Posts by Cassius

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All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

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We have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

Episode 282 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today we continue Part Two of Cicero's treatment of the nature of evil in Tusculan Disputations, and our episode is entitled: "Is A Trifling Pain A Greater Evil Than The Worst Infamy?"

Happy Birthday to Erik! Learn more about Erik and say happy birthday on Erik's timeline: Erik

Happy Birthday to tariq! Learn more about tariq and say happy birthday on tariq's timeline: tariq

Thanks to Lowri834 for this find! She posted it first on the reading list, but due to the way the forum software works I'm not sure it will come to everyone's attention there - so reposting it here:

Professor Emily Austin wins inaugural Public History of Philosophy Prize | Inside WFU

Emily Austin, Professor of Philosophy at Wake Forest University, has been named the first-ever recipient of the Public History of Philosophy Prize, a new…

inside.wfu.edu

Austin Wins New Public History of Philosophy Prize - Daily Nous

The Journal of the History of Philosophy has established a new, biannual prize for a book that brings the history of philosophy to a broader public audience.…

dailynous.com

Ok so I see this post is perhaps closest but we don't really have one.

Post

RE: What if Kyriai Doxai was NOT a list?

Following up on a post of mine from Cassius' thread about PDs in narrative form on a list of 44 PDs in a 1739 Greek/Latin translation:

I used a 1739 Greek with Latin translation to compare with the text at Perseus Digital Library:

1739: https://hdl.handle.net/2027/nn…id=27021597768674761-1400

Perseus Greek (DL, Book 10): http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/h…3Abook%3D10%3Achapter%3D1

Perseus English (DL, Book 10): http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/h…3Abook%3D10%3Achapter%3D1

I used the Greek text to compare…

Don

August 2, 2023 at 12:00 AM

Some of them clearly belong together (on canonics, on justice, for example) but others are more flexible or the topics are shorter. If anyone has re-divided them already and wants to suggest an arrangement I can put up a page, but I'll label it clearly that we're just doing our best and there doesn't seem to be anything in the Greek to which we can point as definitive way to divide them

Quote from Patrikios

I found that studying the Key Doctrines in short groups of 3 or 4 related doctrines was more beneficial to focus on a key topic.

Don do we or you have a page or listing somewhere that breaks the PDs down not by number but by related paragraph and/or topic? I know we've discussed this many times but i am not sure I have seen a polished and formatted version. I am sure that there are many possible divisions but we might as well be helpful to people and suggest one or two.

Robert I am working on this week's podcast and included within the section we read is this from Cicero attacking the Stoics in Part2 Section XII of Tusculan Disputations:

Here's the intro:

Quote

Therefore, you allowed enough when you admitted that infamy appeared to you to be a greater evil than pain. And if you abide by this admission, you will see how far pain should be resisted: and that our inquiry should be not so much whether pain be an evil; as how the mind may be fortified for resisting it.

And here's Cicero's attack that I wanted to cite. This quote is useful in many contexts to show the difference between the Stoics and Epicurus, or between the Stoics and anyone who uses common sense rather than word games.

Quote

The Stoics infer from some petty quibbling arguments, that it is no evil, as if the dispute was about a word, and not about the thing itself. Why do you impose upon me, Zeno? for when you deny what appears very dreadful to me to be an evil; I am deceived, and am at a loss to know why that which appears to me to be a most miserable thing, should be no evil. The answer is, that nothing is an evil but what is base and vicious. You return to your trifling, for you do not remove what made me uneasy. I know that pain is not vice,—you need not inform me of that: but show me, that it makes no difference to me whether I am in pain or not. It has never anything to do, say you, with a happy life, for that depends upon virtue alone; but yet pain is to be avoided. If I ask, why? it is disagreeable, against nature, hard to bear, woful and afflicting.Here are many words to express that by so many different forms, which we call by the single word, evil. You are defining pain, instead of removing it, when you say, it is disagreeable, unnatural, scarcely possible to be endured or borne: nor are you wrong in saying so; but the man who vaunts himself in such a manner should not give way in his conduct, if it be true that nothing is good but what is honest, and nothing evil but what is disgraceful. This would be wishing, not proving.

