Posts by Cassius

EDIT: I didn't see Joshua's post before posting this.

The question is an excellent one and I am still thinking about what to write further.

As we see in other discussions that focus on translations, there is considerable peril in looking solely to dictionaries and taking definitions out of context. Especially in the case of Epicurus, he uses words in non-standard ways when he believes that the popular opinion of it is inaccurate (example - "gods"). So you have to really be aware of the sweep of the remaining texts to make sure you don't take something out of context that contradicts the whole.

I would think the best way to proceed would be to first look at what we know of the actual lives of Epicureans and how they lived in the ancient world. And even after we do that, clearly there are lots of shades of intensity of friendship so that those so that those at one of the spectrum are hardly recognizable as being in the same category as the other end.

That's what you are illustrating in this question:

Quote from Noah Calderon

Are there bounds to the concept of friendship in the sense thought of by Epicurus (the characteristics of it and the specific benefits it provides) that rule out other forms of kinship with human beings, kinds that do not even necessarily require knowing the other person?

Surely the answer to that is "yes there are bounds" at least in the sense that there are differences in the way we deal with them. It was the Stoics that asserted that there is a divine order of things whereby all humans are bound together in divinely-ordered ways. Whatever else we might say about it, the Epicurean view seems to have been much more practical than that, and would turn on the specific people, places, times, and cirumstances, just as does "justice" (as explained in the PDs).

Quote from Don

. For my understanding of the philosophy, a primary purpose of a tranquil mind, free from anxiety and fear and worry, is to more fully experience every other choiceworthy pleasure and to make prudent decisions on what those are

Agreed!

Quote from Kalosyni

By contrast, ataraxia is a highly active, unshakeable state of mental resilience.

I agree with your contention, but I also think this is exactly what is in dispute. Neither of these terms have readily-understandable meanings in English beyond "calmness" at best.

The major purpose of EpicureanFriends is to make Epicurean philosophy understandable and useful for living people today. Epicurus definitely sometimes uses words differently. We have to explain that when Epicurus was refering to gods he was not referring to something supernatural. We have to explain that when Epicurus referred to pleasure he meant all that is desirable, not just stimulation. Those are explanations which are not particularly difficult and readily understandable. If someone wants to go on a campaign to assert that "tranqullity or ataraxia implies a full complete active life full of ordinary pleasures experienced calmly" then that in my mind is a much harder lift. it might be doable, but it's far beyond the differentiation of meaning that Epicurus gave to gods or pleasure. And the best evidence of that is that most academicians make no effort in that regard. They simply cite ataraxia or tranquility without further explanation as if it is self-evident that we are talking Buddhism or Stoicism.

Quote from Kalosyni

Active Engagement: To the ancient Greeks, ataraxia wasn't about completely removing oneself from the world (which tranquility implies) . It was about actively managing and overcoming unfounded anxieties and destructive passions so you can live a flourishing life, often referred to as eudaimonia.

I would love for that definition of ataraxia to be true, but I am unaware of any authoritative source that would make that statement easy to argue and explain persuasively. Reference to "flourishing" and the like is, as we've discussed, largely a weasel word way of discussing it. In contrast, pleasure is something we feel without need for outside or academic explanation. Even Epicurus' extension of pleasure to "all that is desirable" (pleasure is the absence of pain) is readily understandable if we stop forcing other contradictory philosophies into the mix and simply look to sensations, pleasure and pain, and anticipations for direct evidence of what is desirable.

Thanks for the translation comment Don. The PD, on any translation, says that of all the things wisdom prepares or provides toward a blessed life, friendship is by far the greatest. Not a good and useful means among equally-good means — the single greatest one.

Friendship is, by Maxs's account, additive in exactly the way ice cream and a fine view of the sky are additive. More trust, more years, more depth is always better, other things being equal. If additive goods are structurally barred from contributing to a "perfect" or "complete" life, and only katastematic pleasure can clear that bar, I don't see why wisdom would single out an additive good as its single greatest tool for reaching blessedness. Does "additive" really disqualify a good from being central to the blessed life, or doesn't it?

