Posts by Cassius

Quote from Rolf

I’ve got to be honest, I don’t really understand Meno’s paradox and how it’s helpful in the context of Epicurean philosophy.

The issue of skepticism is a huge one, and it is fundamental to the conflict between the schools.

But let me address something in particular as it may apply to all your comment in that post: Many people see Epicurus as a self-help therapist for whom it is a given that being "happy" is the goal, with the only question being what techniques to follow to achieve happiness.

I would say this is basic misunderstanding of what Epicurus as all about. Yes, understanding how to properly pursue happiness will follow in the end from Epicurus' insights, but that is not the place you have to start. As Diogenes of Oinoanda says, the question is not the "means" of happiness, but "What is happiness?" in the first place.

Plato's cave analogy is famous because it dramatizes the contention of the Platonists (and the rest) that human life is lived in the dark with only unreliable flickers of evidence that we can't trust. Such people therefore contend that we therefore ultimately need to trust in the gods and their gift of esoteric logic in order to understand the truth. These people say that we are a supernatural creation and that we ultimately need to live a life of hard-coded virtue in order to live life properly.

So the very first issue is whether we as humans are even capable of understanding anything to be true. All the other major Greek schools held that we cannot do so without some form of "logic" that transcens the senses and our natural abilities as the core of the way forward. Even today we are confronted with Abrahamism which says essentially the same thing, just more explicitly based on religion.

Just as with atomism which is needed to understand physics, Epicurus needed a framework for understanding the way humans think -- a way that we *can* legitimately determine which things are true and which are not. If you are convinced from the beginning that truth is impossible to find, you will eventually give up trying, and that is what Epicurus is finding.

Remember, Epicurus started out as a philosopher because he rejected the theories of chaos and he wanted a framework that he could believe to be true. He is primarily a philosopher, not a therapist, and while he is happy to build a therapy on top of the philosophy, Epicurus says that it would be better to believe the myths of the religions than to give in to hard core determinism, which is itself a kind of skepticism. If Epicurus had concluded that the evidence supports that a supernatural god and heaven really did exist, Epicurus would have embraced it, because his primary concern is truth, not taking a pleasure pill. You don't know for sure that pleasure is the appropriate guide until you've taken a firm position on the basic constitution of the universe, and you can't take a firm position on the basic constitution of the universe until you have confidence that taking a firm position of any kind on any subject is possible.

The point i would stress is that the friction and conflict between the schools is real and essential to recognize. Epicurus was practical enough to see that he had to engage in that conflict if he wanted his school to be successful, to reach more people with its message, and to survive that conflict without being run out of town, as he himself had been in Mytilene.

The primary weapons used against Epicurus were skepticism and determinism, as they remain today. A theory of knowledge, of which prolepsis is an important part (but not the whole) is essential to being confident of anything, and to fighting back against those weapons that are being used against us. You can't have confidence that skepticism and determinism are wrong without a proper theory of knowledge.

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All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

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We have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

If I recall correctly the first video in the following post is very good:

Post

RE: Prolepsis / Anticipations As Epicurus' Answer to the MENO Problem

So far this video by Matthew Lampert is the best I have found setting forth Meno's issue. There is also a Greg Sadler video on this one, and I will link it below, but I don't consider it as good as the first one. I'll keep looking for a better video that sets out the basic issue.

Matthew Lampert: if you only watch one video, watch this one:

youtu.be/yXKnS7YXOv4

Greg Sadler:

youtu.be/QrIYClniEHc

Cassius

October 31, 2024 at 6:15 PM

This sets up that the entire issue is a sort of logic problem, and if prolepsis is a response to it as it appears to be, that shows that the theory of prolepsis has its root in a deductive logic chain just like atoms do.

[EDIT: I changed that last sentence to add "the theory of prolepsis." I would say that: "Atomism" is a theory that describes in general terms what atoms are without giving us every detail; atoms themselves are real. "Prolepsis" is a theory that describes a faculty that allows us to recognize patterns without explaining every detail of the process, but the individual experiences of prolepsis are not just a theory but really exist.]