I started to post this in Rolf's "Confusion - The Feelings Are Only Two" thread, because it gets at how Epicurus can at times be speaking in broad philosophical terms. But it comes from this week's podcast, so I will put it here. This is a passage we cover in the upcoming Lucretius Today Podcast from Book 1 of Tusculan Disputations:

Quote

XII.¶

But why are we angry with the poets? we may find some philosophers, those masters of virtue, who have taught that pain was the greatest of evils. But you, young man, when you said but just now that it appeared so to you, upon being asked by me what appeared greater than infamy, gave up that opinion at a word. Suppose I ask Epicurus the same question. He will answer, that a trifling degree of pain is a greater evil than the greatest infamy; for that there is no evil in infamy itself, unless attended with pain. What pain then attends Epicurus, when he says this very thing, that pain is the greatest evil; and yet nothing can be a greater disgrace to a philosopher than to talk thus.

I would suggest that this is another example of Epicurus speaking philosophically in ways that contradict our current modern presumptions. We today think of "evil" as supernaturally black-hearted or the like.

But while there is no "evil" in Epicurean philosophy in the sense of supernatural personified devils or sin, Epicurus does use a word that we translate as "evil" to describe pain. How do we reconcile that?

I'd say we reconcile it by saying that Epicurus is telling us to disregard the concept of sinning against gods or supernatural "evil," but instead we can make legitimate use of the word "evil" to describe something that we very much don't want to experience and which we avoid when it makes sense to avoid it.

In unwinding Cicero's statement, to me what Cicero is doing is switching the context to distort Epicurus' intent.

Epicurus could easily be saying, and apparently did say, that:

1. Pain is always "evil," because it is undesirable in itself.

2. But "infamy" is not always "evil." - An Epicurean could say that he doesn't care at all what the crowd thinks, if he thinks what he is doing is the correct thing to do, but he would care if the crowd takes action to inflict pain on him because of it.

Therefore speaking philosophically, even a trifling amount of pain, if experienced for no reason, is always "evil," while the worst "infamy" cannot be with certainty judged to be evil unless it results in actual harm to the person involved.

I'll leave the rest for the podcast discussion, but I illustrated this by referring to Cicero himself, and to Cassius Longinus.

in certain circles Cicero was held up to "infamy" for his execution of the Cataline conspirators. Likewise, Cassius was held up to "infamy" for the assassination of Julius Caesar.

But at the time they took those actions, there was no necessity that those actions would result in infamy or bad results to them at all. Cicero believed that his actions regarding Cataline were among his most heroic, and would send him down in history as the savior of the Roman Republic. If Cassius and Brutus had won the battle of Philippi, then they too would likely have been judged to have saved Rome from julius Caesar's dictatorship.

So you can support the idea that even trifling amounts of "pain" are worse than any amount of "infamy" by speaking strictly: "Pain of and for itself" is always undesirable, but no amount of "infamy" can reliably be judged as always undesirable without referring to consequences.

I don't know whether Epicurus said something like this explicitly, or whether Cicero invented the argument like he misrepresented Epicurus as saying that being in the bull of Phalaris is "sweet." But either way, we can read between the lines and unwind the points being made by Epicurus, and see that Epicurus was regularly making philosophical points ("the feelings are two, pleasure and pain, so that absence of pain is the same as pleasure.") that are easy to misrepresent if you take them out of context.

Quote from Don

I've read the complaints about the Epicurean school having to do with their being dogmatic or not disagreeing with the teacher.

I'd have to look back too to really be sure, but I am thinking that some of this criticism is included in Nussbaum's pro-Stoic "Therapy of Desire." I'm not a fan of that book but if someone were looking for that criticism, which I think is totally unfounded, that's one place I would look.