Here are several specific questions which as I see it call for addressing in order to see the implications of what Max is advocating:

1. Where is the textual basis for "some goods don't contribute to blessedness"? Is there a passage where Epicurus says a specific pleasure fails to count toward the blessed life merely because it is gradable/additive?
2. As Don has asked, why does the Letter to Menoeceus 128 name "health of the body AND tranquility of the mind" jointly as the goal, if tranquility alone confers blessedness?
3. Does the "additive, therefore excluded from blessedness" rule apply to friendship? PD27 says friendship is the greatest of "all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life." Friendship is not katastematic — more friends, deeper friendship, would seem "additive" by Max's own logic. So: does friendship confer blessedness (per PD27) or not (per Max's exclusion rule)? If friendship only confers blessedness instrumentally, by producing tranquility, why does PD27 say "produces the blessedness," not "protects tranquility"?
4. Would a tranquil person with no friends, no joys, no positive pleasures — just an undisturbed, empty mind — count as having achieved the blessed life in full?
5. What would Max tell someone to do differently if someone were to accept Max's contention and prioritize tranquility over pleasure? In a concrete choice between two options, would "refer each of your actions to the goal of nature" (which Max alleges to be tranquility) ever recommend something different from "weigh total pleasure against total pain under a simple and straightforward ordinary calculation"?

Quote from wbernys

Epicurus responds that Pleasure can be perfect (in removing all pain, often thought the neutral state) and afterwards admits only variation. Just as the Stoic sage may vary in different qualities (rich/poor, young/old, Greek/Non-Greek), but not be more wise, pleasure varies in state to state (Joy/Tranquility), but not be more perfect.

I agree withj wbernys here and this is why I would say that once you focus on the logic implications of the foundattional premise that there are only two feelings, it makes perfect sense that the best state is going to be one of pure pleasure accompanied by no pain. Such a goal serves as a target to emulate and aspire to, just as the Epicurean theory of gods provides that target of what the best life would be -- which is much as is stated by Torquatus in the line we quote often:

Quote

[40] XII. Again, the truth that pleasure is the supreme good can be most easily apprehended from the following consideration. Let us imagine an individual in the enjoyment of pleasures great, numerous and constant, both mental and bodily, with no pain to thwart or threaten them; I ask what circumstances can we describe as more excellent than these or more desirable? A man whose circumstances are such must needs possess, as well as other things, a robust mind subject to no fear of death or pain, because death is apart from sensation, and pain when lasting is usually slight, when oppressive is of short duration, so that its temporariness reconciles us to its intensity, and its slightness to its continuance.

[41] When in addition we suppose that such a man is in no awe of the influence of the gods, and does not allow his past pleasures to slip away, but takes delight in constantly recalling them, what circumstance is it possible to add to these, to make his condition better?

Which answers the question:

... there being no mystery to setting out total absence of pain / perfect pleasure as the theoretical goal, as that conclusion is clearly and logically compelled by the two feelings doctrine, in the same way that the observation that everything in the universe is ultimately composed of bodies and space rules out the presence of supernatural gods.

The difficulty is not that this two-feelings doctrine is unclear. Cicero allows Torquatus to spell it out plainly, Diogenes of Laertius cites it clearly, it is embedded into the fabric of much core Epicurean doctrine. Every ancient student of Epicurus would be expected to know it. The difficulty is that since the suppression of the school, and as part of that project, anti-Epicureans have been trying to make Epicurus into a Stoic and reconcile him with mainstream Greek philosophy by placing an attitude / single feeling (tranquility) as the ultimate goal of life. This deprecates pleasure into a tool which is to be discarded as soon the unthreatening goal of absence of pain is achieved.

If one focuses on the very clear big picture it is obvious that the theoretical best life is one composed solely of pleasures with no presence of pain. Epicurus knew that we as mortals can't reach that state, just as he could not cure his kidney disease, but the essential thing for a philosophy to do is to set forth the goal - the target to which we aspire. "Pleasure" - complete and unadulterated, but not specific in kind, as we are individuals - is the goal. This perspective answers those who like Plato in Philebus or Seneca assert that those who hold to "additive theories of pleasure" are being illogical. It's no harder for an Epicurean to deal with the difficulties of reaching pure pleasure than it is for a Stoic or Platonist to deal with he difficulties of reaching pure virtue. And in fact it's a whole lot easier, because pleasure actually exists, and Platonic ideals and Supernatural gods don't.

Also:

Yet More Scrolls Burned by Vesuvius Are Decoded by AI–Revealing Insights by Unknown Stoic Philosopher

Undoubtedly more of these scrolls will be decoded as the years progress and the yet-young methods of their decoding are refined further.

www.goodnewsnetwork.org

I have been asked to explain why I would post a thread about "Worst" videos on Epicurus. The reason is that as this website has clearly stated on its masthead for over ten years, our purpose is to study and promote Epicurean philosophy. That includes defending Epicurus and calling our falsehoods when they occcur and when it makes sense to do so. Youtube videos are a very good case for discussing material that is easily graspable and easily discussed. Our current front page describes this mission in this way:

Quote

"EpicureanFriends.com is an internet community dedicated to the study and promotion of Classical Epicurean Philosophy. Just as Epicurus taught, our foundation is built on the study of Nature and reliance on the senses as sufficient for obtaining knowledge of the universe. Unlike Stoicism or Aristotelianism, which bear some superficial similarities, Epicurus affirmed that Nature has no mystical forces over it, so there is no supernatural basis for virtue or morality. Rather than virtue as an end it itselfa, Epicurus held that Nature calls all living things to pursue Happiness understood as a life of Pleasure as the goal of life. Therefore rather than "Ataraxia," "Tranquility," "Virtue," "Piety," "Minimalism," "Asceticism," or any other "Ism," we focus on what Epicurus actually taught, not on developing our own eclectic blends through freelancing, especially not with Buddhism, Stoicism and Humanism.

