision to embrace this worldview, rather than fear and otherworldliness and escape, is a conscious decision that requires you to "tune in" to this perspective. It doesn't happen just by falling off the turnip truck or by simply "observing" the light of day -- you have to put it together in your mind in a way that makes sense.

How's this for a caveat:

As of the afternoon of May 26, 2025, unless and until someone like Don or Bryan or Joshua or otherwise convinces me I am wrong, that's the way it seems to me that the statements of Epicurus as recorded by Torquatus, Diogenes Laertius, the Principal Doctrines, Lucretius, Diogenes of Oinoanda, and Epicurus' own letters best fit together. It takes the study of nature and a scheme of systematic understanding to reach these conclusions and have confidence that they are correct. Neither feeling nor reason alone can do it - you have to combine the two into a rational system where the one supports the other.

To return to Don's point, it is interesting that current researchers tend to reach the same conclusion, but given that they didn't have access to this information I can't see that the ancient Epicureans approached things that way. My first goal is understanding their position before I evaluate whether I think they were on solid ground. So I want to try to put myself in their shoes.

And as for their shoes, it seems to me that they were in the heat of battle with the Platonists and others to develop a philosophy of life that made sense and allowed them to confidently beat back the anti-Pleasure / pro-mysticism assertions of the other schools. Such a philosophy has to be both in touch with practical reality AND logically consistent and persuasive.

Fitting the feeling of pleasure together with sound reasoning in philosophy in this way leads to a logically coherent worldview that accomplishes that goal. it's not magic and it doesn't transform the world into a constant parade of champaign and caviar. But it does allow you to view the universe in a way in which you can live happily and refute the challenges of those who say that you have to rely on supernaturalism.

And thus DeWitt's statement - reason justifies the application of the concepts of pleasure and pain in this way, and humans are happier if they adopt this perspective:

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“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.

Quote from “Epicurus And His Philosophy” page 240 - Norman DeWitt (emphasis added)

Quote from Rolf

If the removal of pain is always pleasurable, why is the removal of pleasure not always painful? In practical, not theoretical, terms.

Rolf your questions are the reason that I think that both of the two factors I listed are essential -- I do not think that you can reach Epicurus' conclusion without theoretical analysis on top of the actual evidence. If you do not consciously identify "absence of pain" as pleasure in your mind, then your body will not conclude that this labeling is appropriate.

To me, these doctrines point to the reasoning as a decisive, necessary element:

PD18. The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures, and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind.

PD19. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure.

PD20. The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited, and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits, and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time; but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short, in any way, of the best life.

PD21. He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want, and makes the whole of life complete, is easy to obtain, so that there is no need of actions which involve competition.

Quote from Rolf

How would this look in practice?

In practice, when you view life as Epicurus suggests, you can find pleasure in all sorts of places and all sorts of things, so you're not going to normally find a "total absence of pleasure" situation. if you're absolutely unable to find pleasure, even using Epicurus' perspective, for some extreme reason, then you're probably approaching a "time to exit the stage" analysis because boy has the play really ceased to please you! But as Epicurus says that's an extreme and unusual situation, unless you want to count the state that all of us will eventually get to -- when we are at a limit of frailty of mind and body from old age. But most of the time long before that we meet our end from some other cause.

I'd say you could also simply recognize that any painful experience can justifiably be called an 'absence of pleasure' experience.

Quote from Don

As far as the "feelings are two," I fall back on the modern psychological research on valence and activation. You'll see some of this on this forum if you search for circumplex or Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett, https://lisafeldmanbarrett.com/

And while I am glad to have any argument in support of Epicurus, modern research manifestly cannot have been on Epicurus' mind when he formulated his philosophy.

Quote from Rolf

Why is this? If the absence of pain is pleasurable, then shouldn't the absence of pleasure be painful, by necessity? When pleasure simply fades away, what are we left with if not pain?

Given Epicurus' framework, I think it is clear that Epicurus would say that 'absence of pleasure' equals pain.

Here is my first effort to synthesize what Bryan and I were discussing last week.

The division of the feelings into two, and not more than two, is based on both feeling and philosophical reasoning:

1. We find through our own pre-rational feeling that all experiences in life naturally fall into positive (pleasure) and negative (pain) categories, and
2. We can and should through reason and logic affirmatively identify the healthy normal functioning of the mind and body (even when they are not being "stimulated") as pleasure.

If we did not hold point (1) to be true, then point (2) would not be justified. Insisting on the truth of point (1) separates Epicurean philosophy, which is based on the evidence of natural sensation (feeling), from Platonism, Stoicism, religion, etc which says reason and logic or divine inspiration alone, without the evidence of sensation, is sufficient.

If we did not hold Item (2) to be true, then we would not recognize as pleasure those experiences in life when we are not being stimulated. We would be like Cicero and Plato and believe that pleasure is not always available, pleasure cannot always serve as the guide of life, and that it is impossible for us to identify a life of happiness as a life of pleasure because pleasure supposedly requires constant stimulation, which is impossible to achieve.

It seems to me that an approach somewhat similar to this is probably where Epicurus was coming from in dividing the feelings into two. Some people will say my point one above is self-evident and all that is needed. I don't think that's the case - I think that the philosophical understanding is also necessary to understand why the division makes sense, and in support of that I would cite the quote from Lucretius:

1:146:

Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest non radii solis neque lucida tela diei discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque.

Bailey:
This terror then, this darkness of the mind, must needs be scattered not by the rays of the sun and the gleaming shafts of day, but by the outer view and the inner law of nature; whose first rule shall take its start for us from this, that nothing is ever begotten of nothing by divine will.

So we can cite quotation after quotation that establishes that Epicurus did in fact divide the feelings into two, and that he stated that if we are feeling anything then we are feeling one or the other and there is no neutral state.

However, What was his justification for doing so? Is the question that needs elaboration.

Thanks Joshua. Here is my current list of the quotes that are central to this:

Diogenes Laertius X-34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“

1. On Ends Book One, 30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?
2. On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
3. On Ends Book One, 39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
4. On Ends Book One, 56 : By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.
5. On Ends Book One, 62 : But these doctrines may be stated in a certain manner so as not merely to disarm our criticism, but actually to secure our sanction. For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool’s life with his own, he feels great pleasure. And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.
6. On Ends Book Two, 9 : Cicero: “…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”
7. On Ends, Book Two, 11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Clearly the same, he says, and indeed the greatest, beyond which none greater can possibly be.” (Plane idem, inquit, et maxima quidem, qua fieri nulla maior potest. Cic. Fin. 2.11)
8. On Ends Book Two, 16 : “This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?”