As to Stoicism, other issues in addition to divine order, plus a belief in life after death (so you start off violating Epicurus' first two doctrines right there) are their emphasis on logic over feeling/sensation and their dismissal of pleasure.

In my case I got interested in Stoicism due to high school and college courses in Latin, and my general impression (which I now see to be false) that Cicero was a Stoic. Aside from Cicero's willingness to enlist the Stoics in his defense of Virtue, Cicero delivers a strong take-down of Stoicism in one of the latter chapters of his "On Ends."

Quote from Rolf

For sure. When it comes to pains that are chosen to avoid greater pain or achieve greater pleasure, I completely understand. However, I am more concerned about the pains that we do not choose - the unnecessary pains that serve no purpose. How do we reconcile them under Epicureanism, particularly if they are frequent? If one is truly unable to get rid of such pains, is it best to adjust one's mindset and accept them? Does Epicurus write about this sort of thing? From what I've read so far, pain is mainly mentioned in the contexts of a) pain should be avoided and b) some pains should be chosen in the name of prudence. But what of the pains that can neither be avoided nor are chosen?

We certainly sometimes are subjected to pain beyond our control. As Epicurus said to Menoeceus,

Quote

We must then bear in mind that the future is neither ours, nor yet wholly not ours, so that we may not altogether expect it as sure to come, nor abandon hope of it, as if it will certainly not come.

...

(He thinks that with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity) and some by chance, and some are within our control; for while necessity cannot be called to account, he sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame.

I think we've gone through this example before but the best is probably Epicurus own kidney disease. I don't know that he "accepted" it, but he found ways to enjoy life even in the presence of the pain. I think that's the answer to your question - what you can't get rid of you work on diluting with pleasure to the extent possible. That's not a satisfying answer to some, probably, but the fake gods and fake ideals of the Stoics and others are not going to be able to eliminate pain either, despite what they may say, and if they persuade you to give up studying nature and trying to apply your mind to solving your problem and/or diluting your pain, then they are taking away from you any real hope of bettering the situation. Because the hopes offered by supernatural religion and false philosophies aren't real.

Quote from Rolf

This here almost feels like an endorsement for the "ascetic absence of pain" argument. "To be in no pain" seems to be used here literally, rather than to mean "100% pleasure 0% pain". And, if I understand correctly, this state is put above "joyous activity of pleasure". How do you interpret this? Though perhaps it's meant to be read as "since there are only two feelings, if the hand is not in pain, then it is in pleasure, and therefore feels no need for pleasure".

Yes I think your last sentence is the explanation. There's a lot to process in the whole passage, among which is the fact that we don't think of a hand or any other part of the body as having its own separate will or thought process to think that it "lacks" anything. So there's some underlying premise here that's not being stated as to why the whole question should be interpreted as making sense. I presume that Chrysippus is reasoning something along the lines of "You Epicurus say that pleasure is the guide of ALL living things, so it ought not make any difference whether the living thing has a brain or not, so let's pick a "hand."

When you put it together with much else that Cicero says, the general point seems to be that Chrysippus is taking the orthodox position that pleasure means "stimulation." If pleasure means stimulation, and Epicurus is going to assert that all things are guided toward pleasure, then a hand should feel the lack of pleasure when it is not stimulated, and the hand should want stimulation. The fact that the hand doesn't seem to want stimulation is to Chrysippus proof that the hand does not identify pleasure as the good. And if the hand doesn't, Epicurus, then why should we presume that pleasure is nature's goal for living things -- your theory is blown to bits.

And that's why Torquatus' father told him that the argument was laughable, as it is effective against people like the Cyreniacs who identify pleasure with stimulation, but it doesn't touch Epicurus, since Epicurus' definition of pleasure is more than just stimulation, and includes healthy normal functioning. And since there is no reason to believe that Chrysippus' hand was not functioning normally at the time of the questioning, in the Epicurean view Chrysippus' hand is experiencing pleasure (because normal healthy condition is considered to be pleasure, even though that condition isn't stimulation).