The videos that follow in this thread are simply awful - they are woefully incorrect and discredit Epicurus by associating him with ideas that are among the list in the box above. While it might be disturbing for some people here to watch these, it is important to realize that the true legacy of Epicurus is hotly contested today, and we have to understand the opposition framework if we are to understand how to diagnose those errors and be able to understand in our own minds how to correct them.

Those who can go through these vidoes and immediately spot the Stoic, Buddhist, Ascetic, and Tranquliist presumptions are far ahead of the game in understandin what Epicurus is all about.

Original message:

This video just came over that feed. It's not just an example of homogenized pure-AI clickbate. It does have a message, and it perfectly illustrates why I campaign against the "ascetic" and "tranquility above all" interpretation of Epicurus.

This is the common conception of Epicurus out there in the world today, and it requires firm and clear repudiation if Classical Epicurean Philosophy is ever to make a comeback.

Just in case the clip cuts off the title, the title is:

"The Man Who Invented "Pleasure" Ate Only Bread and Water"

(Note: Title changed from "Trashy Videos On Epicurus" because "World's Worst" conveys the point better.)

Here's another example I just noted from the signature line used by Elli, one of our members from Greece:

Should we tell her that that's not accurate, and that she should change it to:

Beauty and virtue and such are worthy of honor, if they bring tranquility, but if not then bid them farewell.

Another direct question that would be helpful to answer:

Just as we question as to "flourishing," what exactly does "tranquility" mean and what does it entail?

In short, what Max do you think at that a person is doing while they are tranquil?

Also, do you agree with a statement Don in an earlier post that he believes tranquility is specifically defined in terms of a lack of fear of gods and of death?

What specific improvement or advancement in a person's life arises from holding "tranquility" to be the goal rather than the ordinary calculus of evaluating pleasures vs pains?

Quote from Max DuBoff

So, all pleasure is good and is worthy of pursuit. When figuring out what to do, figure out first and foremost what will lead to blessedness, which Epicurus identifies as tranquility. One should only pursue other pleasures when they do not interfere with blessedness.

One way of summarily getting to the conclusion would be to go back to my eariler question: was Emily Austin's book misnamed? Your comment would imply that to be accurate to Epicurus it should have titled it "Living for Tranquility"? Or perhaps maybe "Living for Pleasure Means Living For Tranqility"?

Quote from Max DuBoff

I understand "the goal of nature" as particularly connoting katastematic pleasure (following the use of this term in Men. 133 and VS 25, where it most naturally refers to katastematic pleasure).

If there were a fate it would be that we would once again be going down the Katastematic/Kinetic rabbit hole and all that it entails. DeWitt, Gosling and Taylor, Emily Austin, and Boris Nikolsky can be lined up military-style against virtually the entire rest of academia, with one side incorporating joy and delight along with tranquility into the wider concept of pleasure as all that is desirable, and one side narrowing the goal by elevating "tranquility" to the only thing that is really worthwhile and the only reason we need "pleasure" in the first place.

Max, do you see the lines dividing differently? It will be useful to go through detailed argument but I suspect it would be more efficient to state the end-points as soon as possible. Surely the ancient world did not require battalions of experts to understand Epicurus, or he would not have been so popular (and hated) so we ought to be able to describe the conclusions in human form too.

Thank you for that post Elli!

I am sure someone will ask about this:

Quote from Elli

Epicurus sets no such norms. He does not measure height, origin, class, or wealth. He does not say “whom you are allowed to love in order to marry.” On the contrary, we see him offering an exhortation: “your wife must not be afraid of you, because you did not marry her to serve you, but to be your companion in life”

Is this an actual quote for which there is a citation, or is this exhortation a paraphrase?

Thank you Matt. We have had a very good team of people rotate through over the years, and I am convinced that the material there is some of the best we produce. I've now gotten most all of them converted over into text transcripts which are all available here both with summaries (on the index page) linking to the full transcripts:

Quote from Godfrey

All pleasure is pleasure, full stop. The way to differentiate between various pleasures is not by attempting to rank the pleasures but by looking closely at their intensity, location and duration.