And that's why I keep saying that we shouldn't be looking at this primarily in terms of human biology. Yes the exploration of human biology will give us validation that the conceptual framework makes sense, but just like Epicurean atomism is a framework rather than a blueprint that we can take and immediately start building molecules and planetary systems, prolepsis is not going to be something that immediately lets us start decoding the workings of the brain. Prolepsis is a logical theory that shows to us that knowledge is possible and gives us justification for dismissing the Platonic arguments and moving forward with science at whatever pace we find appropriate. That's a hugely important achievement that should not be underestimated, even if it doesn't immediately lead to a pill to take for depression or mental illness.. To judge prolepsis to be lousy psychology would be just as unfair and inappropriate as to judge Epicurus to be a lousy builder of nuclear reactors.

Thanks Joshua.

Godfrey we have a discussion thread on it here:

Thread

Prolepsis / Anticipations As Epicurus' Answer to the MENO Problem

We definitely need to keep working on making prolepsis / anticipations understandable to normal people of ordinary education. In reading a 2023 work which @Matteng brought to our attention, I want to highlight the following passage passage to the effect that both Epicureans and Stoics looked to (their own) view of PROLEPSIS as the answer to "the Meno Problem."

We haven't yet gotten to the Epicurean sections of Cicero's Academica, but that's on the horizon for our podcast. By the time we get…

Cassius

October 31, 2024 at 1:20 PM

But we really need our own extended treatment of exactly what it involved.

Yes my first reaction to this is that it is an intentionally unflattering but grounded-in-truth description of such as what Epicurus was doing in his last days. He was mentally weighing total pleasures against total pains and considering that he was happy because the net pleasures predominated over the net pains -- at least up to that point in his life when he decided that this was going to be his "last day."

I can't help but think also that this approach has to be seen realistically as mental and conceptual rather than "clinical." In most normal cases you will be successful in getting past difficult circumstances. However when on the executioner's rack or when in extreme pain from terminal disease, the total sum of pains is going to eventually eclipse the total sum of pleasures. That has to be factored into the decision as to how longto continue to try to live on (were you to choose to endure every-growing pain with no hope of improvement). When the calculus becomes clear that it is about to turn net negative, that is the point is where you choose to exit the stage, as Epicurus himself apparently did.

There's no way that the mind can perceptually maintain a feeling of net pleasure under increasing extreme unrelenting and insolvable pain,. That's where I would say the ultimate limiting factor on pain has to be brought to bear.

And this is why too i expect the Epicureans saw it essential to be clear to people that the "pleasure" they identified was much broader than stimulative pleasure. And further that the "happiness" they identified as their goal did not involve the total absence of all pain from every moment of life and the need to expect that eventually in the case of everyone that calculation is going to turn negative.

I would be very concerned that people would rightly think that they were being defrauded if these points were not made clear. I therefore feel sure that the ancient Epicureans were clear as to the true meaning of pleasure and happiness, and that Cicero's claim of ignorance or misunderstanding was insincere. He knew better, but he chose to give the crowd the unrealistic view of Epicurus that they "wanted" to hear so that he could ridicule it and point out that - as they wanted to understand it - Epicurean philosophy is unworkable.

Today, when people are told that the goal of Epicurean philosophy is "absence of pain," it's going to be even more important to be clear. Most people have no reference point at all to understand these subtleties, and so they will eventually give up on Epicurus due to their unrealistic expectations unless those are corrected promptly.

This section contains an extended treatment of Epicurean views, especially the following:, in which we will have to be cautious, as Cicero himself seems to say that he is stating them differently than would the Epicureans:

Quote from Part 3 Section XV

But I shall speak more particularly on these matters after I have first considered Epicurus's opinion, who thinks that all people must necessarily be uneasy who believe themselves to be in any evils, let them be either foreseen and expected, or habitual to them; for, with him, evils are not the less by reason of their continuance, nor the lighter for having been foreseen; and it is folly to ruminate on evils to come, or such as, perhaps, never may come; every evil is disagreeable enough when it does come; but he who is constantly considering that some evil may befal him, is loading himself with a perpetual evil, and even should such evil never light on him, he voluntarily takes upon himself unnecessary misery, so that he is under constant uneasiness, whether he actually suffers any evil, or only thinks of it. But he makes the alleviation of grief depend on two things, a ceasing to think on evil, and a turning to the contemplation of pleasure. For he thinks that the mind may possibly be under the power of reason, and follow her directions; he forbids us, therefore, to mind trouble, and calls us off from sorrowful reflections: he throws a mist over our eyes to hinder us from the contemplation of misery. Having sounded a retreat from this statement, he drives our thoughts on again, and encourages them to view and engage the whole mind in the various pleasures with which he thinks the life of a wise man abounds, either from reflecting on the past, or from the hope of what is to come. I have said these things in my own way, the Epicureans have theirs: however, let us examine what they say; how they say it is of little consequence.