For me the trickier part is where Torquatus goes further, as he does several times, and state that the absence of pain (which I think is fairly interpreted as in PD03) means not only pleasure, but the height of pleasure. To me, the various examples can reasonably be interpreted only one way (especially when Torquatus says "nothing could be more true"). What is being referred to is the logical / mathematical point (which you cited already) that when there are only two possibilities, the absence of one IS the presence of the other - which is compelled by definition to the extent words have any necessity in them at all.

This is where I think Cicero intentionally leaves the the Epicurean argument incomplete, because he should have allowed Torquatus to spell that out explicitly. Instead, he leaves the implication clear but dangling. And in the case of the question regarding the comparison of the pleasure of the host who is pouring wine to the guest who is drinking wine, Cicero doesn't allow explanation by Torquatus at all -- we are just left to draw the logical conclusion that anyone who is "without pain" is at the height of pleasure - in pure pleasure - by definition.

Remember that the "height of pleasure" or "the limit of pleasure" need not be interpreted to mean "most intense" or "longest duration" or "all parts of the body." All "the limit of pleasure" really requires is that what is being measured is 100% pleasure and 0% pain. And if you say that your hand, or yourself, or anything else is "without pain" -- then if we are saying what we mean and mean what we say - then we are saying that we are at the "height of pleasure." People can balk and bark back that "that's not what I mean when I say height of pleasure!" But if they've been paying attention, Epicurus has shown them over and over that they need to think about how they are using words like "gods" and "virtue" and "pleasure" --- and "height of pleasure" is just another example of the same kind of re-statement of what a word really means.

Quote from Rolf

I'm also unsure about how this passage relates to the topic at hand (no pun intended), in terms of attitude and mindset. Or was it meant as a more general callback to the initial topic of the thread?

I was mainly referring back to the general topic of the thread, but now that you mention it there is definitely a "mindset" issue here too -- seeing "height of pleasure" and "pleasure" in more accurate terms is a matter of adjusting your mind. That's the reason I entitled one of my recent articles a "Paradigm Shift"

Quote from Rolf

Speaking of which - a vaguely related thought I want to bring up. There are times when I find myself doubting whether Epicurean philosophy can truly work for me — not because I disagree with its core ideas, but because I live with a persistent undercurrent of physical discomfort. I start to wonder if Epicureanism assumes a baseline of health that I just don’t have.

I would say that whether something "works" is defined by whether it is consistent with reality. The unreal and madeup can never "work" for any length of time. The Epicurean viewpoint is the one that is consistent with reality, so I'd say that it's the only one that could every "work" for anyone, no matter how much baseline of pain you start with. Epicurean philosophy is going to call you to do everything you can to change the situation, and even when it can't be changed, it isn't going to try to lull you into complacency with a noble lie

Quote from Rolf

In those moments, other perspectives become tempting. The “surrender to the flow” of Taoism, or the radical acceptance of Stoicism, can seem like a way to bypass the whole problem of pain — to dissolve it in detachment. And yet, they ultimately drift from reality by denying that pleasure and pain matter.

Yes that is the problem. And sure someone can go ahead and commit suicide, counting on their religion to take them to a better place. I don't see counting on fables as a workable solution - I see that as the ultimate in terrible trades and guaranteed to lead to unfortunate results. At least when you are dealing with the truth, even though the odds may be stacked against you, you aren't placing your hope in fictional rescues that will never come.

For example Rolf:

10.2. THE DOUBLE CHOICE

The first and foremost refinement of the topic in the hands of Epicurus was to draw a clear distinction between choosing an attitude, diathesis, toward action in a given sphere and choosing to do or not to do a given thing within that field. For example, a man must first choose what attitude he shall assume toward death and the gods, pleasure and pain, Necessity, Fortune, political life, monarchy, fame, friendship, diet, and several others. To exemplify from this list, the right attitude toward Necessity is to deny it, toward Fortune to defy her, toward political life to avoid it, toward fame to ignore it, and toward friendship to look upon it as the most precious of all the acquisitions of the wise man. The famous collection known as the Authorized Doctrines is rightly understood as a guide for the choice of attitudes toward the essential things in the art of living happily. The first, for instance, advises the disciple that the gods are not to be feared. This is an attitude, which is first to be chosen and then cultivated.