I always "like" it when you call our attention to PD09 on this topic. In this case I have a comment in regard to "All pleasure is pleasure, full stop." That very simple sentence stands at the top of a mountain of specific questions. Yes, I agree, all pleasure is pleasure - but what does that mean? I think the answer is that this is a clear instance in which Epicurus (when he says things like this) is talking conceptually, and saying that the common element in all pleasures is that we find them desirable. That leaves a universe of various ways in which mental and bodily pleasures differ from each other, all while remaining desirable.

PD09 gives us firm evidence that Epicurus was not a dunderhead and that the fully understood that all pleasures are not the same in every respect. The concept of pleasure is extremely broad, and that is why it is broad enough to contain "tranquilty" within it. But the reverse is not true - there are many pleasures that are not 'tranquil". That's in large part why the category term to describe what is desirable in life is "Pleasure," not "tranquility" or "true pleasure" or "worthy pleasure" or "fancy pleasure" or "simple pleasure" or "abiding pleasure" or any other term that places a qualifier on pleasure.

I am tagging Patrikios here because I feel sure he will be interested in Elli's post 10 directly above.

Welcome to Episode 341 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we start are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective, which gives us an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and helps us understand Epicurus' position on the same issues.

We are now in Section 9 of Book 2

Our text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackham translation here:

• Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

As we move into section ten, Lucullus (from the Stoic perspective) attacks those who imply that the mind - a creation of nature - is useless for obtaining knowledge, which has the result of overturning the whole of life.

He then moves to address those who argue that there is a difference between saying everything is uncertain and that nothing can be perceived, and this takes him toward the discussion of Cicero's own position - that it makes sense to say that some things are probable and some are not.

Then as we move into eleven the talk turns more and more to discussing "signs" - and that is the beginning of the point we are looking for - so that we can eventually tackle Philodemus' "On Signs"

Quote from wbernys

I would slightly disagree, caviar and a beautiful view do feel great in the same way as tranquility, afterall pleasure reach it's limit in removing pain,

I have the same reaction, Wbernys, and I would be alert to the direction that some writers seem to take that tranquility does not only not "feel great" -- but that tranquility is not a "feeling" at all. That's how "they" (not referring here to Max) argue that tranquility is not a feeling at all.

This is no doubt a complex subject, so I think one of the ways to help sort it out is to play out the logic ruthlessly, and see if the logic results in an absurd conclusion. The Epicurean texts are replete with references to not even being able to know what good is without reference to the normal sensory pleasures of life, so if we hold fast to that and rule out any construction that the Epicureans didn't really care about normal pleasures because all they wanted is "tranquility," that should be a good way of avoiding an absurd result.

The common sense "pleasure means all types of pleasure" perspective can easily accomodate the value of tranquility as one among many important pleasures, but the "tranquility above all" perspective cannot coexist with the great weight of the authoritative records. Had "tranqulity above all" really been Epicurus' teaching, the Ciceros and Plutarchs and Epictetuses of the world would never had raised a finger to oppose him.

Quote from Noah Calderon

It would require a lot of zeroes to already be in one's bank statement or budget to be confident that raising children would be pleasurable enough to justify the cost, as this post points out.

Raphael Raul what do you think of that formulation? What kind of philosophical perspective can we bring to the question of how many zeroes are required to be confident that the pleasure would outweigh the pain?

Quote from Max DuBoff

It is very clear that the good is pleasure and vice versa, but it is not at all clear waht pleasure(s) actually determine a blessed life. Only the absence of pain does that; but he expects that lots of other pleasures will be present in a blessed life.

As to what plesaures actually determine a blessed life, I think I recall Gosling & Taylor examining that at length in "The Greeks On Pleasure" in their chapter on the katastematic/kinetic issue, and concluding that there is nothing mysterious at all about these pleasures, as they include all the normal and ordinary pleasures of regular human life.

As to how "absence of pain" plays into that, it clearly can't mean "total absence of pain in every aspect of life," if we are to accept (as we should) that Epicurus considered himself to be happy even during his last days of extreme physical pain. On the other hand, if "absence of pain" simply means "pleasure" as Torquatus insists to Cicero repeatedly that it does, then there's no issue, as Epicurus tells us that his mental pleasures from friends and philosophy outweighed the physical pains.

On Ends Book Two, 9 : Cicero: “…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”

Quote from Max DuBoff

Two of my more complicated views (can say more later

You certainly can! No time limits are ticking, and your patience and attention to detail is appreciated! I presume I can speak for most everyone that we appreciate your being here and engaging.