Welcome to Episode 288 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we continue our series covering Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations" from an Epicurean viewpoint. This series addresses five of the greatest questions in human life (Death, Pain, Grief/Fear, Joy/Desire, and Virtue) with Cicero speaking for the majority and Epicurus the main opponent.

Today we begin in Part 3, which addresses Grief or pain of mind. We'll first comment on some general points Cicero makes, and then begin reading with Section IV.

Quote from Kalosyni

Could we say that prolepsis is an inborn ability that is required for reasoning - prolepsis is the ability to have pattern recognition.

I think that's a pretty logical conclusion. Calling it "ability to have pattern recognition" does not presume that the mind already has in it the particular patterns that are to be recognized. The problem comes when we begin to think (and there is a great temptation to do so) that some particular pattern is inborn within us at birth.

I think most of us agree that we are not a "blank slate," but describing what it is that IS inborn is hard to do. Lucretius gives examples of how different animals have different temperaments, and that's somewhere in the ballpark, but there might not be much better way than to just call it "the ability to have pattern recognition."

To repeat, this is an area where we should welcome back and forth discussion and debate and exploration of options from anyone who's looked into the issues at all.

3-288

Moreover the mind possesses that heat, which it dons when it boils with rage, and the fire flashes more keenly from the eyes. Much cold breath too it has, which goes along with fear, and starts a shuddering in the limbs and stirs the whole frame. And it has too that condition of air lulled to rest, which comes to pass when the breast is calm and the face unruffled. But those creatures have more of heat, whose fiery heart and passionate mind easily boils up in anger. Foremost in this class is the fierce force of lions, who often as they groan break their hearts with roaring, and cannot contain in their breast the billows of their wrath. But the cold heart of deer is more full of wind, and more quickly it rouses the chilly breath in its flesh, which makes a shuddering motion start in the limbs. But the nature of oxen draws its life rather from calm air, nor ever is the smoking torch of anger set to it to rouse it overmuch, drenching it with the shadow of murky mist, nor is it pierced and frozen by the chill shafts of fear: it has its place midway between the two, the deer and the raging lions.

3-307

So is it with the race of men. However much training gives some of them an equal culture, yet it leaves those first traces of the nature of the mind of each. Nor must we think that such maladies can be plucked out by the roots, but that one man will more swiftly fall into bitter anger, another be a little sooner assailed by fear, while a third will take some things more gently than is right. And in many other things it must needs be that the diverse natures of men differ, and the habits that follow thereon; but I cannot now set forth the secret causes of these, nor discover names for all the shapes of the first atoms, whence arises this variety in things. One thing herein I see that I can affirm, that so small are the traces of these natures left, which reason could not dispel for us, that nothing hinders us from living a life worthy of the gods.

Rolf, TauPhi's post is a useful example of how on an issue like this where there is fragmentary or even conflicting evidence with which to work, different people are going to come to different conclusions, and each person in the end has to reach their own conclusion pending discovery of more texts.

I gather Tau Phi is saying that the same process that applies to unicorns applies to gods and justice. I would disagree. I would argue that a unicorn is an example of a concept/idea that arises from combining examples of horses with examples of horned animals, and that thus something very different is involved in abstractions such as justice or divinity.

This is why I argue the starting point for analysis should be the alleged paradox of Meno and the assertions of Plato.

I think most here agree that we don't have a prolepsis of atoms.

I would also say myself that your question is why DeWitt argues that Diogenes Laertius' description of prolepsis (examples as to humans and oxen) is at best incomplete and at worst just wrong as a description of prolepsis. And as you know DeWitt concludes that Cicero's understanding of the issue as expressed through Velleius (as something that exists BEFORE an individual's first exposure to an example) is much more accurate.