The choice of attitude, however, by no means abolished the necessity of making individual choices. The proper attitude toward pain, for instance, is to regard it as inherently evil and to be avoided; nevertheless, in the individual case the lesser pain, such as that of the surgeon's knife, is endured for the sake of the greater good. Again, the proper attitude toward food is to prefer a simple diet, but this does not preclude and even approves the occasional indulgence. Neither is political life to be avoided under all circumstances; the evil is not in such a life itself but in surrendering freedom by making a career of it. Thus in spite of the choices of attitude the necessity of making the individual choice is perpetual.

Dewitt stresses that attitude is a large part of what Epicurus teaches by pointing out that many of his teachings are just that -setting attitude - by such things as "believe that a god is a living being blessed and imperishable...." And others.

Yes I agree that that is true.

Also Rolf, have you read the Chrisypus' hand challenge, and if so what do you make of it?

It's in Book One of On Ends:

[39] But actually at Athens, as my father used to tell me, when he wittily and humorously ridiculed the Stoics, there is in the Ceramicus a statue of Chrysippus, sitting with his hand extended, which hand indicates that he was fond of the following little argument: Does your hand, being in its present condition, feel the lack of anything at all? Certainly of nothing. But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack. I agree. Pleasure then is not the supreme good. My father used to say that even a statue would not talk in that way, if it had power of speech. The inference is shrewd enough as against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus. For if the only pleasure were that which, as it were, tickles the senses, if I may say so, and attended by sweetness overflows them and insinuates itself into them, neither the hand nor any other member would be able to rest satisfied with the absence of pain apart from a joyous activity of pleasure. But if it is the highest pleasure, as Epicurus believes, to be in no pain, then the first admission, that the hand in its then existing condition felt no lack, was properly made to you, Chrysippus, but the second improperly, I mean that it would have felt a lack had pleasure been the supreme good. It would certainly feel no lack, and on this ground, that anything which is cut off from the state of pain is in the state of pleasure.

Quote from Rolf

This discussion makes me wonder: How important is a conscious positive mindset/attitude to Epicurean living?

I would say it's very important. It seems to me that it's implicit in virtually all of it that you have to make conscious choices to focus your mind and decide to trust the senses and use them properly. If you don't then you end up like Cicero or worse, with an essentially supernatural or terrified or depressed view of life.

Now Cicero et al would say that it's more important to be in accord with the gods and virtue than it is to be happy, but that's again where you have to decide what kind of universe you think you live in, how you are able to learn things (if at all) and what choices you are going to make about how to live.

Quote from Don

The question, to me, is "Does the idea correlate to reality or not?" Epicurus' categorization, to my current understanding, correlates to reality while Cicero, Plato, "St." Paul, etc. do not.

Quote from Don

Cicero and Plato redefine pleasure for their own purposes, but Epicurus' all-encompassing concept of pleasure and pain just makes sense to me.

I'm not adding anything new here, but we keep talking about "definitions" and "correlating to reality" for a reason. I always worry about staying away from "reductionism" -- implying that there is no fixed outside reality and everything can be changed simply by assigning different words. It appears Democritus went in that direction, and that leads to skepticism and determinism and all sorts of problems.

Then there's the opposite problem - thinking that there is some absolute eternal reference point either in heaven (Plato) or within everything (Aristotle), and thinking that our task is just to get in touch with this ultimate reality through logic, religion, etc.