Our process of concluding that atoms exist is outlined at length by Lucretius in Book One. We come to the conclusion that atoms exist through deductive reasoning about things that we do see exist. I would say that is just how we come to the concept of humans and oxen as well. Our senses (trustworthy as without opinion, just like prolepsis) tell us that bodies in general exist. It is our minds that have to use reasoning to deduce the categories from atom to human and everything in between into which we place those bodies and assign names to them. As to the assignment of names that too arises from nature in the trial and error experience of men, and there is no god-given assignment of classes or names to them.

As to gods (divinity) or justice however, the two best-documented examples in the major surviving texts, those are more in the nature of abstractions of which we never touch or "see" or smell or hear examples directly. That is why deductive reasoning alone does not work for gods and justice. Did we not have some kind of faculty for recognizing the patterns involved, our five senses would never recognize that these relationships / abstractions exist.

Maybe an even better example would be lower organisms - all the way down to single cell amoeba. We would not expect - and do not associate in our minds - the actions of amoeba in competing for food to be just or unjust. We do not expect that amoeba have any appreciation at all for such issues, and for amoeba no justice or injustice exists.

Somewhere up the line of advancement living things become capable of "thinking," and at some point they begin to appreciate that there is an issue or question involved in their relationships to other living beings. Somewhere in that range they begin to have "prolepsis of justice" which allows them to even begin considering that their relationships with other living beings might be divided into categories of relationships, and they begin to consider whether one type of relationship is more productive for them than another type of relationship. At that point they begin to consider some things "just" and other things "unjust" - but those are just words that we assign to the concept. I would say that you are long past the "prolepsis" stage at that point.

But if the "prolepsis" of justice or gods did not exist, we would never begin considering or discussing those concepts in the first place.

It's much better in my view to start analyzing prolepsis from the point of view of philosophy and the Meno problem than it is to start with some particular clinical phenomena (like monkeys or beavers) and try to analyze the issue in terms of specific animals or their conclusions. Otherwise you just transfer to the monkeys the same question we ask about ourselves: "Where does the whole idea of "justice" come from in the first place?"

I will write more in response to Rolf''s question but my first comment would be that I think most of us agree that a prolepsis comes before any opinion or conclusion. So anytime the statement is something like "sharing food is fair" that is a conclusion and not a prolepsis.

If prolepsis is a PRE-conception, I would describe it more as "the ability to recognize that an issue is involved." The monkeys recognize that there is an unequal distribution of food in this example, but that in itself does not tell us or them what a "fair" distribution of food would be.

Lucretius argues that the gods could not have created the universe because it makes no sense that the gods had any inkling of the possibility of any kind of universe at all until there was first a universe of a kind to serve as an example from which they could recognize a pattern.

Further, the principal doctrines make clear that even "justice" is a very fluid concept, and that what appears to be just at one moment can be unjust at the next if circumstances change -- and that includes compacts not to harm or be harmed, which not all are even willing or able to make in the first place. We can recognize that justice as an issue exists, but we don't know what is just or unjust with evaluating in our reasoning minds particular contextual facts.

So the reason prolepsis is not an "objective morality" - I would say - is that prolepsis has no "objective" content (opinion, conclusion) within it. To say that the monkeys have prolepsis of justice does not mean that Nature gives them a correct conclusion as to whether they are getting a fair or just amount of food.

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Quote from Don

I'm going to maintain that effort - expending energy for a given purpose - has pain associated with it.

I think we definitely agree on that, and that's why it is so important to see happiness as a balance in which pleasure predominates over pain, rather than expecting that TOTAL absence of pain is going to be achievable in real life.

I see this as probably one of the most practical and important divisions in the way one will interpret Epicurus.

There is the "extinguish all pain at all cost" crowd, (which I suspect to be largely influenced by Buddhism and similar thought) who talk mostly about "ataraxia," without making much effort to define it, and think that what it means is something like tranquility and living as minimally and detached from the world as possible. This group has as their guiding light as the avoidance of pain - which they often translate into the avoidance of all "effort" of any kind.

And then there is the crowd (where I perceive most all of us to be) which perceives that Epicurus was happy even in the worst pain of kidney disease, just as the wise man can be happy even under torture. The group focuses on eudaimonia / happiness understood to mean the predominance of pleasure over pain, so the guiding light of this group is the intelligent choice or avoidance of pain, so we embrace pain when we expect that pain to produce a net gain in pleasure. We certainly don't go out of our way to look for pain that is unnecessary, but we recognize that "effort" is necessary to achieve the happiness we'd like to achieve in life, so we don't shrink from exerting that effort.

Episode 287 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today our episode is entitled: "The Fear of Pain Is Overrated, But Cicero and Epicurus Disagree As To Why."

Quote from Don

Sure, the motivation for the effort of learning a new skill or achieving a goal one wants is potentially pleasurable, but the effort experienced is painful in the form of repetitive exercises or practice. Frustration sets in that must be overcome. Feelings of inadequacy.

This comes very close, or is at least analogous, to the question of whether all "desire" should be seen to be painful.

My personal view is that not all desire is painful, and neither is all effort. And in the case of either desire or effort, even in those times where the desire or effort is painful, the ultimate question remains whether the resulting total pleasure is worth the total cost in pain.

Quote from Rolf

I suppose in a sense the answer is “as much effort as possible” - what else could be more important?

Bingo Rolf! Exactly what I hoped you were thinking.

Why art thou confused, Sir Rolf ? I would like to think I can predict your concern but I am not sure.

What Don says is true and also a lot turns on what definition you give to "effort." Building a stone wall with an inscription about Epicurus takes a lot of a certain type of effort. So does composing six long books of a poem. So does writing 37 books on Nature and all the rest that Epicurus wrote. So does building a philosophical school that opposes and takes on the majority philosophical and religious orthodoxy.

If effort means intensity of focus and action, then those are examples of people putting tremendous effort into their pursuit of a correct philosophy, on which happiness depends, and I would say you put everything you've got into that effort to find pleasure and be happy.

The pleasures Don lists which can be achieved by "getting out of the way" of them is a valid approach if you are able to maintain those and have confidence in their continuance and your satisfaction with them, but there are also other pleasures that you will never experience if you do not pursue them vigorously. There is no god to tell you whether to pursue them or not, and no "ideal" pattern to follow. You yourself have to decide which to pursue. I would argue that there is no good Epicurean authority for the proposition that everyone should always choose those pleasures which take the least "effort." Epicurus says we will sometime choose pain in order to avoid a worse pain or achieve greater pleasure.

It is also arguable based on the sources that DeWitt cites that even the Epicurean gods have to take action to maintain their own blessedness, and certainly every Epicurean we know anything about went to lots of effort to promote their philosophy. There are no Epicurean examples I know of who were held up by the Epicureans as pursuing happiness through engaging in minimal effort in all aspects of life.

The reference to the gods needing to act to maintain their deathlessness is in Section 13 part 3 of DeWitt's book, including: "If deathlessness were inherent in their nature, they would be in another class by themselves. Since they do belong in the same class as man, it is a logical necessity to think of their incorruptibility as by some means preserved. Since in the cosmos of Epicurus, unlike that of Plato, this incorruptibility lacked a superior being to guarantee its continuance, the sole possibility was that the gods preserved it for themselves by their own vigilance. Thus it must be discerned that just as the happiness of man is self-achieved, so the happiness of the gods is self-preserved. However astonishing this doctrine may seem, it is well authenticated. Plutarch, for example, who, though hostile, wrote with texts of Epicurus before him, has this to say: "Freedom from pain along with incorruptibility should have been inherent in the nature of the blissful being, standing in no need of active concern." This manifestly implies that the Epicurean gods were unable to take their immunity from corruption for granted but must concern themselves for its perpetuation. The incongruity between this selfish concern for their own bodily security and their indifference to the good of mankind was certain to elicit condemnation from believers in divine providence, and this has not escaped record. Thus the Christian Eusebius quotes his Atticus as saying: "According to Epicurus it's good-bye to providence, in spite of the fact that according to him the gods bring to bear all diligent care for the preservation of their own peculiar blessings.")