What I think Epicurus is doing and we're trying to restate in English is that we should consider as "real" what our feelings tell us as to pleasure and pain. Those feelings come in many varieties , and we can assign many different words and descriptions to them, but we don't change their nature by using different words. We legitimately "feel" certain things to be positive or negative, and we're not just arbitrarily changing the desirable or undesirable nature of the feeling by calling the good bad or the bad good.

I see this as analogous to seeing and hearing and the other core senses. We can assign all sorts of names to describe what we deduce about the inputs of the eyes or ears, but the inputs come to us, like pleasure and pain do, by nature, and without the eyes or the ears etc injecting their own opinions.

My point in writing this being that we're not just totally playing word games by dividing the feelings into two categories. When we observe that it's possible to divide the feelings into different categories, we tend to recoil and think that everything is totally a matter of how we define it, and there's no solid footing on which we can ever stand and have confidence in our conclusions. Epicurus is saying that you have freedom of thought and you can take the position that nothing in life is real or certain if you like, but if you do you will suffer very bad consequences. It's much better for you to look at nature and realize that no matter whether you like it or not, nature has given you faculties of feeling and sensation that when properly understood and used can lead to lives in which pleasure predominates.

Rolf I'll say publicly what I told you privately - I do not judge your questioning to be pessimistic or too persistent. You are asking excellent questions and doing us a great favor by boring in on a key issue like this. Please keep it up and feel free to expand the questioning to other topics when you are through with this one!

Quote from Don

I would disagree with Cassius 's wording. Your mind can never be in neutral. Your mind doesn't "generate" positive feelings, it experiences them before you can think about generating

We should talk further about (1) how to regard idle or non-Epicurean thought processes, and (2) whether it is appropriate to consider the mind as generating pleasure and pain. I am in general agreement with Don's post, but I think how we choose to use our minds does generate pleasure or pain.

Also, while I think it is very reasonable and justifiable to divide all feelings between pleasure and pain, and to insist that there is no neutral state, I am not prepared to say that Epicurus' categorization plan is the only one that can be proposed and discussed. Cicero and Plato have a different definition of pleasure than does Epicurus, and they call absence of stimulation 'neutral.'

I think they are wrong to regard it that way, but does that mean that their position cannot be acknowledged and discussed to explain the problem they cause for themselves? Is Epicurean philosophy best seen as the best choice for how to live because it generates the most happiness, or is Epicurean philosophy best seen as the way everyone in fact lives whether they admit it or not?

The latter view sounds to me like that "psychological hedonism" argument that I find extremely unhelpful, and yet I acknowledge that the argument exists. So too I would accept that it is possible to view the world as does a Stoic or a Buddhist, even though I would classify that view as wrong because it is harmful.

But for now I have no problem rewording "should never be in a neutral state" to "should never be considered to be in a neutral state."

Quote from Rolf

When I'm in a "neutral state" - not sick, injured, etc. - and I focus on my body's senses, I pretty much always notice some kind of ache, tenseness, stomach pain, itchiness, or some other uncomfortable feeling that I'm generally able to ignore when I'm not not fixating on it. This isn't some new sensation either - this has been my general experience for as long as I can remember, and I don't have any kind of underlying medical issues (that I know of) that would cause this kind of thing.

I think a lot of people would say this, and I wouldn't disagree. What I would cite in response is the example of Epicurus on his last day or the hypo of being in the bull of Phalaris. Your mind should never be in neutral - it always has the capacity to generate positive feelings which are (or should be) more significant to us than those aches and pains you are speaking about. This would be another reason why I would emphasize the importance of the "philosophic approach" over and above any implication that we can find what most people think of as bodily pleasure simply by minimizing bodily pain.

These two examples (Epicurus last day and the bull of Phalaris) combine well with the hand of Chrysippus to lead in this direction. There's no magic underlying feeling that suddenly leaps to the fore when we eliminate pains -- we have to mentally appreciate being alive in order to generate the result we are looking for. The person who does not apply Epicurean philosophy in this way will find nothing but emptiness when he drains his experience of feeling, and that's when he (the non-Epicurean) starts looking for "meaning" and supernatural escape.